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facility name: Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES)

Inspection Period: June 11, 1996 through July 29, 1996

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-387/96-08, 50-388/96-08

This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a seven-week period of resident inspection; in addition, it includes the results of announced inspections by several other regional inspectors.

Operations

The 'E' diesel generator (DG) was inoperable for 20 days due to a breaker mis-positioning by a non-licensed nuclear plant operator (NPO). The multiple administrative barriers intended to prevent and detect such an occurrence failed. Three Technical Specification surveillances by NPOs failed to detect that the breaker was mis-positioned. Reliance on operator action as a compensatory measure to maintain the diesel generator operable during a loss of cooling accident/loss of offsite power (LOCA/LOOP) is not considered reasonable. The inoperable diesel generator, the inadequate Technical Specification (TS) surveillances, and the failures to implement procedures are all apparent violations of NRC requirements and are being considered for escalated enforcement in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy.

An NPO error caused the 'B' Standby Liquid Control pump heat trace to be deenergized from June 12 to June 13, 1996. The inspector determined that the NPO failed to follow procedures for operation of equipment identified with a Status Control Tag. Although not directly contributing to the occurrence, the actions taken to identify and correct a configuration control deficiency were not timely. The NPO's failure to implement the Status Control procedure constitutes an apparent violation of NRC requirements and is being considered for escalated enforcement in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy.

During separate control room tours, two different plant conditions were identified by the inspector which required operator actions by procedure. The actions were minor and were performed following identification by the inspector. PP&L management response to the conditions was positive and reinforced the need to follow plant procedures. These failures to follow procedure constitute a violation of minor significance and are being treated as a Non-Cited Violation consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

The licensee's immediate actions to address identified NPO performance weaknesses were aggressive. The issue will remain unresolved pending further NRC review of the NPO performance weaknesses and the licensee's corrective action plan.

The overall plant response to the July 14 Unit 2 reactor scram was adequate. Operator response was aggressive and complete, and equipment performed as expected. The post trip Plant Operator Review Committee (PORC) performed its function well. Corrective actions were aggressively identified and pursued by the licensee.



The inspector concluded that there were no substantial differences between the most recent Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) evaluation findings and the current NRC perception of licensee performance. In addition, there were no INPO evaluation findings that required additional regional follow-up outside of the normal NRC review of licensee corrective actions.

Maintenance

Maintenance was generally well performed throughout the period. However, one maintenance related weakness resulted in a Unit 2 reactor trip.

Engineering

The inspector found the licensee's 1992 justification for blocking open doors and hatchways to high energy pipe areas to be inadequate. The licensee is currently reevaluating this issue and pending NRC review of their results, this issue is unresolved.

The modification process associated with re-design of the containment radiation monitors (CRM) was a missed opportunity to identify a conflict between the reactor protection system (RPS) bus transfer procedure and the CRM Technical Specification (TS). The licensee is pursuing appropriate TS changes and has committed to reasonable corrective actions in LER 50-387/96-003-00.

The failure to evaluate a scram discharge volume design basis requirement in an operability determination for its vent and drain valves on June 24, 1996, was viewed a weakness.

Plant Support

The Emergency Response Organization performed well during the off-year emergency exercise. The recovery manager showed good command and control, declared a General Emergency in a correct and timely manner, and communicated well with facility supervisors, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, and the PP&L mock NRC team during facility briefings. The licensee's critique on July 11 provided critical and detailed self assessment.

On June 5, the inspector identified a temporary tanker truck parked 20 feet from the DG building wall and DG combustion air intakes. The tanker contained approximately 400 gallons of DG fuel oil and had been parked in this location in support of maintenance on the 'A' DG. Upon notification, the licensee took immediate action to remove the tanker truck and documented the violation of station procedure in a Condition Report. This failure to follow procedures constitutes a violation of minor significance and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy.



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Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

At the beginning of this inspection period, Unit 1 was at 100 percent power. On June 15 power was reduced to a low of 73% in support of on-line maintenance for 10 hydraulic control units, an inspection of the 'B' condenser water box, and quarterly main steam isolation valve testing. The Unit was returned to 100% power on June 17. On July 6 power was reduced to 73% for approximately 4 hours at the request of the load dispatcher. On July 12 power was reduced to 75% for investigation of a small main condenser tube leak and was returned to 100% on July 14. Other minor power reductions were made for weekly turbine bypass valve testing. On July 19, four controls rods were withdrawn making all control rods full out and beginning the end of cycle coastdown.

At the beginning of this inspection period, Unit 2 was at 100 percent power. Routine power reductions were made in support of weekly turbine bypass valve testing. On July 14, Unit 2 was manually scrammed by operators when they observed that all three feedwater pumps had tripped due to loss of suction pressure. During post maintenance testing on a supply breaker to Auxiliary Bus 12A, all supply breakers to the bus opened and de-energized two condensate pumps, which caused the loss of suction pressure at the feedwater pumps. All safety systems responded to the transient as expected and the licensee verified all required isolations went to completion.

I. Operations

O1 Conduct of Operations¹

O1.1 Substitution Of The 'E' Diesel Generator In Place Of The 'D' Diesel Generator

a. Inspection Scope (93702)

On June 14, the 'E' Diesel Generator (DG) was substituted for the 'D' DG which was out of service for planned maintenance. On July 4, the licensee discovered that the 'E' DG had been inoperable since the substitution, due to a misalignment of the class 1E power supply breaker for its auxiliary equipment. This condition existed for 20 days, exceeding the Technical Specification (TS) allowed outage time of 72 hours. The inspector reviewed the procedures for alignment of the 'E' DG, weekly breaker alignment surveillance records, security access logs, and the design of the 'E' DG annunciators for breaker alignment.

¹Topical headings such as O1, M8, etc., are used in accordance with the NRC standardized reactor inspection report outline. Individual reports are not expected to address all outline topics.



b. Observations and Findings

Background

At SSES, four emergency DGs are required by TS during power operation. The 'A', 'B', 'C', and 'D' DGs supply the emergency power to a shared electrical distribution system servicing both Units. The 'E' DG is an installed spare which can be directly substituted for any one of the other four DGs to allow maintenance during power operation.

The 'E' DG's auxiliary equipment is normally supplied by offsite power through non-safety related electrical equipment. If the normal supply is lost when the 'E' DG is running, a safety related supply breaker (OA510-05) will automatically close to provide power from the 'E' DG's output. The auxiliary equipment includes the fuel oil transfer pump, 'E' DG building heating and ventilation, and normal lighting.

The 'E' DG bus, OA510, has five cubicles where a common transfer breaker is used to align the 'E' DG output to either the loads of another DG or to a non-safety related test bus. To substitute the 'E' DG for the 'D' DG, a single breaker manipulation is required at bus OA510. The common transfer breaker is moved from the test bus cubicle, where it is typically stored (racked out and control power deenergized) to the cubicle designated as the supply for the 'D' DG's emergency bus. Cubicle 6 on bus OA510 is always occupied by the safety related supply breaker for the 'E' DG auxiliary equipment (breaker OA510-05), regardless of the common transfer breaker location.

The designations for breakers on the 'E' DG bus OA510 are unique because they do not match the normal station convention. Procedures for breaker manipulations at OA510 identify each removable breaker by number, whereas procedures for manipulating all other station 4 kV breakers reference cubicle numbers. These two conventions do not coincide at bus OA510. The inspector observed that despite the difference in convention, the labels on bus OA510 cubicles accurately describe their purpose.

'E' Diesel Generator Alignment

On June 14, an NPO was instructed to substitute the 'E' DG for the 'D' DG in accordance with OP-024-004, "Transfer And Test Mode Operations Of Diesel Generator E." During the alignment at bus OA510, the NPO discovered what he thought was the common transfer breaker (OA510-06) in a "racked in" position and open, with its control power energized. The common transfer breaker is a single breaker that is used in any one of five cubicle positions (one for each of the four DGs, and one for a test bus). When the 'E' DG is not aligned for another DG, the common breaker is normally located in the test cubicle, in a racked out position with its control power de-energized. The condition noted by the NPO was contrary to the expected condition. After discussion with the control room, he was given permission to de-energize the control power and "rack out" the breaker, allowing him to move it to the 'D' DG emergency bus supply cubicle (i.e., the output of 'E'

substituted for 'D'), as required by the procedure. The licensee assumed that breaker OA510-06 had been left in the incorrect configuration following a recent test, and initiated a Condition Report (CR) for the perceived status control event. The NPO continued with the 'E' DG alignment and following its operability surveillance, the 'E' DG was declared operable. No one field checked the "as found" breaker condition reported by the NPO during preparation of the CR. The CR concluded that there was no operability impact because the reported breaker would not affect the other diesel generators.

On July 4, the licensee discovered that the NPO had mistaken the 'E' DG auxiliary equipment supply breaker (OA510-05, in cubicle 6) for the common transfer breaker (OA510-06, in cubicle 1) during alignment of the DG on June 14. Consequently, during the 20 day period, if the 'E' DG was needed for a loss of offsite power (LOOP) event, the engine would have started but its auxiliary equipment would not have been automatically energized (see Safety Impact section below) because the NPO had removed the 'E' DG auxiliary equipment breaker. If uncorrected, this condition would prevent the DG from performing its intended safety function. The 'E' DG was inoperable for 20 days and exceeded the TS 3.8.1 allowed outage time of 72 hours. This is an apparent violation and is being considered for escalated enforcement in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. (EEI 96-08-01)

The licensee initially determined that discovery of the inoperable 'E' DG did not require an ENS notification but did require a Licensee Event Report (LER). However on July 5, 1996, the licensee identified two occasions when a second DG was inoperable for a short period of time. On June 24, the 'A' DG was inoperable for one minute and on July 1, the 'C' DG was inoperable for two minutes. Since the plant's design basis relies on a minimum of three operable DGs, the licensee made a four hour ENS notification because the plant had been outside its design basis (EN No. 30713). The inspector noted that the required reporting of this event was delayed for approximately 12 hours due to an inadequate review of DG LCO entries at the time of discovery.

Weekly 4 kV Breaker Surveillances

Three weekly 4kV breaker alignment surveillances required by TS 4.8.3.1.1 were performed by NPOs between June 14 and July 4. The surveillance procedure specifically requires verification that the 'E' DG auxiliary equipment supply breaker OA510-05 is "racked in" and open. Three NPOs signed the surveillance step indicating that the desired condition was observed; however, the breaker was not present. Security records show the three NPOs did enter the 'E' DG building. The inspector noted that one of the three NPOs performed his routine rounds and the 4kV breaker alignment verification in less than two minutes. The inspector considered it unlikely that an operator could reliably complete these tasks in that amount of time. The failure to verify the proper 4kV breaker alignment is an apparent violation of NRC requirements and is being considered for escalated enforcement in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. (EEI 96-08-02)

Procedure Adherence Errors

NDAP-QA-0022, Revision 1, Self Checking (STAR Program), describes a process for self-checking including, a step to identify the correct component train, unit, etc, before taking action. OP-AD-001, Revision 7, step 6.18.3.b, states "If the existing procedure is wrong, it shall be corrected prior to use." The NPO who performed the 'E' DG substitution on June 14, 1996, did not check the label on cubicle 6 at OA510 and therefore failed to implement requirements of the administrative procedures.

OI-AD-080, Revision 4, "Investigation of Status Control Occurrences", step 4.6.1.d, states "Station personnel written statements should be completed on the day of the event prior to leaving site." Shift personnel involved with the transfer breaker problem reported on June 14, 1996, during the 'E' DG transfer, did not complete their written statements until June 26.

SSES Policy Letter 89-003, Revision 3, "Verification Of Component Status," describes the activities which require independent verification. Alignment of safety related systems for operation requires independent verification. Alternatively, a system test verification may be performed in lieu of an independent verification. A system test verification is a functional test that demonstrates the subject component is in its proper state. The licensee's procedures for alignment of the 'E' DG, OP-024-004 and its monthly operability surveillance, SO-024-001, do not functionally check or independently verify the alignment of breaker OA510-05.

NDAP-QA-300, Revision 5, Conduct Of Operations, step 4.1.3.2, requires the NPO to keep the Plant Control Operator (PCO) informed of potential problems. On two occasions NPOs failed to inform the PCO after identification of potential problems.

- On May 6, the 'E' DG local annunciator for "MCC Not Proper For Auto Operation" was found in alarm and no action was taken for four days.
- On July 3, an NPO on rounds identified that the lights on bus OA510 did not look correct.

Fifteen NPOs performed routine rounds in the 'E' DG building between June 14 and July 4, 1996. The rounds sheet, OI-PL-0171, provides general instructions for observations at load centers and motor control centers. NPOs are to observe that indicating lights are on (and change bulbs if necessary), and that the status of protective relays is acceptable. During the 20 day period, the fifteen NPOs failed to identify that the indicating lights on OA510 were not as expected.

Additional information regarding the quality of NPO rounds and the accuracy of their records documenting performance of certain activities is further discussed in Section O1.2 of this report.

The above examples involve failures to implement station procedures and they are apparent violations of NRC requirements. These issues are being considered for escalated enforcement in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. (EEI 96-08-03)

Safety Impact

The licensee performed a safety assessment of the 'E' DG misalignment event that occurred on June 14. The safety assessment was completed as part of CR 96-0823 and approved by the licensee during a July 26, PORC meeting. In the safety evaluation the licensee identified three consequence paths ("limiting cases") of the 'E' DG misalignment. These limiting cases were:

- 'E' DG run time until the fuel in the day tank was exhausted.
- 'E' DG run time until local area temperatures elevated to the point that critical equipment was affected.
- 'E' DG run time until an associated DG battery was depleted below required voltage.

Each of these consequence paths would result in the loss of the 'E' DG during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) together with a loss of offsite power (LOOP). The expected time duration between event occurrence and the loss of the 'E' DG, for the three limiting cases, corresponded to 1 hour 25 minutes, 45 minutes, and 4 hours, respectively. The excessive temperature case was identified as the shortest time period and therefore the worst case. The licensee estimated that it would take a single operator approximately 15 minutes to manipulate the breaker into a position to support the operation of the 'E' DG, leaving approximately 30 minutes to identify the problem and dispatch an operator(s) to align the 'E' DG breaker. The licensee concluded that the 45 minute time period was sufficient to implement manual corrective action to keep the 'E' DG in operation. If this were true, the impact on safety would be significantly reduced.

The inspector reviewed the safety assessment and determined that:

- The reliance on manual action would depend on the same NPO training that did not prevent the initial misalignment nor the subsequent misverification of the equipment. In addition, the NPO response would not be preplanned, and would be under stressful circumstances.
- The post LOCA/LOOP realignment of the 'E' DG would require the NPO to manipulate heavy equipment in low lighting, high noise conditions with questionable air quality. The DG room would have vapors and may have paint and other fumes present because of the high temperatures. In addition, the DG room temperatures may exceed 110 degrees F when the breaker manipulation is required.

- The licensee's conclusion that the control room operators and the NPO would be able to readily identify the source of the 'E' DG misalignment during a LOCA/LOOP, even though the 'E' DG would appear to be running normally, from a load distribution standpoint, until failure, does not seem to be reasonable.

The inspector concluded that the reliance on operator action as a compensatory action during a LOCA/LOOP, prior to the loss of the 'E' DG, is not reasonable. Therefore, the safety impact of the misalignment of the 'E' DG is significant.

c. Conclusion

The 'E' diesel generator was inoperable for 20 days due to a breaker misalignment by a non-licensed operator. The multiple quality administrative control barriers intended to prevent and detect such an occurrence failed. Three Technical Specification surveillances by non-licensed operators failed to detect the subject breaker was missing. Reliance on operator action as a compensatory measure to maintain the diesel generator operable during a LOCA/LOOP is not considered reasonable. The inoperable diesel generator, the inadequate TS surveillances, and the failures to implement procedures are all apparent violations of NRC requirements and are being considered for escalated enforcement in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy.

