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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6175

June 13, 2017

Kristine L. Svinicki
Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
11555 Rockville Pike, O17D01
Rockville, MD 20852

Dear Chairman Svinicki:

On behalf of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, we would like to thank you for testifying before the Committee on Tuesday, June 13, 2017 at the hearing entitled, *"Hearing on the Nominations of Kristine Svinicki (Reappointment), Annie Caputo and David Wright to be Members of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Nomination of Susan Bodine to be Assistant Administrator of the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency."* The committee greatly appreciates your attendance and participation in this hearing.

In order to maximize the opportunity for communication between you and the Committee, follow-up questions have been submitted by the members. To comply with Committee rules, please e-mail a copy of your responses to Elizabeth_Olsen@epw.senate.gov or deliver one hard copy by **COB Wednesday, June 14, 2017.** Responses should be delivered to the EPW Committee at 410 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC 20510.

If you have any questions about the requests or the hearing, please feel free to contact Staff Director, Richard Russell in the Majority Office at (202) 224-6176 or Staff Director, Gabrielle Batkin in the Minority Office at (202) 224-8832.

Sincerely,

John Barrasso, M.D.
Chairman

Thomas R. Carper
Ranking Member

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Senate Environment and Public Works Committee
Hearing entitled, *"Hearing on the Nominations of Kristine Svinicki (Reappointment), Annie Caputo and David Wright to be Members of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Nomination of Susan Bodine to be Assistant Administrator of the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency."*
Tuesday, June 13, 2017
Questions for the Record for Kristine Svinicki

Senator Booker:

1. Some private sector companies are working on new technologies such as fusion reactors and sub-critical reactors that are not currently subject to NRC review. If NRC was to amend its definition of "nuclear reactor" to cover advanced reactors such as these, do you believe that NRC should subject these technologies to the existing regulatory framework designed for light water reactors, or would you expect that NRC would instead quickly develop a more appropriate risk based regulation for these types of inherently safer technologies?

Senator Markey:

Force-on-force inspections

The 2005 Energy Policy Act includes a provision, which I authored, that mandates that the NRC conduct security inspections at U.S. nuclear power plants. These inspections must include force-on-force exercises, where a mock adversary force conducts a simulated attack on a power plant to probe potential gaps in the plant's security.

These exercises allow the NRC to ensure that nuclear power plants are adequately protected against terrorists or other bad actors. The alternative – of having plant operators run their own exercises – would not only violate the law, but it would also create a clear conflict of interest, and undermine public safety.

In the past, the nuclear industry lobbied the NRC to get rid of its force-on-force exercises in favor of exercises conducted by power plant operators. In effect, this would have nuclear power plant operators inspect themselves, in violation of the law.

2. Do you support security evaluations of nuclear power plants that are conducted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and not by licensees?

Safety and security exemptions

When Entergy announced its intention to cease operations at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission promised that the closure would "not relieve [Entergy] of the responsibility of running that plant as safely as possible until the end of its life."

But in the last several months, the NRC has broken that promise by providing Pilgrim with exemptions from critical safety upgrades.

After the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011, the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force recommended a series of safety upgrade for America's nuclear fleet. The NRC opted to accept these recommendations, and apply them to reactors of the same design as Fukushima, like Pilgrim.

Among the critical safety upgrades were the requirement to reevaluate and address the risk of earthquakes and floods. The other critical safety upgrade was to install hardened containment vents capable of operating under severe accident conditions. These are meant to prevent the release of radioactivity in the event of a terrorist attack or severe accident.

But instead of requiring Entergy to carry out these commonsense safety upgrades, the NRC provided Pilgrim with exemptions.

3. Do you believe that providing exemptions from NRC safety regulations to U.S. nuclear plants increases public confidence in the safe operation of those plants?

4. Do you intend to continue granting exemptions to nuclear plants that have announced their intention to shut down operations?

