

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS

ARG1

Initiating Condition:

Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1000 mRem TEDE or 5000 mRem thyroid CDE.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, D

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Notes:

- The Emergency Director should declare the ~~General Emergency event~~ promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
- If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes.
- ~~Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.~~ If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.
- The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.

~~(1) — Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer:~~

~~— (site-specific monitor list and threshold values)~~

1. Reading on the sum of U1 and U2 WRNGM (RIC-5415) Effluent Monitors **> 1.94 E+09 µCi/sec for ≥ 15 minutes.**

OR

2. Dose assessment ~~u~~Using actual meteorology indicates doses at or beyond ~~(site-specific dose receptor point)~~ the site boundary of **EITHER:**

- a. **> 1000 mRem TEDE**

OR

- b. **> 5000 mRem CDE Thyroid**

OR

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS

- ~~— Field survey results indicate **EITHER** of the following at or beyond (site-specific dose receptor point):~~
- ~~— Closed window dose rates greater than 1,000 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.~~
 - ~~— Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 5,000 mrem for one hour of inhalation.~~

3. Field survey results at or beyond the site boundary indicate **EITHER**:

- a. Gamma (closed window) dose rates **>1000 mR/hr** are expected to continue for **≥ 60 minutes**.

OR

- b. Analyses of field survey samples indicate **> 5000 mRem CDE Thyroid** for **60 minutes** of inhalation.

Basis:

This IC addresses a release of gaseous radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than ~~or equal to~~ the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases. Releases of this magnitude will require implementation of protective actions for the public.

Radiological effluent EALs are also included to provide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.

The TEDE dose is set at the EPA PAG of 1000 mRem while the 5000 mRem thyroid CDE was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroid CDE.

~~Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.~~

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AG1
2. Off-Site Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
3. UFSAR Section 11.1.2.1 Liquid Waste Processing System

RECOGNITION CATEGORY

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS

4. EP-EAL-0635, Calculation of Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Table R-1 EAL Threshold Values

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS

ARS1

Initiating Condition:

Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 100 mRrem TEDE or 500 mRrem thyroid CDE.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, D

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Notes:

- The Emergency Director should declare the **Site Area Emergency event** promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
- If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes.
- **Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.** If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.
- The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.

~~(1) — Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer:~~

~~(site specific monitor list and threshold values)~~

~~(2) — Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (site specific dose receptor point).~~

~~(3) — Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond (site specific dose receptor point):~~

- ~~Closed window dose rates greater than 100 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.~~
- ~~Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 500 mrem for one hour of inhalation.~~

1. Reading on the sum of U1 and U2 WRNGM (RIC-5415) Effluent Monitors
> 1.94 E+08 μ Ci/sec for \geq 15 minutes.
OR

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS

4.2. Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses at or beyond the site boundary of **EITHER**:

a. **> 100 mRem TEDE**

OR

b. **> 500 mRem CDE Thyroid**

OR

2.3. Field survey results at or beyond the site boundary indicate **EITHER**:

a-c. Gamma (closed window) dose rates **>100 mR/hr** are expected to continue for **≥ 60 minutes**.

OR

b. Analyses of field survey samples indicate **> 500 mRem CDE Thyroid** for **60 minutes** of inhalation.

Basis:

This IC addresses a release of gaseous radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than ~~or equal to~~ 10% of the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases. Releases of this magnitude are associated with the failure of plant systems needed for the protection of the public.

Radiological effluent EALs are also included to provide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.

The TEDE dose is set at 10% of the EPA PAG of 1000 mRrem while the 500 mRrem thyroid CDE was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroid CDE.

~~Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.~~

Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC RAG1.

RECOGNITION CATEGORY**ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS****Basis Reference(s):**

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AS1
2. Off-Site Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
3. UFSAR Section 11.1.2.1 Liquid Waste Processing System
4. EP-EAL-0635, Calculation of Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Table R-1 EAL Threshold Values

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS

ARA1

Initiating Condition:

Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 10 mRrem TEDE or 50 mRrem thyroid CDE.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, D

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Notes:

- The Emergency Director should declare the **Alert event** promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
 - If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes.
 - **Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.** If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.
 - The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.
- ~~(1) — Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer:~~
- ~~(site-specific monitor list and threshold values)~~
- ~~(2) — Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (site-specific dose receptor point).~~
- ~~(3) — Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or release rate that would result in doses greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (site-specific dose receptor point) for one hour of exposure.~~
- ~~(4) — Field survey results indicate **EITHER** of the following at or beyond (site-specific dose receptor point):~~
- ~~• Closed window dose rates greater than 10 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.~~
 - ~~• Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 50 mrem for one hour of inhalation.~~

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS

1. Reading on the sum of U1 and U2 WRNGM (RIC-5415) Effluent Monitors
> 1.94 E+07 μ Ci/sec for \geq 15 minutes.

OR

2. Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses at or beyond the site boundary of **EITHER**:

- a. **> 10 mRem TEDE**

OR

- b. **> 50 mRem CDE Thyroid**

OR

3. Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or release rate that would result in doses greater than **EITHER** of the following at or beyond the site boundary

- a. **10 mRem TEDE for 60 minutes** of exposure

OR

- b. **50 mRem CDE Thyroid for 60 minutes** of exposure

OR

4. Field survey results at or beyond the site boundary indicate **EITHER**:

- a. Gamma (closed window) dose rates **> 10 mR/hr** are expected to continue for **\geq 60 minutes**.

OR

- b. Analyses of field survey samples indicate **> 50 mRem CDE Thyroid** for **60 minutes** of inhalation.

RECOGNITION CATEGORY

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS

Basis:

This IC addresses a release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than ~~or equal to~~ 1% of the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases. Releases of this magnitude represent an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant as indicated by a radiological release that significantly exceeds regulatory limits (e.g., a significant uncontrolled release).

Radiological effluent EALs are also included to provide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.

The TEDE dose is set at 1% of the EPA PAG of 1000 mR_{rem} while the 50 mR_{rem} thyroid CDE was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroid CDE.

~~Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.~~

Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC RAS1.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AA1
2. Off-Site Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
3. AOP-6B Accidental Release of Radioactive Liquid Waste
4. UFSAR Section 11.1.2.1 Liquid Waste Processing System
5. EP-EAL-0635, Calculation of Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Table R-1 EAL Threshold Values

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS

ARU1

Initiating Condition:

Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the ~~ODCM (site-specific effluent release controlling document)~~ limits for 60 minutes or longer.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, D

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Notes:

- The Emergency Director should declare the ~~Unusual Event event~~ promptly upon determining that ~~60 minutes the applicable time~~ has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
- If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 60 minutes.
- ~~Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.~~ If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.

~~(1) — Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the (site-specific effluent release controlling document) limits for 60 minutes or longer:~~

~~(site-specific monitor list and threshold values corresponding to 2 times the controlling document limits)~~

~~(2) — Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the alarm setpoint established by a current radioactivity discharge permit for 60 minutes or longer.~~

~~(3) — Sample analysis for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a concentration or release rate greater than 2 times the (site-specific effluent release controlling document) limits for 60 minutes or longer.~~

1. Reading on **ANY** of the following effluent monitors **> 2x the Adjustable / Maximum set point** established by a current radioactive release discharge permit for **≥ 60 minutes**.

- Liquid Radwaste Effluent Monitor (0-RIC-2201)
- S/G Blowdown Monitor (1/2-RIC-4095)
- S/G Blowdown Tank Monitor (1/2-RIC-4014)
- Gaseous Radwaste Processing System Monitor (0-RI-2191)

RECOGNITION CATEGORY**ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS**

- Wide Range Noble Gas Monitor (WRNGM) (1/2-RIC-5415) (During WGDT release)
- Main Vent Gas Monitor (1/2- RI-5415) (During WGDT release)
- ~~— Liquid Radwaste Effluent Monitor (0-RI-2201)~~
- ~~— S/G Blowdown Monitor (1/2-RI-4095)~~
- ~~— S/G Blowdown Tank Monitor (1/2-RI-4014)~~
- ~~— Gaseous Radwaste Processing System Monitor (0-RI-2191)~~
- ~~— Wide Range Gas Monitor, Low Range (1/2-RIC-5415)~~
- ~~— Westinghouse Plant Vent Stack Monitor (1/2-RI-5415)~~
- Discharge Permit specified Monitor

OR

2. Reading on the sum of U1 and U2 WRNGM (RIC-5415) Effluent Monitors **> 5.09 E+05 μ Ci/sec for \geq 60 minutes.**

OR

3. Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous or liquid releases indicate concentrations or release rates **> 2-timesx ODCM Limit** with a release duration of **\geq 60 minutes.**

Basis:

This IC addresses a potential decrease in the level of safety of the plant as indicated by a low-level radiological release that exceeds regulatory commitments for an extended period of time (e.g., an uncontrolled release). It includes any gaseous or liquid radiological release, monitored or un-monitored, including those for which a radioactivity discharge permit is normally prepared.

Nuclear power plants incorporate design features intended to control the release of radioactive effluents to the environment. Further, there are administrative controls established to prevent unintentional releases, and to control and monitor intentional releases. The occurrence of an extended, uncontrolled radioactive release to the environment is indicative of degradation in these features and/or controls.

Radiological effluent EALs are also included to provide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.

~~— Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.~~

RECOGNITION CATEGORY**ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS**

Releases should not be prorated or averaged. For example, a release exceeding 4 times release limits for 30 minutes does not meet the EAL.

EAL #1 Basis:

EAL #2-- This EAL addresses radioactivity releases that cause effluent radiation monitor readings to exceed 2 times the limit established by a radioactivity discharge permit. This EAL will typically be associated with planned batch releases from non-continuous release pathways (e.g., radwaste, waste gas).

The effluent monitors listed are those normally used for planned discharges. If a discharge is performed using a different flowpath or effluent monitor other than those listed (e.g., a portable or temporary effluent monitor), then the declaration criteria will be based on the monitor specified in the Discharge Permit.

EAL #2 Basis:

~~EAL #1~~—This EAL addresses normally occurring continuous radioactivity releases from monitored gaseous ~~or liquid~~ effluent pathways.

EAL #3 Basis:

~~EAL #3~~—This EAL addresses uncontrolled gaseous or liquid releases that are detected by sample analyses or environmental surveys, particularly on unmonitored pathways (e.g., spills of radioactive liquids into storm drains, heat exchanger leakage in river water systems, etc.).

Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC RAA1.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AU1
2. Off-Site Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
3. AOP-6B Accidental Release of Radioactive Liquid Waste
4. UFSAR Section 11.1.2.1 Liquid Waste Processing System
5. EP-EAL-0635, Calculation of Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Table R-1 EAL Threshold Values

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS

ARG2

Initiating Condition:

Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least ~~(site-specific Level 3 description)~~45.167 ft. for 60 minutes or longer.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, D

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note:

- The Emergency Director should declare the ~~General Emergency~~event promptly upon determining that ~~60 minutes~~the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.

Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least ~~(site-specific Level 3 value)~~45.167 ft. as indicated on **EITHER 0-LI-2003 OR 0-LI-2003A** for ~~-~~ **≥ 60 minutes** ~~or longer~~.

Basis:

This IC addresses a significant loss of spent fuel pool inventory control and makeup capability leading to a prolonged uncover of spent fuel. This condition will lead to fuel damage and a radiological release to the environment.

It is recognized that this IC would likely not be met until well after another General Emergency IC was met; however, it is included to provide classification diversity.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AG2
2. NRC Correspondence Dated Nov 15, 2013, Interim Staff Evaluation and Request for Additional Information by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Related to the Overall Integrated Plan in Response to ORDER EA-12-051, "Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation" Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant. Units 1 and 2 Docket NOS. 50-317 and 50-318

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS

AS2RS2

Initiating Condition:

Spent fuel pool level at ~~(site-specific Level 3 description)~~ 45.167 ft.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, D

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Lowering of spent fuel pool level to ~~(site-specific Level 3 value)~~ 45.167 ft. as indicated on **EITHER 0-LI-2003 OR 0-LI-2003A.**

Basis:

This IC addresses a significant loss of spent fuel pool inventory control and makeup capability leading to IMMEDIATE fuel damage. This condition entails major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public and thus warrant a Site Area Emergency declaration.

It is recognized that this IC would likely not be met until well after another Site Area Emergency IC was met; however, it is included to provide classification diversity.

Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC RG1 or RG2.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AS2
2. NRC Correspondence Dated Nov 15, 2013, Interim Staff Evaluation and Request for Additional Information by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Related to the Overall Integrated Plan in Response to ORDER EA-12-051, "Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation" Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant. Units 1 and 2 Docket NOS. 50-317 and 50-318

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS**

ARA2

Initiating Condition:

Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, D

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

- ~~1. Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY.~~
- ~~2. Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity from the fuel as indicated by **ANY** of the following radiation monitors:

~~—— (site-specific listing of radiation monitors, and the associated readings, setpoints and/or alarms)~~~~
- ~~4. Lowering of spent fuel pool level to (site-specific Level 2 value). [See Developer Notes]~~
 - 1. Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY.
 - OR**
 - 2. Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity from the fuel as indicated by **ANY** Table R2 Radiation Monitor Alarm.
 - OR**
 - 3. Lowering of spent fuel pool level to **50.167 ft.** as indicated on **EITHER** 0-LI-2003 **OR** 0-LI-2003A.

Table R2 Radiation Monitors	
RMS	Area Monitored
RI-5420	Fuel Handling Area Vent
ORIC-7023 Channel 4RI-7024	SFP Area RM-320 EL-69
ORIC-7023 Channel 3RI-7025	Spent Fuel Handling Machine
RI-5316/A/B/C/D	Unit1/2 CNTMT EL-69

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS

Basis:

REFUELING PATHWAY: all the cavities, tubes, canals and pools through which irradiated fuel may be moved or stored, but not including the reactor vessel below the flange.

IMMINENT: The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met within a relatively short period of time regardless of mitigation or corrective actions.

This IC addresses events that have caused IMMINENT or actual damage to an irradiated fuel assembly, ~~or a significant lowering of water level within the spent fuel pool (see Developer Notes).~~ These events present radiological safety challenges to plant personnel and are precursors to a release of radioactivity to the environment. As such, they represent an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

~~———— This IC applies to irradiated fuel that is licensed for dry storage up to the point that the loaded storage cask is sealed. Once sealed, damage to a loaded cask causing loss of the CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY is classified in accordance with IC E-HU1.~~

~~Escalation of the emergency would be based on either Recognition Category A or C ICs.~~

EAL #1 Basis:~~EAL #1~~

This EAL escalates from RAU2 in that the loss of level, in the affected portion of the REFUELING PATHWAY, is of sufficient magnitude to have resulted in uncover of irradiated fuel. Indications of irradiated fuel uncover may include direct or indirect visual observation (e.g., reports from personnel or camera images), as well as significant changes in water and radiation levels, or other plant parameters. Computational aids may also be used (e.g., a boil-off curve). Classification of an event using this EAL should be based on the totality of available indications, reports and observations.

While an area radiation monitor could detect an ~~increase~~rise in a dose rate due to a lowering of water level in some portion of the REFUELING PATHWAY, the reading may not be a reliable indication of whether or not the fuel is actually uncovered. To the degree possible, readings should be considered in combination with other available indications of inventory loss.

A drop in water level above irradiated fuel within the reactor vessel may be classified in accordance Recognition Category C during the Cold Shutdown and Refueling modes.

EAL #2 Basis:~~EAL #2~~

RECOGNITION CATEGORY**ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS**

This EAL addresses a release of radioactive material caused by mechanical damage to irradiated fuel. Damaging events may include the dropping, bumping or binding of an assembly, or dropping a heavy load onto an assembly. A rise in readings on radiation monitors should be considered in conjunction with in-plant reports or observations of a potential fuel damaging event (e.g., a fuel handling accident).

Escalation of the emergency would be based on either Recognition Category R A-or C ICs.

EAL #3 Basis:

Spent fuel pool water level at this value is within the lower end of the level range necessary to prevent significant dose consequences from direct gamma radiation to personnel performing operations in the vicinity of the spent fuel pool. This condition reflects a significant loss of spent fuel pool water inventory and thus it is also a precursor to a loss of the ability to adequately cool the irradiated fuel assemblies stored in the pool.

~~Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via ICs AS1 or AS2 (see AS2 Developer Notes).~~

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AA2
2. NRC Correspondence Dated Nov 15, 2013, Interim Staff Evaluation and Request for Additional Information by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Related to the Overall Integrated Plan in Response to ORDER EA-12-051, "Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation" Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant. Units 1 and 2 Docket NOS. 50-317 and 50-318
3. System Description No. 67/68 Spent Fuel Pool and Cooling System
4. Shutdown Safety Surveillance H (Fuel Movement Observation)
5. Technical Specifications Section 3.9.6 Refueling Pool Water Level
6. Technical Specifications Section 3.7.13 SFP Water Level
7. TS-05.01 Technical Specification Action Value Bases Document

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS**

ARU2

Initiating Condition:

UNPLANNED loss of water level above irradiated fuel.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, D

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

~~(1) a. UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by ANY of the following:~~

~~(site-specific level indications).~~

~~AND~~

~~b. UNPLANNED rise in area radiation levels as indicated by ANY of the following radiation monitors:~~

~~(site-specific list of area radiation monitors)~~

1. a. UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by **ANY** of the following:

- Inability to restore and maintain SFP level > Technical Specification limit (65 ft 7 in)
- Inability to restore and maintain RFP level > Technical Specification limit (56 ft 8.5 in)
- Indication or report of a drop in water level in the REFUELING PATHWAY

~~UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY.~~

AND

b. UNPLANNED Area Radiation Monitor reading rise on **ANY** radiation monitors in Table R2.

Table R2 Radiation Monitors	
RMS	Area Monitored
RI-5420	Fuel Handling Area Vent
ORIC-7023 Channel 4RI-7024	SFP Area RM-320 ELI-69
ORIC-7023 Channel 3RI-7025	Spent Fuel Handling Machine

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS

RI-5316/A/B/C/D	Unit1/2 CNTMT EL-69
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Basis:

UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown.

REFUELING PATHWAY: all the cavities, tubes, canals and pools through which irradiated fuel may be moved or stored, but not including the reactor vessel below the flange.

This IC addresses a ~~decrease-loss~~ in water level above irradiated fuel sufficient to cause elevated radiation levels. This condition could be a precursor to a more serious event and is also indicative of a minor loss in the ability to control radiation levels within the plant. It is therefore a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant.

A water level ~~decrease-loss~~ will be primarily determined by indications from available level instrumentation. Other sources of level indications may include reports from plant personnel (e.g., from a refueling crew) or video camera observations (if available) **or from any other temporarily installed monitoring instrumentation**. A significant drop in the water level may also cause an ~~increase~~ rise in the radiation levels of adjacent areas that can be detected by monitors in those locations.

The effects of planned evolutions should be considered. For example, a refueling bridge area radiation monitor reading may ~~increase~~ rise due to planned evolutions such as lifting of the reactor vessel head or movement of a fuel assembly. Note that this EAL is applicable only in cases where the elevated reading is due to an UNPLANNED loss of water level.

A drop in water level above irradiated fuel within the reactor vessel may be classified in accordance Recognition Category C during the Cold Shutdown and Refueling modes.

Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC **RAA2**.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AU2
2. System Description No. 67/68 Spent Fuel Pool and Cooling System
3. Shutdown Safety Surveillance H (Fuel Movement Observation)
4. Technical Specifications Section 3.9.6 Refueling Pool Water Level
5. Technical Specifications Section 3.7.13 SFP Water Level

RECOGNITION CATEGORY

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS

7. TS-05.01 Technical Specification Action Value Bases Document
8. 1(2)AOP-6E Loss of Refueling Pool Level
9. OP-07 Shutdown Operations, Section 6.9.B Checklist for Fuel Movement"

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS

ARA3**Initiating Condition:**

Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, D

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note: If the equipment in the ~~listed~~ room or area listed in Table R4 was already inoperable, or out of service, before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted

~~(1) Dose rate greater than 15 mR/hr in ANY of the following areas:~~

- ~~• Control Room~~
- ~~• Central Alarm Station~~
- ~~• (other site-specific areas/rooms)~~

~~(2) An UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or impede access to any of the following plant rooms or areas:~~

~~(site-specific list of plant rooms or areas with entry related mode applicability identified)~~

1. Dose rate greater than > 15 mR/hr in ANY of the areas contained in Table R3:

Table R3 Areas Requiring Continuous Occupancy
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Main Control Room (by survey) • Central Alarm Station (CAS) (by survey)

OR

RECOGNITION CATEGORY

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS

2. **UNPLANNED** event results in radiation levels that prohibit or significantly impede access to any of the Table R4 plant rooms or areas:

Table R4 Areas with Entry Related Mode Applicability	
Area	Entry Related Mode Applicability
45' West Electrical Penetration Rooms	Modes 3, 4, and 5
69' Electrical Penetration Rooms	Modes 3, 4, and 5
ECCS Pump Rooms	Modes 3, 4, and 5
Charging Pump Rooms	Modes 3, 4, and 5
Component Cooling Rooms	Modes 3, 4, and 5

Basis:

UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown.