O1.2 Non-Licensed Operator Performance

a. Inspection Scope (71707)

The licensee's investigation of the 'E' DG misalignment event revealed that approximately half of the non-licensed NPOs had failed to perform a function that they documented.

b. Observations and Findings

On July 18, 1996, while investigating the 'E' DG breaker misalignment event, the licensee's Independent Safety Evaluation Services (ISES) identified that an alarm panel test required by the routine NPO rounds would be recorded by the plant computer. A comparison of computer records and rounds sheets from January 1, 1996 to July 10, 1996 showed that eleven NPOs routinely failed to perform the alarm test they signed for on their rounds sheets. These eleven individuals were taken off shift duties and had their protected area access revoked pending a further evaluation of their performance and corrective actions. Seven additional NPOs missed the alarm test on at least one occasion, however based on the sufficient length of time these individuals took to perform their rounds and the relatively small number of missed alarm tests, licensee management determined that they could continue to perform shift duties.

All Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS required surveillances normally performed by NPOs, were re-performed between July 24 and July 26 by Operations Department supervisors.



In addition, all electrical and mechanical check-off lists for the proper alignment of emergency core cooling systems on both Units were re-performed by Operations Department supervisors. The licensee did not identify any alignment or equipment status control problems during these reviews. Some minor procedure errors and labeling discrepancies were identified during this process.

At the close of this report period the licensee was still evaluating possible corrective actions. This item is considered unresolved pending further NRC review of the licensee's final corrective action plan. (URI 96-08-04)

c. Conclusion

The licensee's immediate actions to address identified NPO performance weaknesses were aggressive. The issue will remain unresolved pending further NRC review of the NPO performance weaknesses and the licensee's corrective action plan.

O1.3 Unit 2 Reactor Scram

a. Inspection Scope (71707)

On July 14, 1996, the Unit 2 reactor was manually scrammed by the plant control operator (PCO) in anticipation of a low reactor water level scram. The decreasing reactor water level was caused by the loss of all three steam driven feedwater pumps initiated by an electrical malfunction of the 12A Auxiliary bus that resulted in the loss of two condensate pumps. The inspector reviewed the cause of the pump trips, the overall plant response, the results of licensee's Event Review Team investigation, and the activities of the Plant Operations Review Committee.

b. Observations and Findings

On July 14, planned maintenance was performed on the breakers and bus ducts that connect the Unit 2 Auxiliary buses to Startup Transformer 20. During a post maintenance test on the supply breaker to the 12A Auxiliary bus, the power to the bus was lost causing the loss of the 'A' and 'C' condensate pumps. Loss of the condensate pumps resulted in a loss of net positive suction head for the feedwater pumps. After all three feedwater pumps tripped on low suction pressure, the PCO manually initiated a scram prior to reaching the low water level scram (+13"). The operators responded to the event in a capable manner.

The licensee determined the cause of the scram to be an incorrectly performed maintenance activity. An electrical lead was not correctly landed in cubicle 2A101-04. The licensee performed an initial electrical system lineup verification based on switch position and indication lights (external cabinet inspection) to determine if the electrical distribution system was correctly aligned. These activities, however, were superficial to the extent that they would not have identified the type of electrical connection problem that caused the scram because the unconnected wires were internal to the electrical panel. PP&L management was reluctant to enter the



internal space of electrical cabinets due to concerns related to causing inadvertent component/system actuations, with the exception of two specific cabinets that were worked by the same maintenance crew. An internal inspection of similar electrical cabinets on both Unit 1 and 2 was subsequently performed after NRC Region I management expressed concern regarding the lack of an internal inspection. That inspection did not identify similar deficiencies.

The licensee's post trip review of the transient found that the equipment and plant personnel responded as expected.

Following the transient, the licensee conducted three independent reviews of the scram. The reviews were conducted by a station Event Review Team, the ISES, and a PP&L corporate independent auditing group. The three reviews determined that the event was caused by a maintenance activity (Tie Bus Outage TP-003-007). The three PP&L reviews each eliminated tampering and equipment failure as potential root causes and concluded that the cause of the event was human error associated with weak maintenance work practices. The maintenance work was performed by the Relay and Test work group which is a corporate function rather than a site function. Key contributors to the established root cause were inadequate job performance by the members of the Relay and Test group, and inadequate supervisory oversight during the conduct of the Relay and Test group work.

The inspector identified a similar Unit 2 event that occurred on April 15, 1995, that was discussed in NRC inspection report 387,388/95-08. In that event a generator load reject occurred when the 500 kV switchyard south bus circuit breaker 3T was opened in preparation for a planned maintenance activity. The load reject resulted in an automatic scram. The root cause of the event was inadequate maintenance activity performed by the PP&L Relay and Test group on Susquehanna distribution equipment. One of the key contributors during this event was the mis-configuration of a motor-operated disconnect (MOD) 3N-S auxiliary contact.

The inspector observed the restart Plant Operation Review Committee (PORC) meeting, 96-045, on July 12. The licensee discussed the following issues:

- Secondary containment bypass leakage
- Forced outage 96-01 open items
- Findings from the independent reviews of the 7/14/96 scram
- Findings from the ERT of the E emergency diesel alignment event
- Scram discharge volume vent/drain valve opening times
- Off gas guard bed high temperature condition

The PORC activities were detailed, probing and introspective. The initial corrective actions for each of the items was adequate and supported the restart of the unit.

c. Conclusion

The overall plant response to the maintenance induced Unit 2 reactor scram was adequate. Operator response was aggressive and complete and equipment

performed as expected. The post trip PORC performed its function well. Corrective actions were aggressively identified and pursued by the licensee.

O1.4 Review of Third Party Audits

a. Inspection Scope (71707)

A qualitative comparison of recent NRC inspection findings and Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) evaluation findings was performed.

b. Observations and Findings

INPO evaluation findings from the last two full scale plant evaluations were reviewed for safety significance and the need for further follow-up activities. In addition, a Condition Report dated July 16, which accounted for the most recent Nuclear Mutual Limited Insurance property loss inspection was reviewed, in order to determine if these evaluations were consistent with or substantially deviated from the most recent NRC perception of the licensee's performance.

c. Conclusion

The inspector concluded that there were no substantial differences between the INPO evaluation findings and the current NRC perception of licensee performance. In addition, there were no INPO evaluation findings that required additional regional follow-up outside of the normal NRC review of licensee corrective actions.

O3 Operations Procedures and Documentation

O3.1 Unit 1 Power Ascension

a. Inspection Scope (71707)

An observation of a power ascension process was performed.

b. Observations and Findings

During a tour of the Unit 1 control room, on July 14, the inspector determined that Unit 1 was increasing power from approximately 70% and had two control board alarms that were energized for an extended period of time. The two alarms were the Average Power Range Monitor power alarm, and the Rod Block alarm. When these alarms cleared, operators initiated power changes which reinitiated the alarms. The inspector discussed the alarms and the power ascension scheme with shift personnel and determined that the operators were following a power ascension scheme prescribed by Reactor Engineering. The intentional reliance on alarm and blocking functions was discussed with licensee plant management, and with the NRR and AEOD offices of the NRC. It was determined that the reliance on the alarm functions was common in the boiling water reactor industry. Two subsequent power changes were observed following the inspector's discussion of this issue

with licensee management, in which the mentioned alarms were not forced into the alarm condition.

c. Conclusion

The operator actions during an observed power ascension were good; and no violations of Technical Specifications, the license, or procedures were identified.

03.2 Licensed Operator Annunciator Response

a. Inspection Scope (71707)

An observation of condition 1 and 4 activities was performed.

b. Observations and Findings

During a tour of the Unit 2 control room on July 14, the inspector identified that Unit 2 was operating at 100% power with annunciator Control Rod Drive (CRD) Panel 2C007 common alarm actuated. Unit 2 operators indicated that a work authorization had been initiated to respond to this condition and were able to identify the cause of the common alarm to a specific rod. The same common alarm condition was identified by the inspector on August 5. A different shift of Unit 2 operators indicated that a work authorization had been initiated to respond to this condition, but were not able to identify which rod was causing the common alarm. The annunciator response procedure stated that the operators were to determine the affected CRD by observing CRD temperature indicator TRSH-C12-2R608 at panel 2C007. When the inspector spoke to the operators on August 5, 1996, they were not able to identify the specific cause of the alarm and had not verified the specific cause in accordance with the procedure. This issue was discussed with the Unit Supervisor, the Shift Supervisor and the Operations Manager. Each stated that the PP&L expectation was that the on shift PCO would have complied with the annunciator response procedure and would be able to identify the specific cause of the alarm. Subsequently the operator determined the specific cause of the alarm and management has communicated its expectations to the control room operators. This failure constitutes example 1 of a violation of minor significance and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

During a tour of the Unit 2 control room, the inspector noted that Unit 2 had been operating at 100% power for several days with the annunciator for standby liquid control tank level high/low alarmed. Annunciator response procedure AR-207-001 referred the operator to operating procedure OP-253-001. The operating procedure directed the operator to return the high level condition to a normal operating level. This condition was discussed with plant operators who were knowledgeable of the condition and chose not to implement the procedure because the level remained within the acceptable Technical Specification range. This issue was discussed with the Unit Supervisor, the Shift Supervisor and the Operations Manager. Each stated that the PP&L expectation was that the on shift PCO would have complied with the

annunciator response procedure. This failure constitutes example 2 of a violation of minor significance and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

c. Conclusion

Based on PP&L management response to these two issues and their relatively low safety significance, the issues discussed above meet the current enforcement program requirements for a Non-cited Violations and require no further actions.

O4 Operator Knowledge and Performance

O4.1 Standby Liquid Control System Heat Trace

a. Inspection Scope (71707)

On June 12, 1996, a non-licensed operator de-energized circuit breakers labeled as the normal and alternate power supplies for the 'A' standby liquid control (SBLC) pump heat trace in preparation for work on the inoperable 'A' pump. A day later, the license discovered that the NPO had erroneously deenergized heat trace for the 'B' SBLC pump which was still operable. The inspector reviewed the sequence of events, impact on operability of the 'B' SBLC pump, and the licensee's resolution of a Condition Report (CR) for the event.

b. Observations and Findings

The heat trace system for SBLC is designed to prevent precipitation of sodium pentaborate in the piping which could affect its ability to perform its intended safety function. TS Surveillance 4.1.5 requires daily verification that the heat trace is operable by use of its test feature and that the sodium pentaborate solution temperatures are within the limits of TS Figure 3.1.5-2. Based on these TS surveillances, the inspector determined that the heat trace is a support system required for operability of the SBLC system.

In January a work authorization was written for electrical maintenance to support the preparation of "as-built" drawings for the heat trace control panel 1BC290, after it was recognized that the existing drawings were incorrect.

On March 11, a status control tag (SCT 1-96-073) was hung on the right hand door of panel 1BC290 stating "All blocking requested on panel must be field verified."

At 3:22 a.m. on June 12, an NPO applied a protective blocking permit, opening circuit breakers for what he thought was the 'A' SBLC pump heat trace.

At 2:05 p.m. on June 13, after insulation had been removed from the 'A' pump, workers discovered the heat trace was still energized. Further investigation found that the breakers opened for the blocking permit were actually the power supply for the 'B' SBLC pump heat trace. During the 34 hour period the 'B' SBLC pump heat



was deenergized, operators were already in a seven day action statement because the 'A' pump was inoperable for planned maintenance. With both SBLC pumps inoperable, TS 3.1.5 requires restoration of one pump within 8 hours or hot shutdown within the next 12 hours.

Based on the ambient air temperature and sodium pentaborate concentration, Condition Report 96-705 concluded that there was no impact on the 'B' SBLC pump operability during this period. Room temperatures taken by the Safety Department (for heat stress calculations) indicate that the minimum ambient air temperature was greater than 85°F. A chemistry sample taken on May 23 and June 20, found the average sodium pentaborate concentration to be 15.03% and 14.65% respectively. Based on this information and TS Figure 3.1.5-1 "Sodium Pentaborate Solution Temperature/Concentration Requirements," the inspector concluded that the precipitation of sodium pentaborate should not have occurred.

The inspector independently reviewed the heat trace alarm circuit drawings and discussed the alarm function with Nuclear Systems Engineering (NSE) to determine whether the daily TS required surveillance should have detected the deenergized heat trace. The inspector found that the alarm circuit will only alarm if a demand for heat is present and no current flow to the heat trace is detected. The alarm test required by TS only verifies that an alarm will occur with these condition simulated. Therefore, the NPO daily surveillance would not detect the open breakers. The inspector noted that this issue was not reviewed as part of the CR.

According to the NPO's description of the occurrence, he did observe the status control tag (SCT) and read it. However, he believed that the tag only applied to components behind the right hand door of panel 1BC290 and not the left hand door.

NDAP-QA-302, Revision 6, step 6.3.14 states that "Repositioning / operating components controlled by SCTs may be performed with the permission of the individual or work group who required the tag and either Operations Shift Supervision or Operations Outage Group Supervision."

The CR resolution concluded that the NPO who hung the SCT should have hung tags on the breakers for the 'A' and 'B' pumps' heat trace. The inspector did not agree with this conclusion because the extent of the wiring discrepancies inside the cabinet was not known and the SCT provided an encompassing warning.

The inspector made the following observations regarding the event and the licensee's corrective actions:

- Corrective actions were not properly initiated in January when this condition was first identified.
- The Status Control Tags applied in March, as an interim measure to identify the degraded condition, were not effective in preventing the error.
- The NPO's failure to contact Shift Supervision after reading the SCT applied to the panel in which he was to perform switching was in violation of NDAP-QA-302.



- The CR investigation did not address the adequacy of the TS required surveillance of the heat trace and whether the NPO on rounds should have identified the problem.
- The CR resolution did not address the performance of the NPO who performed the switching on June 12, 1996.

c. Conclusion

A non-licensed operator error caused the 'B' Standby Liquid Control pump heat trace to be deenergized from June 12 to June 13, 1996. The inspector determined that the NPO failed to follow procedures for operation of equipment identified with a Status Control Tag. Although not directly contributing to the occurrence, the corrective actions taken to identify and resolve the equipment deficiency were not timely. The NPO's failure to implement the status control procedure constitutes an apparent violation of NRC Requirements and is being considered for escalated enforcement in accordance with the NRC enforcement policy. (EEI 96-08-05)

O8 Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92700)

O8.1 (Closed) LER 50-387/96-003-00: Entry into TS 3.0.3 due to both loops of Containment Radiation Monitors being inoperable during an RPS bus swap. See Section E1.2 of this report.

II. Maintenance

M1 Conduct of Maintenance

M1.1 General Comments

a. Inspection Scope (62703)

The inspector observed all or portions of the following work activities:

C63195	Relocation of Unit 1 Containment Foundation Seismic Monitor, June 10, 1996.
S63599	Overhaul Of 'A' SBLC Pump, June 12, 1996.
P52939	Removal Of 'A' SBLC Pump Relief Valve PSV148F029A, June 14, 1996.
A53903	HPCI Post Maintenance Local Leak Rate Testing, June 19, 1996.
DCP94-9014	CAC/CIG Relay Replacement
PMP94-3015	Unit 1 PCS Tie to the PICSY Network

The inspector observed all or portions of the following surveillance activities:

SO-252-002	Quarterly HPCI Flow Verification, June 5, 1996.
SI-099-302	Calibration Of Strong Motion Seismic Instrumentation, June 26, 1996.