Emergency response at decommissioned reactors

The recent National Academies of Sciences report on lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear disaster noted that the risk of a spent nuclear fuel fire may actually rise at a decommissioned nuclear plant, because "the pool may be filled to near capacity and some plant safety systems may be inoperable."[1] Yet the Commission has made it a habit of providing exemptions to decommissioned reactors from emergency response and security regulations. Exempting these plants from NRC rules wholesale permits the nuclear industry to lower the safety margin at decommissioned reactors, which continue to have dangerous spent nuclear fuel on site.

5. Do you agree that the danger of accidents at spent-fuel pools at decommissioned reactors warrants the application of all emergency response and security regulations that are designed to protect against spent fuel fires?

[1] National Academy of Sciences, *Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety and Security of U.S. Nuclear Plants*, Phase 2 (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2016), p. 185.

Spent fuel fires

In June 2016, I wrote to the NRC to urge the Commission to re-examine and address the risk to public safety posed by overcrowded spent-fuel pools at commercial reactors, in light of two reports that identified serious gaps in the NRC's previous analysis. A fire in a densely-packed spent-fuel pool could result in health and economic consequences comparable to those caused by an accident at an operating reactor, including the displacement of millions of people and untold economic damage. These risks could be much reduced by transferring spent fuel to dry casks, which are more resilient against accidents or attacks.

6. The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report, *Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety and Security of U.S. Nuclear Plants*, recommends that the NRC "perform a spent fuel storage risk assessment to elucidate the risks and potential benefits of expedited transfer of spent fuel from pools to dry casks."[2] Do you intend to carry out this recommendation? If not, why not?

7. The NAS report recommended that the NRC "strengthen their capabilities for identifying, evaluating, and managing the risks from terrorist attacks,"[3] and that the NRC's spent fuel storage risk assessment "should address accident and sabotage risks."[4] Do you agree with the NAS recommendation that the NRC must fully account for the risk of terrorism and sabotage in its re-assessment of spent-fuel risks? If not, why not?

8. What steps, if any, will you support to strengthen the NRC's capabilities for identifying, evaluating, and managing the risk of terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities, including spent-fuel storage sites?

9. As the Fukushima disaster demonstrated, a major release of radioactivity at a nuclear plant could have significant societal effects. As such, to fully capture spent-fuel storage risks, the NAS report recommended that the NRC's analysis "[c]onsider societal, economic, and health consequences"[5] of a spent-fuel fire, as well as the direct risks of radioactive release. Do you agree with this recommendation? If not, why not?

10. According to the NAS report, the NRC "has not carried out an independent examination of surveillance and security measures for protecting stored spent fuel," as recommended by the NAS's 2006 report.[6] As such, the 2016 NAS report recommended that the NRC fulfill this recommendation, and that the NRC's analysis "should include an examination

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[2] Ibid., pp. 155-156

[3] Ibid., p. 91.

[4] Ibid., p. 156.

[5] Ibid., p. 173.

[6] National Academy of Sciences," Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage: Public Report" (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2006), http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11263/safety-and-security-of-commercial-spent-nuclear-fuel-storage-public

of the effectiveness of [the NRC's] programs for mitigating insider threats."[7] Do you support carrying out an independent examination, as recommended by both NAS studies? If not, why not?

11. According to an article in the May 26 issue of *Science* magazine, the NRC's previous assessment of spent-fuel risks ignored the potential damage from a spent fuel fire beyond 50 miles of a plant, despite the fact that a significant portion of the radiation exposure would occur beyond that radius. Failing to account for this factor led the NRC to underestimate the destruction of a spent fuel fire. Do you support inclusion of contamination and other effects beyond 50 miles in the NRC's assessment of spent fuel fire risks?

12. According to the *Science* magazine article, the NRC's previous analysis also assumed that, in the event of a spent fuel fire, contaminated areas could be effectively cleaned up within a one year timeframe, despite evidence from both the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents. Do you support revising that assumption in any re-assessment by the Commission of spent-fuel risks?

