ATTACHMENT NO. 3 TO PLA-4903

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS MARK-UPS

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
B. Both Unit 1 RHRSW subsystems inoperable.	B.1 Restore one Unit 1 RHRSW subsystem to OPERABLE status.	8 hours from discovery of one or both Unit 2 RHRSW subsystems not capable of supporting associated Unit 1 RHRSW subsystem AND 7 days
C. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met. OR UHS inoperable	C.1 Be in MODE 3. AND C.2 Be in MODE 4.	12 hours 36 hours

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.7.1.1	Verify the water level is greater than or equal to 678 feet 1 inch above Mean Sea Level.	12 hours
SR 3.7.1.2	Verify the average water temperature of the UHS is ≤ 88°F.	24 hours

Replace with insert B

(continued)

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
B. Both Unit 2 RHRSW subsystems inoperable.	B.1 Restore one Unit 2 RHRSW subsystem to OPERABLE status.	8 hours from discovery of one or both Unit 1 RHRSW subsystems not capable of supporting associated Unit 2 RHRSW subsystem AND 7 days
C. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met. OR UHS inoperable	C.1 Be in MODE 3. AND C.2 Be in MODE 4.	12 hours 36 hours

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.7.1.1 Verify the water level is greater than or equal to 678 feet 1 inch above Mean Sea Level.	12 hours
SR ~~3.7.1.2~~ Verify ~~the average water temperature of the~~ UHS ~~is~~ ≤ 88°F.	24 hours

Replace with insert B

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

following a LOCA. The ability of the RHRSW System to support long term cooling of the reactor or primary containment is discussed in the FSAR, Chapters 6 and 15 (Refs. 2 and 3, respectively). These analyses explicitly assume that the RHRSW System will provide adequate cooling support to the equipment required for safe shutdown. These analyses include the evaluation of the long term primary containment response after a design basis LOCA.

The safety analyses for long term cooling were performed for various combinations of RHR System failures. The worst case single failure that would affect the performance of the RHRSW System is any failure that would disable one subsystem of the RHRSW System. As discussed in the FSAR, Section 6.2.2 (Ref. 2) for these analyses, manual initiation of the OPERABLE RHRSW subsystem and the associated RHR System is assumed to occur 30 minutes after a DBA. In this case, the maximum suppression chamber water temperature and pressure are analyzed to be below the design temperature of 220°F and maximum allowable pressure of 53 psig.

The RHRSW System, together with the UHS, satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. (Ref.4)

LCO

Two RHRSW subsystems are required to be OPERABLE to provide the required redundancy to ensure that the system functions to remove post accident heat loads, assuming the worst case single active failure occurs coincident with the loss of offsite power.

An RHRSW subsystem is considered OPERABLE when:

a. One pump is OPERABLE; and

b. An OPERABLE flow path is capable of taking suction from the UHS and transferring the water to the RHR heat exchanger and returning it to the UHS at the assumed flow rate, and

c. An OPERABLE UHS.

Replace with Insert C →

The OPERABILITY of the UHS is based on having a minimum water level of 678 feet 1 inch above mean sea level and a maximum water temperature of 88°F.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

following a LOCA. The ability of the RHRSW System to support long term cooling of the reactor or primary containment is discussed in the FSAR, Chapters 6 and 15 (Refs. 2 and 3, respectively). These analyses explicitly assume that the RHRSW System will provide adequate cooling support to the equipment required for safe shutdown. These analyses include the evaluation of the long term primary containment response after a design basis LOCA.

The safety analyses for long term cooling were performed for various combinations of RHR System failures. The worst case single failure that would affect the performance of the RHRSW System is any failure that would disable one subsystem of the RHRSW System. As discussed in the FSAR, Section 6.2.2 (Ref. 2) for these analyses, manual initiation of the OPERABLE RHRSW subsystem and the associated RHR System is assumed to occur 30 minutes after a DBA. In this case, the maximum suppression chamber water temperature and pressure are analyzed to be below the design temperature of 220°F and maximum allowable pressure of 53 psig.

The RHRSW System, together with the UHS, satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. (Ref.4)

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Two RHRSW subsystems are required to be OPERABLE to provide the required redundancy to ensure that the system functions to remove post accident heat loads, assuming the worst case single active failure occurs coincident with the loss of offsite power.

An RHRSW subsystem is considered OPERABLE when:

a. One pump is OPERABLE; and

b. An OPERABLE flow path is capable of taking suction from the UHS and transferring the water to the RHR heat exchanger and returning it to the UHS at the assumed flow rate, and

c. An OPERABLE UHS.

Replace with Insert C

The OPERABILITY of the UHS is based on having a minimum water level of 678 feet 1 inch above mean sea level and a maximum water temperature of 88°F.

(continued)

TSCR 98-001

ITS INSERTS:

Insert B:

SR	3.7.1.2.a	When both units are in MODE 1 or 2, or either unit has been in MODE 3 for less than twelve (12) hours, verify the average water temperature in the UHS is ≤ 85°F.
SR	3.7.1.2.b	When either unit has been in MODE 3 for at least twelve (12) hours but not more than twenty-four (24) hours, verify the average water temperature in the UHS is ≤ 87°F.
SR	3.7.1.2.c	When either unit has been in MODE 3 for at least twenty-four (24) hours, verify the average water temperature in the UHS is ≤ 88°F.

Insert C:

The OPERABILITY of the UHS is based on having a minimum water level at the overflow weir of 678 feet 1 inch above mean sea level and a maximum water temperature of 85°F; unless either unit is in MODE 3. If a unit enters MODE 3, the time of entrance into this condition determines the appropriate maximum ultimate heat sink fluid temperature. If the earliest unit to enter MODE 3 has been in that condition for less than twelve (12) hours, the peak temperature to maintain OPERABILITY of the ultimate heat sink remains at 85°F. If either unit has been in MODE 3 for more than twelve (12) hours but less than twenty-four (24) hours, the OPERABILITY temperature of the ultimate heat sink becomes 87°F. If either unit has been in MODE 3 for twenty-four (24) hours or more, the OPERABILITY temperature of the ultimate heat sink becomes 88°F.

This OPERABILITY definition is supported by analysis and evaluations performed in accordance with the guidance given in Regulatory Guide 1.27.