P53406 Calibration Of HPCI Pump Discharge Flow Switch For Minimum Flow Valve Control, June 17, 1996.
TP 273-012 CAC/CIG Relay Replacement Test

b. Observations and Findings

In general, the inspector found that the observed portions of the maintenance and surveillance work were performed in accordance with applicable procedures. The workers were cognizant of prerequisites and aware of station policies, such as the one precluding the blocking open of fire doors.

M1.2 Standby Liquid Control Pump 'A' Corrective Maintenance

On June 11, the 'A' SBLC pump was taken out of service for preventive maintenance on circuit breakers. Following the maintenance, the quarterly flow surveillance, SO-153-004O, was run and the 'A' SBLC pump could only develop a flow of 39 gpm, failing the 41.2 gpm acceptance criteria.

On June 12, the licensee disassembled the 'A' SBLC pump and reworked the seating surfaces of the six internal check valves. Post maintenance testing showed a flow of 39 gpm. On June 13, the flow indicator was replaced and again the pump showed 39 gpm.

On June 14, the licensee replaced the 'A' pump pressure relief valve. This maintenance required an abnormal system alignment and necessitated the installation of a blank flange. The use of flanges in place of the 'A' pressure relief valve was evaluated and approved via the licensee's Bypass (temporary modification) process. A 50.59 safety evaluation was completed and found this temporary change to the system acceptable, allowing the licensee to consider the 'B' SBLC pump operable. Bench testing of the 'A' relief valve found that it began leaking at less than 80% of its relief setpoint. The valve was reworked, tested, and re-installed.

The licensee's corrective action for the failed surveillance was performed within the time allowed by the applicable TS action statements. The inspector noted that the repeated entry into the 8 hour, two inoperable pump, action statement was necessary because there is no isolation valve in the drain line common to both pumps' suction piping.

M1.3 Movement Of New Lead Use Fuel Assemblies

The inspector observed the inspection, assembly, and movement of four new lead use fuel assemblies on June 20. The receipt and inspection was controlled by RE-1TY-101, Revision 0, dated June 12, 1996. The fuel movements and assembly were carefully performed by maintenance personnel. Good oversight was provided by the Activity Control Engineer. The inspector noted that the use of nylon slings and the overhead crane's auxiliary hook to move the fuel assemblies was a simplified arrangement with less opportunity for equipment failure in comparison

with the general purpose grapple and jib crane (Reference IR 50-387/95-20). The new rigging arrangement was reviewed in the Safety Evaluation for procedure RE-1TY-101 and approved by PORC on June 6. The inspector concluded the overall conduct of this evolution was very good.

M1.4 5 Year Planned Maintenance on Bus OA107

a. Inspection Scope (62707)

The inspector observed planned maintenance associated with Bus OA107.

b. Observations and Findings

This activity was performed by the Relay and Test group and included Doble testing of a portion of the distribution network. The work was controlled by:

Test Procedure (TP) 003007 Doble Test
Work Authorization (WA) S60590
WA P61824
WA S60630
Diagram TP 003007

The inspector determined that diagram TP003007 was included in the work package, but did not indicate that it was a controlled document. Maintenance technician communicated that the document was used to brief the work crew activities in a pre-job briefing. There was some indication that the diagram was used during the actual maintenance activity (grease marks indicating component position) although workers stated that it was only for "reference."

No written procedure was present in the field for the Doble testing that was being performed. The inspector discussed the Doble testing with the technician performing the activity but was not able to identify any documented acceptance criteria. The acceptance criteria offered by the technician performing the Doble test was that it was "close to last time." No Susquehanna maintenance supervision was observed controlling the activities in the field.

c. Conclusion

The work activities were poorly controlled, performed and supervised. Similar Test and Relay group activities performed on the same day as this observation was conducted, resulted in a reactor scram (see Section O1.3 of this report). These issues are considered related to the activities resulting in the July 14, reactor scram and adequate corrective actions for the scram are expected to address the weaknesses identified in this case.



M1.5 4 kV Breaker Isolation Modification On 2A202/201.**a. Inspection Scope (62707)**

This maintenance activity included a review of the procedures controlling continuity testing for indication circuits on the 4 kV distribution network, and the observation of a portion of the field activities.

b. Observations and Findings

This field activity included continuity testing for indication circuits on a portion of the 4 kV distribution network and was supported by:

WA C50247
PMR 94-3047P
Permit 2-96-0641

During an observation of a portion of this maintenance activity the inspector observed that the field technician who was stationed at cabinet 2C680 - BOP Transducer Panel Bay F:

- Was working alone inside of an energized cabinet, having part of his torso, head and both arms inside the cabinet.
- Did not have a copy of the procedure being performed or an electrical print to refer to during the test.
- Did not have continuous communications with the test director so he had to leave his work area and go down a short passage to speak on a handset each time communications were necessary.

The inspector discussed the observed activities with Susquehanna maintenance supervision, a representative from the site safety organization and the technician involved, at a subsequent date. Susquehanna maintenance supervision asserted that the worker was not required to have communications with the test director, that the worker was not near the energized portion of the equipment, and that because he had installed the modification that was being tested neither a copy of the procedure nor an electrical print was required.

The maintenance activity resulted in a positive post maintenance acceptance test, and no personnel or equipment damage occurred.

c. Conclusion

The field activity was poorly controlled by procedure and supervised. However, because of the acceptable test results, the fact that no personnel injury occurred, and an increase in management oversight in subsequent maintenance activities, the



safety significance was considered to be low. The inspector had no further questions.

M1.6 Conclusions on Conduct of Maintenance

With the exceptions described above, the performance of maintenance activities during this inspection period was adequate.

III. Engineering

E1 Conduct of Engineering

E1.1 High Energy Line Break Protection

a. Inspection Scope (73051)

During observation of HPCI on-line maintenance activities on June 19, the inspector found the licensee had blocked open doors connecting the general area of Unit 2 Reactor Building 670' elevation and the air spaces of both the HPCI and RCIC rooms. The inspector questioned the effects of blocking open these doors since it appeared to defeat several design features for coping with a high energy line break.

b. Observations and Findings

FSAR Section 3.6.1.1 states that piping systems whose failure might generate hazardous environmental conditions are located in compartments which are capable of being isolated from required safety systems. Isolation of compartments which enclose high energy lines is provided by maintaining normally closed accessways and providing automatic isolation of other communication paths, such as ductwork. Three facets of protection against high energy line breaks are steam leak detection, ventilation back draft isolation dampers (BDIDs), and room blowout panels.

Each of the rooms containing high energy piping are equipped with temperature sensors for leak detection. They are designed to detect pipe flaws which could lead to a high energy line break. The temperature instruments initiate automatic isolation and control room alarms.

BDIDs isolate the ventilation ducts for each room to contain the steam from a pipe break and prevent damage to other systems in rooms connected to the same ventilation system. The BDIDs actuate on differential pressure between the room and the general reactor building.

Room blowout panels are designed to relieve pressure buildup from a high energy line break before damage to the secondary containment structure occurs.



A 1992 Engineering Work Request (M10103) addressed control of removable floor plugs, panels, and personnel access door for reactor building areas containing high energy piping. Areas reviewed were the HPCI, RCIC, and RHR Rooms, HPCI/RCIC piping areas, RWCU equipment area and the main steam tunnel. The evaluation was aimed at how opening these room boundaries would impact operability of the Steam Leak Detection Systems, Backdraft Isolation Dampers and room blow-out panels. The 1992 evaluation concluded that the safety functions of these features would not be affected by opening access hatches or doors.

The inspector's review of this evaluation found that the analysis assumptions were not documented and that a comparison was not made with the actual boundary openings created by any specific open door, hatch, or combination thereof. The leak detection/temperature models were revised after the initial assessment but the evaluation states that the model was only re-run for two rooms. Given these factors, and the related findings documented in NRC Inspection Report 96-04 concerning RWCU room leak detection, the inspector considered the 1992 evaluation to be inadequate justification for blocking open doors to rooms containing high energy piping.

The 1992 evaluation also did not evaluate other aspects of plant design such as divisional separation and environmental qualification. The inspector considered the failure to evaluate all applicable design aspects impacted by the change in normal operational configuration to be further evidence of an inadequate engineering review.

On July 10 the inspector found a door to the Unit 1 RWCU Heat Exchanger room blocked open by cables for a video camera which was installed in April 1996. The inspector notified the Shift Supervisor and subsequently the camera was removed and the door was closed. A review of CR 96-748, issued on June 21 in response to the inspector's initial concern, found that no immediate corrective actions were taken. On July 12, the Shift Supervisor stopped work (which had been released to the work group) that would remove the RCIC room floor plugs because the issue had not been resolved. CR 96-870 was issued to document his concern and immediate corrective actions included removal of a Technical Specification Interpretation (TSI 1-92-006) from the control room pending further engineering evaluation.

c. Conclusion

The inspector found the licensee's 1992 justification for blocking open doors and hatchways to high energy pipe areas, during power operation, inadequate. Initial response to the NRC identified issue was weak. The licensee is currently reevaluating this issue and pending NRC review of their results, this issue will be tracked as an unresolved item. (URI 96-08-06)

E1.2 Containment Radiation Monitor Modification

a. Inspection Scope (73051)

On June 12, the licensee identified that performance of an approved procedure for transfer of a Reactor Protection System (RPS) bus to its alternate power supply required entry into TS 3.0.3 because TS 3.4.3.1 does not address the isolation of both Containment Radiation Monitors (CRMs). The inspector reviewed the applicable TS, PP&L's Licensee Event Report, and the safety impact of the procedure's alignment of the equipment.

b. Observations and Findings

A 1995 modification separated the containment penetrations for the Containment Radiation Monitors (CRM) and Hydrogen/Oxygen Analyzers. As part of the design change separating the penetrations, the isolation features for each system were re-designed. On June 12, the licensee recognized that when the power supply for the 'A' RPS bus was transferred from its normal supply to the alternate supply, both loops of the CRMs had isolated. Since TS 3.4.3.1, Reactor Coolant Leakage Detection Systems, did not address isolation of both loops of CRMs at the same time, TS 3.0.3 was entered.

The licensee's CR investigation found that the original isolation logic design had also created this situation during transfer of RPS power supplies. The inspector was told that several years ago it was the practice at SSES to not enter TS 3.0.3 when the condition was a direct result of an approved procedure step, existed for short duration, and could be easily realigned from the control room. The inspector discussed the necessity for entry into TS 3.0.3, regardless of procedural controls, with the Operations Manager. The Operations manager provided assurance that this practice had been stopped and that this type of interpretation would not be used in the future.

The inspector reviewed the changes to the modification program referenced as a corrective action in the LER. These changes were already in progress at the time of the CRM problem and were initiated as a result of other issues captured by the licensee's corrective action process.

The inspector considered the safety impact of this occurrence low and the licensee is pursuing TS changes to address the simultaneous isolation of both CRM loops. In the interim, the licensee will enter TS 3.0.3 for both loops of CRM being inoperable during the RPS power supply swap and will submit a LER for each occurrence.

c. Conclusion

A 1995 modification to the Containment Radiation Monitors was a missed opportunity to identify a problem between the plant procedures, which isolate both CRMs, and Technical Specification requirements. The licensee is pursuing



appropriate TS changes and has committed to reasonable corrective actions in LER 50-387/96003-00.

E4 Engineering Staff Knowledge and Performance

E4.1 Engineering Support For Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Operability Determination

a. Inspection Scope (37551)

On June 24, problems occurred with the scram discharge volume vent and drain valve IST stroke times during their quarterly surveillance. After several retests were performed and adjustment made, the valves were declared operable on June 27. The inspector reviewed the licensee's operability determination which was necessary during the three day evaluation period.

b. Observations and Findings

TS 4.1.3.1.4 requires the SDV vent and drain valves close within 30 seconds after receipt of a scram signal and open when the scram signal is reset.

General Electric (GE) Design Specification 22A7468 for the Control Rod Drive System, dated March 27, 1981, and controlled plant drawings, show that the inboard vent and drain valves fully close at least 5.0 seconds before and start to open at least 5.0 seconds after the outboard vent and drain valves. According to the GE specification, the staggered opening and closing is necessary to preclude potential hydrodynamic interaction between the redundant, in-line, vent and drain valves.

On June 24, performance of surveillance procedure SO-255-002 identified two valves which did not meet the procedure's acceptable stroke time but were within the stroke time required by TS. The licensee produced an operability determination for vent and drain valves to support the 96 hour period for stroke time evaluation allowed by the ASME Code.

The inspector found that the operability determination did not evaluate whether the apparent reversal of the valve sequence described in the design basis would impact the system's ability to perform its intended safety function. The valve sequence requirement is provided in the GE Specification cited above, however, the basis for this requirement was not readily available. This issue will be reviewed during a future inspection.

The licensee's investigation of this occurrence for CR 96-760 concluded that the actual valve stroke times were acceptable and that environmental factors had led to problems with the in-field timing of the valve strokes. Computer records were used to support this conclusion. Corrective actions to improve the surveillance procedure are planned.

c. Conclusion

The failure to evaluate a scram discharge volume design basis requirement during the operability determination for its vent and drain valves on June 24 was viewed a weakness.

E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92902)

E8.1 Review of UFSAR Commitments

The recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a manner contrary to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) description highlighted the need for a special focused review that compares plant practices, procedures and/or parameters to the UFSAR description. In response to this industry issue, PP&L initiated a Current Licensing Basis Review (CLBR) project.

The inspector found that the majority of licensing basis issues identified by PP&L during the Improved Technical Specification and CLBR projects are of minor safety significance. The licensee identified the following inconsistencies between the wording of the UFSAR and the plant practices, procedures and parameters.

EOP Inhibit Of ADS

CR 96-507, dated April 22, identified that Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) may cause operators to take action within the first ten minutes of a design basis event that would inhibit the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS). Although this action is consistent with the Emergency Procedure Guidelines, it is inconsistent with FSAR Section 6.3.2.8 which states that no operator action is required to initiate Emergency Core Cooling Systems with the first ten minutes of a design basis accident. Specifically, EO-1/200-102, "RPV Control," contained steps which directed operators to inhibit ADS by use of key locked switches and reset the ADS timer.

The licensee resolved this issue by revising the EOPs to eliminate all steps which would cause operators to inhibit ADS in situations other than an Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS). The licensee does not consider this a safety significant change, and therefore is not seeking prior NRC approval. The change was reflected in the revised Safety Evaluation NL-92-023, Revision 3, for deviations from the EPGs.

This issue was discussed among the resident inspectors, the NRR Project Manager and a reviewer from NRR's Reactor Systems Branch. NRR plans to review this issue on a generic basis.

Post Accident Reactor Vessel Water Level Instruments

During preparation of an Improved Technical Specification submittal the licensee identified a question regarding which vessel level instrument is required by TS

3.3.7.5 for post accident monitoring. This TS requires calibration of the level instrument every 18 months. At the time the question was raised, the wide range instrument was assumed by the licensee for the TS required channel check and 18 month calibration. The extended range and fuel zone range channels are calibrated by a preventive maintenance program every 3 years based on their prior performance. All three sets of instruments were designed to meet Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2.

The TS requirements are not clear as to which level instruments are expected to be available for post accident monitoring. The FSAR (Sections 7.5.1 and 7.5.2) and licensing correspondence (PLI-35432) reference both extended and wide range instruments. The licensee is revising the FSAR and procedures to reflect the use of Fuel Zone, Extended and Wide Range RPV level indication as Post Accident Monitoring. This change has been incorporated into the licensee's ITS submittal to NRR dated August 1, 1996, and the inspector concluded there was no immediate safety concern.