13. According to the recent NAS study, under NRC rules, if the risk of prompt and cancer fatalities in the vicinity of a nuclear accident falls below a certain threshold, the NRC is not required to undertake a cost-benefit analysis of strategies for mitigating that risk. As a result of this rule, even though a spent-fuel fire could displace millions of people and result in trillions in economic damage, the NRC would not be required to evaluate the costs and benefits of strategies to mitigate such an event because it would not necessarily produce a significantly higher risk of fatalities in the immediate vicinity of the plant. To address this obvious deficiency, the NAS study cites experts who have suggested that the NRC should amend its rules by setting a limit on the likelihood that a large number of people would be displaced for a long-term period following a release of radioactive fall-out. Do you support implementing such a rule?

Senator Sanders:

Nuclear decommissioning regulations

14. As you know, the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station is in the process of decommissioning. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requested comments on a draft regulatory basis ending this month to support a rulemaking that would amend NRC's regulations for the decommissioning of nuclear power reactors. The NRC's goals in amending these regulations would be to provide for an efficient decommissioning process; reduce the need for exemptions from existing regulations; address other decommissioning issues deemed relevant by the NRC staff; and support the principles of good regulation, including openness, clarity, and reliability.

[7] NAS, *Lessons Learned*, p. 104.

If confirmed, will you commit to supporting the following decommissioning requirements for the decommissioning rulemaking? If not, why?

- The enhancement of community involvement by requiring licensees of decommissioning reactors to include state and local officials' input into licensees' decommissioning plans;
- that decommissioning funds are used strictly for statutorily-authorized purposes;
- that spent nuclear fuel be removed from wet storage and placed into safer dry cask storage as quickly as possible;
- that the site of the plant is rapidly returned to beneficial use instead of decades after the plant ceases operations, and that licensees maintain or obtain the financial resources necessary to do so; and
- that all emergency preparedness and response, and security resources and licensing requirements, remain in place until all the spent nuclear fuel is placed into safer dry cask storage or removed from the site.

15. What do you believe should be the process for reviewing and processing public comments in the rulemaking and other formal proceedings? How should public comments be weighed by the Commission against comments from the industry?

16. How should the NRC educate the public about the existence and meaning of the ongoing decommissioning rulemaking process? What should be NRC's plan for community outreach for the remainder of this decommissioning rulemaking process?

17. Should NRC plan public field meetings to gather comments or testimony from communities where nuclear plants are decommissioning now, or will be soon? If not, why?

18. What is the justification for the NRC to continuously waive its own regulations, especially those pertaining to the decommissioning trust fund, even though it is working to create new decommissioning rules?

19. What justification is there for the NRC to approve withdrawals from Vermont Yankee's Decommissioning Trust Fund for spent fuel management when NRC's regulations expressly prohibit such use? (10 C.F.R. § 50. 75 at FN 1.)

20. Former NRC Chair Allison Macfarlane authored a paper in 2003 along with other experts that concluded that dry cask storage offers compelling advantages over wet pool storage: it is safer and it is less prone to failure. They recommended that spent fuel should be transferred from wet pools to dry cask storage within five years of discharge to reduce the risk of fire and subsequent radioactive contamination of air and land.

    Do you have a position on dry cask versus wet pool storage? If confirmed, will you commit to supporting more studies of this issue?

Working with state and local government regulators

21. State regulatory officials from Vermont have raised concerns that the NRC is less likely to consider commentary received from state and local governments on reactor license change requests, and NRC rulemaking and regulatory guidance efforts, than commentary from nuclear power plant operators (e.g. Entergy, Exelon and First Energy) and nuclear power industry organizations such as the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI). If confirmed, what steps would you take to assure that commentary and concerns expressed by state and local governments, or other nuclear power plant stakeholders, are given consideration equal to that already enjoyed by nuclear power plant operators and their supporters?

22. To date, nuclear power plants that have permanently shut down have been permitted to eliminate their offsite Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) roughly 15 to 20 months after cessation of power generation. The risk of a spent fuel fire resulting from a significant loss of spent fuel pool water inventory is greatly reduced, but a reduction in risk is not an elimination of risk. A reduced risk of a spent fuel fire still requires a significant offsite emergency response that requires drills or exercises to demonstrate proficiency in response and funding to maintain essential emergency response equipment and staff. If confirmed, will you support maintaining offsite EPZs for permanently shut down nuclear power plants until such time that all spent fuel is removed from onsite spent fuel pools?

