



Commonwealth Edison

Dresden Nuclear Power Station

R.R. #1

Morris, Illinois 60450

Telephone 815/942-2920

October 13, 1978

BBS Ltr. #78-1368

James G. Keppler, Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations - Region III
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Reportable Occurrence Report #78-055/01T-0, Docket #050-237 is hereby submitted to your office in accordance with Dresden Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.1.(e), failure or malfunction of one or more components which prevents or could prevent, by itself, the fulfillment of the functional requirements of system(s) used to cope with accidents analyzed in the SAR.

B.B. Stephenson
Station Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS/deb

Enclosure

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
Director of Management Information & Program Control
File/NRC

REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

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A002
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 I L D R S 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T. REPORT SOURCE L 0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7 0 9 3 0 7 8 1 0 1 3 7 8 9
60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 While performing DOS 2300-3 (HPCI Turbine Quarterly Surv.) the HPCI turbine tripped
 0 3 on low pump suction pressure of 11.5 psig which exceeds the Dresden setpoint of 9.4
 0 4 in. Hg vacuum increasing. Safety significance was reduced since redundant Isolation
 0 5 Condenser and Auto Depressurization Systems were operable. No previous similar
 0 6 events at Dresden.

0 7
 0 8

0 9 SYSTEM CODE S F 11 CAUSE CODE E 12 CAUSE SUBCODE E 13 COMPONENT CODE I N S T R U 14 COMP. SUBCODE E 15 VALVE SUBCODE Z 16
9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20
 17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 7 8 11 0 5 5 1 0 1 T 0
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
 ACTION TAKEN E 18 FUTURE ACTION Z 19 EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20 SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21 HOURS 0 0 0 0 0 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23 NPRD-4 FORM SUB. Y 24 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N 25 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER M 2 3 5
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The cause was attributable to instrument drift of pressure switch PS 2-2360. The
 1 1 switch was recalibrated to trip at -9.4" Hg increasing. The switch will be checked
 1 2 in two months to ensure its continued acceptability.

1 3
 1 4

1 5 FACILITY STATUS E 28 % POWER 0 9 2 29 OTHER STATUS NA 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY B 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Surveillance Testing 32
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

1 6 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE Z 33 Z 34 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY NA 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE NA 36
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

1 7 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 0 37 TYPE 38 DESCRIPTION 39
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

1 8 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 0 40 DESCRIPTION 41 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

1 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 42 DESCRIPTION 43 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

2 0 PUBLICITY ISSUED N 44 DESCRIPTION 45 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

7810200097

NAME OF PREPARER Carl Lindberg

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 78-055/01T-0
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)
DRESDEN UNIT-2 (ILDRS-2)
DOCKET #050-237

While conducting the HPCI Turbine Quarterly Surveillance DOS 2300-3, the HPCI Turbine tripped on low pump suction pressure sensed by pressure switch PS-2-2360. The switch tripped at 11.5 psig which is considerably above the Dresden setpoint of 9.4" Hg vacuum increasing. The safety significance of the event was reduced since the redundant Isolation Condenser and Automatic Depressurization Systems were operable.

In the surveillance procedure, normally closed MO valves 2-2301-14 (Flow to Torus), 2-2301-10 (Flow to 2/3B Contaminated Condensate Storage Tank), and 2-2301-49 (HPCI bypass line) are all opened and the HPCI turbine is started against little backpressure. Using a temporary procedure change, valve 2301-10 was closed to restrict the pumps discharge and HPCI started normally. Valve 2301-10 was subsequently throttled and proper flows and pressures were obtained to satisfactorily demonstrate operability in accordance with the surveillance requirements.

However, after subsequent management review on the next normal working day, it was concluded that HPCI might not have been operational under all accident conditions and should have been reported inoperable in accordance with Technical Specifications 6.6.B.1.e.

The cause of the trip was instrument drift of PS2-2360. The switch was recalibrated to trip at 9.4 inches Hg vacuum increasing. These switches have been calibrated each refueling outage in the past, and a review of records indicates no unusual tendency for excessive drifting of the switch setpoints. The switch will be checked in two months to ensure its continued acceptability.