IV. Plant Support

P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in EP

P4.1 Off-Year EP Exercise Review

a. Inspection Scope (82301)

The inspectors observed and evaluated the licensee's Emergency Response Organization (ERO) performance in the simulator control room (SCR), Technical Support Center (TSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) during the off-year exercise. The inspectors attended an exercise scenario briefing on Monday, July 8, where licensee representatives explained scenario events and answered NRC team questions. The inspectors also attended the licensee's critique of the exercise on July 11. The licensee stated that emergency response organization notification and mobilization was not an objective for this exercise and would not be demonstrated.

b. Emergency Response Facility Observations

SCR

The inspectors observed a good response by the licensed operators during the initiating transient in the SCR.

TSC

The inspector noted that the TSC was adequately staffed. The staff frequently consulted procedures, the status board was maintained up-to-date, and the noise level at the TSC was kept at a minimum.

The command and control at the TSC was adequate. Although frequent communication between the Emergency Director (ED), operations coordinator, the control room personnel and the Recovery Manager (RM) in the EOF was observed, due to real life technical problem with the telephones, ED's briefing with the RM was disrupted. The licensee resolved the problem with the use of cellular phones. The operations coordinator maintained a strong role, and dictated TSC operation. The inspector noted that the declaration of alert was a few minutes late. Site accountability was initiated when required and completed on time.

The inspector noted good radiation protection (RP) support at the TSC and the damage control teams being dispatched from the TSC. Positive access control was maintained to ensure that the TSC was clean of radioactive contamination. Appropriate announcements were made by RP and were coordinated over the PA system to alert plant personnel about areas in the plant that should be avoided for radiological reasons, and the access path to be taken for entry into the TSC. The licensee radiological team performed dose projections from the onsite field data.

The technical support team's performance was task oriented and supported the operations coordinator's assessment followup. The technical support coordinator kept his team well informed about the unfolding scenario and tasks at hand. The inspector noted that the TSC could benefit further from more independent analysis of plant conditions performed by this team.

The inspector concluded the licensee's performance at the TSC was adequate.

EOF

The RM intentionally delayed the turnover of emergency control from the TSC to the EOF because telephone difficulties that were being experienced, and because he wanted to ensure that they were resolved before the EOF assumed control. The inspector concluded that this was a good decision even though it delayed the turnover for approximately 30 minutes. The decision had no adverse impact on licensee performance.

The RM showed good command and control of the event during the exercise. Facility briefings were frequent and included input from all the facility supervisors, as well as the ED in the TSC, who provided plant status updates by conference call. There were good communications with the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection representatives and the mock NRC site response team, played by licensee representatives. Both of these groups were represented at the RM staff briefings. The RM utilized his supervisors well to attain needed information and follow up on important issues as the event progressed.

The General Emergency declaration by the RM was correct and timely, and made after consulting with his staff and the ED. The protective action recommendation (PAR) was in accordance with the licensee's procedures and was appropriate for



protection of public health and safety. The RM subsequently asked for current dose projection information so that a PAR update could be made, but none was necessary.

The EOF dose assessment team performed its function properly. The dose assessment personnel arrived and began to activate the dose assessment area in a timely fashion. The team coordinator called the TSC and determined the dispatch locations for the Alpha and Bravo field monitoring teams. The dose assessment assistant established contact with the TSC radiological assessment coordinator, determined plant radiological conditions, and briefed the radiological controls supervisor when he arrived.

The team coordinator maintained communications with the field teams and, when the EOF assumed control, he directed the teams to the appropriate down-wind locations for plume tracking. He also kept the dose assessment assistant and the radiological controls supervisor informed of field monitoring team results.

The dose assessment assistant performed "what if" calculations as directed by the radiological controls supervisor. Additionally, the dose assessment assistant questioned some of the iodine results that were being transmitted by the TSC dose assessor, and also the information from the dose projection computer. It was determined that when calculations were made using field team survey data, the computer program for this function was using the accident default mix when zero was entered for iodine concentration. This resulted in inappropriately high iodine doses. The licensee identified this problem and planned on correcting the computer program.

The inspector observed that the telecommunications problems at the EOF also caused the plant information computer system (PICSY) to drop off the line several times. This had no negative impact since the TSC was responsible for dose projections and it did not experience any telephone difficulties.

c. Conclusion

The Emergency Response Organization performed well during the off-year emergency exercise. The recovery manager showed good command and control, declared a General Emergency in a correct and timely manner, and communicated well with facility supervisors, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, and PP&L's mock NRC team during facility briefings. The licensee's critique on July 11 provided critical and detailed self assessment.

F1 Control of Fire Protection Activities

F1.1 Improper Storage Of Combustible Materials

On June 4, the inspector identified a temporary tanker truck parked 20 feet away from the DG building wall and DG combustion air intakes. The tanker contained

approximately 400 gallons of DG fuel oil and had been parked in this location in support of maintenance on the 'A' DG.

NDAP-QA-440, Control Of Transient Combustible/Hazardous Materials, Revision 1, Step 6.1.10, states that flammable material tankers shall not be placed within 50 feet of any plant buildings which have vents or other openings.

Upon notification, the licensee took immediate action to remove the tanker truck and documented the violation of their NDAP requirement in accordance with the corrective action program in CR 96-659. This failure to follow procedures constitutes a violation of minor significance and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

V. Management Meetings

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented their findings to members of the licensee's management on August 15. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented and no objections were made.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

X2 Plant Performance Review (PPR) Meeting

On August 13, a PPR Meeting was held at the NRC Region I office to discuss licensee performance over the past six months and evaluate inspection plans for the next six months. NRC staff from all Region I technical divisions and the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation participated in this meeting. The results of this meeting were communicated to the licensee in a letter dated August 19, 1996.



INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems
IP 62703: Maintenance Observation
IP 64704: Fire Protection Program
IP 71707: Plant Operations
IP 73051: Inservice Inspection - Review of Program
IP 73753: Inservice Inspection
IP 83729: Occupational Exposure During Extended Outages
IP 83750: Occupational Exposure
IP 92700: Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities
IP 92902: Followup - Engineering
IP 92903: Followup - Maintenance
IP 93702: Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

96-08-01	EEL	'E' Diesel Generator Operability
96-08-02	EEL	Failure to Verify 4kV Breaker Alignment
96-08-03	EEL	'E' DG-Related Failure to Follow Procedures
96-08-04	URI	Failure to Perform Alarm Panel Test
96-08-05	EEL	Operator Error Caused SBLC Pump Heat Trace to Deenergize
96-08-06	URI	HELB Protection With Room Doors, Floor Plugs, etc. Open

Closed

LER 50-387/96-003-00 Both CRM Loops Isolated, TS 3.0.3 Entry

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ADS	Automatic Depressurization System
AEOD	Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data
ALARA	As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable
ASME	American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ATWS	Anticipated Transient Without Scram
CAC	Containment Atmosphere Control
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CIG	Containment Instrument Gas
CLBR	Current Licensing Basis Review
CR	Condition Report
CRM	Containment Radiation Monitors
DG	Diesel Generator
EA	Escalated Action
ED	Emergency Director
ENS	Emergency Notification System
EOF	Emergency Operations Facility
EOP	Emergency Operating Procedure
EP	Emergency Preparedness
ERO	Emergency Response Organization
ESF	Engineered Safety Feature
gpm	gallons per minute
HP	Health Physics
HPCI	High Pressure Coolant Injection
IFI	Inspection Follow-Up Item
IFS	Inspection Follow-Up System
INPO	Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
ISES	Independent Safety Evaluation Services
ISI	In-Service Inspection
LER	Licensee Event Report
LOCA	Loss of Coolant Accident
LOOP	Loss of Offsite Power
MOD	Motor-Operated Disconnect
NCV	Non-Cited Violation
NMSS	Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
NOV	Notice of Violation
NPO	Nuclear Plant Operator
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRR	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
NSE	Nuclear Systems Engineering
PA	Public Address
PAR	Protective Action Recommendation
PCO	Plant Control Operator
PCS	Plant Computer System
PICSY	Plant Information Computer System
PP&L	Pennsylvania Power and Light
PPR	Plant Performance Review
RA	Regional Administrator

RCIC	Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
RHR	Residual Heat Removal
RM	Recovery Manager
RP	Radiation Protection
RPS	Reactor Protection System
RPV	Reactor Pressure Vessel
RWCU	Reactor Water Cleanup
SALP	Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance
SBLC	Standby Liquid Control
SCR	Simulator Control Room
SCT	Status Control Tag
SSES	Susquehanna Steam Electric Station
TI	Temporary Instruction
TS	Technical Specification
TSC	Technical Support Center



General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions

Enforcement Policy

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Office of Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001



Abstract

This document includes the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's or Commission's) revised General Statement of Policy and Procedure for Enforcement Actions (Enforcement Policy) as it was published in the *Federal Register* on June 30, 1995 (60 FR 34381). This document also includes the notice announcing the removal of the Enforcement Policy from the Code of Federal Regulations (60 FR 34380; June 30, 1995). The Enforcement Policy is a general statement of policy explaining the NRC's policies and procedures in initiating enforcement actions, and of the presiding officers and the Commission in reviewing these actions. This policy statement is applicable to enforcement in matters involving the radiological health and safety of the public, including employees' health and safety, the common defense and security, and the environment. This statement of general policy and procedure is published as NUREG-1600 to provide widespread dissemination of the Commission's Enforcement Policy. However, this is a policy statement and not a regulation. The Commission may deviate from this statement of policy and procedure as appropriate under the circumstances of a particular case.

Questions concerning the Enforcement Policy should be directed to the NRC's Office of Enforcement at 301-415-2741.



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Friday
June 30, 1995

Final Rule

Part III

**Nuclear Regulatory
Commission**

10 CFR Part 2

Enforcement Actions Policy and
Procedure: Final Rule and Notice

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 2

Policy and Procedure for Enforcement Actions; Removal

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Policy statement.

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is removing its General Statement of Policy and Procedure for Enforcement Actions (Enforcement Policy) from the Code of Federal Regulations because the Enforcement Policy is not a regulation.

DATES: This action is effective on June 30, 1995.

Submit comments on or before August 14, 1995. Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so but the Commission is able to assure consideration only for comments received on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Send written comments to: The Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555. **ATTN:** Docketing and Service Branch; Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, between 7:45 am and 4:15 pm, Federal workdays. Copies of comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW, (Lower Level), Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555 (301) 415-2741.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On May 13, 1994, the NRC's Executive Director for Operations established a review team to assess the NRC enforcement program. The review team report, NUREG-1525, "Assessment of the

NRC Enforcement Program," was published in April 1995. The team report, in Recommendation II. G-3, recommended that the Enforcement Policy be removed from the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) because the Enforcement Policy is not a regulation.

The NRC Enforcement Policy has been codified at 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C to provide widespread dissemination of the Commission's Enforcement Policy. However, after the Commission first published the Enforcement Policy on October 7, 1980 (45 FR 66754), the Commission has maintained that the NRC Enforcement Policy is a policy statement and not a regulation. The Commission's reason for having a policy statement rather than a rule was explained in the Statement of Considerations that accompanied the publication of the 1982 Enforcement Policy. The Commission stated then:

An underlying basis of this policy that is reflected throughout it is that the determination of the appropriate sanction requires the exercise of discretion such that each enforcement action is tailored to the particular factual situation. In view of the discretion provided, the enforcement policy is being adopted as a statement of general policy rather than as a regulation, notwithstanding that the statement has been promulgated with notice and comment procedures. A general statement of policy will permit the Commission maximum flexibility in revising the policy statement and it is expected that the statement, especially the supplement, will be revised as necessary to reflect changes in policy and direction of the Commission (47 FR 9989; March 9, 1992).

For the same reasons, the Commission continues to hold the view that the Enforcement Policy is a policy statement. However, at least one court, in considering whether an enforcement policy was a policy statement or a regulation, noted that if the policy were published in the CFR, it would be properly treated as a regulation because the CFR is reserved for documents "having general applicability and legal

Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161. A copy is also available for inspection and copying for a fee in the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW, (Lower Level), Washington, DC 20555-0001.

effect." (Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1986) citing 44 U.S.C. 1510 (1982)).

Therefore, because the Enforcement Policy is not a regulation, the Commission is removing it from the Code of Federal Regulations. Revisions of the Enforcement Policy will continue to be published in the Federal Register.

To ensure widespread dissemination, the Enforcement Policy will be provided to licensees, made available on an electronic bulletin board, and published as NUREG-1600, "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions."

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

This policy statement contains no information collection requirements and, therefore, is not subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 2

Administrative practice and procedure, Antitrust, Byproduct material, Classified information, Environmental protection, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalties, Sex discrimination, Source material, Special nuclear material, Waste treatment and disposal.

PART 2—RULES OF PRACTICE FOR DOMESTIC LICENSING PROCEEDINGS AND ISSUANCE OF ORDERS

1. The authority citation for part 2 continues to read, in part, as follows:

Authority: Secs. 161, 181, 68 Stat. 948, 953, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201, 2231); sec. 191, as amended, Pub. L. 87-615, 76 Stat. 409 (42 U.S.C. 2241); sec. 201, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841) * * *

Appendix C to Part 2 [Removed]

2. Appendix C to Part 2 is removed.

Dated at Rockville, MD, this 23rd day of June, 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

John C. Hoyle,

Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc. 95-15951 Filed 6-29-95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

¹ Copies of NUREG-1525 may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 37082, Washington, DC 20013-7082. Copies are also available from the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Revision of the NRC Enforcement Policy

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Policy statement.

SUMMARY: As a result of an assessment of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) enforcement program, the NRC has revised its General Statement of Policy and Procedure for Enforcement Actions (Enforcement Policy or Policy). By a separate action published today in the Federal Register, the Commission is removing the Enforcement Policy from the Code of Federal Regulations.

DATES: This action is effective on June 30, 1995, while comments are being received. Submit comments on or before August 14, 1995. Additionally, the Commission intends to provide an opportunity for public comments after this revised Enforcement Policy has been in effect for about 18 months.

ADDRESSES: Send written comments to: The Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555. **ATTN:** Docketing and Service Branch. Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, between 7:45 am and 4:15 pm, Federal workdays. Copies of comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, (301) 415-2741.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On May 13, 1994, the NRC's Executive Director for Operations established a review team to assess the NRC enforcement program. In its report (NUREG-1525, "Assessment of the NRC Enforcement Program," April 5, 1995), the review team concluded that the existing NRC enforcement program, as implemented, is appropriately directed toward supporting the agency's overall safety mission. This conclusion is reflected in several aspects of the program:

- The Policy recognizes that violations have differing degrees of safety significance.

¹ Copies of NUREG-1525 may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Mail Stop S50P, Washington, DC 20402-9328. Copies are also available from the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161. A copy is also available for inspection and copying for a fee in the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC 20555-0001.

As reflected in the severity levels, safety significance includes actual safety consequence, potential safety consequence, and regulatory significance. The use of graduated sanctions from Notices of Violation to orders further reflects the varying seriousness of noncompliances.

- The enforcement conference is an important step in achieving a mutual understanding of facts and issues before making significant enforcement decisions. Although these conferences take time and effort for both the NRC and licensees, they generally contribute to better decision-making.

- Enforcement actions deliver regulatory messages properly focused on safety. These messages emphasize the need for licensees to identify and correct violations, to address the root causes, and to be responsive to initial opportunities to identify and prevent violations.

- The use of discretion and judgment throughout the deliberative process recognizes that enforcement of NRC requirements does not lend itself to mechanistic treatment.

