Mr. Robert G. Byram Senior Vice President-Generation and Chief Nuclear Officer Pennsylvania Power and Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, PA 18101

SUBJECT:

CHANGES TO THE BASES OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 (TAC NOS.

MA1485 AND MA1486)

Dear Mr. Byram:

By letter dated October 21, 1997, Pennsylvania Power and Light Company submitted changes to the Bases of the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications (TSs). These changes revise existing Bases Section 3/4.9.7 to revise the dose consequences from a fuel handling accident and to define the methods of the control of loads over the spent fuel pool. This letter acknowledges these changes to the TS Bases section. TS Page B 3/4 9-2 for each unit with the proposed changes are enclosed.

Sincerely,

/S/ Victor Nerses, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate I-2 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-387

and 50-388

Enclosure: As stated

cc w/encl: See next page

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VNerses MO'Brien CAnderson, RGN I

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PD I-2 Reading

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
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 April 30, 1998

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and Chief Nuclear Officer
Pennsylvania Power and Light Company
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Project Directorate I-2


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Mr. Robert G. Byram
Pennsylvania Power & Light Company

Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2

CC:

Jay Silberg, Esq. Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 2300 N Street N.W. Washington, D.C. 20037

Bryan A. Snapp, Esq.
Assistant Corporate Counsel
Pennsylvania Power & Light Company
2 North Ninth Street
Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101

Licensing Group Supervisor Pennsylvania Power & Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101

Senior Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 35 Berwick, Pennsylvania 18603-0035

Director-Bureau of Radiation
Protection
Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Resources
P. O. Box 8469
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17105-8469

Mr. Jesse C. Tilton, III
Allegheny Elec. Cooperative, Inc.
212 Locust Street
P.O. Box 1266
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108-1266

Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

General Manager
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station
Pennsylvania Power and Light Company
Box 467
Berwick, Pennsylvania 18603

Mr. Herbert D. Woodeshick Special Office of the President Pennsylvania Power and Light Company Rural Route 1, Box 1797 Berwick, Pennsylvania 18603

George T. Jones
Vice President-Nuclear Operations
Pennsylvania Power and Light Company
2 North Ninth Street
Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101

Dr. Judith Johnsrud National Energy Committee Sierra Club 433 Orlando Avenue State College, PA 16803

Chairman
Board of Supervisors
738 East Third Street
Berwick, PA 18603



REFUELING OPERATIONS

BASES

3/4.9.6 REFUELING PLATFORM

DELETED

3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL

The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel assembly over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool ensures that in the event this load is dropped 1) the dose consequences of the accident would be well within the requirements of 10 CFR 100 doses (less than 25% of 10 CFR 100 doses), and 2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the safety analyses.

The restriction of movement is accomplished by interlocks, physical stops or administrative controls as stated in the Final Safety Analysis Report.

3/4.9.8 and 3/4.9.9 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL and WATER LEVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL

The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. This minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the safety analysis.

3/4.9.10 CONTROL ROD REMOVAL

These specifications ensure that maintenance or repair of control rods or control rod drives will be performed under conditions that limit the probability of inadvertent criticality. The requirements for simultaneous removal of more than one control rod are more stringent since the SHUTDOWN MARGIN specification provides for the core to remain subcritical with only one control rod fully withdrawn.

3/4.9.11 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

The requirement that at least one residual heat removal loop be OPERABLE or that an alternate method capable of decay heat removal be demonstrated and that an alternate method of coolant mixing be in operation ensures that 1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel below 140°F as required during REFUELING, and 2) sufficient coolant circulation would be available through the reactor core to assure accurate temperature indication and to distribute and prevent stratification of the poison in the event it becomes necessary to actuate the standby liquid control system.

The requirement to have two shutdown cooling mode loops OPERABLE when there is less than 22 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange ensures that a single failure of the operating loop will not result in a complete loss of residual heat removal capability. With the reactor vessel head removed and 22 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange, a large heat sink is available for core cooling. Thus, in the event a failure of the operating RHR loop, adequate time is provided to initiate alternate methods capable of decay heat removal or emergency procedures to cool the core.

REFUELING OPERATIONS

BASES

3/4.9.6 REFUELING PLATFORM

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