This IC addresses elevated radiation levels in certain plant rooms/areas sufficient to preclude or impede personnel from performing actions necessary to maintain normal plant operation, or to perform a normal plant cooldown and shutdown. As such, it represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The Emergency Director should consider the cause of the increased radiation levels and determine if another IC may be applicable.

Assuming all plant equipment is operating as designed, normal operation is capable from the Main Control Room (MCR). The plant is also able to transition into a hot shutdown condition from the MCR, therefore Table R4 is a list of plant rooms or areas with entry-related mode applicability that contain equipment which require a manual/local action necessary to transition the plant from normal plant operation, cooldown and shutdown as specified in normal operating procedures, where if this action is not completed the plant would not be able to attain and maintain cold shutdown. This Table does not include rooms or areas for which entry is required solely to perform actions of an administrative or record keeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routine inspections).

Rooms and areas listed in EAL #1 do not need to be included in EAL #2, including the Control Room.

For EAL #2, an Alert declaration is warranted if entry into the affected room/area is, or may be, procedurally required during the plant operating mode in effect at the time of the elevated radiation levels. The emergency classification is not contingent upon whether entry is actually necessary at the time of the increased radiation levels. Access should be considered as impeded if extraordinary measures are necessary to facilitate entry of

RECOGNITION CATEGORY**ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS**

personnel into the affected room/area (e.g., installing temporary shielding **beyond that required by procedures**, requiring use of non-routine protective equipment, requesting an extension in dose limits beyond normal administrative limits).

An emergency declaration is not warranted if any of the following conditions apply.

- The plant is in an operating mode different than the mode specified for the affected room/area (i.e., entry is not required during the operating mode in effect at the time of the elevated radiation levels). For example, the plant is in Mode 1 when the radiation **increaserise** occurs, and the procedures used for normal operation, cooldown and shutdown do not require entry into the affected room until Mode 4.
- The increased radiation levels are a result of a planned activity that includes compensatory measures which address the temporary inaccessibility of a room or area (e.g., radiography, spent filter or resin transfer, etc.).
- The action for which room/area entry is required is of an administrative or record keeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routine inspections).
- The access control measures are of a conservative or precautionary nature, and would not actually prevent or impede a required action.

Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via Recognition Category **RA**, C or F ICs.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AA3
2. System Description # 77/79 Radiation Monitoring System
3. UFSAR Section 11.2.2.5 Auxiliary Building Shielding

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS

SRU3

Initiating Condition:

Reactor coolant activity greater than Technical Specification allowable limits.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

~~(1) — (Site specific radiation monitor) reading greater than (site specific value).~~

~~(2) — Sample analysis indicates that a reactor coolant activity value is greater than an allowable limit specified in Technical Specifications.~~

1. Letdown monitor RY-202-1 high alarm ($\geq 1E+06$ cpm)

OR

2. Sample analysis indicates Coolant activity > **ANY** of the following:

- Dose equivalent I-131 0.5 uCi/gm for 100 hrs. continuous
 - Dose equivalent I-131 acceptable region of T.S. Fig. 3.4.15-1
 - Dose equivalent I-131 137.5 uCi/gm
- Gross activity 100/E-bar uCi/gm

Basis:

This IC addresses a reactor coolant activity value that exceeds an allowable limit specified in Technical Specifications. This condition is a precursor to a more significant event and represents a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

Conditions that cause the specified monitor to alarm that are not related to fuel clad degradation should not result in the declaration of an Unusual Event.

This EAL addresses site-specific radiation monitor readings that provide indication of a degradation of fuel clad integrity.

Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via ICs FA1 or the Recognition Category **RA** ICs.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU3
2. Technical Specification 3.4.15 Reactor Coolant System - RCS Specific Activity
3. AOP-6A Abnormal Reactor Coolant Chemistry/Activity
4. 1(2)C07-ALM F-21 RAD MON LVL HI
5. UFSAR Section 9.1.3

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION**

FG1

Initiating Condition:

Loss of ANY Two Barriers AND Loss or Potential Loss of the third barrier.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Loss and Potential Loss threshold values to determine barrier status.

Basis:

Fuel Cladding, **Reactor Coolant System** and Containment comprise the fission product barriers.

At the General Emergency classification level each barrier is weighted equally.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-3

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION**

FS1

Initiating Condition:

Loss or Potential Loss of ANY two barriers.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Loss and Potential Loss threshold values to determine barrier status.

Basis:

Fuel Cladding, **Reactor Coolant System** and Containment comprise the fission product barriers.

At the Site Area Emergency classification level, each barrier is weighted equally.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-3

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION**

FA1

Initiating Condition:

ANY Loss or ANY Potential Loss of either Fuel Clad or RCS.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Loss and Potential Loss threshold values to determine barrier status.

Basis:

Fuel Cladding, **Reactor Coolant System** and Containment comprise the fission product barriers.

At the Alert classification level, Fuel Cladding and RCS barriers are weighted more heavily than the Containment barrier. Unlike the Containment barrier, loss or potential loss of either the Fuel Cladding or RCS barrier may result in the relocation of radioactive materials or degradation of core cooling capability. Note that the loss or potential loss of Containment barrier in combination with loss or potential loss of either Fuel Cladding or RCS barrier results in declaration of a Site Area Emergency under EAL FS1.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-3

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION**

FC1**Initiating Condition:**

RCS or SG Tube Leakage

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:POTENTIAL LOSS~~A. RCS/reactor vessel level less than (site specific value).~~

RVLMS indicates < 10 inch alarm

Basis:

There is no Loss threshold associated with RCS or SG Tube Leakage.

Potential Loss Threshold Basis:

This reading indicates a reduction in reactor vessel water level sufficient to allow the onset of heat-induced cladding damage.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-3
2. UFSAR 7.5.9
3. ERPIP-800 Core Damage Assessment
4. OP-7 Shutdown Operations
5. ERPIP-600 Severe Accident Management
6. ERPIP-601 Severe Accident Management Initial Diagnosis

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION**

FC2

Initiating Condition:

Inadequate Heat Removal

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:

LOSS

~~A. Core Exit Thermocouple readings greater than (site specific temperature value)~~

1. Core Exit Thermocouple readings > **1200°F**

Potential Loss

~~A. Core-exit thermocouple readings greater than (site specific temperature value).~~

~~B. Inadequate RCS heat removal capability via steam generators as indicated by (site specific indications).~~

2. Core Exit Thermocouple readings > **700°F**

OR

3. Once Through Core Cooling (OTCC) in effect

Basis:

Loss Threshold #1 Basis

~~Loss 2.A~~

~~This reading~~ indicates temperatures within the core are sufficient to cause significant superheating of reactor coolant.

Potential Loss Threshold #2 Basis

~~Potential Loss 2.A~~

~~This reading~~ indicates temperatures within the core are sufficient to allow the onset of heat-induced cladding damage.

Potential Loss Threshold #3 Basis

~~Potential Loss 2.B~~

This condition indicates an extreme challenge to the ability to remove RCS heat using the steam generators (i.e., loss of an effective secondary-side heat sink). This condition represents a potential loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier. In accordance with EOPs, there may be unusual accident conditions during which operators intentionally reduce the heat removal capability of the steam generators; during these conditions, classification using threshold is not warranted.

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION

Meeting this threshold results in a Site Area Emergency because this threshold is identical to RCS Barrier RC2 Potential Loss threshold ~~2.A~~; both will be met. This condition warrants a Site Area Emergency declaration because inadequate RCS heat removal may result in fuel heat-up sufficient to damage the cladding and ~~increase~~ raise RCS pressure to the point where mass will be lost from the system.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-3
2. ERPIP-600 Severe Accident Management
3. ERPIP-601 Severe Accident Management Initial Diagnosis
4. ERPIP-802 Core Damage Assessment Using Core Exit Thermocouples
5. EOP-5 Loss of Coolant Accident
6. EOP-8 Functional Recovery Procedure
7. CEN-152 Emergency Procedure Guidelines
8. ERPIP-800 Core Damage Assessment
9. ERPIP-802 Core Damage Assessment Using Core Exit Thermocouples
10. EOP-5 Loss of Coolant Accident
11. EOP-8 Functional Recovery Procedure
12. EOP-24.33 Action Value Bases Document
13. CEN-152 Emergency Procedure Guidelines
14. EOP-3 Loss of All Feedwater

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION**

FC3

Initiating Condition:

Containment Radiation / RCS Activity

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:

LOSS

1. Containment radiation monitor (5317A/B) reading > **7,000 R/hr.**

OR

2. Coolant activity > **300 uCi/gm** Dose Equivalent I-131

OR

3. Post-accident sample dose rate \geq **40mRem/hr.** (1ft from sample)

~~A. Containment radiation monitor reading greater than (site specific value)~~

~~—B. (Site specific indications that reactor coolant activity is greater than 300uCi/gm dose equivalent I-131)~~

Basis:

Loss Threshold #1 Basis

Loss 3.A

The radiation monitor reading corresponds to an instantaneous release of all reactor coolant mass into the containment, assuming that reactor coolant activity equals 300 μ Ci/gm dose equivalent I-131. Reactor coolant activity above this level is greater than that expected for iodine spikes and corresponds to an approximate range of 2% to 5% fuel clad damage. Since this condition indicates that a significant amount of fuel clad damage has occurred, it represents a loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier.

The radiation monitor reading in this threshold is higher than that specified for RCS Barrier **RC3** Loss ~~T~~ threshold ~~3.A~~ since it indicates a loss of both the Fuel Clad Barrier and the RCS Barrier. Note that a combination of the two monitor readings appropriately escalates the emergency classification level to a Site Area Emergency.

Loss Threshold #2 and #3 Basis

Loss 3.B

This threshold indicates that RCS radioactivity concentration is greater than 300 μ Ci/gm dose equivalent I-131. Reactor coolant activity above this level is greater than that expected for iodine spikes and corresponds to an approximate range of 2% to 5% fuel clad damage. Since this condition indicates that a significant amount of fuel clad damage has occurred, it represents a loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier.

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION

It is recognized that sample collection and analysis of reactor coolant with highly elevated activity levels could require several hours to complete. Nonetheless, a sample-related threshold is included as a backup to other indications

There is no **Fuel Clad Barrier** Potential Loss threshold associated with RCS Activity / Containment Radiation.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-3
2. EP-EAL-0714, Criteria for Choosing Containment Radiation values Indicating: Loss of Fuel Clad and Potential Loss of Containment for Calvert Cliffs Station
3. BG&E Fuel Degradation EALs Calculation Worksheet, JSB Associates, February 18, 1993

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION**

FC56**Initiating Condition:**

Emergency Director Judgment.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:LOSS

1A. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier.

POTENTIAL LOSS

2A. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier.

Basis:**Loss Threshold #1 Basis**Loss-6.A

This threshold addresses any other factors that may be used by the Emergency Director in determining whether the Fuel Clad Barrier is lost.

Potential Loss Threshold #2 BasisPotential Loss-6.A

This threshold addresses any other factors that may be used by the Emergency Director in determining whether the Fuel Clad Barrier is potentially lost. The Emergency Director should also consider whether or not to declare the barrier potentially lost in the event that barrier status cannot be monitored.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-3

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION**

RC1

Initiating Condition:

RCS or SG Tube Leakage

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:

LOSS

~~A.~~ ~~1.~~ ~~A~~1~~~~ automatic or manual ECCS (SIAS) actuation is required by **EITHER** of the following:

~~a~~1~~~~. UNISOLABLE RCS leakage

OR

~~b~~2~~~~. SG tube RUPTURE.

POTENTIAL LOSS

~~2.~~ RCS leak rate > **50 gpm with letdown isolated** due to **EITHER** of the following:

~~a.~~ UNISOLABLE RCS leakage

OR

~~b.~~ SG tube leakage.

OR

~~3.~~ Uncontrolled RCS cooldown and to the left of Max Operating Pressure Curve (EOP Attachment 1, RCS Pressure Temperature Limits)

~~– Operation of a standby charging (makeup) pump is required by **EITHER** of the following:~~

~~1.~~ UNISOLABLE RCS leakage

OR

~~SG tube leakage.~~

~~B.~~ RCS cooldown rate greater than (site specific pressurized thermal shock criteria/limits defined by site specific indications)

~~3.~~ **RCS Integrity Red** entry conditions met.

RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION

Basis:

UNISOLABLE: An open or breached system line that cannot be isolated, remotely or locally.

RUPTURE(D): The condition of a steam generator in which primary-to-secondary leakage is of sufficient magnitude to require a safety injection.

FAULTED: The term applied to a steam generator that has a steam leak on the secondary side of sufficient size to cause an uncontrolled drop in steam generator pressure or the steam generator to become completely depressurized.

Failure to isolate the leak within 15 minutes or if known that the leak cannot be isolated within 15 minutes from the start of the leak requires immediate classification.

Loss Threshold #1 Basis

Loss 1.A

This threshold is based on an UNISOLABLE RCS leak of sufficient size to require an automatic or manual actuation of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) (~~Exceeds the capacity of the Charging pumps~~). This condition clearly represents a loss of the RCS Barrier.

This threshold is applicable to unidentified and pressure boundary leakage, as well as identified leakage. It is also applicable to UNISOLABLE RCS leakage through an interfacing system. The mass loss may be into any location – inside containment, to the secondary-side (i.e., steam generator tube leakage) or outside of containment.

A steam generator with primary-to-secondary leakage of sufficient magnitude to require a safety injection is considered to be RUPTURED. If a RUPTURED steam generator is also FAULTED outside of containment, the declaration escalates to a Site Area Emergency since the Containment Barrier CT1 Loss threshold ~~1.A~~ will also be met.

Potential Loss Threshold #2 Basis

Potential Loss 1.A

This threshold is based on an UNISOLABLE RCS leak that results in the inability to maintain pressurizer level within specified limits by operation of a normally used charging (makeup) pump, but an ECCS (SI) actuation has not occurred. ~~The threshold is met when an operating procedure, or operating crew supervision, directs that a standby charging (makeup) pump be placed in service to restore and maintain pressurizer level.~~

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION

This threshold is applicable to unidentified and pressure boundary leakage, as well as identified leakage. It is also applicable to UNISOLABLE RCS leakage through an interfacing system. The mass loss may be into any location – inside containment, to the secondary-side (i.e., steam generator tube leakage) or outside of containment.

If a leaking steam generator is also FAULTED outside of containment, the declaration escalates to a Site Area Emergency since the Containment Barrier Loss threshold **CT1.A** will also be met.

Potential Loss Threshold #3 Basis

This condition indicates an extreme challenge to the integrity of the RCS pressure boundary due to pressurized thermal shock – a transient that causes rapid RCS cooldown while the RCS is in Mode 3 or higher (i.e., hot and pressurized).

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-3
2. EOP-4 Excessive Steam Demand Event
3. EOP-Attachments, Attachment 1 RCS Pressure Temperature Limits
4. EOP-Attachments, Attachment 14 RCS Cooldown Data Sheet
5. EOP-8 Functional Recovery Procedure
6. AOP-2A Excessive Reactor Coolant Leakage
7. EOP-5 Loss of Coolant Accident
8. EOP-6 Steam Generator Tube Rupture
9. 1C08-ALM ESFAS 11, G-05
10. Technical Specifications Table 3.3.4-1
11. UFSAR Section 9.1.3

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION****RC2****Initiating Condition:**

Inadequate Heat Removal

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:**POTENTIAL LOSS**

~~Once Through Core Cooling (OTCC) in effectA-
Inadequate RCS heat removal capability via steam generators as indicated by (site
specific indications)~~

Basis:

There is no Loss threshold associated with Inadequate Heat Removal.

Potential Loss Threshold Basis**Potential Loss 2.A**

Once-Through-Cooling in effect indicates a Lack of Primary to Secondary Heat Transfer capability.

This condition indicates an extreme challenge to the ability to remove RCS heat using the steam generators (i.e., loss of an effective secondary-side heat sink). This condition represents a potential loss of the RCS Barrier. In accordance with EOPs, there may be unusual accident conditions during which operators intentionally reduce the heat removal capability of the steam generators; during these conditions, classification using threshold is not warranted.

Meeting this threshold results in a Site Area Emergency because this threshold is identical to Fuel Clad Barrier **FC2** Potential Loss **T**hreshold **2.B#3**; both will be met. This condition warrants a Site Area Emergency declaration because inadequate RCS heat removal may result in fuel heat-up sufficient to damage the cladding and ~~increase~~**raise** RCS pressure to the point where mass will be lost from the system.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-3
2. EOP-3 Loss of All Feedwater

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION**

RC3

Initiating Condition:

Containment Radiation / RCS Activity

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:

LOSS

A.

Containment radiation monitor (5317A/B) reading > **12 R/hr.**

~~Containment radiation monitor reading greater than
(site-specific value).~~

Basis:

Loss Threshold Basis

~~Loss 3.A~~

The radiation monitor reading corresponds to an instantaneous release of all reactor coolant mass into the containment, assuming that reactor coolant activity equals Technical Specification allowable limits. This value is lower than that specified for Fuel Clad Barrier **FC3** Loss Threshold ~~3.A#1~~ since it indicates a loss of the RCS Barrier only.

There is no **RCS** Potential Loss threshold associated with RCS Activity / Containment Radiation.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-3
2. EP-EAL-0511, Criteria for Choosing Containment Radiation Monitor Readings Indicative of Loss of RCS Barrier for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION****RC56****Initiating Condition:**

Emergency Director Judgment.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:LOSS

1A. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Loss of the RCS Barrier.

POTENTIAL LOSS

2B. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Potential Loss of the RCS Barrier.

Basis:**Loss Threshold #1 Basis**Loss-6.A

This threshold addresses any other factors that may be used by the Emergency Director in determining whether the RCS Barrier is lost.

Potential Loss Threshold #2 BasisPotential Loss-6.A

This threshold addresses any other factors that may be used by the Emergency Director in determining whether the RCS Barrier is potentially lost. The Emergency Director should also consider whether or not to declare the barrier potentially lost in the event that barrier status cannot be monitored.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-3

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION**

CT1

Initiating Condition:

RCS or SG Tube Leakage

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:

LOSS

~~A~~-A leaking or RUPTURED SG > **50 gpm** is FAULTED outside of containment.

Basis:

FAULTED: The term applied to a steam generator that has a steam leak on the secondary side of sufficient size to cause an uncontrolled drop in steam generator pressure or the steam generator to become completely depressurized.

RUPTURE(D): The condition of a steam generator in which primary-to-secondary leakage is of sufficient magnitude to require a safety injection.

Loss Threshold Basis

Loss 1.A

This threshold addresses a leaking or RUPTURED Steam Generator (SG) that is also FAULTED outside of containment. The condition of the SG, whether leaking or RUPTURED, is determined in accordance with the thresholds for RCS Barrier **RC1** Potential Loss **Threshold 2.b 1.A** and Loss **Threshold 1.b-A**, respectively. This condition represents a bypass of the containment barrier.

FAULTED is a defined term within the NEI 99-01 methodology; this determination is not necessarily dependent upon entry into, or diagnostic steps within, an EOP. For example, if the pressure in a steam generator is decreasing uncontrollably [*part of the FAULTED definition*] and the faulted steam generator isolation procedure is not entered because EOP user rules are dictating implementation of another procedure to address a higher priority condition, the steam generator is still considered FAULTED for emergency classification purposes.

