

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station - Unit 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)
05000387

PAGE (3)
1 OF 3

TITLE (4)
Entry Into Technical Specification 3.0.2

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
5	03	98	98	-- 008	-- 00	6	02	98	Susquehanna SES - Unit 2	05000388
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	POWER LEVEL (10)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)																						
5	000	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER
																								Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Stephen J. Ellis - Senior Engineer, Licensing	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 717 / 542-3537
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).							

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On May 3, 1998, at 1225 hours, with Unit 1 in Condition 5 (Refueling) and Unit 2 in Condition 1 (Power Operation) at 100% power, it was discovered that the Secondary Containment Isolation logic had previously been de-energized for approximately fourteen hours and five minutes. No Limited Conditions for Operation (LCOs) were taken at that time. The time intervals of the appropriate ACTION statements were exceeded. When this condition was discovered, Technical Specification 3.0.2 was entered. This event, exceeding the time interval of an ACTION statement, is reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). The cause of the event has been identified as an error in a test procedure. The error was made in the latest procedure revision and was not identified by the preparer or the reviewer. There was no safety consequence to this event, and since the other division of Secondary Containment Isolation was available throughout the duration of this event, the safety significance was minimal. The health and safety of the public was not compromised. The appropriate procedures have been reviewed and changes made as necessary. This event has been reviewed with the involved personnel to emphasize the need for self-checking and field verification.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station - Unit 1	05000				
	387	98	008	00	2 OF 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On May 3, 1998 at 1225 hours, with Unit 1 in Condition 5 (Refueling) at 0% power and Unit 2 in Condition 1 (Power Operation) at 100% power, it was discovered that the incorrect 120 VAC transfer switch for Division II control power had been repositioned. As a result of this event, the Division II Secondary Containment Isolation (EIS Code: VA) logic power became de-energized during the electrical bus testing at 1225 hours on May 2, 1998. The transfer switch is intended to provide an alternate power supply to this equipment during the bus outage. Loss of the Secondary Containment Isolation logic power affected both units. The bus testing was being controlled by an approved procedure, TP-104-012. This Division II equipment remained de-energized, and thus inoperable, for approximately fourteen hours and five minutes, until 0230 hours on May 3, 1998, when the electrical bus was re-energized. This was in excess of the 12 hours allowed by the Technical Specification ACTION statement. The discrepancy was identified during the restoration from the bus testing. No Technical Specification Limited Condition for Operation (LCO) ACTIONS were taken at the time of the event. When the condition was discovered, Technical Specification 3.0.2 was entered on both units, which states in part: Non-compliance with a specification shall exist when the requirements of the LCO and associated ACTION requirements are not met within the specified time intervals...

CAUSE OF EVENT

Investigation of this event revealed that an error had been made in the last revision. That revision incorporated steps from another procedure, and in the process, HSS-0681A designation (120 VAC Division I transfer switch) was inadvertently not changed to HSS-0681B (120 VAC Division II transfer switch).

The error was missed by both the procedure preparer and the technical reviewer. This is considered a human performance error.

REPORTABILITY/ANALYSIS

As a result of the described event, the Secondary Containment Isolation logic power was lost during the time that electrical bus testing of load center 1B220 was in progress. With this equipment de-energized, Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2 ACTION statements require that this equipment be placed in the tripped condition within twelve hours or establish Secondary Containment with the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) (EIS Code: BH) system operating within one hour. Since the condition was unknown at the time, no LCOs were entered. The time interval of the applicable LCOs were exceeded, making this event reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). The isolation logic was subsequently re-energized with the bus restoration. Later in the restoration process the noted error was identified, at which time LCO 3.0.2 was entered to document that a condition had existed where the time interval of a Technical Specification ACTION had not been met. The events described had no safety consequence since the Secondary Containment Isolation system was not challenged. The Division I isolation logic and equipment and SBGT were available throughout this event, and therefore, the safety significance was minimal. The health and safety of the public was not compromised.



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Susquehanna Steam Electric Station - Unit 1	05000				3 OF 3
	387	98	-- 008	-- 00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Based on the guidance of NUREG 1022, Revision 1, the submittal date for this Licensee Event Report is June 2, 1998.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The following corrective actions have been taken:

- The appropriate procedures have been changed to correct the error described.
- Review of other procedures for possible enhancements in switch nomenclature has been completed. No changes were required.
- The involved personnel have reviewed this event with emphasis placed on the importance of performing self-checking during procedure revisions and on a thorough/complete field verification.

A department-wide communication capturing the lessons learned from this event will be shared with department personnel.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Past Similar Events: None

Failed Component: None

