NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | I L D R S 3 (2) | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | | (5)
LICENSEE CODE | LICENSE NUMBER | LICENSE TYPE | CAT

CON'T 01 REPORT SOURCE L (6) 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 9 (7) 0 9 2 2 7 8 (8) 1 0 1 7 7 8 (9)
DOCKET NUMBER | EVENT DATE | REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 During routine start-up on 9-22-78 and during normal operation on 9-23-78, the Con-
03 tainment Cooling Service Water (CCSW) LPCI heat exchanger valve MO-3-1501-3A failed
04 to operate in automatic mode while attempting to start torus cooling. The safety
05 implications were minimal because surveillances proved redundant CCSW loop operable
06 and sufficient time exists to operate valve manually if needed. No previous similar
07 occurrences.
08

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
S F (11)	B (12)	A (13)	V A L V 0 P (14)	A (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
7 8	—	0 3 9	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
X (18)	G (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	Y (24)	N (25)	L 2 0 0 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 With the Containment Cooling heat exchanger differential pressure controller in auto-
11 matic, the motor operated valve open and close contacts began "chattering". Thermal
12 overload tripped. Valve then operated in remote manual satisfactorily. An on-site
13 review will be conducted to determine if the Containment Cooling heat exchanger differ-
14 ential pressure controller can be operated normally in the manual position.

FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
15 C (28)	0 0 0 (29)	Rx Pwr at 16%	A (31)	Operational Event

ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
16 Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
17 0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
18 0 0 0 (40)	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

TYPE	DESCRIPTION
19 Z (42)	NA

PUBLICITY

ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
20 N (44)	NA	

7810270231

NAME OF PREPARER John Achterberg PHONE: 265

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 78-039/03L-0
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)
DRESDEN UNIT-3 (ILDRS-3)
DOCKET #050-249

During routine startup on 9/22/78 and during normal operation on 9/23/78, the Containment Cooling Service Water (CCSW) LPCI heat exchanger valve MO 3-1501-3A failed to operate in automatic mode while attempting to start torus cooling. The safety implications were minimal because the redundant CCSW loop was operable and sufficient time exists to operate the valve manually during any condition requiring its use.

The design of this system calls for the differential pressure between the LPCI and CCSW outlet lines be controlled by a motor operated valve in the CCSW outlet line. With the controller in the automatic mode, frequent fluctuations of the differential pressure across the heat exchanger cause excessive cycling of the valve. The open and close contactors then began to "chatter" causing the thermal overload to trip. Manual operation of the valve has been proven to be adequate in controlling the heat exchanger differential pressure. An on-site review will be conducted to determine if the containment cooling heat exchanger differential pressure controller can be normally operated manually.