The FAULTED criterion establishes an appropriate lower bound on the size of a steam release that may require an emergency classification. Steam releases of this size are readily observable with normal Control Room indications. The lower bound for this aspect of the containment barrier is analogous to the lower bound criteria specified in IC **RSU3** for the fuel clad barrier (i.e., RCS activity values) and IC **MSU64** for the RCS barrier (i.e., RCS leak rate values).

This threshold also applies to prolonged steam releases necessitated by operational considerations such as the forced steaming of a leaking or RUPTURED steam generator directly to atmosphere to cooldown the plant, or to drive an auxiliary (emergency) feed water pump. These types of conditions will result in a significant and

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION**

sustained release of radioactive steam to the environment (and are thus similar to a FAULTED condition). The inability to isolate the steam flow without an adverse effect on plant cooldown meets the intent of a loss of containment.

Steam releases associated with the expected operation of a SG ~~power-operated relief~~atmospheric dump valve or safety relief valve do not meet the intent of this threshold. Such releases may occur intermittently for a short period of time following a reactor trip as operators process through emergency operating procedures to bring the plant to a stable condition and prepare to initiate a plant cooldown. Steam releases associated with the unexpected operation of a valve (e.g., a stuck-open safety valve) ~~do~~ **meets** this threshold.

Following an SG tube leak or rupture, there may be minor radiological releases through a secondary-side system component (e.g., air ejectors, gland seal exhausters, valve packing, etc.). These types of releases do not constitute a loss or potential loss of containment but should be evaluated using the Recognition Category **RA** ICs.

The emergency classification levels resulting from primary-to-secondary leakage, with or without a steam release from the FAULTED SG, are summarized below.

P-to-S Leak Rate	Affected SG is FAULTED Outside of Containment?	
	Yes	No
Less than or equal to 25 gpm (or other value per SU4 Developer Notes)	No classification	No classification
Greater than 25 gpm (or other value per SU4 Developer Notes)	Unusual Event per SU4MU6	Unusual Event per SU4MU6
> 50 gpm with letdown isolated Requires operation of a standby charging (makeup) pump (RCS Barrier Potential Loss)	Site Area Emergency per FS1	Alert per FA1
Requires an automatic or manual ECCS (SI) actuation (RCS Barrier Loss)	Site Area Emergency per FS1	Alert per FA1

There is no Potential Loss threshold associated with RCS or SG Tube Leakage.

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION**

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-3
2. EOP-6 Steam Generator Tube Rupture
3. EOP-8 Functional Recovery Procedure

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION**

CT2

Initiating Condition:

Inadequate Heat Removal

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:

POTENTIAL LOSS

~~A. 1. (Site specific criteria for entry into core cooling restoration procedure)~~

~~AND~~

~~—2. Restoration procedure not effective within 15 minutes.~~

1. a. Core Exit Thermocouple readings > **1200°F**

AND

b. Restoration procedures not effective in < **15 minutes**.

OR

2. a. Core Exit Thermocouples > **700 °F**

AND

b. RVLMS indicates < **10 inch alarm**

AND

c. Restoration procedures not effective in < **15 minutes**.

Basis:

IMMINENT: The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met within a relatively short period of time regardless of mitigation or corrective actions.

There is no Loss threshold associated with Inadequate Heat Removal.

Potential Loss Threshold Basis

Potential Loss 2.A

This condition represents an IMMEDIATE core melt sequence which, if not corrected, could lead to vessel failure and an increased potential for containment failure. For this condition to occur, there must already have been a loss of the RCS Barrier and the Fuel Clad Barrier. If implementation of a procedure(s) to restore adequate core cooling is not effective (successful) within 15 minutes, it is assumed that the event trajectory will likely lead to core melting and a subsequent challenge of the Containment Barrier.

The restoration procedure is considered “effective” if core exit thermocouple readings are decreasing and/or if reactor vessel level is increasing. Whether or not the procedure(s) will be effective should be apparent within 15 minutes. The Emergency

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION

Director should escalate the emergency classification level as soon as it is determined that the procedure(s) will not be effective.

Severe accident analyses (e.g., NUREG-1150) have concluded that function restoration procedures can arrest core degradation in a significant fraction of core damage scenarios, and that the likelihood of containment failure is very small in these events. Given this, it is appropriate to provide 15 minutes beyond the required entry point to determine if procedural actions can reverse the core melt sequence.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-3
2. ERPIP-600 Severe Accident Management
3. ERPIP-802 Core Damage Assessment Using Core Exit Thermocouples
4. CEN-152 Emergency Procedure Guidelines
5. EOP-24.33 Action Value Bases Document
6. ERPIP-600 Severe Accident Management
7. ERPIP-601 Severe Accident Management Initial Diagnosis
8. ERPIP-802 Core Damage Assessment Using Core Exit Thermocouples

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION****CT3****Initiating Condition:**

Containment Radiation / RCS Activity

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:**POTENTIAL LOSS**

~~A. Containment radiation monitor reading greater than (5317A/B) reading > 70,000 R/hr. (site specific value).~~

Basis:

There is no Loss threshold associated with RCS Activity / Containment Radiation.

Potential Loss Threshold Basis**Potential Loss 3.A**

The radiation monitor reading corresponds to an instantaneous release of all reactor coolant mass into the containment, assuming that 20% of the fuel cladding has failed. This level of fuel clad failure is well above that used to determine the analogous Fuel Clad Barrier Loss and RCS Barrier Loss thresholds.

NUREG-1228, *Source Estimations During Incident Response to Severe Nuclear Power Plant Accidents*, indicates the fuel clad failure must be greater than approximately 20% in order for there to be a major release of radioactivity requiring offsite protective actions. For this condition to exist, there must already have been a loss of the RCS Barrier and the Fuel Clad Barrier. It is therefore prudent to treat this condition as a potential loss of containment which would then escalate the emergency classification level to a General Emergency.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-3
2. EP-EAL-0714, Criteria for Choosing Containment Radiation values Indicating: Loss of Fuel Clad and Potential Loss of Containment for Calvert Cliffs Station

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION**

CT4

Initiating Condition:

Containment Integrity or Bypass

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:

LOSS

1A. Containment isolation is required ~~and~~**AND ANY** of the following:

a. UNPLANNED lowering in containment pressure following initial pressure rise.

OR

b. Containment pressure or sump level response not consistent with LOCA conditions.

OR

c. UNISOLABLE pathway from containment to the environment exists.

~~Containment isolation is required **AND EITHER** of the following:~~

~~1. UNPLANNED decrease in containment pressure or rise in radiation monitor readings outside of containment that indicate a loss of containment integrity.~~

~~**OR**~~

~~2. UNISOLABLE pathway from containment to the environment exists.~~

~~**OR**~~

~~2B. Indication of RCS leakage outside of containment~~

POTENTIAL LOSS

~~3A. **Containment Red** entry conditions met Containment Pressure \geq 50 psig and rising.~~

~~**OR**~~

~~4B. Explosive mixture exists inside containment. Hydrogen Concentration in Containment \geq 4%.~~

~~**OR**~~

~~G.~~

5. a. Containment pressure > 4.25 psig

AND

b. Cannot meet containment design cooling by at least one of the following for \geq 15 minutes:

- 2 Containment Spray Pumps Operating

OR

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION**

- 3 CAC's Operating

OR

- 1 Containment Spray Pump and 2 CAC's Operating

~~1. Containment pressure greater than (site specific pressure setpoint)~~

~~AND ——— 2. Less than one full train of (site specific system or equipment) is operating per design for 15 minutes or longer.~~

Basis:

FAULTED: The term applied to a steam generator that has a steam leak on the secondary side of sufficient size to cause an uncontrolled drop in steam generator pressure or the steam generator to become completely depressurized.

UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown.

UNISOLABLE: An open or breached system line that cannot be isolated, remotely or locally.

LossThreshold #1 Basis:

Loss 4.A

These thresholds address a situation where containment isolation is required and one of two conditions exists as discussed below. Users are reminded that there may be accident and release conditions that simultaneously meet both **loss** thresholds **1.a** or **4.A.1** and **1.b** **4.A.2** and **1.c**.

1.a **4.A.1** – Containment integrity has been lost, i.e., the actual containment atmospheric leak rate likely exceeds that associated with allowable leakage (or sometimes referred to as design leakage). Following the release of RCS mass into containment, containment pressure will fluctuate based on a variety of factors; a loss of containment integrity condition may (or may not) be accompanied by a noticeable drop in containment pressure. Recognizing the inherent difficulties in determining a containment leak rate during accident conditions, it is expected that the Emergency Director will assess this threshold using judgment, and with due consideration given to current plant conditions, and available operational and radiological data (e.g., containment pressure, readings on radiation monitors outside containment, operating status of containment pressure control equipment, etc.).

Refer to the middle piping run of Figure 9-F-4. Two simplified examples are provided. One is leakage from a penetration and the other is leakage from an in-service system valve. Depending upon radiation monitor locations and sensitivities, the leakage could be detected by any of the four monitors depicted in the figure.

Another example would be a loss or potential loss of the RCS barrier, and the simultaneous occurrence of two FAULTED locations on a steam generator where one

RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION

fault is located inside containment (e.g., on a steam or feedwater line) and the other outside of containment. In this case, the associated steam line provides a pathway for the containment atmosphere to escape to an area outside the containment.

Following the leakage of RCS mass into containment and a rise in containment pressure, there may be minor radiological releases associated with allowable (design) containment leakage through various penetrations or system components. These releases do not constitute a loss or potential loss of containment but should be evaluated using the Recognition Category **RA** ICs.

1.b4.A.2 – Containment sump, temperature, pressure and/or radiation levels will rise if reactor coolant mass is leaking into the containment. If these parameters have not increased, then the reactor coolant mass may be leaking outside of containment (i.e., a containment bypass sequence). Raises in sump, temperature, pressure, flow and/or radiation level readings outside of the containment may indicate that the RCS mass is being lost outside of containment.

1.c - Conditions are such that there is an UNISOLABLE pathway for the migration of radioactive material from the containment atmosphere to the environment. As used here, the term “environment” includes the atmosphere of a room or area, outside the containment, that may, in turn, communicate with the outside-the-plant atmosphere (e.g., through discharge of a ventilation system or atmospheric leakage). Depending upon a variety of factors, this condition may or may not be accompanied by a noticeable drop in containment pressure.

Refer to the top piping run of Figure 9-F-4. In this simplified example, the inboard and outboard isolation valves remained open after a containment isolation was required (i.e., containment isolation was not successful). There is now an UNISOLABLE pathway from the containment to the environment.

The existence of a filter is not considered in the threshold assessment. Filters do not remove fission product noble gases. In addition, a filter could become ineffective due to iodine and/or particulate loading beyond design limits (i.e., retention ability has been exceeded) or water saturation from steam/high humidity in the release stream.

Leakage between two interfacing liquid systems, by itself, does not meet this threshold.

Refer to the bottom piping run of Figure 9-F-4. In this simplified example, leakage in an RCP seal cooler is allowing radioactive material to enter the Auxiliary Building. The radioactivity would be detected by the Process Monitor. If there is no leakage from the closed water cooling system to the Auxiliary Building, then no threshold has been met. If the pump or system piping developed a leak that allowed steam/water to enter the Auxiliary Building, then **loss** threshold **24.B** would be met. Depending upon radiation monitor locations and sensitivities, this leakage could be detected by any of the four monitors depicted in the figure and cause threshold **1.a4.A.1** to be met as well.

Following the leakage of RCS mass into containment and a rise in containment pressure, there may be minor radiological releases associated with allowable (design)

RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION

containment leakage through various penetrations or system components. Minor releases may also occur if a containment isolation valve(s) fails to close but the containment atmosphere escapes to a closed system. These releases do not constitute a loss or potential loss of containment but should be evaluated using the Recognition Category **RA** ICs.

The status of the containment barrier during an event involving steam generator tube leakage is assessed using **Containment Barrier CT1 Loss Threshold 1.A**.

Loss Threshold #2 Basis:

Loss 4.B

~~Containment sump, temperature, pressure and/or radiation levels will increase if reactor coolant mass is leaking into the containment. If these parameters have not increased, then the reactor coolant mass may be leaking outside of containment (i.e., a containment bypass sequence). Increase~~Raises in sump, temperature, pressure, flow and/or radiation level readings outside of the containment may indicate that the RCS mass is being lost outside of containment.

Unexpected elevated readings and alarms on radiation monitors with detectors outside containment should be corroborated with other available indications to confirm that the source is a loss of RCS mass outside of containment. If the fuel clad barrier has not been lost, radiation monitor readings outside of containment may not ~~increase~~rise significantly; however, other unexpected changes in sump levels, area temperatures or pressures, flow rates, etc. should be sufficient to determine if RCS mass is being lost outside of the containment.

Refer to the middle piping run of Figure 9-F-4. In this simplified example, a leak has occurred at a reducer on a pipe carrying reactor coolant in the Auxiliary Building. Depending upon radiation monitor locations and sensitivities, the leakage could be

detected by any of the four monitors depicted in the figure and cause ~~loss~~ threshold ~~1.a4.A.1~~ to be met as well.

To ensure proper escalation of the emergency classification, the RCS leakage outside of containment must be related to the mass loss that is causing the RCS **Barrier RC1 Loss Threshold 1.a** and/or Potential Loss threshold ~~2.a1.A~~ to be met.

Potential Loss Threshold #3 Basis

Potential Loss 4.A

If containment pressure exceeds the design pressure, there exists a potential to lose the Containment Barrier. To reach this level, there must be an inadequate core cooling condition for an extended period of time; therefore, the RCS and Fuel Clad barriers would already be lost. Thus, this threshold is a discriminator between a Site Area Emergency and General Emergency since there is now a potential to lose the third barrier.

Potential Loss Threshold #4 Basis

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION**

Potential Loss 4.B

The existence of an explosive mixture means, at a minimum, that the containment atmospheric hydrogen concentration is sufficient to support a hydrogen burn (i.e., at the lower deflagration limit). A hydrogen burn will raise containment pressure and could result in collateral equipment damage leading to a loss of containment integrity. It therefore represents a potential loss of the Containment Barrier.

Potential Loss Threshold #5 Basis


Potential Loss 4.C

This threshold describes a condition where containment pressure is greater than the setpoint at which containment energy (heat) removal systems are designed to automatically actuate, and less than one full train of equipment is capable of operating per design. The 15-minute criterion is included to allow operators time to manually start equipment that may not have automatically started, if possible. This threshold represents a potential loss of containment in that containment heat removal/depressurization systems (e.g., containment sprays, ice condenser fans, etc., but not including containment venting strategies) are either lost or performing in a degraded manner

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-3
2. UFSAR Section 14.20
3. UFSAR Figures 6.2.1-1 through 6.2.1-6b
4. UFSAR 1.2.5
5. UFSAR 5.1.1
6. UFSAR 7.5.8
7. Technical Specifications Table 3.3.10-1
8. OI-41A Hydrogen Recombiners
9. 1C10-ALM ESFAS 14 Alarm Manual, J-09
10. ERPIP-803 Core Damage Assessment Using Hydrogen
11. EOP-8 Functional Recovery Procedure
12. 1C08-ALM ESFAS 11 Alarm Manual, G-07, ACTUATION SYSTEM CSAS TRIP
13. Technical Specifications Table 3.3.4-1
14. Technical Specifications 3.6.6

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION
Figure 93-F-41: PWR Containment Integrity or Bypass Examples



**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION**

CT56**Initiating Condition:**

Emergency Director Judgment.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:LOSS

1A. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Loss of the Containment Barrier.

POTENTIAL LOSS

2B. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Potential Loss of the Containment Barrier.

Basis:**Loss Threshold #1 Basis**Loss 6.A

This threshold addresses any other factors that may be used by the Emergency Director in determining whether the Containment Barrier is lost.

Potential Loss Threshold #2 BasisPotential Loss 6.A

This threshold addresses any other factors that may be used by the Emergency Director in determining whether the Containment Barrier is potentially lost. The Emergency Director should also consider whether or not to declare the barrier potentially lost in the event that barrier status cannot be monitored.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-3

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS**

MSG1

Initiating Condition:

Prolonged loss of all ~~Off-site~~offsite and all ~~On-Site~~onsite AC power to emergency busses.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note: The Emergency Director should declare the ~~General Emergency~~event promptly upon determining that ~~(site-specific hours)~~ the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.

1. Loss of **ALL** offsite and onsite AC power to 4kV vital buses 11(21) and 14(24).

AND

2. **EITHER** of the following:

a. Restoration of at least one 4kV vital bus in **< 4 hours** is not likely.

OR

b. Core exit thermocouples **> 1200°F**.

~~a. Loss of **ALL** offsite and **ALL** onsite AC power to (site-specific emergency busses)~~

~~—**AND**~~

~~b. **EITHER** of the following:~~

~~Restoration of at least one emergency bus in less than (site-specific hours) is not likely.~~

~~• (Site-specific indication of an inability to adequately remove heat from the core)~~

Basis:

SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related.

This IC addresses a prolonged loss of all power sources to AC emergency busses. A loss of all AC power compromises the performance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal and the ultimate heat sink. A

RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS

prolonged loss of these buses will lead to a loss of ~~one or more~~ any fission product barriers. In addition, fission product barrier monitoring capabilities may be degraded under these conditions.

The EAL should require declaration of a General Emergency prior to meeting the thresholds for IC FG1. This will allow additional time for implementation of offsite protective actions.

Escalation of the emergency classification from Site Area Emergency will occur if it is projected that power cannot be restored to at least one AC emergency bus by the end of the analyzed station blackout coping period. Beyond this time, plant responses and event trajectory are subject to greater uncertainty, and there is an increased likelihood of challenges to multiple fission product barriers.

The estimate for restoring at least one emergency bus should be based on a realistic appraisal of the situation. Mitigation actions with a low probability of success should not be used as a basis for delaying a classification upgrade. The goal is to maximize the time available to prepare for, and implement, protective actions for the public.

The EAL will also require a General Emergency declaration if the loss of AC power results in parameters that indicate an inability to adequately remove decay heat from the core.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SG1
2. UFSAR Section 8 and Figure 8-1
3. Technical Specifications LCO 3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating
4. Technical Specifications LCO 3.8.9 Distribution Systems-Operating
5. OI-21A-1 1A Diesel Generator
6. OI-21A-2 2A Diesel Generator
7. OI-21B-1 1B Diesel Generator
8. OI-21B-2 2B Diesel Generator
9. OI-21C OC Diesel Generator
10. STP-O-90 AC Sources and On-site Power Distribution Systems 7 Day Operability Verification
11. AOP-7I Loss of 4kV, 480 Volt, or 208/120 Volt Instrument Bus Power
12. AOP-3F Loss of Off-site Power While in MODES 3, 4, 5, or 6
13. EOP-0 Post-trip Immediate Actions
14. EOP-2 Loss of Off-site Power
15. EOP-7 Station Blackout

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS**

16. EOP-8 Functional Recovery
17. EOP-24.33 Action Value Bases Document
18. ERPIP-800 Core Damage Assessment
19. ERPIP-802 Core Damage Assessment Using Core Exit Thermocouples
20. EOP-5 Loss of Coolant Accident
21. CEN-152 Emergency Procedure Guidelines
22. OP-7 Shutdown Operations
23. ERPIP-601 Severe Accident Management Initial Diagnosis
24. Letter dated March 6, 1997 from Charles H. Cruse to USNRC "Revision to Emergency Action Levels Technical Basis Document"

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS**MSS1****Initiating Condition:**

Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency busses for 15 minutes or longer.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note: The Emergency Director should declare the ~~Site Area Emergency event~~ promptly upon determining that ~~the applicable time 15 minutes~~ has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.

1. Loss of **ALL** offsite and onsite AC power to 4kV vital buses 11(21) and 14(24).

AND

2. Failure to restore power to at least one 4kV vital bus in **< 15 minutes** from the time of loss of both offsite and onsite AC power.

~~1. Loss of **ALL** offsite and ALL onsite AC Power to (site specific emergency buses) for 15 minutes or longer.~~

Basis:

SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related.