However, the Review Team found that the existing enforcement program at times provided mixed regulatory messages to licensees, and room for improvement existed in the Enforcement Policy. The review suggested that the program's focus should be clarified to:

- Emphasize the importance of identifying problems before events occur, and of taking prompt, comprehensive corrective action when problems are identified;
- Direct agency attention at licensees with multiple enforcement actions in a relatively short period; and
- Focus on current performance of licensees.

In addition, the review team found that the process for assessing civil penalties could be simplified to improve the predictability of decision-making and obtain better consistency between regions.

As a result of its review, the review team made several recommendations to revise the NRC Enforcement Policy to produce an enforcement program with clearer regulatory focus and more predictability. The Commission is issuing this policy statement after considering those recommendations and the bases for them in NUREG-1525.

The more significant changes to the current Enforcement Policy are described below:

I. Introduction and Purpose

This section has been modified to emphasize that the purpose and objectives of the enforcement program are focused on using enforcement actions:

- (1) As a deterrent to emphasize the importance of compliance with requirements; and

- (2) To encourage prompt identification and prompt, comprehensive correction of violations.

IV. Severity of Violations

Severity Level V violations have been eliminated. The examples at that level have been withdrawn from the supplements. Formal enforcement actions will now only be taken for violations categorized at Severity Level I to IV to better focus the inspection and enforcement process on safety. To the extent that minor violations are described in an inspection report, they will be labeled as Non-Cited Violations (NCVs). When a licensee does not take corrective action or repeatedly or willfully commits a minor violation such that a formal response would be needed, the violation should be categorized at least at a Severity Level IV.

The NRC staff will be reviewing the severity level examples in the supplements over the next 6 months. The purpose of this review is to ensure the examples are appropriately focused on safety significance, including consideration of actual safety consequence, potential safety consequence, and regulatory significance.

V. Predecisional Enforcement Conferences

Enforcement conferences are being renamed "predecisional enforcement conferences." These conferences should be held for the purpose of obtaining information to assist NRC in making enforcement decisions when the agency reasonably expects that escalated enforcement actions will result. They should also normally be held if requested by a licensee. In addition they should normally be held before issuing an order or a civil penalty to an unlicensed individual.

In light of the changes to the Enforcement Policy, the Commission has decided to continue a trial program of conducting approximately 25 percent of eligible conferences open to public observation pending further evaluation. (See 57 FR 30762; July 10, 1992, and 59 FR 36796; July 19, 1994). The intent of open conferences is not to maximize public attendance, but is rather for determining whether providing the public with an opportunity to observe the regulatory process is compatible with the NRC's ability to exercise its regulatory and safety responsibilities. The provisions of the trial program have been incorporated into the Enforcement Policy.

VI. Enforcement Actions

A. Notice of Violation

This section was modified to clarify that the NRC may waive all or portions of a licensee's written response to a Notice of Violation to the extent relevant information has already been provided to the NRC in writing or documented in an NRC inspection report and is on the applicable docket in the NRC Public Document Room.

B. Civil Penalty

1. Base Civil Penalty

Tables 1A and 1B have been revised. In Table 1B the percentage for Severity Level IV violations has been deleted since such violations will not be subject to civil penalties. If a violation that would otherwise be categorized at a Severity Level IV violation merits a civil penalty because of its significance, the violation would normally be categorized at a Severity Level III.

Table 1A has been simplified to combine categories of licensees with the same base penalty amounts. The base penalty amounts have generally remained unchanged. The revised policy notes that the base penalties may be adjusted on a case-by-case basis to reflect the ability to pay and the gravity of the violation. 10 CFR Part 35 licensees (doctors, nuclear pharmacies, and other medical related licensees) are combined into an overall medical category, based on the similarity of hazards. Because transportation violations for all licensees are primarily concerned with the potential for personnel exposure to radiation, the violations in this area will be treated the same as those in the health physics area.

The \$100,000 base civil penalty amount for safeguards violations, which applies to only two categories of licensees, fuel fabricators and independent fuel and monitored retrievable storage installations, has been deleted. The penalty amount for safeguards should be the same as for other violations at these facilities. NRC has not had significant safeguards violations at these facilities. If the penalty that would normally be assessed for operational violations is not adequate to address the circumstances of the violation, then discretion would be used to determine the appropriate penalty amount.

The base civil penalty for "other" materials licensees, currently set at \$1000, has been increased to \$5000. The primary concerns for these licensed activities are individual radiation exposure and loss of control of material to the environment, both of which

warrant a more financially meaningful penalty. A \$500 civil penalty for a Severity Level III violation (at 50% of the Severity Level I base amount) does not reflect the seriousness of this type of violation for this category of licensee. It is noted that with the revised assessment approach, these licensees will not normally receive a civil penalty if prompt and comprehensive corrective action is taken for isolated non-willful Severity Level III violations.

2. Civil Penalty Assessment

This section has been renamed to reflect that the process for assessing civil penalties has been substantially changed. The revised process is intended to:

- Continue to emphasize compliance in a manner that deters future violations;
- Encourage prompt identification and prompt, comprehensive correction of violations and their root causes;
- Apply the recognition of good past performance to give credit to a licensee committing a non-willful SL III violation who has had no previous significant violations during the past 2 years or 2 inspections (whichever is longer);
- Place greater attention on situations of greater concern (i.e., where a licensee has had more than one significant violation in a 2-year or two-inspection period, where corrective action is less than prompt and comprehensive, or where egregious circumstances, such as where it is clear that repetitiveness or willfulness, are involved);
- Streamline the NRC decisional process in a manner that will preserve judgment and discretion, but will provide a clear normative standard and produce relatively predictable results for routine cases; and
- Provide clear guidance on applying fewer adjustment factors in various types of cases, in order to increase consistency and predictability.

Once a violation has been categorized at a Severity Level III or above, the assessment process considers four basic decisional points:

- (1) Whether the licensee has had a previous escalated enforcement action during the past 2 years or past 2 inspections, whichever is longer;
- (2) Whether the licensee should be given credit for actions related to identification;
- (3) Whether the licensee's corrective actions may reasonably be considered prompt and comprehensive; and
- (4) Whether, in view of all the circumstances, the case in question warrants the exercise of discretion. As described in the Enforcement Policy,

each of these decisional points may have several associated considerations for any given case. However, the outcome of a case, absent the exercise of discretion, is limited to three results: no civil penalty, a base civil penalty, or a base civil penalty escalated by 100%.

D. Related Administrative Actions

The reference to related administrative mechanisms have been replaced with related administrative actions to clarify the documents as actions.

VII. Exercise of Discretion

The ability to exercise discretion is preserved with the revised policy. Discretion is provided to deviate from the normal approach to either increase or decrease sanctions where necessary to ensure that the sanction reflects the significance of the circumstances and conveys the appropriate regulatory message. This section has been modified to provide examples where it is appropriate to consider civil penalties or escalate civil penalties notwithstanding the normal assessment process in Section VI of the Enforcement Policy. One significant example to note involves the loss of a source. This example is being added to emphasize the importance of licensees being aware of the location of their sources and to recognize that there should not be an economic advantage for inappropriate disposal or transfer. As to mitigation of sanctions for violations involving special circumstances, mitigation can be considered if the licensee has demonstrated overall sustained performance which has been particularly good. The levels of approval for exercising discretion are described in this section. Finally, Table 2, "Examples of Progressions of Escalated Enforcement Actions for Similar Violations in the Same Activity Area Under the Same License," has been withdrawn from the Enforcement Policy. The guidance in that table is not needed because the policy is clear that each case should be judged on its own merits, especially those repetitive violation cases to which the table applied.

VIII. Enforcement Actions Involving Individuals

The Enforcement Policy has been clarified to provide that some action is normally to be taken against a licensee for violations caused by significant acts of wrongdoing by its employees, contractors, or contractors employees. The Policy has also been modified to state that the nine factors in Section VIII



should be used to assist in the decision on whether enforcement action should be taken against an unlicensed individual as well as the licensee. The Policy currently uses these factors to determine whether to take enforcement action against an unlicensed person rather than the licensee. These changes are consistent with the intent of the Commission in promulgating the rule on deliberate misconduct (56 FR 40664, 40666, August 15, 1991). Less significant cases may be treated as an NCV under Section VII.B.1. A Letter of Reprimand is not a sanction and is now referred to as an administrative action consistent with Section VI.D of the Policy.

The Commission expects that the changes to the Enforcement Policy should result in an increase in the protection of the public health and safety by better emphasizing the prevention, detection, and correction of violations before events occur with impact on the public. In about 2 years the Commission intends to review the Enforcement Policy. In that regard, it is expected that in about 18 months an opportunity will be provided to receive public comments on the implementation of this Policy.

General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions

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Preface

The following statement of general policy and procedure explains the enforcement policy and procedures of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) and the NRC staff (staff) in initiating enforcement actions, and of the presiding officers and the Commission in reviewing these actions. This statement is applicable to enforcement in matters involving the radiological health and safety of the public, including employees' health and safety, the common defense and security, and the environment.¹ This statement of general policy and procedure will be published as NUREG-1600 to provide widespread dissemination of the Commission's Enforcement Policy. However, this is a policy statement and not a regulation. The Commission may deviate from this statement of policy and procedure as appropriate under the circumstances of a particular case.

I. Introduction and Purpose

The purpose of the NRC enforcement program is to support the NRC's overall safety mission in protecting the public and the environment. Consistent with that purpose, enforcement action should be used:

- As a deterrent to emphasize the importance of compliance with requirements, and
- To encourage prompt identification and prompt, comprehensive correction of violations.

Consistent with the purpose of this program, prompt and vigorous enforcement action will be taken when dealing with licensees, vendors,² contractors, and their employees, who do not achieve the necessary meticulous attention to detail and the high standard

¹ Antitrust enforcement matters will be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.

² The term "vendor" as used in this policy means a supplier of products or services to be used in an NRC-licensed facility or activity.

of compliance which the NRC expects.³ Each enforcement action is dependent on the circumstances of the case and requires the exercise of discretion after consideration of these policies and procedures. In no case, however, will licensees who cannot achieve and maintain adequate levels of protection be permitted to conduct licensed activities.

II. Statutory Authority and Procedural Framework

A. Statutory Authority

The NRC's enforcement jurisdiction is drawn from the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA) of 1974, as amended.

Section 161 of the Atomic Energy Act authorizes the NRC to conduct inspections and investigations and to issue orders as may be necessary or desirable to promote the common defense and security or to protect health or to minimize danger to life or property. Section 186 authorizes the NRC to revoke licenses under certain circumstances (e.g., for material false statements, in response to conditions that would have warranted refusal of a license on an original application, for a licensee's failure to build or operate a facility in accordance with the terms of the permit or license, and for violation of an NRC regulation). Section 234 authorizes the NRC to impose civil penalties not to exceed \$100,000 per violation per day for the violation of certain specified licensing provisions of the Act, rules, orders, and license terms implementing these provisions, and for violations for which licenses can be revoked. In addition to the enumerated provisions in section 234, sections 84 and 147 authorize the imposition of civil penalties for violations of regulations implementing those provisions. Section 232 authorizes the NRC to seek injunctive or other equitable relief for violation of regulatory requirements.

Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act authorizes the NRC to impose civil penalties for knowing and conscious failures to provide certain safety information to the NRC.

Chapter 18 of the Atomic Energy Act provides for varying levels of criminal

³ This policy primarily addresses the activities of NRC licensees and applicants for NRC licenses. Therefore, the term "licensee" is used throughout the policy. However, in those cases where the NRC determines that it is appropriate to take enforcement action against a non-licensee or individual, the guidance in this policy will be used, as applicable. Specific guidance regarding enforcement action against individuals and non-licensees is addressed in Sections VIII and X, respectively.

penalties (i.e., monetary fines and imprisonment) for willful violations of the Act and regulations or orders issued under sections 65, 161(b), 161(i), or 161(o) of the Act. Section 223 provides that criminal penalties may be imposed on certain individuals employed by firms constructing or supplying basic components of any utilization facility if the individual knowingly and willfully violates NRC requirements such that a basic component could be significantly impaired. Section 235 provides that criminal penalties may be imposed on persons who interfere with inspectors. Section 236 provides that criminal penalties may be imposed on persons who attempt to or cause sabotage at a nuclear facility or to nuclear fuel. Alleged or suspected criminal violations of the Atomic Energy Act are referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.

B. Procedural Framework

Subpart B of 10 CFR part 2 of NRC's regulations sets forth the procedures the NRC uses in exercising its enforcement authority. 10 CFR 2.201 sets forth the procedures for issuing notices of violation.

The procedure to be used in assessing civil penalties is set forth in 10 CFR 2.205. This regulation provides that the civil penalty process is initiated by issuing a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of a Civil Penalty. The licensee or other person is provided an opportunity to contest in writing the proposed imposition of a civil penalty. After evaluation of the response, the civil penalty may be mitigated, remitted, or imposed. An opportunity is provided for a hearing if a civil penalty is imposed. If a civil penalty is not paid following a hearing or if a hearing is not requested, the matter may be referred to the U.S. Department of Justice to institute a civil action in District Court.

The procedure for issuing an order to institute a proceeding to modify, suspend, or revoke a license or to take other action against a licensee or other person subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission is set forth in 10 CFR 2.202. The licensee or any other person, adversely affected by the order may request a hearing. The NRC is authorized to make orders immediately effective if required to protect the public health, safety, or interest, or if the violation is willful. Section 2.204 sets out the procedures for issuing a Demand for Information (Demand) to a licensee or other person subject to the Commission's jurisdiction for the purpose of determining whether an order or other enforcement action should be issued. The Demand does not

provide hearing rights, as only information is being sought. A licensee must answer a Demand. An unlicensed person may answer a Demand by either providing the requested information or explaining why the Demand should not have been issued.

III. Responsibilities

The Executive Director for Operations (EDO) and the principal enforcement officers of the NRC, the Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Material Safety, Safeguards and Operations Support (DEDS) and the Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional Operations, and Research (DEDR), have been delegated the authority to approve or issue all escalated enforcement actions.⁴ The DEDS is responsible to the EDO for the NRC enforcement programs. The Office of Enforcement (OE) exercises oversight of and implements the NRC enforcement programs. The Director, OE, acts for the Deputy Executive Directors in enforcement matters in their absence or as delegated.

Subject to the oversight and direction of OE, and with the approval of the appropriate Deputy Executive Director, where necessary, the regional offices normally issue Notices of Violation and proposed civil penalties. However, subject to the same oversight as the regional offices, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) may also issue Notices of Violation and proposed civil penalties for certain activities. Enforcement orders are normally issued by a Deputy Executive Director or the Director, OE. However, orders may also be issued by the EDO, especially those involving the more significant matters. The Directors of NRR and NMSS have also been delegated authority to issue orders, but it is expected that normal use of this authority by NRR and NMSS will be confined to actions not associated with compliance issues. The Director, Office of the Controller, has been delegated the authority to issue orders where licensees violate Commission regulations by nonpayment of license and inspection fees.

In recognition that the regulation of nuclear activities in many cases does not lend itself to a mechanistic treatment, judgment and discretion must be exercised in determining the severity levels of the violations and the appropriate enforcement sanctions,

⁴The term "escalated enforcement action" as used in this policy means a Notice of Violation or civil penalty for any Severity Level I, II, or III violation (or problem) or any order based upon a violation.

including the decision to issue a Notice of Violation, or to propose or impose a civil penalty and the amount of this penalty, after considering the general principles of this statement of policy and the technical significance of the violations and the surrounding circumstances.