23. When NRC staff respond to concerns raised by state or local government officials, or individual concerned citizens, they rely heavily on references to voluminous regulatory documents which are difficult to follow, or use jargon that only makes sense to other NRC staff. If confirmed, what actions would you consider taking to facilitate clear communication by NRC officials with lay members of the public?

24. One significant source of frustration for state and local governments, and individuals who are following nuclear power plant decommissioning efforts, is that the process of complete decommissioning and site restoration is under the jurisdiction of multiple federal agencies in addition to the NRC, such as the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Energy, the Department of Transportation, and the Department of Homeland Security, just to name a few. If confirmed, what steps would you take to assure that the scope of regulatory authority of all federal agencies with jurisdiction is clear to all stakeholders?

Future of nuclear power

25. What do you believe is the future of nuclear power in this country?

26. If confirmed, what role do you believe you should play—if any—as Commissioner in supporting the nuclear power industry?

27. According to recent Energy Information Agency estimates, the generating capacity from nuclear power will drop from 20 percent to 11 percent by 2050. If confirmed, how will you ensure safety during this time of mass decommissioning?

28. Most of the plants currently being decommissioned across the U.S. are doing so because they are not economically competitive. Some have proposed easing safety and other regulatory burdens to help the economic viability of the nuclear fleet. If regulations on existing and new power plants are decreased, how will you ensure the safety of our nuclear fleet?

Advanced nuclear reactors

29. If confirmed, how will you ensure the public safety of next-generation nuclear reactors that implement advanced technologies?

30. How will the potential development of advanced nuclear technologies affect the problems NRC is currently confronting in storing spent nuclear fuel long-term?

31. Currently the U.S. has no permanent storage for spent nuclear fuel. Where do you anticipate that spent nuclear fuel from next-generation nuclear reactors will be stored?

Nuclear plant safety

32. The March 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident prompted the NRC to review its own regulations. The Commission's Fukushima Task Force, consisting of NRC experts with 135 years of nuclear regulatory expertise among them, made a range of key recommendations for improving nuclear plant safety. The final report included 12 recommendations ranging from requirements to upgrade seismic and flood protections to protections against the long power outages that were the ultimate cause of the Japanese meltdowns. They also concluded that all of the recommendations were necessary for the "adequate protection" of nuclear power plants.

    Despite the repeated urging of its own experts, the Commission has so far refused to make these recommendations mandatory. What steps will you take to ensure that the Commission revisits this decision and does, in fact, adopt the Task Force's safety recommendations as mandatory?

33. A paper published in *Science* last month by nuclear experts from the Union of Concerned Scientists and Princeton University argued that the NRC places the U.S. at risk of disasters like Fukushima because of problems in its approach to assessing the risks and benefits of safety improvements. The authors suggest that NRC should reform its risk assessments in the following ways (see below). Do you concur that these corrections to current NRC risk assessments are needed? If not, why? If so, how will you address these issues as a Commissioner, if confirmed?

    - Take into account the possibility of a terrorist attack in regulatory decisions such as the one on whether or not to require the nuclear utilities to remove spent fuel to dry cask storage after 5 years.
    - Take into account accident consequences beyond 50 miles of the site.

- Make assumptions concerning population relocation, and therefore property losses, after a nuclear accident consistent with the EPA's guidance concerning dose levels.
- Make realistic assumptions concerning the efficacy and speed of decontamination actions.
- Update the NRC's assumption concerning the value of a life lost to radiation-induced cancer by a factor of 2.5, as recommended by the NRC staff.

Safety culture at NRC and nuclear power plants

34. A February 2017 report by Union of Concerned Scientists stated, "Just as nuclear plant owners have downplayed and dismissed clear and present signs about safety culture problems at their plants, the data suggest that the NRC's management is just as dismissive of indications that it has a poor safety culture." Are you concerned that staff at nuclear power plants and the NRC are reluctant to report safety problems because of the lack of trust between workforce and management? If so, how can NRC address the lack of a nuclear safety culture, and lessen risks to public and environmental safety? If not, what evidence do you have that NRC management maintains a robust safety culture?