This IC addresses a total loss of AC power that compromises the performance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal and the ultimate heat sink. In addition, fission product barrier monitoring capabilities may be degraded under these conditions. This IC represents a condition that involves actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for the protection of the public.

The emergency busses of the affected unit can be powered from the unaffected unit through the crosstie breakers. Unit crosstie is considered an adequate source of offsite power when evaluating this EAL.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS**

Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via ICs RAG1, FG1, ~~or MSG1,~~
or MG2.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SS1
2. UFSAR Section 8 and Figure 8-1
3. Technical Specifications LCO 3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating
4. Technical Specifications LCO 3.8.9 Distribution Systems-Operating
5. OI-21A-1 1A Diesel Generator
6. OI-21A-2 2A Diesel Generator
7. OI-21B-1 1B Diesel Generator
8. OI-21B-2 2B Diesel Generator
9. OI-21C OC Diesel Generator
10. STP-O-90 AC Sources and On-site Power Distribution Systems 7 Day Operability Verification
11. AOP-7I Loss of 4kV, 480 Volt, or 208/120 Volt Instrument Bus Power
12. AOP-3F Loss of Off-site Power While in MODES 3, 4, 5, or 6
13. EOP-0 Post-trip Immediate Actions
14. EOP-2 Loss of Off-site Power
15. EOP-7 Station Blackout
16. EOP-8 Functional Recovery

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS**MSA1****Initiating Condition:**

Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note: The Emergency Director should declare the **eventAlert** promptly upon determining that **the applicable time ~~15 minutes~~** has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.

1. AC power capability to 4kV vital buses 11(21) and 14(24) reduced to only one of the following power sources for **≥ 15 minutes**.

- 500kV transmission line 5051*
- 500kV transmission line 5052*
- 500kV transmission line 5072*
- SMECO line, if aligned
- Emergency Diesel Generator 1(2)A DG
- Emergency Diesel Generator 1(2)B DG
- Emergency Diesel Generator 0C DG, if aligned

*A credited 500kV line must have an independent 13kV service transformer

AND

2. Any additional single power source failure will result in a loss of **ALL** AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS.

~~1. a. AC power capability to (site specific emergency buses) is reduced to a single power source for 15 minutes or longer.~~

AND

~~b. Any additional single power source failure will result in a loss of **all** AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS.~~

Basis:

SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related.

RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS

This IC describes a significant degradation of offsite and onsite AC power sources such that any additional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. In this condition, the sole AC power source may be powering one, or more than one, train of safety-related equipment. This IC provides an escalation path from IC MSU1.

An “AC power source” is a source recognized in AOPs and EOPs, and capable of supplying required power to an emergency bus. Some examples of this condition are presented below.

- A loss of all offsite power with a concurrent failure of all but one emergency power source (e.g., an onsite diesel generator).
- ~~● A loss of all offsite power and loss of all emergency power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a single train of emergency buses being back-fed from the unit main generator.~~
- A loss of emergency power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a single train of emergency buses being back-fed from an offsite power source.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of power.

Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC MSS1.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SA1
2. UFSAR Section 8 and Figure 8-1
3. Technical Specifications LCO 3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating
4. Technical Specifications LCO 3.8.9 Distribution Systems-Operating
5. OI-21A-1 1A Diesel Generator
6. OI-21A-2 2A Diesel Generator
7. OI-21B-1 1B Diesel Generator
8. OI-21B-2 2B Diesel Generator
9. OI-21C OC Diesel Generator
10. STP-O-90 AC Sources and On-site Power Distribution Systems 7 Day Operability Verification
11. AOP-7I Loss of 4kV, 480 Volt, or 208/120 Volt Instrument Bus Power
12. AOP-3F Loss of Off-site Power While in MODES 3, 4, 5, or 6

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS**

- 13. EOP-0 Post-trip Immediate Actions
- 14. EOP-2 Loss of Off-site Power
- 15. EOP-7 Station Blackout
- 16. EOP-8 Functional Recovery

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS**MSU1****Initiating Condition:**

Loss of all offsite AC power capability to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note: The Emergency Director should declare the ~~Unusual Event~~event promptly upon determining that ~~the applicable time 15 minutes~~has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.

Loss of **ALL** offsite AC power capability to 4kV vital buses 11(21) and 14(24) for **≥ 15 minutes**.

- 500kV transmission line 5051*
- 500kV transmission line 5052*
- 500kV transmission line 5072*
- SMECO line, if aligned

*A credited 500kV line must have an independent 13kV service transformer

~~1. Loss of **ALL** offsite AC power capability to (site-specific emergency buses) for 15 minutes or longer.~~

Basis:

This IC addresses a prolonged loss of offsite power. The loss of offsite power sources renders the plant more vulnerable to a complete loss of power to AC emergency buses. This condition represents a potential reduction in the level of safety of the plant.

For emergency classification purposes, “capability” means that an offsite AC power source(s) is available to the emergency buses, whether or not the buses are powered from it.

The emergency busses of the affected unit can be powered from the unaffected unit through the crosstie breakers. Unit crosstie is considered an adequate source of offsite power when evaluating this EAL.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of offsite power.

Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC ~~MSA~~1.

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS****Basis Reference(s):**

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU1
2. UFSAR Section 8 and Figure 8-1
3. Technical Specifications LCO 3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating
4. Technical Specifications LCO 3.8.9 Distribution Systems-Operating
5. STP-O-90 AC Sources and On-site Power Distribution Systems 7 Day Operability Verification
6. EOP-2 Loss of Off-site Power

RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS

MSG28

Initiating Condition:

Loss of all AC and Vital DC power sources for 15 minutes or longer.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note: The Emergency Director should declare the ~~General Emergency~~ event promptly upon determining that ~~the applicable time 15 minutes~~ has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.

1. Loss of **ALL** offsite and onsite AC power to 4kV vital buses 11(21) and 14(24).

AND

2. Voltage is **< 105 VDC** on 125 VDC buses 11, 12, 21, and 22.

AND

3. **ALL** AC and Vital DC power sources have been lost for **≥ 15 minutes**.

~~1. a. Loss of **ALL** offsite and **ALL** onsite AC power to (site specific emergency buses) for 15 minutes or longer.~~

~~**AND**~~

~~b. Indicated voltage is less than (site specific bus voltage value) on **ALL** (site specific Vital DC busses) for 15 minutes or longer.~~

Basis:

SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related.

This IC addresses a concurrent and prolonged loss of both AC and Vital DC power. A loss of all AC power compromises the performance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal and the ultimate heat sink. A loss of Vital DC power compromises the ability to monitor and control SAFETY SYSTEMS. A sustained loss of both AC and DC power will lead to multiple challenges to fission product barriers.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses. The 15-minute emergency declaration clock begins at the point when ~~both all~~ EAL ~~conditions s thresholds~~ are met.

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS****Basis Reference(s):**

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SG8
2. UFSAR Section 8, Figure 8-1 and Figure 8.9
3. Technical Specifications LCO 3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating
4. Technical Specifications LCO 3.8.9 Distribution Systems-Operating
5. OI-21A-1 1A Diesel Generator
6. OI-21A-2 2A Diesel Generator
7. OI-21B-1 1B Diesel Generator
8. OI-21B-2 2B Diesel Generator
9. OI-21C OC Diesel Generator
10. STP-O-90 AC Sources and On-site Power Distribution Systems 7 Day Operability Verification
11. AOP-7I Loss of 4kV, 480 Volt, or 208/120 Volt Instrument Bus Power
12. AOP-3F Loss of Off-site Power While in MODES 3, 4, 5, or 6
13. EOP-0 Post-trip Immediate Actions
14. EOP-2 Loss of Off-site Power
15. EOP-7 Station Blackout
16. EOP-8 Functional Recovery
17. EOP-24.33 Action Value Bases Document
18. ERPIP-800 Core Damage Assessment
19. ERPIP-802 Core Damage Assessment Using Core Exit Thermocouples
20. EOP-5 Loss of Coolant Accident
21. CEN-152 Emergency Procedure Guidelines
22. OP-7 Shutdown Operations
23. ERPIP-601 Severe Accident Management Initial Diagnosis
24. Letter dated March 6, 1997 from Charles H. Cruse to USNRC "Revision to Emergency Action Levels Technical Basis Document"
25. AOP-7J Loss of 120 Volt Vital AC or 125 Volt Vital DC Power
26. Technical Specifications Bases 3.8.4

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS****MSG28****Initiating Condition:**

Loss of all vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note: The Emergency Director should declare the ~~Site Area Emergency~~ event promptly upon determining that ~~the applicable time 15 minutes~~ has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.

Voltage is **< 105 VDC** on 125 VDC busses 11, 12, 21, and 22 for **≥ 15 minutes**.

~~Indicated voltage is less than (site specific bus voltage value) on ALL (site specific Vital DC busses) for 15 minutes or longer.~~

Basis:

SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related.

This IC addresses a loss of Vital DC power which compromises the ability to monitor and control SAFETY SYSTEMS. In modes above Cold Shutdown, this condition involves a major failure of plant functions needed for the protection of the public.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via ICs RAG1, FG1 or **MSG28**.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SS8
2. UFSAR Section 8.4.3 and Figure 8.9
3. EOP-0 Post-Trip Immediate Actions
4. EOP-2 Loss of Off-Site Power, Section V
5. AOP-7J Loss of 120 Volt Vital AC or 125 Volt Vital DC Power
6. Technical Specifications Bases 3.8.4

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS**MSS35****Initiating Condition:**

Inability to shutdown the reactor causing a challenge to core cooling or RCS heat removal.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

1. Automatic or Manual Trip did **not** shutdown the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power \geq 5%.

AND

2. All DSS / manual actions to shutdown the reactor have been unsuccessful as indicated by Reactor Power \geq 5%.

AND

3. **ANY** of the following conditions exist:

a. Core exit thermocouples $>$ 1200°F

OR

b. Once Through Core Cooling (OTCC) in effect.

~~1. Automatic or Manual trip did **not** shutdown the reactor~~

~~**AND**~~

~~2. **All** manual actions to shutdown the reactor have been unsuccessful~~

~~**AND**~~

~~3. **EITHER** of the following conditions exist:~~

~~a. (Site specific indication of an inability to adequately remove heat from the core)~~

~~**OR**~~

~~b. (Site specific indication of an inability to adequately remove heat from the RCS)~~

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS****Basis:**

This IC addresses a failure of the RPS to initiate or complete an automatic or manual reactor trip that results in a reactor shutdown, **all subsequent operator manual actions, both inside and outside the Control Room including driving in control rods and boron injection, all subsequent operator actions to manually shutdown the reactor** are unsuccessful, and continued power generation is challenging the capability to adequately remove heat from the core and/or the RCS. This condition will lead to fuel damage if additional mitigation actions are unsuccessful and thus warrants the declaration of a Site Area Emergency.

In some instances, the emergency classification resulting from this IC/EAL may be higher than that resulting from an assessment of the plant responses and symptoms against the Recognition Category F ICs/EALs. This is appropriate in that the Recognition Category F ICs/EALs do not address the additional threat posed by a failure to shutdown the reactor. The inclusion of this IC and EAL ensures the timely declaration of a Site Area Emergency in response to prolonged failure to shutdown the reactor.

~~A reactor shutdown is determined in accordance with applicable Emergency Operating Procedure criteria.~~

Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC RAG1 or FG1.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SS5
2. Technical Specifications 3.3.1, Reactor Protective System (RPS) Instrumentation - Operating
3. Technical Specifications 3.3.2, Reactor Protective System (RPS) Instrumentation - Shutdown
4. Technical Specifications 3.3.3, Reactor Protective System (RPS) Logic and Trip Initiation
5. EOP-0 Post-Trip Immediate Actions
6. EOP-8 Functional Recovery
7. UFSAR Section 7
8. AOP-3G Malfunction of Main Feedwater System
9. UFSAR 14.1.2.2.e
10. UFSAR 14.4.1 & Table 14.1-2
11. ERPIP-800 Core Damage Assessment
12. ERPIP-802 Core Damage Assessment Using Core Exit Thermocouples
13. EOP-5 Loss of Coolant Accident

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS**

14. EOP-24.33 Action Value Bases Document
15. CEN-152 Emergency Procedure Guidelines
16. OP-7 Shutdown Operations
17. ERPIP-601 Severe Accident Management Initial Diagnosis

RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS

MSA35

Initiating Condition:

Automatic or manual trip fails to shutdown the reactor, and subsequent manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in shutting down the reactor.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note: A manual action is any operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies.

1. ~~An a~~Automatic or manual ~~T~~trip did **not** shutdown the reactor **as indicated by Reactor Power \geq 5%.**

AND

2. ~~DSS / M~~manual actions taken at the ~~reactor control consoles~~Console Center are **not** successful in shutting down the reactor **as indicated by Reactor Power \geq 5%.**

Basis:

This IC addresses a failure of the RPS to initiate or complete an automatic ~~or manual~~ reactor trip that results in a reactor shutdown, and subsequent operator manual actions taken at the ~~reactor control consoles~~Console Center to shutdown the reactor are also unsuccessful. This condition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. An emergency declaration is required even if the reactor is subsequently shutdown by an action taken away from the reactor control consoles since this event entails a significant failure of the RPS.

A manual action at the ~~reactor control consoles~~Console Center is any operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core (e.g., initiating a manual reactor trip. This action does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies. If this action(s) is unsuccessful, operators would immediately pursue additional manual actions at locations away from the ~~reactor control consoles~~Console Center (e.g., locally opening breakers). Actions taken at back-panels or other locations within the Control Room, or any location outside the Control Room, are not considered to be "at the ~~reactor control consoles~~Console Center".

The plant response to the failure of an automatic ~~or manual~~ reactor trip will vary based upon several factors including the reactor power level prior to the event, availability of the condenser, performance of mitigation equipment and actions, other concurrent plant conditions, etc. If the failure to shutdown the reactor is prolonged enough to cause a challenge to the core cooling or RCS heat removal safety functions, the emergency

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS**

classification level will escalate to a Site Area Emergency via IC **MSS35**. Depending upon plant responses and symptoms, escalation is also possible via IC FS1. Absent the plant conditions needed to meet either IC **MSS35** or FS1, an Alert declaration is appropriate for this event.

It is recognized that plant responses or symptoms may also require an Alert declaration in accordance with the Recognition Category F ICs; however, this IC and EAL are included to ensure a timely emergency declaration.

~~A reactor shutdown is determined in accordance with applicable Emergency Operating Procedure criteria.~~

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SA5
2. Technical Specifications 3.3.1, Reactor Protective System (RPS) Instrumentation - Operating
3. Technical Specifications 3.3.2, Reactor Protective System (RPS) Instrumentation - Shutdown
4. Technical Specifications 3.3.3, Reactor Protective System (RPS) Logic and Trip Initiation
5. EOP-0 Post-Trip Immediate Actions
6. EOP-8 Functional Recovery
7. UFSAR Section 7
8. AOP-3G Malfunction of Main Feedwater System
9. UFSAR 14.1.2.2.e
10. UFSAR 14.4.1 & Table 14.1-2

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS**

MSU35

Initiating Condition:

Automatic or manual trip fails to shutdown the reactor.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note: A manual action is any operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies.

1. a. ~~An a~~ Automatic Ttrip did not shutdown the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power $\geq 5\%$.

AND

- b. ~~A s~~ Subsequent DSS / manual action taken at the ~~reactor control consoles~~ Console Center is successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power $< 5\%$.

OR

2. a. ~~A m~~ Manual Ttrip did not shutdown the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power $\geq 5\%$.

AND

- b. **EITHER** of the following:

1. ~~A subsequent~~ Subsequent DSS / manual action taken at the reactor control consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power $< 5\%$.

OR

- ~~2.~~ ~~A s~~ Subsequent DSS / automatic Ttrip is successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power $< 5\%$.

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS****Basis:**

This IC addresses a failure of the RPS to initiate or complete an automatic or manual reactor trip that results in a reactor shutdown, and either a subsequent operator manual action taken at the ~~Console Center reactor control consoles~~ or an automatic trip is successful in shutting down the reactor. This event is a precursor to a more significant condition and thus represents a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

EAL #1 Basis

Following the failure on an automatic reactor trip, operators will promptly initiate manual actions at the ~~Console Center reactor control consoles~~ to shutdown the reactor (e.g., initiate a manual reactor trip). If these manual actions are successful in shutting down the reactor, core heat generation will quickly fall to a level within the capabilities of the plant's decay heat removal systems.

EAL #2 Basis

If an initial manual reactor trip is unsuccessful, ~~operators will promptly take manual action at another location(s) on the reactor control consoles to shutdown the reactor (e.g., initiate a manual reactor trip using a different switch). Depending upon several factors, the initial or subsequent effort to manually trip the reactor, or~~ a concurrent plant condition, may lead to the generation of an automatic reactor trip signal. If a subsequent ~~manual or~~ automatic trip is successful in shutting down the reactor, core heat generation will quickly fall to a level within the capabilities of the plant's decay heat removal systems.

A manual action at the ~~Console Center reactor control consoles~~ is any operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core (e.g., initiating a manual reactor trip). This action does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies. Actions taken at back-panels or other locations within the Control Room, or any location outside the Control Room, are not considered to be "at the ~~Console Center reactor control consoles~~".

The plant response to the failure of an automatic or manual reactor trip will vary based upon several factors including the reactor power level prior to the event, availability of the condenser, performance of mitigation equipment and actions, other concurrent plant conditions, etc. If subsequent operator manual actions taken at the ~~Console Center reactor control consoles~~ are also unsuccessful in shutting down the reactor, then the emergency classification level will escalate to an Alert via IC ~~MSA35~~. Depending upon the plant response, escalation is also possible via IC FA1. Absent the plant conditions needed to meet either IC ~~MSA35~~ or FA1, an Unusual Event declaration is appropriate for this event.

~~A reactor shutdown is determined in accordance with applicable Emergency Operating Procedure criteria.~~

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS**

Should a reactor trip signal be generated as a result of plant work (e.g., RPS setpoint testing), the following classification guidance should be applied.

- If the signal **generated as a result of plant work** causes a plant transient that **created a real condition that** should have included an automatic reactor trip and the RPS fails to automatically shutdown the reactor, then this IC and the EALs are applicable, and should be evaluated.
- If the signal **generated as a result of plant work** does not cause a plant transient **but should have generated an RPS trip signal** and the trip failure is determined through other means (e.g., assessment of test results), then this IC and the EALs are not applicable and no classification is warranted.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU5
2. Technical Specifications 3.3.1, Reactor Protective System (RPS) Instrumentation - Operating
3. Technical Specifications 3.3.2, Reactor Protective System (RPS) Instrumentation - Shutdown
4. Technical Specifications 3.3.3, Reactor Protective System (RPS) Logic and Trip Initiation
5. EOP-0 Post-Trip Immediate Actions
6. UFSAR Section 7
7. AOP-3G Malfunction of Main Feedwater System
8. UFSAR 14.1.2.2.e
9. UFSAR 14.4.1 & Table 14.1-2

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS**

MSA42

Initiating Condition:

UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer with a significant transient in progress.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note: The Emergency Director should declare the **eventAlert** promptly upon determining that **the applicable time 15 minutes** has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.

1. a. ~~An~~ UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more **Table M1 of the following** parameters from within the Control Room for **≥ 15 minutes or longer**.

[see table below]

[PWR parameter list]
Reactor Power
RCS Level
RCS Pressure
In Core/Core Exit Temperature
Levels in at least (site specific number) steam generators
Steam Generator Auxiliary or Emergency Feed Water Flow

Table M1 Control Room Parameters
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reactor Power • PZR Level • RCS Pressure • In Core/Core Exit Temperature • Level in at least one Steam Generator • Auxiliary Feed Water Flow

AND

- b. Any **Table M2 of the following** transient **events** in progress.

- ~~Automatic or Manual runback greater than 25% thermal reactor power~~
- ~~Electrical load rejection greater than 25% full electrical load~~
- ~~Reactor trip~~
- ~~ECCS (SI) actuation~~

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS****Table M2 Significant Transients**

- Automatic Turbine Runback >25% thermal reactor power
- Electrical Load Rejection >25% full electrical load
- Reactor Trip
- Safety Injection Actuation

Basis:

UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown.

SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related.

This IC addresses the difficulty associated with monitoring rapidly changing plant conditions during a transient without the ability to obtain SAFETY SYSTEM parameters from within the Control Room. During this condition, the margin to a potential fission product barrier challenge is reduced. It thus represents a potential substantial degradation in the level of safety of the plant.

As used in this EAL, an “inability to monitor” means that values for one or more of the listed parameters cannot be determined from within the Control Room. This situation would require a loss of all of the Control Room sources for the given parameter(s). For example, the reactor power level cannot be determined from any analog, **computer point**, digital and recorder source within the Control Room.

An event involving a loss of plant indications, annunciators and/or display systems is evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (and associated guidance in NUREG-1022) to determine if an NRC event report is required. The event would be reported if it significantly impaired the capability to perform emergency assessments. In particular, emergency assessments necessary to implement abnormal operating procedures, emergency operating procedures, and emergency plan implementing procedures addressing emergency classification, accident assessment, or protective action decision-making.

RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS

This EAL is focused on a selected subset of plant parameters associated with the key safety functions of reactivity control, core cooling and RCS heat removal. The loss of the ability to determine one or more of these parameters from within the Control Room is considered to be more significant than simply a reportable condition. In addition, if all indication sources for one or more of the listed parameters are lost, then the ability to determine the values of other SAFETY SYSTEM parameters may be impacted as well. For example, if the value for reactor vessel level cannot be determined from the indications and recorders on a main control board, the SPDS or the plant computer, the availability of other parameter values may be compromised as well.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of indication.

Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via ICs FS1 or IC RAS1.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SA2
2. UFSAR Sections 7.6 and 7.7
3. AOP-7J Loss of 120 Volt Vital AC or 125 Volt Vital DC Power
4. UFSAR 7.5.5
5. OI-50A Plant Computer

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS**

MSU42

Initiating Condition:

UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note: The Emergency Director should declare the ~~Unusual Event~~event promptly upon determining that ~~the applicable time 15 minutes~~has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.

~~a. An~~UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more **Table M1** parameters from within the Control Room for **≥ 15 minutes**.

Table M1 Control Room Parameters
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reactor Power • PZR Level • RCS Pressure • In Core/Core Exit Temperature • Level in at least one Steam Generator • Auxiliary Feed Water Flow

- ~~of the following parameters from within the Control Room for 15 minutes or longer.~~

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS**

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • {BWR parameter list} 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • {PWR parameter list}
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reactor Power • — 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reactor Power • —
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RPV Water Level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RCS Level
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RPV Pressure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RCS Pressure
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary Containment Pressure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In-Core/Core Exit Temperature
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Suppression Pool Level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Levels in at least (site-specific number)-steam generators
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Suppression Pool Temperature 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Steam Generator Auxiliary or Emergency Feed Water Flow

RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS

Basis:

UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown.

SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related.

This IC addresses the difficulty associated with monitoring normal plant conditions without the ability to obtain SAFETY SYSTEM parameters from within the Control Room. This condition is a precursor to a more significant event and represents a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant.

As used in this EAL, an “inability to monitor” means that values for one or more of the listed parameters cannot be determined from within the Control Room. This situation would require a loss of all of the Control Room sources for the given parameter(s). For example, the reactor power level cannot be determined from any analog, digital and recorder source within the Control Room.

An event involving a loss of plant indications, annunciators and/or display systems is evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (and associated guidance in NUREG-1022) to determine if an NRC event report is required. The event would be reported if it significantly impaired the capability to perform emergency assessments. In particular, emergency assessments necessary to implement abnormal operating procedures, emergency operating procedures, and emergency plan implementing procedures addressing emergency classification, accident assessment, or protective action decision-making.

This EAL is focused on a selected subset of plant parameters associated with the key safety functions of reactivity control, core cooling and RCS heat removal. The loss of the ability to determine one or more of these parameters from within the Control Room is considered to be more significant than simply a reportable condition. In addition, if all indication sources for one or more of the listed parameters are lost, then the ability to determine the values of other SAFETY SYSTEM parameters may be impacted as well. For example, if the value for reactor vessel level cannot be determined from the indications and recorders on a main control board, the SPDS or the plant computer, the availability of other parameter values may be compromised as well.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of indication.

Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC **MSA42**.

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS**

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU2
2. UFSAR Sections 7.6 and 7.7
3. AOP-7J Loss of 120 Volt Vital AC or 125 Volt Vital DC Power
4. UFSAR 7.5.5
5. OI-50A Plant Computer

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS**

MSA59

Initiating Condition:

Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM ~~needed~~required for the current operating mode.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note:

- If it is determined that the conditions of MCA52 are not met then assess the event via HU3, HU4, or HU6.

(4) 1. a- The occurrence of **ANY** of the following hazardous events:

- Seismic event (earthquake)
- Internal or external flooding event
- High winds or tornado strike
- FIRE
- EXPLOSION
- ~~(site specific hazards)~~
- Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager

AND

2.b- **EITHER** of the following:

- a.1- Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM ~~needed~~required by **Technical Specifications** for the current operating mode.

OR

- b.2- The event has caused **VISIBLE DAMAGE** to a SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure ~~needed~~required by **Technical Specifications** for the current operating mode.

Basis:

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute FIRES. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent and catastrophic failure of a piece of equipment due to combustion, chemical reaction or overpressurization. A release of steam (from high energy lines or components) or an electrical component failure (caused by short circuits, grounding, arcing, etc.) should not automatically be considered an explosion. Such events may require a post-event inspection to determine if the attributes of an explosion are present.

SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to a component or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. The visual impact of the damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the affected component or structure.

This IC addresses a hazardous event that causes damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM, or a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components, ~~needed~~ required for the current operating mode, "required", i.e. required to be operable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode. This condition significantly reduces the margin to a loss or potential loss of a fission product barrier, and therefore represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. ~~Manual or automatic electrical isolation of safety equipment due to flooding, in and of itself, does not constitute degraded performance and is classified under HU6.~~

EAL 1.b.1#2.a Basis

This EAL addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM train that is required to be operable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode, and is in ~~service~~/operation since indications for it will be readily available. The indications of degraded performance should be significant enough to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the SAFETY SYSTEM train.

EAL 1.b.2#2.b Basis

This EAL addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM component that is ~~required to be operable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode, and is not in service~~/operation or readily apparent through indications alone, ~~or as well as damage to~~ a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components. Operators will make this determination based on the totality of available event and damage report information. This is intended to be a brief assessment not requiring lengthy analysis or quantification of the damage.

Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC FS1 or RAS1.

If the EAL conditions of MA5 are not met then assess the event via HU3, HU4, or HU6.

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS**

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 SA9

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS**MSU64****Initiating Condition:**

RCS leakage for 15 minutes or longer.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note: The Emergency Director should declare the ~~Unusual Event~~event promptly upon determining that ~~the applicable time 15 minutes~~has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.

1. RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage ~~greater than~~
> 10 gpm for \geq 15 minutes. ~~(site-specific value) for 15 minutes or longer.~~

OR

2. RCS identified leakage ~~greater than~~**>25 gpm for \geq 15 minutes.** ~~(site-specific value) for 15 minutes or longer.~~

OR

3. Leakage from the RCS to a location outside containment **>25 gpm for \geq 15 minutes.** ~~greater than 25 gpm for 15 minutes or longer.~~

Basis:

UNISOLABLE: An open or breached system line that cannot be isolated, remotely or locally.

~~Failure to isolate the leak within 15 minutes or if known that the leak cannot be isolated within 15 minutes from the start of the leak requires immediate classification.~~

This IC addresses RCS leakage which may be a precursor to a more significant event. In this case, RCS leakage has been detected and operators, following applicable procedures, have been unable to promptly isolate the leak. This condition is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

EAL #1 and EAL #2 Basis

~~These EALs~~ are focused on a loss of mass from the RCS due to "unidentified leakage", "pressure boundary leakage" or "identified leakage" (as these leakage types are defined in the plant Technical Specifications).

EAL #3 Basis

~~This EAL~~ addresses a RCS mass loss caused by an UNISOLABLE leak through an interfacing system.

RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS

These EALs thus apply to leakage into the containment, a secondary-side system (e.g., steam generator tube leakage) or a location outside of containment.

The leak rate values for each EAL were selected because they are usually observable with normal Control Room indications. Lesser values typically require time-consuming calculations to determine (e.g., a mass balance calculation). EAL #1 uses a lower value that reflects the greater significance of unidentified or pressure boundary leakage.

The release of mass from the RCS due to the as-designed/expected operation of a relief valve does not warrant an emergency classification. An emergency classification

would be required if a mass loss is caused by a relief valve that is not functioning as designed/expected (e.g., a relief valve sticks open and the line flow cannot be isolated).

The 15-minute threshold duration allows sufficient time for prompt operator actions to isolate the leakage, if possible.

Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via ICs of Recognition Category **RA** or F.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU4
2. Technical Specifications 3.4.13, Reactor Coolant System Operational Leakage
3. AOP-2A Excessive Reactor Coolant Leakage
4. STP 0-27-1(2) RCS Leakage Evaluation
5. Technical Specifications 1.1, Definitions

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS**

MSU76

Initiating Condition:

Loss of all ~~On~~-onsite or ~~Off~~-onsite communications capabilities.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

1. Loss of **ALL** Table M3 **Onsite** communications capability affecting the ability to perform routine operations.

OR

2. Loss of **ALL** Table M3 **Offsite** communication capability affecting the ability to perform offsite notifications.

OR

3. Loss of **ALL** Table M3 **NRC** communication capability affecting the ability to perform NRC notifications.

Table M3 Communications Capability			
System	Onsite	Offsite	NRC
Plant Page System	X		
CCNPP Radio System	X	X	
Commercial landline telephones	X	X	X
FTS 2001 telephone system (HPN, ENS)			X
Satellite Phone System		X	X

- ~~1. Loss of **ALL** of the following onsite communication methods:~~

~~(site-specific list of communications method)~~

- ~~2. Loss of **ALL** of the following ORO communications s) methods:~~

~~(site-specific list of communications methods)~~

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS**

~~3. Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods:~~

~~(site specific list of communications methods)~~

Basis:

This IC addresses a significant loss of on-site~~—~~, ~~offsite~~, or ~~NRC~~ or ~~offsite~~ communications capabilities. While not a direct challenge to plant or personnel safety, this event warrants prompt notifications to ~~Offsite Response Organizations (OROs)~~ and the NRC.

This IC should be assessed only when extraordinary means are being utilized to make communications possible (e.g., use of non-plant, privately owned equipment, relaying of on-site information via individuals or multiple radio transmission points, individuals being sent to offsite locations, etc.).

EAL #1 Basis

~~a~~Addresses a total loss of the communications methods used in support of routine plant operations.

EAL #2 Basis

~~a~~Addresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify all OROs of an emergency declaration. The OROs referred to here are ~~listed in procedure EP-MA-114-100-F-01, State / Local Event Notification Form. (see Developer Notes).~~

EAL #3 basis

~~a~~Addresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify the NRC of an emergency declaration.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU6
2. Emergency Response Facility Directory & Communications Equipment Information
3. NO-1-113, Control of Radio Transmitter (PRT)

RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS

MSU87

Initiating Condition:

Failure to isolate containment or loss of containment pressure control.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

1. a. Failure of containment to isolate when required by an actuation signal.

AND

- b. **ANY** required penetration remains open ≥ 15 minutes of the from the actuation signal. ~~ALL required penetrations are **not** closed within 15 minutes of the actuation signal.~~

OR

2. a. Containment pressure > 4.25 psig

AND

- b. **Cannot** meet containment design cooling by at least one of the following for ≥ 15 minutes. :
 - 2 Containment Spray Pumps Operating
 - 3 CAC's Operating
 - 1 Containment Spray Pump and 2 CAC's Operating

~~2~~

- ~~a. Containment pressure greater than (site specific pressure).~~

AND

- ~~b. Less than one full train of (site specific system or equipment) is operating per design for 15 minutes or longer.~~

Basis:

This IC addresses a failure of ~~one or more~~any containment penetrations to automatically isolate (close) when required by an actuation signal. It also addresses an event that results in high containment pressure with a concurrent failure of containment pressure control systems. Absent challenges to another fission product barrier, either condition represents potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS****For EAL #1 Basis**

The containment isolation signal must be generated as the result of an off-normal/accident condition (e.g., a safety injection or high containment pressure); a failure resulting from testing or maintenance does not warrant classification. The determination of containment and penetration status – isolated or not isolated – should be made in accordance with the appropriate criteria contained in the plant AOPs and EOPs. The 15-minute criterion is included to allow operators time to manually isolate the required penetrations, if possible.

EAL #2 Basis

Addresses a condition where containment pressure is greater than the setpoint at which containment energy (heat) removal systems are designed to automatically actuate, and less than one full train of equipment is capable of operating per design. The 15-minute criterion is included to allow operators time to manually start equipment that may not have automatically started, if possible. The inability to start the required equipment indicates that containment heat removal/depressurization systems (e.g., containment sprays or ice condenser fans) are either lost or performing in a degraded manner.

This event would escalate to a Site Area Emergency in accordance with IC FS1 if there were a concurrent loss or potential loss of either the Fuel Clad or RCS fission product barriers.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU7
2. UFSAR Section 14.20
3. UFSAR Figures 6.2.1-1 through 6.2.1-6b
4. UFSAR 1.2.5
5. UFSAR 5.1.1
6. UFSAR 7.5.8
7. Technical Specifications Table 3.3.10-1
8. OI-41A Hydrogen Recombiners
9. 1C10-ALM ESFAS 14 Alarm Manual, J-09
12. 1C08-ALM ESFAS 11 Alarm Manual, G-07, ACTUATION SYSTEM CSAS TRIP
13. Technical Specifications Table 3.3.4-1
14. Technical Specifications 3.6.6

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

CA12

Initiating Condition:

Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency busses for 15 minutes or longer.

Operating Mode Applicability:

5, 6, D

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note: The Emergency Director should declare the ~~Alert event~~ promptly upon determining that ~~the applicable time 15 minutes time~~ has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.

1. Loss of **ALL** offsite and onsite AC power to 4kV vital buses 11(21) and 14(24).
AND
2. Failure to restore power to at least one 4kV vital bus in **< 15 minutes** from the time of loss of both offsite and onsite AC power.

~~Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC Power to (site-specific emergency busses) for 15 minutes or longer.~~

Basis:

SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related

This IC addresses a total loss of AC power that compromises the performance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal and the ultimate heat sink.

When in the cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode, this condition is not classified as a Site Area Emergency because of the increased time available to restore an emergency bus to service. Additional time is available due to the reduced core decay heat load, and the lower temperatures and pressures in various plant systems. Thus, when in these modes, this condition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

The emergency busses of the affected unit can be powered from the unaffected unit through the crosstie breakers. Unit crosstie is considered an adequate source of offsite power when evaluating this EAL.

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CS64 or RAS1.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CA2
2. UFSAR Section 8 and Figure 8-1
3. Technical Specifications LCO 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown
4. Technical Specifications LCO 3.8.10 Distribution Systems-Shutdown
5. OI-21A-1 1A Diesel Generator
6. OI-21A-2 2A Diesel Generator
7. OI-21B-1 1B Diesel Generator
8. OI-21B-2 2B Diesel Generator
9. OI-21C OC Diesel Generator
10. STP-O-90 AC Sources and On-site Power Distribution Systems 7 Day Operability Verification
11. AOP-7I Loss of 4kV, 480 Volt, or 208/120 Volt Instrument Bus Power
12. AOP-3F Loss of Off-site Power While in MODES 3, 4, 5, or 6
13. EOP-2 Loss of Off-site Power
14. EOP-7 Station Blackout
15. EOP-8 Functional Recovery

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

CU12

Initiating Condition:

Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer.

Operating Mode Applicability:

5, 6, D

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note: The Emergency Director should declare the ~~Unusual Event~~event promptly upon determining that ~~the applicable time 15 minutes~~has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.

1. AC power capability to 4kV vital buses 11(21) and 14(24) reduced to only one of the following power sources for **≥ 15 minutes**.

- 500kV transmission line 5051*
- 500kV transmission line 5052*
- 500kV transmission line 5072*
- SMECO line, if aligned
- Emergency Diesel Generator 1(2)A DG
- Emergency Diesel Generator 1(2)B DG
- Emergency Diesel Generator 0C DG, if aligned

*A credited 500kV line must have an independent 13kV service transformer

AND

2. **ANY** additional single power source failure will result in a loss of **ALL** AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS.

- a. ~~AC power capability to (site specific emergency buses) is reduced to a single power source for 15 minutes or longer.~~

AND

- b. ~~Any additional single power source failure will result in loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS.~~

Basis:

SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related.

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY

This IC describes a significant degradation of offsite and onsite AC power sources such that any additional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. In this condition, the sole AC power source may be powering one, or more than one, train of safety-related equipment.

When in the cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode, this condition is not classified as an Alert because of the increased time available to restore another power source to service. Additional time is available due to the reduced core decay heat load, and the lower temperatures and pressures in various plant systems. Thus, when in these modes, this condition is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

An "AC power source" is a source recognized in AOPs and EOPs, and capable of supplying required power to an emergency bus. Some examples of this condition are presented below.

- A loss of all offsite power with a concurrent failure of all but one emergency power source (e.g., an onsite diesel generator).
- A loss of all offsite power and loss of all emergency power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a single train of emergency buses being back-fed from the unit main generator.
- A loss of emergency power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a single train of emergency buses being back-fed from an offsite power source.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of power.

The subsequent loss of the remaining single power source would escalate the event to an Alert in accordance with IC CA12.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6 CU2
2. UFSAR Section 8 and Figure 8-1
3. Technical Specifications LCO 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown
4. Technical Specifications LCO 3.8.10 Distribution Systems-Shutdown
5. OI-21A-1 1A Diesel Generator
6. OI-21A-2 2A Diesel Generator
7. OI-21B-1 1B Diesel Generator
8. OI-21B-2 2B Diesel Generator
9. OI-21C OC Diesel Generator
10. STP-O-90 AC Sources and On-site Power Distribution Systems 7 Day Operability Verification

RECOGNITION CATEGORY

HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY

11. AOP-7I Loss of 4kV, 480 Volt, or 208/120 Volt Instrument Bus Power
12. AOP-3F Loss of Off-site Power While in MODES 3, 4, 5, or 6
13. EOP-2 Loss of Off-site Power

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

CA26

Initiating Condition:

Hazardous event affecting SAFETY SYSTEM ~~needed~~required for the current operating mode.

Operating Mode Applicability:

5, 6

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note:

- If it is determined that the conditions of CA2 are not met then assess the event via HU3, HU4, or HU6.

1. ~~a.~~ The occurrence of **ANY** of the following hazardous events:

- Seismic event (earthquake)
- Internal or external flooding event
- High winds or tornado strike
- FIRE
- EXPLOSION
- ~~(site specific hazards)~~
- Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager

AND

2.~~b.~~ **EITHER** of the following:

- ~~a.1.~~ Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM ~~needed~~required by **Technical Specifications** for the current operating mode.

OR

- ~~b.2.~~ The event has caused **VISIBLE DAMAGE** to a SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure ~~needed~~required by **Technical Specifications** for the current operating mode.

Basis:

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute FIRES. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent and catastrophic failure of a piece of equipment due to combustion, chemical reaction or overpressurization. A release of steam (from high energy lines or components) or an electrical component failure (caused by short circuits, grounding, arcing, etc.) should not automatically be considered an explosion. Such events may require a post-event inspection to determine if the attributes of an explosion are present.

SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to a component or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. The visual impact of the damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the affected component or structure.

This IC addresses a hazardous event that causes damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM, or a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components, ~~needed~~required for the current operating mode, "required", i.e. required to be operable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode. This condition significantly reduces the margin to a loss or potential loss of a fission product barrier, and therefore represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Manual or automatic electrical isolation of safety equipment due to flooding, in and of itself, does not constitute degraded performance and is classified under HU6.