Unless Commission consultation or notification is required by this policy, the staff may depart, where warranted in the public's interest, from this policy as provided in Section VII, "Exercise of Enforcement Discretion." The Commission will be provided written notification of all enforcement actions involving civil penalties or orders. The Commission will also be provided notice in those cases where discretion is exercised as discussed in Section VII.B.6. In addition, the Commission will be consulted prior to taking action in the following situations (unless the urgency of the situation dictates immediate action):

- (1) An action affecting a licensee's operation that requires balancing the public health and safety or common defense and security implications of not operating with the potential radiological or other hazards associated with continued operation;
- (2) Proposals to impose civil penalties in amounts greater than 3 times the Severity Level I values shown in Table 1A;
- (3) Any proposed enforcement action that involves a Severity Level I violation;
- (4) Any enforcement action that involves a finding of a material false statement;
- (5) Exercising discretion for matters meeting the criteria of Section VII.A.1 for Commission consultation;
- (6) Refraining from taking enforcement action for matters meeting the criteria of Section VII.B.2;
- (7) Any proposed enforcement action that involves the issuance of a civil penalty or order to an unlicensed individual or a civil penalty to a licensed reactor operator;
- (8) Any action the EDO believes warrants Commission involvement;
- (9) Any proposed enforcement case involving an Office of Investigation (OI) report where the staff (other than the OI staff) does not arrive at the same conclusions as those in the OI report concerning issues of intent if the Director of OI concludes that Commission consultation is warranted; and
- (10) Any proposed enforcement action on which the Commission asks to be consulted.

IV. Severity of Violations

Regulatory requirements⁵ have varying degrees of safety, safeguards, or environmental significance. Therefore, the relative importance of each violation, including both the technical significance and the regulatory significance is evaluated as the first step in the enforcement process.

Consequently, for purposes of formal enforcement action, violations are normally categorized in terms of four levels of severity to show their relative importance within each of the following eight activity areas:

- I. Reactor Operations;
- II. Facility Construction;
- III. Safeguards;
- IV. Health Physics;
- V. Transportation;
- VI. Fuel Cycle and Materials Operations;
- VII. Miscellaneous Matters; and
- VIII. Emergency Preparedness.

Licensed activities will be placed in the activity area most suitable in light of the particular violation involved including activities not directly covered by one of the above listed areas, e.g., export license activities. Within each activity area, Severity Level I has been assigned to violations that are the most significant and Severity Level IV violations are the least significant. Severity Level I and II violations are of very significant regulatory concern. In general, violations that are included in these severity categories involve actual or high potential impact on the public. Severity Level III violations are cause for significant regulatory concern. Severity Level IV violations are less serious but are of more than minor concern; i.e., if left uncorrected, they could lead to a more serious concern.

The Commission recognizes that there are other violations of minor safety or environmental concern which are below the level of significance of Severity Level IV violations. These minor violations are not the subject of formal enforcement action and are not usually described in inspection reports. To the extent such violations are described, they are noted as Non-Cited Violations.⁶

Comparisons of significance between activity areas are inappropriate. For example, the immediacy of any hazard to the public associated with Severity Level I violations in Reactor Operations is not directly comparable to that associated with Severity Level I violations in Facility Construction.

⁵ The term "requirement" as used in this policy means a legally binding requirement such as a statute, regulation, license condition, technical specification, or order.

⁶ A Non-Cited Violation (NCV) is a violation that has not been formalized into a 10 CFR 2.201 Notice of Violation.

Supplements I through VIII provide examples and serve as guidance in determining the appropriate severity level for violations in each of the eight activity areas. However, the examples are neither exhaustive nor controlling. In addition, these examples do not create new requirements. Each is designed to illustrate the significance that the NRC places on a particular type of violation of NRC requirements. Each of the examples in the supplements is predicated on a violation of a regulatory requirement.

The NRC reviews each case being considered for enforcement action on its own merits to ensure that the severity of a violation is characterized at the level best suited to the significance of the particular violation. In some cases, special circumstances may warrant an adjustment to the severity level categorization.

A. Aggregation of Violations

A group of Severity Level IV violations may be evaluated in the aggregate and assigned a single, increased severity level, thereby resulting in a Severity Level III problem, if the violations have the same underlying cause or programmatic deficiencies, or the violations contributed to or were unavoidable consequences of the underlying problem. Normally, Severity Level II and III violations are not aggregated into a higher severity level.

The purpose of aggregating violations is to focus the licensee's attention on the fundamental underlying causes for which enforcement action appears warranted and to reflect the fact that several violations with a common cause may be more significant collectively than individually and may therefore, warrant a more substantial enforcement action.

B. Repetitive Violations

The severity level of a Severity Level IV violation may be increased to Severity Level III, if the violation can be considered a repetitive violation.⁷ The purpose of escalating the severity level of a repetitive violation is to acknowledge the added significance of the situation based on the licensee's failure to implement effective corrective action for the previous violation. The decision to escalate the severity level of

⁷ The term "repetitive violation" or "similar violation" as used in this policy statement means a violation that reasonably could have been prevented by a licensee's corrective action for a previous violation normally occurring (1) within the past 2 years of the inspection at issue, or (2) the period within the last two inspections, whichever is longer.

a repetitive violation will depend on the circumstances, such as, but not limited to, the number of times the violation has occurred, the similarity of the violations and their root causes, the adequacy of previous corrective actions, the period of time between the violations, and the significance of the violations.

C. Willful Violations

Willful violations are by definition of particular concern to the Commission because its regulatory program is based on licensees and their contractors, employees, and agents acting with integrity and communicating with candor. Willful violations cannot be tolerated by either the Commission or a licensee. Licensees are expected to take significant remedial action in responding to willful violations commensurate with the circumstances such that it demonstrates the seriousness of the violation thereby creating a deterrent effect within the licensee's organization. Although removal of the person is not necessarily required, substantial disciplinary action is expected.

Therefore, the severity level of a violation may be increased if the circumstances surrounding the matter involve careless disregard of requirements, deception, or other indications of willfulness. The term "willfulness" as used in this policy embraces a spectrum of violations ranging from deliberate intent to violate or falsify to and including careless disregard for requirements. Willfulness does not include acts which do not rise to the level of careless disregard, e.g., inadvertent clerical errors in a document submitted to the NRC. In determining the specific severity level of a violation involving willfulness, consideration will be given to such factors as the position and responsibilities of the person involved in the violation (e.g., licensee official⁸ or non-supervisory employee), the significance of any underlying violation, the intent of the violator (i.e., careless disregard or deliberateness), and the economic or other advantage, if any, gained as a result of the violation. The relative weight given to each of these

⁸ The term "licensee official" as used in this policy statement means a first-line supervisor or above, a licensed individual, a radiation safety officer, or an authorized user of licensed material whether or not listed on a license. Notwithstanding an individual's job title, severity level categorization for willful acts involving individuals who can be considered licensee officials will consider several factors, including the position of the individual relative to the licensee's organizational structure and the individual's responsibilities relative to the oversight of licensed activities and to the use of licensed material.

factors in arriving at the appropriate severity level will be dependent on the circumstances of the violation. However, if a licensee refuses to correct a minor violation within a reasonable time such that it willfully continues, the violation should be categorized at least at a Severity Level IV.

D. Violations of Reporting Requirements

The NRC expects licensees to provide complete, accurate, and timely information and reports. Accordingly, unless otherwise categorized in the Supplements, the severity level of a violation involving the failure to make a required report to the NRC will be based upon the significance of and the circumstances surrounding the matter that should have been reported. However, the severity level of an untimely report, in contrast to no report, may be reduced depending on the circumstances surrounding the matter. A licensee will not normally be cited for a failure to report a condition or event unless the licensee was actually aware of the condition or event that it failed to report. A licensee will, on the other hand, normally be cited for a failure to report a condition or event if the licensee knew of the information to be reported, but did not recognize that it was required to make a report.

V. Predecisional Enforcement Conferences

Whenever the NRC has learned of the existence of a potential violation for which escalated enforcement action appears to be warranted, or recurring nonconformance on the part of a vendor, the NRC may provide an opportunity for a predecisional enforcement conference with the licensee, vendor, or other person before taking enforcement action. The purpose of the conference is to obtain information that will assist the NRC in determining the appropriate enforcement action, such as: (1) A common understanding of facts, root causes and missed opportunities associated with the apparent violations, (2) a common understanding of corrective action taken or planned, and (3) a common understanding of the significance of issues and the need for lasting comprehensive corrective action.

If the NRC concludes that it has sufficient information to make an informed enforcement decision, a conference will not normally be held unless the licensee requests it. However, an opportunity for a conference will normally be provided before issuing an order based on a violation of the rule on Deliberate Misconduct or a civil penalty to an unlicensed person. If a conference

is not held, the licensee will normally be requested to provide a written response to an inspection report, if issued, as to the licensee's views on the apparent violations and their root causes and a description of planned or implemented corrective action.

During the predecisional enforcement conference, the licensee, vendor, or other persons will be given an opportunity to provide information consistent with the purpose of the conference, including an explanation to the NRC of the immediate corrective actions (if any) that were taken following identification of the potential violation or nonconformance and the long-term comprehensive actions that were taken or will be taken to prevent recurrence. Licensees, vendors, or other persons will be told when a meeting is a predecisional enforcement conference.

A predecisional enforcement conference is a meeting between the NRC and the licensee. Conferences are normally held in the regional offices and are not normally open to public observation. However, a trial program is being conducted to open approximately 25 percent of all eligible conferences for public observation, i.e., every fourth eligible conference involving one of three categories of licensees (reactor, hospital, and other materials licensees) will be open to the public. Conferences will not normally be open to the public if the enforcement action being contemplated:

(1) Would be taken against an individual, or if the action, though not taken against an individual, turns on whether an individual has committed wrongdoing;

(2) Involves significant personnel failures where the NRC has requested that the individual(s) involved be present at the conference;

(3) Is based on the findings of an NRC Office of Investigations report; or

(4) Involves safeguards information, Privacy Act information, or information which could be considered proprietary;

In addition, conferences will not normally be open to the public if:

(5) The conference involves medical misadministrations or overexposures and the conference cannot be conducted without disclosing the exposed individual's name; or

(6) The conference will be conducted by telephone or the conference will be conducted at a relatively small licensee's facility.

Notwithstanding meeting any of these criteria, a conference may still be open if the conference involves issues related to an ongoing adjudicatory proceeding with one or more intervenors or where the evidentiary basis for the conference

is a matter of public record, such as an adjudicatory decision by the Department of Labor. In addition, with the approval of the Executive Director for Operations, conferences will not be open to the public where good cause has been shown after balancing the benefit of the public observation against the potential impact on the agency's enforcement action in a particular case.

As soon as it is determined that a conference will be open to public observation, the NRC will notify the licensee that the conference will be open to public observation as part of the agency's trial program. Consistent with the agency's policy on open meetings, "Staff Meetings Open to Public," published September 20, 1994 (59 FR 48340), the NRC intends to announce open conferences normally at least 10 working days in advance of conferences through (1) notices posted in the Public Document Room, (2) a toll-free telephone recording at 800-952-9674, and (3) a toll-free electronic bulletin board at 800-952-9676. In addition, the NRC will also issue a press release and notify appropriate State liaison officers that a predecisional enforcement conference has been scheduled and that it is open to public observation.

The public attending open conferences under the trial program may observe but not participate in the conference. It is noted that the purpose of conducting open conferences under the trial program is not to maximize public attendance, but rather to determine whether providing the public with opportunities to be informed of NRC activities is compatible with the NRC's ability to exercise its regulatory and safety responsibilities. Therefore, members of the public will be allowed access to the NRC regional offices to attend open enforcement conferences in accordance with the "Standard Operating Procedures For Providing Security Support For NRC Hearings And Meetings," published November 1, 1991 (56 FR 56251). These procedures provide that visitors may be subject to personnel screening, that signs, banners, posters, etc., not larger than 18" be permitted, and that disruptive persons may be removed.

Members of the public attending open conferences will be reminded that (1) the apparent violations discussed at predecisional enforcement conferences are subject to further review and may be subject to change prior to any resulting enforcement action and (2) the statements of views or expressions of opinion made by NRC employees at predecisional enforcement conferences, or the lack thereof, are not intended to represent final determinations or beliefs.

Persons attending open conferences will be provided an opportunity to submit written comments concerning the trial program anonymously to the regional office. These comments will be subsequently forwarded to the Director of the Office of Enforcement for review and consideration.

When needed to protect the public health and safety or common defense and security, escalated enforcement action, such as the issuance of an immediately effective order, will be taken before the conference. In these cases, a conference may be held after the escalated enforcement action is taken.

VI. Enforcement Actions

This section describes the enforcement sanctions available to the NRC and specifies the conditions under which each may be used. The basic enforcement sanctions are Notices of Violation, civil penalties, and orders of various types. As discussed further in Section VI.D, related administrative actions such as Notices of Nonconformance, Notices of Deviation, Confirmatory Action Letters, Letters of Reprimand, and Demands for Information are used to supplement the enforcement program. In selecting the enforcement sanctions or administrative actions, the NRC will consider enforcement actions taken by other Federal or State regulatory bodies having concurrent jurisdiction, such as in transportation matters. Usually, whenever a violation of NRC requirements of more than a minor concern is identified, enforcement action is taken. The nature and extent of the enforcement action is intended to reflect the seriousness of the violation involved. For the vast majority of violations, a Notice of Violation or a Notice of Nonconformance is the normal action.

A. Notice of Violation

A Notice of Violation is a written notice setting forth one or more violations of a legally binding requirement. The Notice of Violation normally requires the recipient to provide a written statement describing (1) the reasons for the violation or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation; (2) corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved; (3) corrective steps that will be taken to prevent recurrence; and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. The NRC may waive all or portions of a written response to the extent relevant information has already been provided to the NRC in writing or documented in an NRC inspection report. The NRC may require responses to Notices of Violation

to be under oath. Normally, responses under oath will be required only in connection with Severity Level I, II, or III violations or orders.

The NRC uses the Notice of Violation as the usual method for formalizing the existence of a violation. Issuance of a Notice of Violation is normally the only enforcement action taken, except in cases where the criteria for issuance of civil penalties and orders, as set forth in Sections VI.B and VI.C, respectively, are met. However, special circumstances regarding the violation findings may warrant discretion being exercised such that the NRC refrains from issuing a Notice of Violation. (See Section VII.B, "Mitigation of Enforcement Sanctions.") In addition, licensees are not ordinarily cited for violations resulting from matters not within their control, such as equipment failures that were not avoidable by reasonable licensee quality assurance measures or management controls. Generally, however, licensees are held responsible for the acts of their employees. Accordingly, this policy should not be construed to excuse personnel errors.

B. Civil Penalty

A civil penalty is a monetary penalty that may be imposed for violation of (1) certain specified licensing provisions of the Atomic Energy Act or supplementary NRC rules or orders; (2) any requirement for which a license may be revoked; or (3) reporting requirements under section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act. Civil penalties are designed to deter future violations both by the involved licensee as well as by other licensees conducting similar activities and to emphasize the need for licensees to identify violations and take prompt comprehensive corrective action.

Civil penalties are considered for Severity Level III violations. In addition, civil penalties will normally be assessed for Severity Level I and II violations and knowing and conscious violations of the reporting requirements of section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act.

Civil penalties are used to encourage prompt identification and prompt and comprehensive correction of violations, to emphasize compliance in a manner that deters future violations, and to serve to focus licensees' attention on violations of significant regulatory concern.

Although management involvement, direct or indirect, in a violation may lead to an increase in the civil penalty, the lack of management involvement may not be used to mitigate a civil penalty. Allowing mitigation in the latter case could encourage the lack of

management involvement in licensed activities and a decrease in protection of the public health and safety.