Yucca Mountain

35. NRC's Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) is responsible for regulating activities which provide for the safe and secure production of nuclear fuel used in commercial nuclear reactors; the safe storage, transportation and disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel; and the transportation of radioactive materials regulated under the Atomic Energy Act. The United States is facing a significant long-term problem in its disposal of nuclear waste. What do you envision as a potential solution, and what role should NRC play?

36. President Trump's FY18 budget proposal would revive the approval process for Yucca Mountain nuclear waste site. NRC's role in approving the Yucca Mountain site has been to assess DOE's license application to consider whether the proposed facility meets its regulatory requirements for geologic disposal of the waste. The NRC process also includes conducting a Safety Evaluation Report and adjudicatory hearings before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. Adjudicatory hearings for Yucca Mountain, which must be completed before a licensing decision can be made, remain suspended. If confirmed, will you ensure robust public comment and involvement in any decision on a potential solution to this country's significant long-term problem of nuclear waste disposal?

Radioactive iodine patients

37. According to the NRC, radioactive iodine 131 is the most toxic isotope used in medicine. Before 1997, patients receiving therapeutic doses of I-131 for thyroid cancer had to be kept in radiological isolation until it was safe for them to go home and mingle with the public. In 1997, however, a radical deregulation by the NRC made outpatient treatment with I-131 the norm. The U.S. is now an outlier in the world radiation protection

community, with weaker controls than those not only of Europe and Japan, but also of Iran and Indonesia. We are a first-world country with sub-third world radiation protection for the public.

During the Chairmanship of Allison Macfarlane, she and Commissioner Magwood sought to correct this situation, but lacking your support, their efforts failed. If reconfirmed, will you commit to correct this situation and address the need to protect the public from exposure to medical radioactive iodine contamination?

38. The National Council on Radiation Protection and International Commission on Radiological Protection both declare that the maximum radiation dose to a member of the public from a licensed activity should be 100 millirems per year. Yet the NRC allows all members of the public, including pregnant women and nursing mothers, to receive 500 millirems from released patients. If confirmed, will you commit to reconsidering the NRC's 500 millirems standard?

Potassium iodide for thyroid protection

39. Within the past two weeks, doctors at Pennsylvania State University published a paper analyzing 44 cases of thyroid cancer in the vicinity of the Three Mile Island nuclear plant and found convincing evidence that they showed signs of exposure to radiation. In 2002, as part of the response to the 9/11 disaster, Congress authorized an expansion from 10 to 20 miles of the radius within which the drug potassium iodide would be distributed. At the time, the NRC fought that expansion, and under President Bush, the law was not implemented. If confirmed, will you commit to a re-evaluation of the need for greater availability of potassium iodide in view of increased evidence of the sensitivity of the thyroid gland to the carcinogenic effects of radiation?

Leadership

40. The NRC used to be considered one of the top federal agencies in workplace satisfaction. Yet, according to index scores from the U.S. Office of Personnel Management's Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey, employee satisfaction at NRC is the worst since 2005 with declines of 3.5 points in just the last year (2015 to 2016). This drop in the last year represents one of the steepest declines among agencies of its size. Moreover, scores on leadership are consistently down across all categories, including senior leadership, empowerment, and fairness. Having served as a Commissioner since 2008, how would you explain these declines in workplace satisfaction? If confirmed, what will you do in your role as chairman to address these declines?

Independence

41. The first of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's five Principles of Good Regulation is "Independence." What does that principle mean to you?

42. Would you agree that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) should not allow political meddling from Congress, other parts of the executive branch, or industry to

interfere with the NRC's independent decision-making processes?

43. Do you commit to zealously guard the independence of the NRC and oppose any efforts to undermine it?

Senator Sullivan:

Earlier this spring the Committee on Environment and Public Works reported S.512, the "Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act'' on a strong bi-partisan vote. The findings and purposes of this bill provide a framework for these questions.