EAL 1.b.12.a Basis

~~a~~Addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM train that is ~~required to be operable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode, and is in service/~~operation since indications for it will be readily available. The indications of degraded performance should be significant enough to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the SAFETY SYSTEM train.

EAL 1.b.22.b Basis

~~a~~Addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM component that is ~~required to be operable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode, and is not in service/~~operation or readily apparent through indications alone, or to a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components. Operators will make this determination based on the totality of available event and damage report information. This is intended to be a brief assessment not requiring lengthy analysis or quantification of the damage.

Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CS64 or RAS1.

If the EAL conditions of CA2 are not met then assess the event via HU3, HU4, or HU6.

Basis Reference(s):

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CA6

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

CU34

Initiating Condition:

Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer.

Operating Mode Applicability:

5, 6

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note: The Emergency Director should declare the ~~Unusual Event~~event promptly upon determining that ~~the applicable time 15 minutes time~~ has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.

Voltage is **< 105 VDC** on required 125 VDC busses 11, 12, 21, and 22 for **≥ 15 minutes**.

~~Indicated voltage is less than (site specific bus voltage value) on required Vital DC buses for 15 minutes or longer.~~

Basis:

SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related.

This IC addresses a loss of Vital DC power which compromises the ability to monitor and control operable SAFETY SYSTEMS when the plant is in the cold shutdown or refueling mode. In these modes, the core decay heat load has been significantly reduced, and coolant system temperatures and pressures are lower; these conditions ~~increaseraise~~ the time available to restore a vital DC bus to service. Thus, this condition is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

As used in this EAL, “required” means the Vital DC buses necessary to support operation of the in-service, or operable, train or trains of SAFETY SYSTEM equipment. For example, if Train A is out-of-service (inoperable) for scheduled outage maintenance work and Train B is in-service (operable), then a loss of Vital DC power affecting Train B would require the declaration of an Unusual Event. A loss of Vital DC power to Train A would not warrant an emergency classification.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Depending upon the event, escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CA64 or CA53, or an IC in Recognition Category RA.

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CU4
2. UFSAR Section 8.4.3 and Figure 8.9
3. EOP-0 Post-Trip Immediate Actions
4. EOP-2 Loss of Off-Site Power, Section V
5. AOP-7J Loss of 120 Volt Vital AC or 125 Volt Vital DC Power
6. Technical Specifications Bases 3.8.10

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

CU45

Initiating Condition:

Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities.

Operating Mode Applicability:

5, 6, D

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

1. Loss of **ALL** Table C1 **Onsite** communications capability affecting the ability to perform routine operations.

OR

2. Loss of **ALL** Table C1 **Offsite** communication capability affecting the ability to perform offsite notifications.

OR

3. Loss of **ALL** Table C1 **NRC** communication capability affecting the ability to perform NRC notifications.

Table C1 – Communications Capability			
System	Onsite	Offsite	NRC
Plant Page System	X		
CCNPP Radio System	X	X	
Commercial landline telephones	X	X	X
FTS 2001 telephone system (HPN, ENS)			X
Satellite Phone System		X	X

~~1. Loss of **ALL** of the following onsite communication methods:
(site specific list of communications methods)~~

~~2. Loss of **ALL** of the following ORO communications methods:
(site specific list of communications methods)~~

~~3. Loss of **ALL** of the following NRC communications methods:
(site specific list of communications methods)~~

Basis:

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY

This IC addresses a significant loss of on-site—, offsite, or NRC or—offsite communications capabilities. While not a direct challenge to plant or personnel safety, this event warrants prompt notifications to Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) and the NRC.

This IC should be assessed only when extraordinary means are being utilized to make communications possible (e.g., use of non-plant, privately owned equipment, relaying of on-site information via individuals or multiple radio transmission points, individuals being sent to offsite locations, etc.).

EAL #1 Basis

aAddresses a total loss of the communications methods used in support of routine plant operations.

EAL #2 Basis

aAddresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify all OROs of an emergency declaration. The OROs referred to here are listed in procedure EP-MA-114-100-F-01, State / Local Event Notification Form. (see Developer Notes).

EAL #3 Basis

aAddresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify the NRC of an emergency declaration.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CU5
2. Emergency Response Facility Directory & Communications Equipment Information
3. NO-1-113, Control of Radio Transmitter (PRT)

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

CA53

Initiating Condition:

Inability to maintain the plant in cold shutdown.

Operating Mode Applicability:

5, 6

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note:

- —The Emergency Director should declare the **Alert—event** promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
- A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant a classification.

1. UNPLANNED rise in RCS temperature > 200°F for > Table C2 duration.

Table C2 RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds		
RCS Status	Containment Closure Status	Heat-up Duration
Intact	Not Applicable	60 minutes*
Not Intact OR	Established	20 minutes*
	Not Established	0 minutes
* If an RCS heat removal system is in operation within this time frame and RCS temperature is being reduced, then EAL #1 is not applicable.		

OR

2. UNPLANNED RCS pressure rise > 10 psig as a result of temperature rise. (This EAL does not apply in solid plant conditions.)

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

- ~~1. UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than (site-specific Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit) for greater than the duration specified in the following table.~~

~~Table: RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds~~

RCS Status	Containment Closure Status	Heat-up Duration
Intact (but not at reduced inventory [PWR])	Not applicable	60 minutes*
Not intact (or at reduced inventory [PWR])	Established	20 minutes*
	Not Established	0 minutes
_____ * If an RCS heat removal system is in operation within this time frame and RCS temperature is being reduced, the EAL is not applicable.		

- ~~2. UNPLANNED RCS pressure increase greater than (site-specific pressure reading). (This EAL does not apply during water solid plant conditions. [PWR])~~

Basis:

UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown.

CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined conditions or actions taken to secure containment and its associated structures, systems, and components as a functional barrier to fission product release under shutdown conditions.

RCS is intact when the RCS pressure boundary is in its normal condition for the Cold Shutdown mode of operation (e.g. no freeze seals, etc.).

This IC addresses conditions involving a loss of decay heat removal capability or an addition of heat to the RCS in excess of that which can currently be removed. Either condition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant a classification.

The RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds table addresses an ~~increase~~ rise in RCS temperature when CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is established but the RCS is not intact,

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY

or RCS inventory is reduced (e.g., mid-loop operation in PWRs). The 20-minute criterion was included to allow time for operator action to address the temperature increase.

The RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds table also addresses an increase in RCS temperature with the RCS intact. The status of CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is not crucial in this condition since the intact RCS is providing a high pressure barrier to a fission product release. The 60-minute time frame should allow sufficient time to address the temperature increase without a substantial degradation in plant safety.

Finally, in the case where there is an increase in RCS temperature, the RCS is not intact or is at reduced inventory—~~[PWR]~~, and CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is not established, no heat-up duration is allowed (i.e., 0 minutes). This is because 1) the evaporated reactor coolant may be released directly into the Containment atmosphere and subsequently to the environment, and 2) there is reduced reactor coolant inventory above the top of irradiated fuel.

EAL #2 Basis

Provides a pressure-based indication of RCS heat-up.

Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CS64 or RAS1.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CA3
2. AOP-2, Excessive Reactor Coolant Leakage
3. AOP-3B, Abnormal Shutdown Cooling Conditions
4. OP-7 Shutdown Operations
5. STP 0-27-1(2) RCS Leakage Evaluation

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

CU53

Initiating Condition:

UNPLANNED ~~increase-rise~~ in RCS temperature

Operating Mode Applicability:

5, 6

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note:

- The Emergency Director should declare the ~~Unusual Event~~event promptly upon determining that ~~the applicable time 15 minutes~~ has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
- A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant a classification.

1. UNPLANNED rise in RCS temperature > **200°F**.

OR

2. Loss of the following for \geq **15 minutes**.

- **ALL** RCS temperature indications

AND

- **ALL** reactor vessel/RCS level indications

~~1. UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than (site-specific Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit).~~

~~2. Loss of **ALL** RCS temperature and reactor vessel/RCS level indication for 15 minutes or longer.~~

Basis:

~~UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown.~~

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY

CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined conditions or actions taken to secure containment and its associated structures, systems, and components as a functional barrier to fission product release under shutdown conditions.

This IC addresses an UNPLANNED **increase** in RCS temperature above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit, or the inability to determine RCS temperature and level, represents a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. If the RCS is not intact and CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is not established during this event, the Emergency Director should also refer to IC CA53.

RCS is intact when the RCS pressure boundary is in its normal condition for the Cold Shutdown mode of operation (e.g. no freeze seals, etc.).

A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant a classification.

EAL #1 Basis

Involves a loss of decay heat removal capability, or an addition of heat to the RCS in excess of that which can currently be removed, such that reactor coolant temperature cannot be maintained below the cold shutdown temperature limit specified in Technical Specifications. During this condition, there is no immediate threat of fuel damage because the core decay heat load has been reduced since the cessation of power operation.

During an outage, the level in the reactor vessel will normally be maintained above the reactor vessel flange. Refueling evolutions that lower water level below the reactor vessel flange are carefully planned and controlled. A loss of forced decay heat removal at reduced inventory may result in a rapid **increase** in reactor coolant temperature depending on the time after shutdown.

EAL #2 Basis

Reflects a condition where there has been a significant loss of instrumentation capability necessary to monitor RCS conditions and operators would be unable to monitor key parameters necessary to assure core decay heat removal. During this condition, there is no immediate threat of fuel damage because the core decay heat load has been reduced since the cessation of power operation.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of indication.

Escalation to Alert would be via IC CA64 based on an inventory loss or IC CA53 based on exceeding plant configuration-specific time criteria.

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CU3
2. AOP-2, Excessive Reactor Coolant Leakage
3. AOP-3B, Abnormal Shutdown Cooling Conditions
4. OP-7 Shutdown Operations
5. STP 0-27-1(2) RCS Leakage Evaluation

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

CG61

Initiating Condition:

Loss of reactor vessel/RCS inventory affecting fuel clad integrity with containment challenged.

Operating Mode Applicability:

5, 6

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note: The Emergency Director should declare the ~~General Emergency~~ event promptly upon determining that ~~the applicable time 30 minutes~~ has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.

1. a. RCS Level < **32.9 ft.** (10 in. 8th alarm on RVLMS*) for **≥ 30 minutes**.
* This alarm is 10 in. above top of active fuel, use only when a valid RFP/RCS level indication is **not** available.
AND
 - b. **ANY** Containment Challenge Indication (Table C4)
- OR**
 2. a. Reactor vessel / RCS level **cannot** be monitored for **≥ 30 minutes**.
AND
 - b. Core uncovery is indicated by **ANY** of the following:
 - Table C3 indications of a sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery.
 - OR**
 - Erratic WRNI indication.
 - OR**
 - Containment Radiation reading **≥ 3 R/hr.**
- AND**
 3. **ANY** Containment Challenge Indication (Table C4)

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

Table C3 Indications of RCS Leakage
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNPLANNED Containment Sump level rise* • UNPLANNED Auxiliary Bldg. Sump level rise* • UNPLANNED Miscellaneous Waste System Tank level rise* • UNPLANNED RWT level rise* • UNPLANNED RC Waste System Tank level rise* • UNPLANNED rise in RCS makeup • Observation of leakage or inventory loss
<p>*Rise in level is attributed to a loss of reactor vessel/RCS inventory.</p>

Table C4 Containment Challenge Indications
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hydrogen Concentration in Containment $\geq 4\%$ • UNPLANNED rise in containment pressure • CONTAINMENT CLOSURE <u>not</u> established*
<p>* If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute core uncover time limit, then escalation to a General Emergency is <u>not</u> required for this containment challenge.</p>

~~1. a. (Reactor vessel/RCS level less than (site-specific level) for 30 minutes or longer.~~

~~**AND**~~

~~_____ b. ANY indication from the Containment Challenge Table (see below).~~

~~2. a. Reactor vessel/RCS level cannot be monitored for 30 minutes or longer.~~

~~**AND**~~

~~_____ b. Core uncover is indicated by ANY of the following:~~

- ~~• (Site-specific radiation monitor) reading greater than (site-specific value)~~
- ~~• Erratic source range monitor indication~~

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

- ~~● UNPLANNED increase in (site specific sump and/or tank) levels of sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncover~~
- ~~● (Other site specific indications)~~

AND

- ~~c. ANY indication from the Containment Challenge Table (see below).~~

Containment Challenge Table
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established* ■ (Explosive mixture) exists inside containment ■ UNPLANNED increase in containment pressure

~~* If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, then declaration of a General Emergency is not required.~~

Basis:

UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown.

IMMINENT: The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met within a relatively short period of time regardless of mitigation or corrective actions.

CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined conditions or actions taken to secure containment and its associated structures, systems, and components as a functional barrier to fission product release under shutdown conditions.

This IC addresses the inability to restore and maintain reactor vessel level above the top of active fuel with containment challenged. This condition represents actual or IMMEDIATE substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA **Protective Action Guidelines** (PAG) exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.

Following an extended loss of core decay heat removal and inventory makeup, decay heat will cause reactor coolant boiling and a further reduction in reactor vessel level. If RCS/reactor vessel level cannot be restored, fuel damage is probable.

With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established, there is a high potential for a direct and unmonitored release of radioactivity to the environment. If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, then declaration of a General Emergency is not required **for this containment challenge**.

The existence of an explosive mixture means, at a minimum, that the containment atmospheric hydrogen concentration is sufficient to support a hydrogen burn (i.e., at the

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY

lower deflagration limit). A hydrogen burn will raise containment pressure and could result in collateral equipment damage leading to a loss of containment integrity. It therefore represents a challenge to Containment integrity.

In the early stages of a core uncover event, it is unlikely that hydrogen buildup due to a core uncover could result in an explosive gas mixture in containment. If all installed hydrogen gas monitors are out-of-service during an event leading to fuel cladding damage, it may not be possible to obtain a containment hydrogen gas concentration reading as ambient conditions within the containment will preclude personnel access. During periods when installed containment hydrogen gas monitors are out-of-service, operators may use the other listed indications to assess whether or not containment is challenged.

~~In EAL 2.b,~~ The 30-minute criterion is tied to a readily recognizable event start time (i.e., the total loss of ability to monitor level), and allows sufficient time to monitor, assess and correlate reactor and plant conditions to determine if core uncover has actually occurred (i.e., to account for various accident progression and instrumentation uncertainties). It also allows sufficient time for performance of actions to terminate leakage, recover inventory control/makeup equipment and/or restore level monitoring.

The inability to monitor reactor vessel/RCS level may be caused by instrumentation and/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation. If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the reactor vessel/RCS.

These EALs address concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, *Loss of Decay Heat Removal*; SECY 91-283, *Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues*; NUREG-1449, *Shutdown and Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States*; and NUMARC 91-06, *Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management*.

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CG1
2. UFSAR 7.5.9
3. OP-7 Shutdown Operations
4. ERPIP-601 Severe Accident Management Initial Diagnosis
5. ERPIP-800 Core Damage Assessment
6. NO-1-114 Containment Closure
7. STP O-55A-1(2) Containment Closure Verification
8. UFSAR 7.5.8
9. Technical Specifications Table 3.3.10-1
10. OI-41A Hydrogen Recombiners
11. 1C10-ALM ESFAS 14 Alarm Manual, J-09
12. ERPIP-803 Core Damage Assessment Using Hydrogen
13. EOP-8 Functional Recovery Procedure
14. EOP-13.02 Hydrogen Concentration 4.0%
15. UFSAR 1.2.5
16. UFSAR 5.1.1
17. Operating License Amendment No. 242/DPR-53 & 216/DPR-69

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

CS61

Initiating Condition:

Loss of reactor vessel/RCS inventory affecting core decay heat removal capability.

Operating Mode Applicability:

5, 6

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note: The Emergency Director should declare the ~~Site Area Emergency event~~ promptly upon determining that ~~the applicable time 30 minutes~~ has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.

1. With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established RCS Level < **32.9 ft.** (10 in. 8th alarm on RVLMS*)
 - * This alarm is 10 in. above top of active fuel, use only when a valid RFP/RCS level indication is **not** available.

OR

2. With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE **not** established RCS Level < **34.7 ft.** (19 in. 7th alarm on RVLMS)

OR

3. a. Reactor vessel / RCS level **cannot** be monitored for **>30 minutes.**

AND

b. Core uncover is indicated by **ANY** of the following:

- Table C3 indications of a sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncover.
- OR**
- Erratic WRNI indication.
- OR**
- Containment Radiation reading ≥ 3 R/hr.

Table C3 Indications of RCS Leakage
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNPLANNED Containment Sump level rise* • UNPLANNED Auxiliary Bldg. Sump level rise* • UNPLANNED Miscellaneous Waste System Tank level rise* • UNPLANNED RWT level rise* • UNPLANNED RC Waste System Tank level rise* • UNPLANNED rise in RCS makeup • Observation of leakage or inventory loss
<p>*Rise in level is attributed to a loss of reactor vessel/RCS inventory.</p>

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

~~1. a. CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established.~~

~~AND~~

~~b. (Reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level less than (site specific level).~~

~~2. a. CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established.~~

~~AND~~

~~b. (Reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level less than (site specific level).~~

~~3. a. (Reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level cannot be monitored for 30 minutes or longer.~~

~~AND~~

~~b. Core uncover is indicated by ANY of the following:~~

- ~~• (Site specific radiation monitor) reading greater than (site specific value)~~
- ~~• Erratic source range monitor indication [PWR]~~
- ~~• UNPLANNED increase in (site specific sump and/or tank) levels of sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncover~~
- ~~• (Other site specific indications)~~

Basis:

UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown.

CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined conditions or actions taken to secure containment and its associated structures, systems, and components as a functional barrier to fission product release under shutdown conditions.

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

~~This IC addresses a significant and prolonged loss of reactor vessel/RCS inventory control and makeup capability leading to IMMEDIATE fuel damage.~~ The lost inventory may be due to a RCS component failure, a loss of configuration control or prolonged boiling of reactor coolant. These conditions entail major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public and thus warrant a Site Area Emergency declaration.

Following an extended loss of core decay heat removal and inventory makeup, decay heat will cause reactor coolant boiling and a further reduction in reactor vessel level. If RCS/reactor vessel level cannot be restored, fuel damage is probable.

Outage/shutdown contingency plans typically provide for re-establishing or verifying CONTAINMENT CLOSURE following a loss of heat removal or RCS inventory control functions. ~~The difference in the specified RCS/reactor vessel levels of EALs 1.b and 2.b reflect the fact that with CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established, there is a lower probability of a fission product release to the environment.~~

~~In EAL 3.a,~~ The 30-minute criterion is tied to a readily recognizable event start time (i.e., the total loss of ability to monitor level), and allows sufficient time to monitor, assess and correlate reactor and plant conditions to determine if core uncover has actually occurred (i.e., to account for various accident progression and instrumentation uncertainties). It also allows sufficient time for performance of actions to terminate leakage, recover inventory control/makeup equipment and/or restore level monitoring.

The inability to monitor reactor vessel/RCS level may be caused by instrumentation and/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation. If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump

and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the reactor vessel/RCS.

These EALs address concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, *Loss of Decay Heat Removal*; SECY 91-283, *Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues*; NUREG-1449, *Shutdown and Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States*; and NUMARC 91-06, *Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management*.

Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CG46 or ARG1.

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CS1
2. UFSAR 7.5.9
3. OP-7 Shutdown Operations
4. ERPIP-601 Severe Accident Management Initial Diagnosis
5. ERPIP-800 Core Damage Assessment
6. NO-1-114 Containment Closure
7. STP O-55A-1(2) Containment Closure Verification
8. UFSAR 7.5.8
9. Technical Specifications Table 3.3.10-1
10. OI-41A Hydrogen Recombiners
11. 1C10-ALM ESFAS 14 Alarm Manual, J-09
12. ERPIP-803 Core Damage Assessment Using Hydrogen
13. EOP-8 Functional Recovery Procedure
14. EOP-13.02 Hydrogen Concentration 4.0%
15. UFSAR 1.2.5
16. UFSAR 5.1.1
17. Operating License Amendment No. 242/DPR-53 & 216/DPR-69
18. UFSAR 7.5.2
19. OI-35 Radiation Monitoring System
20. TS-76.01 RMS Area Radiation (Containment High Range) - Operable
21. ERPIP 602 Severe Accident Management Verification of Diagnosis
22. ERPIP-801 Core Damage Assessment Using Containment Radiation Dose Rates
23. AOP-2A Excessive Reactor Coolant Leakage
24. STP 0-27-1(2) RCS Leakage Evaluation
25. AOP-3B, Abnormal Shutdown Cooling Conditions

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

CA61

Initiating Condition:

Loss of reactor vessel/RCS inventory.