1. Base Civil Penalty

The NRC imposes different levels of penalties for different severity level violations and different classes of licensees, vendors, and other persons. Tables 1A and 1B show the base civil penalties for various reactor, fuel cycle, materials, and vendor programs. (Civil penalties issued to individuals are determined on a case-by-case basis.) The structure of these tables generally takes into account the gravity of the violation as a primary consideration and the ability to pay as a secondary consideration. Generally, operations involving greater nuclear material inventories and greater potential consequences to the public and licensee employees receive higher civil penalties. Regarding the secondary factor of ability of various classes of licensees to pay the civil penalties, it is not the NRC's intention that the economic impact of a civil penalty be so severe that it puts a licensee out of business (orders, rather than civil penalties, are used when the intent is to suspend or terminate licensed activities) or adversely affects a licensee's ability to safely conduct licensed activities. The deterrent effect of civil penalties is best served when the amounts of the penalties take into account a licensee's ability to pay. In determining the amount of civil penalties for licensees for whom the tables do not reflect the ability to pay or the gravity of the violation, the NRC will consider as necessary an increase or decrease on a case-by-case basis. Normally, if a licensee can demonstrate financial hardship, the NRC will consider payments over time, including interest, rather than reducing the amount of the civil penalty. However, where a licensee claims financial hardship, the licensee will normally be required to address why it has sufficient resources to safely conduct licensed activities and pay license and inspection fees.

2. Civil Penalty Assessment

In an effort to (1) emphasize the importance of adherence to requirements and (2) reinforce prompt self-identification of problems and root causes and prompt and comprehensive correction of violations, the NRC reviews each proposed civil penalty on its own merits and, after considering all relevant circumstances, may adjust the base civil penalties shown in Table 1A and 1B for Severity Level I, II, and III violations as described below.




The civil penalty assessment process considers four decisional points: (a) Whether the licensee has had any previous escalated enforcement action (regardless of the activity area) during the past 2 years or past 2 inspections, whichever is longer; (b) whether the licensee should be given credit for actions related to identification; (c)

whether the licensee's corrective actions are prompt and comprehensive; and (d) whether, in view of all the circumstances, the matter in question requires the exercise of discretion. Although each of these decisional points may have several associated considerations for any given case, the outcome of the assessment process for

each violation or problem, absent the exercise of discretion, is limited to one of the following three results: no civil penalty, a base civil penalty, or a base civil penalty escalated by 100%. The flow chart presented below is a graphic representation of the civil penalty assessment process.

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* Should the licensee be given credit for actions related to identification?

(D) Discretion, e.g., SL I and II violations should normally result in a civil penalty regardless of ID and CA.

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a. Initial escalated action. When the NRC determines that a non-willful Severity Level III violation or problem has occurred, and the licensee has not had any previous escalated actions (regardless of the activity area) during the past 2 years or 2 inspections, whichever is longer, the NRC will consider whether the licensee's corrective action for the present violation or problem is reasonably prompt and comprehensive (see the discussion under Section VI.B.2.c, below). Using 2 years as the basis for assessment is expected to cover most situations, but considering a slightly longer or shorter period might be warranted based on the circumstances of a particular case. The starting point of this period should be considered the date when the licensee was put on notice of the need to take corrective action. For a licensee-identified violation or an event, this would be when the licensee is aware that a problem or violation exists requiring corrective action. For an NRC-identified violation, the starting point would be when the NRC puts the licensee on notice, which could be during the inspection, at the inspection exit meeting, or as part of post-inspection communication.

If the corrective action is judged to be prompt and comprehensive, a Notice of Violation normally should be issued with no associated civil penalty. If the corrective action is judged to be less than prompt and comprehensive, the Notice of Violation normally should be issued with a base civil penalty.

b. Credit for actions related to identification. (1) If a Severity Level I or II violation or a willful Severity Level III violation has occurred—or if, during the past 2 years or 2 inspections, whichever is longer, the licensee has been issued at least one other escalated action—the civil penalty assessment should normally consider the factor of identification in addition to corrective action (see the discussion under Section VI.B.2.c, below). As to identification, the NRC should consider whether the licensee should be given credit for actions related to identification.

In each case, the decision should be focused on identification of the problem requiring corrective action. In other words, although giving credit for Identification and Corrective Action should be separate decisions, the concept of Identification presumes that the identifier recognizes the existence of a problem, and understands that corrective action is needed. The decision on Identification requires considering all the circumstances of identification including:

(i) Whether the problem requiring corrective action was NRC-identified, licensee-identified, or revealed through an event;⁹

(ii) Whether prior opportunities existed to identify the problem requiring corrective action, and if so, the age and number of those opportunities;

(iii) Whether the problem was revealed as the result of a licensee self-monitoring effort, such as conducting an audit, a test, a surveillance, a design review, or troubleshooting;

(iv) For a problem revealed through an event, the ease of discovery, and the degree of licensee initiative in identifying the root cause of the problem and any associated violations;

(v) For NRC-identified issues, whether the licensee would likely have identified the issue in the same time-period if the NRC had not been involved;

(vi) For NRC-identified issues, whether the licensee should have identified the issue (and taken action) earlier; and

(vii) For cases in which the NRC identifies the overall problem requiring corrective action (e.g., a programmatic issue), the degree of licensee initiative or lack of initiative in identifying the problem or problems requiring corrective action.

(2) Although some cases may consider all of the above factors, the importance of each factor will vary based on the type of case as discussed in the following general guidance:

(i) Licensee-Identified. When a problem requiring corrective action is licensee-identified (i.e., identified before the problem has resulted in an event), the NRC should normally give the licensee credit for actions related to identification, regardless of whether prior opportunities existed to identify the problem.

(ii) Identified Through an Event. When a problem requiring corrective action is identified through an event, the decision on whether to give the

licensee credit for actions related to identification normally should consider the ease of discovery, whether the event occurred as the result of a licensee self-monitoring effort (i.e., whether the licensee was "looking for the problem"), the degree of licensee initiative in identifying the problem or problems requiring corrective action, and whether prior opportunities existed to identify the problem.

Any of these considerations may be overriding if particularly noteworthy or particularly egregious. For example, if the event occurred as the result of conducting a surveillance or similar self-monitoring effort (i.e., the licensee was looking for the problem), the licensee should normally be given credit for identification. As a second instance, even if the problem was easily discovered (e.g., revealed by a large spill of liquid), the NRC may choose to give credit because noteworthy licensee effort was exerted in ferreting out the root cause and associated violations, or simply because no prior opportunities (e.g., procedural cautions, post-maintenance testing, quality control failures, readily observable parameter trends, or repeated or locked-in annunciator warnings) existed to identify the problem.


(iii) NRC-Identified. When a problem requiring corrective action is NRC-identified, the decision on whether to give the licensee credit for actions related to identification should normally be based on an additional question: should the licensee have reasonably identified the problem (and taken action) earlier?

In most cases, this reasoning may be based simply on the ease of the NRC inspector's discovery (e.g., conducting a walkdown, observing in the control room, performing a confirmatory NRC radiation survey, hearing a cavitating pump, or finding a valve obviously out of position). In some cases, the licensee's missed opportunities to identify the problem might include a similar previous violation, NRC or industry notices, internal audits, or readily observable trends.

If the NRC identifies the violation but concludes that, under the circumstances, the licensee's actions related to Identification were not unreasonable, the matter would be treated as licensee-identified for purposes of assessing the civil penalty. In such cases, the question of Identification credit shifts to whether the licensee should be penalized for NRC's identification of the problem.

(iv) Mixed Identification. For "mixed" identification situations (i.e., where multiple violations exist, some NRC-

⁹An "event," as used here, means (1) an event characterized by an active adverse impact on equipment or personnel, readily obvious by human observation or instrumentation, or (2) a radiological impact on personnel or the environment in excess of regulatory limits, such as an overexposure, a release of radioactive material above NRC limits, or a loss of radioactive material. For example, an equipment failure discovered through a spill of liquid, a loud noise, the failure to have a system respond properly, or an annunciator alarm would be considered an event; a system discovered to be inoperable through a document review would not. Similarly, if a licensee discovered, through quarterly dosimetry readings, that employees had been inadequately monitored for radiation, the issue would normally be considered licensee-identified; however, if the same dosimetry readings disclosed an overexposure, the issue would be considered an event.



identified, some licensee-identified, or where the NRC prompted the licensee to take action that resulted in the identification of the violation), the NRC's evaluation should normally determine whether the licensee could reasonably have been expected to identify the violation in the NRC's absence. This determination should consider, among other things, the timing of the NRC's discovery, the information available to the licensee that caused the NRC concern, the specificity of the NRC's concern, the scope of the licensee's efforts, the level of licensee resources given to the investigation, and whether the NRC's path of analysis had been dismissed or was being pursued in parallel by the licensee.

In some cases, the licensee may have addressed the isolated symptoms of each violation (and may have identified the violations), but failed to recognize the common root cause and taken the necessary comprehensive action. Where this is true, the decision on whether to give licensee credit for actions related to Identification should focus on identification of the problem requiring corrective action (e.g., the programmatic breakdown). As such, depending on the chronology of the various violations, the earliest of the individual violations might be considered missed opportunities for the licensee to have identified the larger problem.

(v) **Missed Opportunities to Identify.** Missed opportunities include prior notifications or missed opportunities to identify or prevent violations such as (1) through normal surveillances, audits, or quality assurance (QA) activities; (2) through prior notice i.e., specific NRC or industry notification; or (3) through other reasonable indication of a potential problem or violation, such as observations of employees and contractors, and failure to take effective corrective steps. It may include findings of the NRC, the licensee, or industry made at other facilities operated by the licensee where it is reasonable to expect the licensee to take action to identify or prevent similar problems at the facility subject to the enforcement action at issue. In assessing this factor, consideration will be given to, among other things, the opportunities available to discover the violation, the ease of discovery, the similarity between the violation and the notification, the period of time between when the violation occurred and when the notification was issued, the action taken (or planned) by the licensee in response to the notification, and the level of management review that the notification received (or should have received).

The evaluation of missed opportunities should normally depend on whether the information available to the licensee should reasonably have caused action that would have prevented the violation. Missed opportunities is normally not applied where the licensee appropriately reviewed the opportunity for application to its activities and reasonable action was either taken or planned to be taken within a reasonable time.

In some situations the missed opportunity is a violation in itself. In these cases, unless the missed opportunity is a Severity Level III violation in itself, the missed opportunity violation may be grouped with the other violations into a single Severity Level III "problem." However, if the missed opportunity is the only violation, then it should not normally be counted twice (i.e., both as the violation and as a missed opportunity—"double counting") unless the number of opportunities missed was particularly significant.

The timing of the missed opportunity should also be considered. While a rigid time-frame is unnecessary, a 2-year period should generally be considered for consistency in implementation, as the period reflecting relatively current performance.

(3) When the NRC determines that the licensee should receive credit for actions related to Identification, the civil penalty assessment should normally result in either no civil penalty or a base civil penalty, based on whether Corrective Action is judged to be reasonably prompt and comprehensive. When the licensee is not given credit for actions related to Identification, the civil penalty assessment should normally result in a Notice of Violation with either a base civil penalty or a base civil penalty escalated by 100%, depending on the quality of Corrective Action, because the licensee's performance is clearly not acceptable.

c. Credit for prompt and comprehensive corrective action. The purpose of the Corrective Action factor is to encourage licensees to (1) take the immediate actions necessary upon discovery of a violation that will restore safety and compliance with the license, regulation(s), or other requirement(s); and (2) develop and implement (in a timely manner) the lasting actions that will not only prevent recurrence of the violation at issue, but will be appropriately comprehensive, given the significance and complexity of the violation, to prevent occurrence of violations with similar root causes.

Regardless of other circumstances (e.g., past enforcement history, identification), the licensee's corrective actions should always be evaluated as part of the civil penalty assessment process. As a reflection of the importance given to this factor, an NRC judgment that the licensee's corrective action has not been prompt and comprehensive will always result in issuing at least a base civil penalty.

In assessing this factor, consideration will be given to the timeliness of the corrective action (including the promptness in developing the schedule for long term corrective action), the adequacy of the licensee's root cause analysis for the violation, and, given the significance and complexity of the issue, the comprehensiveness of the corrective action (i.e., whether the action is focused narrowly to the specific violation or broadly to the general area of concern). Even in cases when the NRC, at the time of the enforcement conference, identifies additional peripheral or minor corrective action still to be taken, the licensee may be given credit in this area, as long as the licensee's actions addressed the underlying root cause and are considered sufficient to prevent recurrence of the violation and similar violations.

Normally, the judgment of the adequacy of corrective actions will hinge on whether the NRC had to take action to focus the licensee's evaluative and corrective process in order to obtain comprehensive corrective action. This will normally be judged at the time of the enforcement conference (e.g., by outlining substantive additional areas where corrective action is needed). Earlier informal discussions between the licensee and NRC inspectors or management may result in improved corrective action, but should not normally be a basis to deny credit for Corrective Action. For cases in which the licensee does not get credit for actions related to Identification because the NRC identified the problem, the assessment of the licensee's corrective action should begin from the time when the NRC put the licensee on notice of the problem. Notwithstanding eventual good comprehensive corrective action, if immediate corrective action was not taken to restore safety and compliance once the violation was identified, corrective action would not be considered prompt and comprehensive.

Corrective action for violations involving discrimination should normally only be considered comprehensive if the licensee takes prompt, comprehensive corrective action that (1) addresses the broader



environment for raising safety concerns in the workplace, and (2) provides a remedy for the particular discrimination issue.

d. Exercise of discretion. As provided in Section VII, "Exercise of Discretion," discretion may be exercised by either escalating or mitigating the amount of the civil penalty determined after applying the civil penalty adjustment factors to ensure that the proposed civil penalty reflects the NRC's concern regarding the violation at issue and that it conveys the appropriate message to the licensee. However, in no instance will a civil penalty for any one violation exceed \$100,000 per day.

TABLE 1A.—Base Civil Penalties

a. Power reactors	\$100,000
b. Fuel fabricators, industrial processors, and independent spent fuel and monitored retrievable storage installations	25,000
c. Test reactors, mills and uranium conversion facilities, contractors, vendors, waste disposal licensees, and industrial radiographers	10,000
d. Research reactors, academic, medical, or other material licensee ¹	5,000

¹This applies to nonprofit institutions not otherwise categorized in this table, mobile nuclear services, nuclear pharmacies, and physician offices.

TABLE 1B.—BASE CIVIL PENALTIES

Severity level	Base civil penalty amount (Percent of amount listed in Table 1A)
I	100
II	80
III	50

C. Orders. An order is a written NRC directive to modify, suspend, or revoke a license; to cease and desist from a given practice or activity; or to take such other action as may be proper (see 10 CFR 2.202). Orders may also be issued in lieu of, or in addition to, civil penalties, as appropriate for Severity Level I, II, or III violations. Orders may be issued as follows:

1. License Modification orders are issued when some change in licensee equipment, procedures, personnel, or management controls is necessary.
2. Suspension Orders may be used:
 - (a) To remove a threat to the public health and safety, common defense and security, or the environment;
 - (b) To stop facility construction when,
 - (i) Further work could preclude or significantly hinder the identification or

- correction of an improperly constructed safety-related system or component; or
- (ii) The licensee's quality assurance program implementation is not adequate to provide confidence that construction activities are being properly carried out;
- (c) When the licensee has not responded adequately to other enforcement action;
- (d) When the licensee interferes with the conduct of an inspection or investigation; or
- (e) For any reason not mentioned above for which license revocation is legally authorized.

Suspensions may apply to all or part of the licensed activity. Ordinarily, a licensed activity is not suspended (nor is a suspension prolonged) for failure to comply with requirements where such failure is not willful and adequate corrective action has been taken.