In S.512 the Committee found that one of the "...impediments to the commercialization of advanced nuclear reactors..." is the "... durations associated with applying the existing nuclear regulatory framework to advanced nuclear reactors. We further found that "...license application reviews should be as predictable and efficient as practicable without compromising safety or security." And, that "the existing nuclear regulatory framework and the requirements of that framework have not adapted to advances in scientific understanding or the features and performance characteristics of advanced nuclear reactor designs."

To address these findings S.512 would establish "...a program to develop the expertise and regulatory processes necessary to allow innovation and the commercialization of advanced nuclear reactors". S.512 provides the NRC with ample time to develop that program so, even if the bill were enacted this year, it will not be fully in place for several years.

Assuming that S.512 is enacted, I would like to understand your views with respect to the application of the NRC's current regulatory authority to innovative nuclear technologies during the time between enactment and the establishment of this new program.

44. Do you agree with the general findings of S.512? If not, please explain.

    In this interim period, the Commission likely will be confronted with innovative and advanced nuclear technologies, e.g. subcritical technologies, which may not fit within the scope of the NRC's current regulations. The Atomic Energy Act vests the NRC with broad authority to determine the scope of its regulatory jurisdiction, including the discretion to issue additional regulations to bring new technologies within the scope of the existing regulatory framework.

45. In the event you encounter such an issue while serving on the NRC, what views will guide how you exercise your discretion with respect to regulation of such new technologies? Will you regulate simply to regulate or will you insist that there be regulation only when it is needed to adequately address public health and safety risks?

Nuclear industry activities frequently are subject to regulation by many different federal agencies which often have different perspectives and objectives.

46. If you are presented with a situation in which regulation of a new innovative technology by other agencies appropriately addresses any public health and safety risks presented by that technology, will you insist that the NRC also regulate?

Senator Whitehouse:

NRC Budget

Last year, NRC's budget included a $5 million request to build up the infrastructure for improving licensing of advanced reactor concepts. This request was appropriated in this year's Omnibus. Unfortunately, in this year's budget request NRC does not ask for additional funding for their advanced rector licensing work.

47. Can you discuss what the NRC plans to do with the additional funding for advanced reactor licensing?

48. Why did NRC not ask for additional funding in the President's FY2018 budget to continue its work in this area?

49. There have been tremendous advances in predictive modeling and simulation capabilities for new nuclear technologies that can yield new insights into new reactor behaviors and accelerate the licensing of new technologies. Will you help direct the NRC staff to embrace and adopt these tools?

Licensing of Reactors in China

The Chinese currently have 21 new nuclear reactors under construction. The Chinese regulatory system appears to be similar to the new, post-Fukushima Japanese system, where the nuclear regulatory body is housed in the Environment Ministry. Although it appears that the Chinese regulatory systems seems to have similar licensing and regulatory authority to that of the U.S. NRC, their ability to license reactors appears to be more efficient.

50. Can you discuss whether the current regulatory licensing framework at NRC is different than the Chinese licensing system? If so, what are the differences?

51. Can you comment on what may be enabling the Chinese to be able to license 21 new reactors under their framework?

52. Has the NRC looked at a cross comparison between the Chinese licensing process and the U.S. system?

Nuclear Waste

The NRC budget includes $30 million from the Nuclear Waste Fund to fund activities for the proposed Yucca Mountain deep geological repository. DOE has been collecting fees since 1983 under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 to go into the Nuclear Waste Fund. Until 2010, DOE was collecting around $750 million a year (nearly $31 billion in total) into the fund. The fee program was stopped in 2010 after the Obama administration backed away from the planned nuclear fuel repository at Yucca Mountain.

53. If you are confirmed as Commissioner and Congress passes funding for Yucca Mountain licensing do you plan on moving the licensing process forward?

54. If the licensing process for Yucca Mountain moves forward do you support reinstating the fee for the Nuclear Waste Fund?

55. Do you believe that nuclear waste as a liability associated with it that should be quantified? Can you estimate what the liability of the existing nuclear waste stockpile might be?