Operating Mode Applicability:

5, 6

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note: The Emergency Director should declare the **event Alert**—promptly upon determining that **the applicable time 15 minutes** has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.

1. Loss of reactor vessel / RCS inventory as indicated by RCS Level **< 35.6 ft.** (29 in. 6th alarm on RVLMS).

OR

2. a. Reactor vessel / RCS level **cannot** be monitored for **≥ 15 minutes**.

AND

- b. Loss of reactor vessel / RCS inventory per Table C3 indications.

Table C3 Indications of RCS Leakage

- | |
|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNPLANNED Containment Sump level rise* • UNPLANNED Auxiliary Bldg. Sump level rise* • UNPLANNED Miscellaneous Waste System Tank level rise* • UNPLANNED RWT level rise* • UNPLANNED RC Waste System Tank level rise* • UNPLANNED rise in RCS makeup • Observation of leakage or inventory loss |
|--|

*Rise in level is attributed to a loss of reactor vessel/RCS inventory.

~~1. Loss of reactor vessel/RCS inventory as indicated by level less than (site-specific level).~~

~~2. a. Reactor vessel/RCS level cannot be monitored for 15 minutes or longer~~

~~**AND**~~

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY

~~b. UNPLANNED increase in (site specific sump and/or tank) levels due to a loss of reactor vessel/RCS inventory.~~

Basis:

UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown.

—This IC addresses conditions that are precursors to a loss of the ability to adequately cool irradiated fuel (i.e., a precursor to a challenge to the fuel clad barrier). This condition represents a potential substantial reduction in the level of plant safety.

EAL #1 Basis

~~For EAL, a~~ lowering of water level below **0 inches** on Draindown Level indicator ~~(site-specific level)~~ indicates that operator actions have not been successful in restoring and maintaining reactor vessel/RCS water level. The heat-up rate of the coolant will ~~increase~~rise as the available water inventory is reduced. A continuing ~~decrease~~drop in water level will lead to core uncover.

Although related, EAL #1 is concerned with the loss of RCS inventory and not the potential concurrent effects on systems needed for decay heat removal (e.g., loss of a Residual Heat Removal suction point). ~~A~~ ~~increase~~rise in RCS temperature caused by a loss of decay heat removal capability is evaluated under IC CA~~53~~.

EAL #2 Basis

~~For EAL, t~~The inability to monitor reactor vessel/RCS level may be caused by instrumentation and/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation. If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the reactor vessel/RCS.

The 15-minute duration for the loss of level indication was chosen because it is half of the EAL duration specified in IC CS~~64~~.

If the reactor vessel/RCS inventory level continues to lower, then escalation to Site Area Emergency would be via IC CS~~64~~.

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CA1
2. OP-7 Shutdown Operations
3. AOP-2A Excessive Reactor Coolant Leakage
4. AOP-3B, Abnormal Shutdown Cooling Conditions
5. STP 0-27-1(2) RCS Leakage Evaluation

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

CU61

Initiating Condition:

UNPLANNED loss of reactor vessel/RCS inventory for 15 minutes or longer.

Operating Mode Applicability:

5, 6

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note: The Emergency Director should declare the ~~Unusual Event~~ promptly upon determining that ~~the applicable time 15 minutes~~ has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.

1. UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results in the inability to restore and maintain reactor vessel / RCS level to **> procedurally established lower limit for ≥ 15 minutes.**

OR

2. a. Reactor vessel / RCS level cannot be monitored.

AND

- b. Loss of reactor vessel / RCS inventory per Table C3 indications.

Table C3 Indications of RCS Leakage
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNPLANNED Containment Sump level rise* • UNPLANNED Auxiliary Bldg. Sump level rise* • UNPLANNED Miscellaneous Waste System Tank level rise* • UNPLANNED RWT level rise* • UNPLANNED RC Waste System Tank level rise* • UNPLANNED rise in RCS makeup • Observation of leakage or inventory loss
*Rise in level is attributed to a loss of reactor vessel/RCS inventory.

- ~~1. UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results in reactor vessel/RCS level less than a required lower limit for 15 minutes or longer.~~

- ~~2. a. Reactor vessel/RCS level cannot be monitored.~~

~~AND~~

- ~~b. UNPLANNED increase in (site specific sump and/or tank) levels.~~

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY

Basis:

UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown.

This IC addresses the inability to restore and maintain water level to a required minimum level (or the lower limit of a level band), or a loss of the ability to monitor reactor vessel/RCS level concurrent with indications of coolant leakage. Either of these conditions is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

The procedurally established lower limit is not an operational band established above the procedural limit to allow for operator action prior to exceeding the procedural limit, but it is the procedurally established lower limit.

Refueling evolutions that ~~decrease-lower~~ RCS water inventory are carefully planned and controlled. An UNPLANNED event that results in water level decreasing below a procedurally required limit warrants the declaration of an Unusual Event due to the reduced water inventory that is available to keep the core covered.

EAL #1 Basis

~~r~~Recognizes that the minimum required reactor vessel/RCS level can change several times during the course of a refueling outage as different plant configurations and system lineups are implemented. This EAL is met if the minimum level, specified for the current plant conditions, cannot be maintained for 15 minutes or longer. The minimum level is typically specified in the applicable operating procedure but may be specified in another controlling document.

The 15-minute threshold duration allows sufficient time for prompt operator actions to restore and maintain the expected water level. This criterion excludes transient conditions causing a brief lowering of water level.

EAL #2 Basis

~~a~~Addresses a condition where all means to determine reactor vessel/RCS level have been lost. In this condition, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the reactor vessel/RCS.

Continued loss of RCS inventory may result in escalation to the Alert emergency classification level via either IC CA~~64~~ or CA~~53~~.

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01, Rev. 6 CU1
2. AOP-2 Excessive Reactor Coolant Leakage
3. STP 0-27-1(2) RCS Leakage Evaluation
4. AOP-3B, Abnormal Shutdown Cooling Conditions
5. UFSAR 7.4.4
6. 1C06-ALM Window E-35, PZR HTR CUTOFF

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

HG1

Initiating Condition:

~~HOSTILE ACTION resulting in loss of physical control of the facility.~~

Operating Mode Applicability:

~~1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, D~~

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

~~1. a. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the (site specific security shift supervision).~~

AND

~~b. EITHER of the following has occurred:~~

~~1. ANY of the following safety functions cannot be controlled or maintained.~~

- ~~● Reactivity control~~
- ~~● Core cooling~~
- ~~● RCS heat removal~~

OR

~~2. Damage to spent fuel has occurred or is IMMINENT.~~

Basis:

~~This IC addresses an event in which a HOSTILE FORCE has taken physical control of the facility to the extent that the plant staff can no longer operate equipment necessary to maintain key safety functions. It also addresses a HOSTILE ACTION leading to a loss of physical control that results in actual or IMMINENT damage to spent fuel due to 1) damage to a spent fuel pool cooling system (e.g., pumps, heat exchangers, controls, etc.) or, 2) loss of spent fuel pool integrity such that sufficient water level cannot be maintained.~~

~~Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and the Control Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event.~~

~~Security plans and terminology are based on the guidance provided by NEI 03-12, *Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program]*.~~

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

~~Emergency plans and implementing procedures are public documents; therefore, EALs should not incorporate Security-sensitive information. This includes information that may be advantageous to a potential adversary, such as the particulars concerning a specific threat or threat location. Security-sensitive information should be contained in non-public documents such as the Security Plan.~~

~~Basis Reference(s):~~

- ~~1. NEI 99-01, Rev. 6 HG1~~

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

HS1

Initiating Condition:

HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, D

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

A notification from the Security Force that a HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA.

- ~~1. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the (site-specific security shift supervision).~~

Basis:

HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILES, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area).

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.

PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.

PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within the security protected area fence.

HOSTILE FORCE: Any individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction.

INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI): A complex that is designed and constructed for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage.

This IC addresses the occurrence of a HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA. This event will require rapid response and assistance due to the possibility for damage to plant equipment.

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY

Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and the Control Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event.

Security plans and terminology are based on the guidance provided by NEI 03-12, *Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program]*.

As time and conditions allow, these events require a heightened state of readiness by the plant staff and implementation of onsite protective measures (e.g., evacuation, dispersal or sheltering). The Site Area Emergency declaration will mobilize ORO resources and have them available to develop and implement public protective actions in the unlikely event that the attack is successful in impairing multiple safety functions.

This IC does not apply to a HOSTILE ACTION directed at an ISFSI PROTECTED AREA located outside the plant PROTECTED AREA; such an attack should be assessed using IC HA1. It also does not apply to incidents that are accidental events, acts of civil disobedience, or otherwise are not a HOSTILE ACTION perpetrated by a HOSTILE FORCE. Examples include the crash of a small aircraft, shots from hunters, physical disputes between employees, etc. Reporting of these types of events is adequately addressed by other EALs, or the requirements of 10 CFR § 73.71 or 10 CFR § 50.72.

~~Emergency plans and implementing procedures are public documents; therefore, EALs should not incorporate Security sensitive information. This includes information that may be advantageous to a potential adversary, such as the particulars concerning a specific threat or threat location. Security sensitive information should be contained in non-public documents such as the Security Plan.~~

Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via **IC FG1, CG6, or HG7**.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, HS1
2. CCNPP Security and Safeguards Contingency Plan

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

HA1

Initiating Condition:

HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threat within 30 minutes.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, D

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

1. A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack threat < **30 minutes** from the site.
~~1. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported by the (site-specific security shift supervision).~~

OR

2. Notification by the Security Force that a HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA.

~~A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack threat within 30 minutes of the site.~~

Basis:

HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILES, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area).

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.

PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.

OWNER CONTROLLED AREA (OCA): The property associated with the station and owned by the company. Access is normally limited to persons entering for official business.

RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY

PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within the security protected area fence.

HOSTILE FORCE: Any individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction.

This IC addresses the occurrence of a HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or notification of an aircraft attack threat. This event will require rapid response and assistance due to the possibility of the attack progressing to the PROTECTED AREA, or the need to prepare the plant and staff for a potential aircraft impact.

Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and the Control Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event.

Security plans and terminology are based on the guidance provided by NEI 03-12, *Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program]*.

As time and conditions allow, these events require a heightened state of readiness by the plant staff and implementation of onsite protective measures (e.g., evacuation, dispersal or sheltering). The Alert declaration will also heighten the awareness of Offsite Response Organizations, allowing them to be better prepared should it be necessary to consider further actions.

This IC does not apply to incidents that are accidental events, acts of civil disobedience, or otherwise are not a HOSTILE ACTION perpetrated by a HOSTILE FORCE. Examples include the crash of a small aircraft, shots from hunters, physical disputes between employees, etc. Reporting of these types of events is adequately addressed by other EALs, or the requirements of 10 CFR § 73.71 or 10 CFR § 50.72.

EAL #1 addresses the threat from the impact of an aircraft on the plant, and the anticipated arrival time is within 30 minutes. The intent of this EAL is to ensure that threat-related notifications are made in a timely manner so that plant personnel and OROs are in a heightened state of readiness. This EAL is met when the threat-related information has been validated in accordance with ERPIP-3.0 Immediate Actions, Attachment 24 Security.

EAL #24 is applicable for any HOSTILE ACTION occurring, or that has occurred, in the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA. This includes any action directed against an ISFSI that is located outside the plant PROTECTED AREA.

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

~~EAL #2 addresses the threat from the impact of an aircraft on the plant, and the anticipated arrival time is within 30 minutes. The intent of this EAL is to ensure that threat-related notifications are made in a timely manner so that plant personnel and OROs are in a heightened state of readiness. This EAL is met when the threat-related information has been validated in accordance with (site-specific procedure).~~

The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee if the threat involves an aircraft. The status and size of the plane may be provided by NORAD through the NRC.

In some cases, it may not be readily apparent if an aircraft impact within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA was intentional (i.e., a HOSTILE ACTION). It is expected, although not certain, that notification by an appropriate Federal agency to the site would clarify this point. In this case, the appropriate federal agency is intended to be NORAD, FBI, FAA or NRC. The emergency declaration, including one based on other ICs/EALs, should not be unduly delayed while awaiting notification by a Federal agency.

~~Emergency plans and implementing procedures are public documents; therefore, EALs should not incorporate Security sensitive information. This includes information that may be advantageous to a potential adversary, such as the particulars concerning a specific threat or threat location. Security sensitive information should be contained in non-public documents such as the Security Plan.~~

Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC HS1.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, HA1
2. CCNPP Security and Safeguards Contingency Plan

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

HU1

Initiating Condition:

Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, D

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

1. Notification of a credible security threat directed at the site as determined per SY-AA-101-132, Security Assessment and Response to Unusual Activities.
 - ~~1. A SECURITY CONDITION that does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the (site-specific security shift supervision).~~
- OR**
2. A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an aircraft threat.
 - ~~2. Notification of a credible security threat directed at the site.~~
- OR**
3. Notification by the Security Force of a SECURITY CONDITION that does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION.
 - ~~3. A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an aircraft threat.~~

Basis:

SECURITY CONDITION: Any Security Event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION

SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related.

HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILES, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area).

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.

PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.

This IC addresses events that pose a threat to plant personnel or SAFETY SYSTEM equipment, and thus represent a potential degradation in the level of plant safety. Security events which do not meet one of these EALs are adequately addressed by the requirements of 10 CFR § 73.71 or 10 CFR § 50.72. Security events assessed as HOSTILE ACTIONS are classifiable under ICs HA1, HS1 and HG1.

Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and the Control Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event. Classification of these events will initiate appropriate threat-related notifications to plant personnel and OROs.

Security plans and terminology are based on the guidance provided by NEI 03-12, *Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program]*.

EAL #1 ~~addresses the receipt of a credible security threat. The credibility of the threat is assessed in accordance with SY-AA-101-132. references (site specific security shift supervision) because these are the individuals trained to confirm that a security event is occurring or has occurred. Training on security event confirmation and classification is controlled due to the nature of Safeguards and 10 CFR § 2.39 information.~~

EAL #2 ~~addresses the threat from the impact of an aircraft on the plant. The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee if the threat involves an aircraft. The status and size of the plane may also be provided by NORAD through the NRC. Validation of the threat is performed in accordance with AOP-37. (site specific procedure).~~ ~~addresses the receipt of a credible security threat. The credibility of the threat is assessed in accordance with (site specific procedure).~~

EAL #3 ~~references Security Force (site specific security shift supervision) because these are the individuals trained to confirm that a security event is occurring or has occurred. Training on security event confirmation and classification is controlled due to the nature of Safeguards and 10 CFR § 2.39 information.~~ ~~addresses the threat from the impact of an aircraft on the plant. The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee if the threat involves an aircraft. The status and size of the plane may also be provided by NORAD through the NRC. Validation of the threat is performed in accordance with (site specific procedure).~~

~~Emergency plans and implementing procedures are public documents; therefore, EALs should not incorporate Security sensitive information. This includes information that may be advantageous to a potential adversary, such as the particulars concerning a~~

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY
~~specific threat or threat location. Security sensitive information should be contained in non-public documents such as the Security Plan.~~

Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC HA1.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, HU1
2. CCNPP Security and Safeguards Contingency Plan

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

HS26

Initiating Condition:

Inability to control a key safety function from outside the Control Room.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, D

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note: The Emergency Director should declare the ~~Site Area Emergency event~~ promptly upon determining that ~~(site-specific number the applicable time of minutes)~~ has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.

- A Control Room evacuation has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to alternate locations per:
 - AOP-9A Control Room Evacuation and Safe Shutdown Due to a Severe Control Room Fire
 - OR**
 - AOP-11 Control Room Evacuation and Safe Shutdown – Non-Fire Conditions

AND

2. Control of **ANY** Table H1 key safety function is not reestablished in **< 15 minutes**.

Table H1 Safety Functions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reactivity Control (ability to shut down the reactor and keep it shutdown) • Core and RCS Heat Removal (ability to cool the core and maintain heat sink)

~~1. a. An event has resulted in plant control being transferred panels and local control stations) from the Control Room to (site-specific remote shutdown~~

AND

~~b. Control of **ANY** of the following key safety functions is not reestablished within (site-specific number of minutes).~~

- ~~• Reactivity control~~
- ~~• Core cooling [PWR] / RPV water level [BWR]~~
- ~~• RCS heat removal~~

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

Basis:

The time period to establish control of the plant starts when either:

- a. Control of the plant is no longer maintained in the Main Control Room
- OR
- b. The last Operator has left the Main Control Room.

This IC addresses an evacuation of the Control Room that results in transfer of plant control to alternate locations, and the control of a key safety function cannot be reestablished in a timely manner. The failure to gain control of a key safety function following a transfer of plant control to alternate locations is a precursor to a challenge to ~~one or more~~ any fission product barriers within a relatively short period of time.

The determination of whether or not “control” is established at the remote safe shutdown location(s) is based on Emergency Director judgment. The Emergency Director is expected to make a reasonable, informed judgment within ~~(the site-specific time for transfer)~~ 15 minutes whether or not the operating staff has control of key safety functions from the remote safe shutdown location(s).

Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC FG1 or CG64.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HS6
2. AOP-9A Control Room Evacuation and Safe Shutdown Due to a ~~s~~Severe Control Room Fire
3. AOP-11 Control Room Evacuation and Safe Shutdown - Non-Fire Conditions
4. Letter, L.B. Russell (BG&E) to James H. Joyner (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I), Emergency Action Level Review Meeting, June 6, 1991

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

HA26

Initiating Condition:

Control Room evacuation resulting in transfer of plant control to alternate locations.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, D

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

- A Control Room evacuation has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to alternate locations per:
 - AOP-9A Control Room Evacuation and Safe Shutdown Due to a Severe Control Room Fire
 - OR**
 - AOP-11 Control Room Evacuation and Safe Shutdown – Non-Fire Conditions

~~An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to (site-specific remote shutdown panels and local control stations).~~

Basis:

This IC addresses an evacuation of the Control Room that results in transfer of plant control to alternate locations outside the Control Room. The loss of the ability to control the plant from the Control Room is considered to be a potential substantial degradation in the level of plant safety.

Following a Control Room evacuation, control of the plant will be transferred to alternate shutdown locations. The necessity to control a plant shutdown from outside the Control Room, in addition to responding to the event that required the evacuation of the Control Room, will present challenges to plant operators and other on-shift personnel. Activation of the ERO and emergency response facilities will assist in responding to these challenges.

Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC HS26.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HA6
2. AOP-9A Control Room Evacuation and Safe Shutdown Due to a Severe Control Room Fire
3. AOP-11 Control Room Evacuation and Safe Shutdown - Non-Fire Conditions

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

HU34

Initiating Condition:

FIRE potentially degrading the level of safety of the plant.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, D

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note:

- The Emergency Director should declare the ~~Unusual Event~~ promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
 - Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CA2 or MA5.
1. A FIRE in **ANY** Table H2 area is not extinguished in **< 15-minutes** of **ANY** of the following FIRE detection indications:
- Report from the field (i.e., visual observation)
 - Receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or indications
 - Field verification of a single fire alarm
- OR**
2. a. Receipt of a single fire alarm in **ANY** Table H2 area (i.e., no other indications of a FIRE).
- AND**
- b. The existence of a FIRE is not verified in **< 30 minutes** of alarm receipt.
- OR**
3. A FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA or ISFSI PROTECTED AREA not extinguished in **< 60 minutes** of the initial report, alarm or indication.
- OR**
4. A FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA or ISFSI PROTECTED AREA that requires firefighting support by an offsite fire response agency to extinguish.

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

Table H2 Vital Areas
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Containment Building • Auxiliary Building • Diesel Generator Rooms • Intake Structure • 1A/0C DG Buildings • RWT • RWT Rooms • CST N0.12 • FOST No.21 • Auxiliary Feed Pump Rooms

~~(1) a. A FIRE is NOT extinguished within 15 minutes of **ANY** of the following FIRE detection indications:~~

- ~~• Report from the field (i.e., visual observation)~~
- ~~• Receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or indications~~
- ~~• Field verification of a single fire alarm~~

~~**AND**~~

~~b. The FIRE is located within **ANY** of the following plant rooms or areas:~~

~~_____ (site-specific list of plant rooms or areas)~~

~~(2) a. Receipt of a single fire alarm (i.e., no other indications of a FIRE).~~

~~_____ **AND**~~

~~b. The FIRE is located within **ANY** of the following plant rooms or areas:~~

~~_____ (site-specific list of plant rooms or areas)~~

~~_____ **AND**~~

~~c. The existence of a FIRE is not verified within 30 minutes of alarm receipt.~~

~~(3) A FIRE within the plant or ISFSI [for plants with an ISFSI outside the plant Protected Area] PROTECTED AREA not extinguished within 60 minutes of the initial report, alarm or indication.~~

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY

~~(4) A FIRE within the plant or ISFSI [for plants with an ISFSI outside the plant Protected Area] PROTECTED AREA that requires firefighting support by an offsite fire response agency to extinguish~~

Basis:

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute FIRES. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within the security protected area fence.

This IC addresses the magnitude and extent of FIRES that may be indicative of a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

EAL #1 Basis

The intent of the 15-minute duration is to size the FIRE and to discriminate against small FIRES that are readily extinguished (e.g., smoldering waste paper basket). In addition to alarms, other indications of a FIRE could be a drop in fire main pressure, automatic activation of a suppression system, etc.

Upon receipt, operators will take prompt actions to confirm the validity of an initial fire alarm, indication, or report. For EAL assessment purposes, the emergency declaration clock starts at the time that the initial alarm, indication, or report was received, and not the time that a subsequent verification action was performed. Similarly, the fire duration clock also starts at the time of receipt of the initial alarms, indication or report.

EAL #2 Basis

~~This EAL a~~Addresses receipt of a single fire alarm, and the existence of a FIRE is not verified (i.e., proved or disproved) within 30-minutes of the alarm. Upon receipt, operators will take prompt actions to confirm the validity of a single fire alarm. For EAL assessment purposes, the 30-minute clock starts at the time that the initial alarm was received, and not the time that a subsequent verification action was performed.

A single fire alarm, absent other indication(s) of a FIRE, may be indicative of equipment failure or a spurious activation, and not an actual FIRE. For this reason, additional time is allowed to verify the validity of the alarm. The 30-minute period is a reasonable

RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY

amount of time to determine if an actual FIRE exists; however, after that time, and absent information to the contrary, it is assumed that an actual FIRE is in progress.

If an actual FIRE is verified by a report from the field, then EAL #1 is immediately applicable, and the emergency must be declared if the FIRE is not extinguished within 15-minutes of the report. If the alarm is verified to be due to an equipment failure or a spurious activation, and this verification occurs within 30-minutes of the receipt of the alarm, then this EAL is not applicable and no emergency declaration is warranted.

EAL #3 Basis

In addition to a FIRE addressed by EAL #1 or EAL #2, a FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA not extinguished within 60-minutes may also potentially degrade the level of plant safety. This basis extends to a FIRE occurring within the PROTECTED AREA of an ISFSI located outside the plant PROTECTED AREA.

~~[Sentence for plants with an ISFSI outside the plant Protected Area]~~

EAL #4 Basis

If a FIRE within the plant or ISFSI ~~[for plants with an ISFSI outside the plant Protected Area]~~ PROTECTED AREA is of sufficient size to require a response by an offsite firefighting agency (e.g., a local town Fire Department), then the level of plant safety is potentially degraded. The dispatch of an offsite firefighting agency to the site requires an emergency declaration only if it is needed to actively support firefighting efforts because the fire is beyond the capability of the Fire Brigade to extinguish. Declaration is not necessary if the agency resources are placed on stand-by, or supporting post-extinguishment recovery or investigation actions.

Basis-Related Requirements from Appendix R

Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, states in part:

Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part specifies that "Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed and located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions."

When considering the effects of fire, those systems associated with achieving and maintaining safe shutdown conditions assume major importance to safety because damage to them can lead to core damage resulting from loss of coolant through boil-off.

Because fire may affect safe shutdown systems and because the loss of function of systems used to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents under post-fire conditions does not per se impact public safety, the need to limit fire damage to systems required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions is

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY
greater than the need to limit fire damage to those systems required to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents.

In addition, Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, requires, among other considerations, the use of 1-hour fire barriers for the enclosure of cable and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of one redundant train (G.2.c). As used in EAL #2, the 30-minutes to verify a single alarm is well within this worst-case 1-hour time period.

Depending upon the plant mode at the time of the event, escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CA26 or MA5SA9.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HU4
2. Drawing 61502 Plant Property and Buildings
3. UFSAR Section 5A.2 Classes of Structures, Systems, and Equipment
4. AOP-9 Series Fire Procedures

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

HU42

Initiating Condition:

Seismic event greater than OBE levels.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, D

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note:

- Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CA2 or MA5
- For emergency classification if EAL 2.b is not able to be confirmed, then the occurrence of a seismic event is confirmed in manner deemed appropriate by the Shift Manager or Emergency Director in **≤ 15 mins** of the event.

1. Seismic Acceleration Recorder (0-YRC-001) Event Indicator indicates
> Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE)

OR

2. When Seismic Monitoring Equipment is **not** available:

a. Control Room personnel feel an actual or potential seismic event.

AND

b. **ANY** one of the following confirmed in **≤ 15 mins** of the event:

- The earthquake resulted in Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) **≥ VI** and occurred **≤ 3.5 miles** of the plant.
- The earthquake was magnitude **≥ 6.0**
- The earthquake was magnitude **≥ 5.0** and occurred **≤ 125 miles** of the plant.

~~Seismic event greater than Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) as indicated by:~~

~~a. (site specific indication that a seismic event met or exceeded OBE limits)~~

Basis:

This IC addresses a seismic event that results in accelerations at the plant site greater than those specified for an Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE)¹. An earthquake greater

¹ An OBE is vibratory ground motion for which those features of a nuclear power plant necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public will remain functional.

RECOGNITION CATEGORY**HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

than an OBE but less than a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)² should have no significant impact on safety-related systems, structures and components; however, some time may be required for the plant staff to ascertain the actual post-event condition of the plant (e.g., performs walk-downs and post-event inspections). Given the time necessary to perform walk-downs and inspections, and fully understand any impacts, this event represents a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

EAL #2.b and the accompanying note is included to ensure that a declaration does not result from felt vibrations caused by a non-seismic source (e.g., a dropped load). The Shift Manager or Emergency Director may seek external verification if deemed appropriate (e.g., call to USGS, check internet source, etc.) however, the verification action must not preclude a timely emergency declaration. This guidance recognizes that it may cause the site to declare an Unusual Event while another site, similarly affected but with readily available OBE indications in the Control Room, may not.

Event verification with external sources should not be necessary during or following an OBE. Earthquakes of this magnitude should be readily felt by on-site personnel and recognized as a seismic event (e.g., typical lateral accelerations are in excess of 0.08g). The Shift Manager or Emergency Director may seek external verification if deemed appropriate (e.g., a call to the USGS, check internet news sources, etc.); however, the verification action must not preclude a timely emergency declaration.

Depending upon the plant mode at the time of the event, escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CA26 or HA5SA9.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HU2
2. OI-46 Seismic Measurement Equipment
3. UFSAR Section 7.5.7 Seismic Instrumentation
4. Calvert Cliffs ISFSI USAR Section 2.1.1 Site Location
5. STPI M-260-0 Seismic Instrumentation Channel Check
6. ECP-13-000653, Replace the existing five channel SMA-3 Seismic Montitor with a Kinometrics Condor Seismic Monitoring System

² An SSE is vibratory ground motion for which certain (generally, safety-related) structures, systems, and components must be designed to remain functional.

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

HA5

Initiating Condition:

Gaseous release impeding access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown.

Operating Mode Applicability:

~~1, 2, 3~~, 4, 5, ~~D~~

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note:

- If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable, or out of service, before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted.

1. Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gas in **ANY** Table H3 area.

Table H3 Areas with Entry Related Mode Applicability	
Area	Entry Related Mode Applicability
45' West Electrical Penetration Rooms	Modes 3, 4, and 5
69' Electrical Penetration Rooms	Modes 3, 4, and 5
ECCS Pump Rooms	Modes 3, 4, and 5
Charging Pump Rooms	Modes 3, 4, and 5
Component Cooling Rooms	Modes 3, 4, and 5

AND

2. Entry into the room or area is prohibited or impeded

~~— **Note:** If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable or out of service before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted. —~~

- (1) ~~a. Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gas into any of the following plant rooms or areas:~~

~~— (site specific list of plant rooms or areas with entry related mode applicability identified)~~

~~— **AND**~~

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY

~~b. Entry into the room or area is prohibited or impeded.~~

Basis:

This IC addresses an event involving a release of a hazardous gas that precludes or impedes access to equipment necessary to ~~transition the plant from normal plant operation to cooldown and shutdown as specified in normal plant procedures~~~~maintain normal plant operation, or required for a normal plant cooldown and shutdown~~. This condition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

~~Assuming all plant equipment is operating as designed, normal operation is capable from the Main Control Room (MCR). The plant is also able to transition into a hot shutdown condition from the MCR, therefore Table H3 is a list of plant rooms or areas with entry-related mode applicability that contain equipment which require a manual/local action necessary to transition the plant from normal plant operation to cooldown and shutdown as specified in normal operating procedures, where if this action is not completed the plant would not be able to attain and maintain cold shutdown.~~

~~This Table does not include rooms or areas for which entry is required solely to perform actions of an administrative or record keeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routine inspections).~~

~~This Table does not include the Control Room since adequate engineered safety/design features are in place to preclude a Control Room evacuation due to the release of a hazardous gas.~~

An Alert declaration is warranted if entry into the affected room/area is, or may be, procedurally required during the plant operating mode in effect at the time of the gaseous release. The emergency classification is not contingent upon whether entry is actually necessary at the time of the release.

Evaluation of the IC and EAL do not require atmospheric sampling; it only requires the Emergency Director's judgment that the gas concentration in the affected room/area is sufficient to preclude or significantly impede procedurally required access. This judgment may be based on a variety of factors including an existing job hazard analysis, report of ill effects on personnel, advice from a subject matter expert or operating experience with the same or similar hazards. Access should be considered as impeded if extraordinary measures are necessary to facilitate entry of personnel into the affected room/area (e.g., requiring use of protective equipment, such as SCBAs, that is not routinely employed).

An emergency declaration is not warranted if any of the following conditions apply.

- The plant is in an operating mode different than the mode specified for the affected room/area (i.e., entry is not required during the operating mode in effect at the time

RECOGNITION CATEGORY**HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

of the gaseous release). For example, the plant is in Mode 1 when the gaseous release occurs, and the procedures used for normal operation, cooldown and shutdown do not require entry into the affected room until Mode 4.

- The gas release is a planned activity that includes compensatory measures which address the temporary inaccessibility of a room or area (e.g., fire suppression system testing).
- The action for which room/area entry is required is of an administrative or record keeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routine inspections).
- The access control measures are of a conservative or precautionary nature, and would not actually prevent or impede a required action.

An asphyxiant is a gas capable of reducing the level of oxygen in the body to dangerous levels. Most commonly, asphyxiants work by merely displacing air in an enclosed environment. This reduces the concentration of oxygen below the normal level of around 19%, which can lead to breathing difficulties, unconsciousness or even death.

The Operating Mode Applicability of this EAL has been revised from All Modes to modes 3, 4, and 5 due to the mode applicability of the areas of concern in Table H-3. In the future should the areas of concern in Table H-3 be revised then the Operating Mode Applicability of this EAL should be reevaluated.

This EAL does not apply to firefighting activities that generate smoke or that automatically or manually activate a fire suppression system in an area.

Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via Recognition Category RA, C or F ICs.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HA5

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

HU63

Initiating Condition:

Hazardous Event

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, D

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Note:

- EAL #4 does not apply to routine traffic impediments such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or accidents.
- Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CA2 or MA5.

1. Tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA.

OR

2. Internal room or area flooding of a magnitude sufficient to require manual or automatic electrical isolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM component required by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode.

OR

3. Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA is impeded due to an offsite event involving hazardous materials (e.g., an offsite chemical spill or toxic gas release).

OR

4. A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions sufficient to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site via personal vehicles.

OR

5. Abnormal Bay water level, as indicated by **EITHER:**

a. Bay water level \geq **bottom of the traveling screen cover housing** (+120 in. Mean Sea Level)

OR

b. Bay water level $<$ **13.6 feet** below intake concrete level (-43.2 in. Mean Sea Level)

RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY

~~Note: EAL #3 does not apply to routine traffic impediments such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or accidents.~~

- ~~(1) A tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA.~~
- ~~(2) Internal room or area flooding of a magnitude sufficient to require manual or automatic electrical isolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM component needed for the current operating mode.~~
- ~~(3) Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA is impeded due to an offsite event involving hazardous materials (e.g., an offsite chemical spill or toxic gas release).~~
- ~~(4) A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions sufficient to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site via personal vehicles.~~
- ~~(5) (Site specific list of natural or technological hazard events)~~

Basis:

~~PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within the security protected area fence.~~

~~SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related.~~

This IC addresses hazardous events that are considered to represent a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

EAL #1 Basis

~~a~~Addresses a tornado striking (touching down) within the Protected Area.

EAL #2 Basis

~~a~~Addresses flooding of a building room or area that results in operators isolating power to a SAFETY SYSTEM component due to water level or other wetting concerns. Classification is also required if the water level or related wetting causes an automatic isolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM component from its power source (e.g., a breaker or relay trip). To warrant classification, operability of the affected component must be required by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode.

EAL #3 Basis

~~a~~Addresses a hazardous materials event originating at an offsite location and of sufficient magnitude to impede the movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA.

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

EAL #4 Basis

aAddresses a hazardous event that causes an on-site impediment to vehicle movement and significant enough to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site using personal vehicles. Examples of such an event include site flooding caused by a hurricane, heavy rains, up-river water releases, dam failure, etc., or an on-site train derailment blocking the access road.

This EAL is not intended **to** apply to routine impediments such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or accidents, but rather to more significant conditions such as the Hurricane Andrew strike on Turkey Point in 1992, the flooding around the Cooper Station during the Midwest floods of 1993, or the flooding around Ft. Calhoun Station in 2011.

~~EAL #5 addresses (site specific description).~~

EAL #5 Basis

10 ft (+120 in.) Mean Sea Level (approximately bottom of the travelling screen cover) is the still water level used for the Intake Structural Analysis. This value was selected to be anticipatory to the design level of 18 ft Mean Sea Level (top of the travelling screen cover).

The predicted extreme low tide elevation is -3.6 ft (-43.2 in.) Mean Sea Level. However, the plant has been designed for -4.0 ft Mean Sea Level and can continue to operate with an extreme low water Elevation of -6.0 ft Mean Sea Level. The top of the saltwater pump intakes is at -9.5 ft Mean Sea Level.

Operations can measure water level from the intake concrete walking level to the Bay surface with a tape measure. This level is measured upstream (i.e., before) the trash racks. This EAL criterion is met if the water is 13.6 ft below the intake concrete level by observation. This measurement requires judgment because the Bay surface is not normally still.

Radar probes (1-LIT-1100 & 2-LIT-2100) have been installed which provide local indication (1-LI-1100 & 2-LI-2100) of Intake water level in inches relative to Mean Sea Level.

Escalation of the emergency classification level would be based on ICs in Recognition Categories **RA**, **F**, **MS**, **H** or **C**.

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HU3
2. UFSAR Sections 2.8.3.6 and 2.8.3.7
3. UFSAR Table 5-7
4. ECP-10-000208
5. CCPRA RAN: 96-024FLOOD Flood Rule Development
6. CCPRA RAN: 98-062, Internal Flood Initiating Event Frequencies
7. CCPRA RAN: 98-065, Flood Evaluations (Flood Queries)
8. 1C10-ALM ESFAS 13 Alarm Manual, J-17, CC PP RM LVL HI
9. 1C10-ALM ESFAS 13 Alarm Manual, J-18, SRW PP RM LVL HI
10. 1C10-ALM ESFAS 13 Alarm Manual, J-22, CNDSR PIT LVL HI
11. 1C10-ALM ESFAS 13 Alarm Manual, J-23, INTAKE SUMP STRUCTURE LVL HI
12. 1C10-ALM ESFAS 13 Alarm Manual, J-24, INTAKE STRUCTURE CH TRIP
13. 1C10-ALM ESFAS 14 Alarm Manual, J-23
14. ES-005 Civil and Structural Design Criteria
15. CCIPEEE RAN 97-031 High Winds, Floods and Other External Events Analysis Section 5.3.1
16. Drawing 61502 Plant Property and Buildings
17. UFSAR Section 5A.2 Classes of Structures, Systems, and Equipment

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

HG7

Initiating Condition:

Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of a ~~GENERAL~~General ~~EMERGENCY~~Emergency.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, D

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

(4) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMEDIATE substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.

Basis:

IMMEDIATE: The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met within a relatively short period of time regardless of mitigation or corrective actions.

HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILES, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area).

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station

PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.

This IC addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for a General Emergency.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HG7

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

HS7

Initiating Condition:

Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of a ~~SITE-Site~~ ~~AREA-Area~~ ~~EMERGENCY~~Emergency.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, D

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

(4) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary.

Basis:

HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILES, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area).

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station

PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.

This IC addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for a Site Area Emergency.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HS7

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

HA7

Initiating Condition:

Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of an **ALERT-Alert**.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, D

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

(+) Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

Basis:

HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILES, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area).

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station

PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.

This IC addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for an Alert.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HA7

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY**

HU7

Initiating Condition:

Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of an ~~(NO)UEUNUSUAL~~nusual ~~EVENT~~vent.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, D

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

~~(4)~~ Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

Basis:

This IC addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for an ~~NOUEUNUSUAL~~nusual ~~EVENT~~vent.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HU7

RECOGNITION CATEGORY
ISFSI MALFUNCTIONS

E-HU1

Initiating Condition

Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY.

Operating Mode Applicability:

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, D

Emergency Action Level (EAL):

Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by an on-contact radiation reading:

- > 200 mr/hr on the Horizontal Storage Module (HSM) access door

OR

- > 40 mr/hr on the Horizontal Storage Module (HSM) sides
(1) ~~Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by an on-contact radiation reading greater than (2 times the site-specific cask specific technical specification allowable radiation level) on the surface of the spent fuel cask.~~

Basis:

CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: The irradiated fuel dry storage cask barrier(s) between areas containing radioactive substances and the environment.

INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI): A complex that is designed and constructed for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage.

This IC addresses an event that results in damage to the CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY of a storage cask containing spent fuel. It applies to irradiated fuel that is licensed for dry storage beginning at the point that the loaded storage cask is sealed. **The word cask, as used in this EAL, refers to the storage container in use at the site for dry storage of irradiated fuel.** The issues of concern are the creation of a potential or actual release path to the environment, degradation of ~~one or more~~ any fuel assemblies due to environmental factors, and configuration changes which could cause challenges in removing the cask or fuel from storage.

The existence of “damage” is determined by radiological survey. The technical specification multiple of “2 times”, which is also used in Recognition Category A-R IC AU1, is used here to distinguish between non-emergency and emergency conditions. The emphasis for this classification is the degradation in the level of safety of the spent fuel cask and not the magnitude of the associated dose or dose rate. It is recognized that in the case of extreme damage to a loaded cask, the fact that the “on-contact” dose

**RECOGNITION CATEGORY
ISFSI MALFUNCTIONS**

rate limit is exceeded may be determined based on measurement of a dose rate at some distance from the cask.

Security-related events for ISFSIs are covered under ICs HU1 and HA1.

Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 E-HU1
2. Calvert Cliffs Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Appendix A to Materials License SNM-2505 Technical Specifications