- 3. Revocation Orders may be used:**
- (a) When a licensee is unable or unwilling to comply with NRC requirements;
 - (b) When a licensee refuses to correct a violation;
 - (c) When licensee does not respond to a Notice of Violation where a response was required;
 - (d) When a licensee refuses to pay an applicable fee under the Commission's regulations; or
 - (e) For any other reason for which revocation is authorized under section 186 of the Atomic Energy Act (e.g., any condition which would warrant refusal of a license on an original application).

4. Cease and Desist Orders may be used to stop an unauthorized activity that has continued after notification by the NRC that the activity is unauthorized.

5. Orders to unlicensed persons, including vendors and contractors, and employees of any of them, are used when the NRC has identified deliberate misconduct that may cause a licensee to be in violation of an NRC requirement or where incomplete or inaccurate information is deliberately submitted or where the NRC loses its reasonable assurance that the licensee will meet NRC requirements with that person involved in licensed activities.

Unless a separate response is warranted pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, a Notice of Violation need not be issued where an order is based on violations described in the order. The violations described in an order need not be categorized by severity level.

Orders are made effective immediately, without prior opportunity for hearing, whenever it is determined that the public health, interest, or safety so requires, or when the order is responding to a violation involving

willfulness. Otherwise, a prior opportunity for a hearing on the order is afforded. For cases in which the NRC believes a basis could reasonably exist for not taking the action as proposed, the licensee will ordinarily be afforded an opportunity to show why the order should not be issued in the proposed manner by way of a Demand for Information. (See 10 CFR 2.204)

D. Related administrative actions. In addition to the formal enforcement actions, Notices of Violation, civil penalties, and orders, the NRC also uses administrative actions, such as Notices of Deviation, Notices of Nonconformance, Confirmatory Action Letters, Letters of Reprimand, and Demands for Information to supplement its enforcement program. The NRC expects licensees and vendors to adhere to any obligations and commitments resulting from these actions and will not hesitate to issue appropriate orders to ensure that these obligations and commitments are met.

1. Notices of Deviation are written notices describing a licensee's failure to satisfy a commitment where the commitment involved has not been made a legally binding requirement. A Notice of Deviation requests a licensee to provide a written explanation or statement describing corrective steps taken (or planned), the results achieved, and the date when corrective action will be completed.

2. Notices of Nonconformance are written notices describing vendor's failures to meet commitments which have not been made legally binding requirements by NRC. An example is a commitment made in a procurement contract with a licensee as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. Notices of Nonconformances request non-licensees to provide written explanations or statements describing corrective steps (taken or planned), the results achieved, the dates when corrective actions will be completed, and measures taken to preclude recurrence.

3. Confirmatory Action Letters are letters confirming a licensee's or vendor's agreement to take certain actions to remove significant concerns about health and safety, safeguards, or the environment.

4. Letters of Reprimand are letters addressed to individuals subject to Commission jurisdiction identifying a significant deficiency in their performance of licensed activities.

5. Demands for Information are demands for information from licensees or other persons for the purpose of enabling the NRC to determine whether an order or other enforcement action should be issued.



VII. Exercise of Discretion

Notwithstanding the normal guidance contained in this policy, as provided in Section III, "Responsibilities," the NRC may choose to exercise discretion and either escalate or mitigate enforcement sanctions within the Commission's statutory authority to ensure that the resulting enforcement action appropriately reflects the level of NRC concern regarding the violation at issue and conveys the appropriate message to the licensee.

A. Escalation of Enforcement Sanctions

The NRC considers violations categorized at Severity Level I, II, or III to be of significant regulatory concern. If the application of the normal guidance in this policy does not result in an appropriate sanction, with the approval of the appropriate Deputy Executive Director and consultation with the EDO and Commission, as warranted, the NRC may apply its full enforcement authority where the action is warranted. NRC action may include (1) escalating civil penalties, (2) issuing appropriate orders, and (3) assessing civil penalties for continuing violations on a per day basis, up to the statutory limit of \$100,000 per violation, per day.

1. **Civil penalties.** Notwithstanding the outcome of the normal civil penalty assessment process addressed in Section VI.B, the NRC may exercise discretion by either proposing a civil penalty where application of the factors would otherwise result in zero penalty or by escalating the amount of the resulting civil penalty (i.e., base or twice the base civil penalty) to ensure that the proposed civil penalty reflects the significance of the circumstances and conveys the appropriate regulatory message to the licensee. Consultation with the Commission is required if the deviation in the amount of the civil penalty proposed under this discretion from the amount of the civil penalty assessed under the normal process is more than two times the base civil penalty shown in Tables 1A and 1B. Examples when this discretion should be considered include, but are not limited to the following:

- (a) Problems categorized at Severity Level I or II;
- (b) Overexposures, or releases of radiological material in excess of NRC requirements;
- (c) Situations involving particularly poor licensee performance, or involving willfulness;
- (d) Situations when the licensee's previous enforcement history has been particularly poor, or when the current violation is directly repetitive of an earlier violation;

(e) Situations when the excessive duration of a problem has resulted in a substantial increase in risk;

(f) Situations when the licensee made a conscious decision to be in noncompliance in order to obtain an economic benefit; or

(g) Cases involving the loss of a source. In addition, unless the licensee self-identifies and reports the loss to the NRC, these cases should normally result in a civil penalty in an amount at least in the order of the cost of an authorized disposal of the material or of the transfer of the material to an authorized recipient.

2. **Orders.** The NRC may, where necessary or desirable, issue orders in conjunction with or in lieu of civil penalties to achieve or formalize corrective actions and to deter further recurrence of serious violations.

3. **Daily civil penalties.** In order to recognize the added technical safety significance or regulatory significance for those cases where a very strong message is warranted for a significant violation that continues for more than one day, the NRC may exercise discretion and assess a separate violation and attendant civil penalty up to the statutory limit of \$100,000 for each day the violation continues. The NRC may exercise this discretion if a licensee was aware or clearly should have been aware of a violation, or if the licensee had an opportunity to identify and correct the violation but failed to do so.

B. Mitigation of Enforcement Sanctions

The NRC may exercise discretion and refrain from issuing a civil penalty and/or a Notice of Violation, if the outcome of the normal process described in Section VI.B does not result in a sanction consistent with an appropriate regulatory message. In addition, even if the NRC exercises this discretion, when the licensee failed to make a required report to the NRC, a separate enforcement action will normally be issued for the licensee's failure to make a required report. The approval of the Director, Office of Enforcement, with consultation with the appropriate Deputy Executive Director as warranted, is required for exercising discretion of the type described in Section VII.B.1.b where a willful violation is involved, and of the types described in Sections VII.B.2 through VII.B.5. Commission consultation is required for exercising discretion of the type described in Section VII.B.2 and the approval of the appropriate Deputy Executive Director and Commission notification is required for exercising the discretion of the type described in Section VII.B.6. Examples

when discretion should be considered for departing from the normal approach in Section VI.B include but are not limited to the following:

1. **Licensee-Identified Severity Level IV Violations.** The NRC, with the approval of the Regional Administrator or his designee, may refrain from issuing a Notice of Violation for a Severity Level IV violation that is documented in an inspection report (or official field notes for some material cases) and described therein as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) provided that the inspection report includes a brief description of the corrective action and that the violation meets all of the following criteria:

(a) It was identified by the licensee, including identification through an event;

(b) It was not a violation that could reasonably be expected to have been prevented by the licensee's corrective action for a previous violation or a previous licensee finding that occurred within the past 2 years of the inspection at issue, or the period within the last two inspections, whichever is longer;

(c) It was or will be corrected within a reasonable time, by specific corrective action committed to by the licensee by the end of the inspection, including immediate corrective action and comprehensive corrective action to prevent recurrence;

(d) It was not a willful violation or if it was a willful violation;

(i) The information concerning the violation, if not required to be reported, was promptly provided to appropriate NRC personnel, such as a resident inspector or regional section or branch chief;

(ii) The violation involved the acts of a low-level individual (and not a licensee official as defined in Section IV.C);

(iii) The violation appears to be the isolated action of the employee without management involvement and the violation was not caused by lack of management oversight as evidenced by either a history of isolated willful violations or a lack of adequate audits or supervision of employees; and

(iv) Significant remedial action commensurate with the circumstances was taken by the licensee such that it demonstrated the seriousness of the violation to other employees and contractors, thereby creating a deterrent effect within the licensee's organization. Although removal of the employee from licensed activities is not necessarily required, substantial disciplinary action is expected.

2. **Violations Identified During Extended Shutdowns or Work**

Stoppages. The NRC may refrain from issuing a Notice of Violation or a proposed civil penalty for a violation that is identified after (i) the NRC has taken significant enforcement action based upon a major safety event contributing to an extended shutdown of an operating reactor or a material licensee (or a work stoppage at a construction site), or (ii) the licensee enters an extended shutdown or work stoppage related to generally poor performance over a long period of time, provided that the violation is documented in an inspection report (or official field notes for some material cases) and that it meets all of the following criteria:

(a) It was either licensee-identified as a result of a comprehensive program for problem identification and correction that was developed in response to the shutdown or identified as a result of an employee allegation to the licensee; (If the NRC identifies the violation and all of the other criteria are met, the NRC should determine whether enforcement action is necessary to achieve remedial action, or if discretion may still be appropriate.)

(b) It is based upon activities of the licensee prior to the events leading to the shutdown;

(c) It would not be categorized at a severity level higher than Severity Level II;

(d) It was not willful; and

(e) The licensee's decision to restart the plant requires NRC concurrence.

3. Violations Involving Old Design Issues. The NRC may refrain from proposing a civil penalty for a Severity Level II or III violation involving a past problem, such as in engineering, design, or installation, provided that the violation is documented in an inspection report (or official field notes for some material cases) that includes a description of the corrective action and that it meets all of the following criteria:

(a) It was licensee-identified as a result of its voluntary initiative;

(b) It was or will be corrected, including immediate corrective action and long term comprehensive corrective action to prevent recurrence, within a reasonable time following identification (this action should involve expanding the initiative, as necessary, to identify other failures caused by similar root causes); and

(c) It was not likely to be identified (after the violation occurred) by routine licensee efforts such as normal surveillance or quality assurance (QA) activities.

In addition, the NRC may refrain from issuing a Notice of Violation for cases that meet the above criteria provided the

violation was caused by conduct that is not reasonably linked to present performance (normally, violations that are at least 3 years old or violations occurring during plant construction) and there had not been prior notice so that the licensee should have reasonably identified the violation earlier. This exercise of discretion is to place a premium on licensees initiating efforts to identify and correct subtle violations that are not likely to be identified by routine efforts before degraded safety systems are called upon to work.

4. Violations Identified Due to Previous Escalated Enforcement Action. The NRC may refrain from issuing a Notice of Violation or a proposed civil penalty for a violation that is identified after the NRC has taken escalated enforcement action for a Severity Level II or III violation, provided that the violation is documented in an inspection report (or official field notes for some material cases) that includes a description of the corrective action and that it meets all of the following criteria:

(a) It was licensee-identified as part of the corrective action for the previous escalated enforcement action;

(b) It has the same or similar root cause as the violation for which escalated enforcement action was issued;

(c) It does not substantially change the safety significance or the character of the regulatory concern arising out of the initial violation; and

(d) It was or will be corrected, including immediate corrective action and long term comprehensive corrective action to prevent recurrence, within a reasonable time following identification.

5. Violations Involving Certain Discrimination Issues. Enforcement discretion may be exercised for discrimination cases when a licensee who, without the need for government intervention, identifies an issue of discrimination and takes prompt, comprehensive, and effective corrective action to address both the particular situation and the overall work environment for raising safety concerns. Similarly, enforcement may not be warranted where a complaint is filed with the Department of Labor (DOL) under Section 211 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, but the licensee settles the matter before the DOL makes an initial finding of discrimination and addresses the overall work environment. Alternatively, if a finding of discrimination is made, the licensee may choose to settle the case before the evidentiary hearing begins. In such cases, the NRC may exercise its discretion not to take enforcement

action when the licensee has addressed the overall work environment for raising safety concerns and has publicized that a complaint of discrimination for engaging in protected activity was made to the DOL, that the matter was settled to the satisfaction of the employee (the terms of the specific settlement agreement need not be posted), and that, if the DOL Area Office found discrimination, the licensee has taken action to positively reemphasize that discrimination will not be tolerated. Similarly, the NRC may refrain from taking enforcement action if a licensee settles a matter promptly after a person comes to the NRC without going to the DOL. Such discretion would normally not be exercised in cases in which the licensee does not appropriately address the overall work environment (e.g., by using training, postings, revised policies or procedures, any necessary disciplinary action, etc., to communicate its policy against discrimination) or in cases that involve allegations of discrimination as a result of providing information directly to the NRC, allegations of discrimination caused by a manager above first-line supervisor (consistent with current Enforcement Policy classification of Severity Level I or II violations), allegations of discrimination where a history of findings of discrimination (by the DOL or the NRC) or settlements suggests a programmatic rather than an isolated discrimination problem, or allegations of discrimination which appear particularly blatant or egregious.

6. Violations Involving Special Circumstances. Notwithstanding the outcome of the normal civil penalty assessment process addressed in Section VI.B, as provided in Section III, "Responsibilities," the NRC may reduce or refrain from issuing a civil penalty or a Notice of Violation for a Severity Level II or III violation based on the merits of the case after considering the guidance in this statement of policy and such factors as the age of the violation, the safety significance of the violation, the overall sustained performance of the licensee has been particularly good, and other relevant circumstances, including any that may have changed since the violation. This discretion is expected to be exercised only where application of the normal guidance in the policy is unwarranted.

C. Exercise of Discretion for an Operating Facility

On occasion, circumstances may arise where a licensee's compliance with a Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation or with other license conditions would involve an



unnecessary plant transient or performance of testing, inspection, or system realignment that is inappropriate with the specific plant conditions, or unnecessary delays in plant startup without a corresponding health and safety benefit. In these circumstances, the NRC staff may choose not to enforce the applicable TS or other license condition. This enforcement discretion, designated as a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED), will only be exercised if the NRC staff is clearly satisfied that the action is consistent with protecting the public health and safety. A licensee seeking the issuance of a NOED must provide a written justification, or in circumstances where good cause is shown, oral justification followed as soon as possible by written justification, which documents the safety basis for the request and provides whatever other information the NRC staff deems necessary in making a decision on whether or not to issue a NOED.

The appropriate Regional Administrator, or his or her designee, may issue a NOED where the noncompliance is temporary and nonrecurring when an amendment is not practical. The Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or his or her designee, may issue a NOED if the expected noncompliance will occur during the brief period of time it requires the NRC staff to process an emergency or exigent license amendment under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5) or (6). The person exercising enforcement discretion will document the decision.

For an operating plant, this exercise of enforcement discretion is intended to minimize the potential safety consequences of unnecessary plant transients with the accompanying operational risks and impacts or to eliminate testing, inspection, or system realignment which is inappropriate for the particular plant conditions. For plants in a shutdown condition, exercising enforcement discretion is intended to reduce shutdown risk by, again, avoiding testing, inspection or system realignment which is inappropriate for the particular plant conditions, in that, it does not provide a safety benefit or may, in fact, be detrimental to safety in the particular plant condition. Exercising enforcement discretion for plants attempting to startup is less likely than exercising it for an operating plant, as simply delaying startup does not usually leave the plant in a condition in which it could experience undesirable transients. In such cases, the Commission would expect that discretion would be

exercised with respect to equipment or systems only when it has at least concluded that, notwithstanding the conditions of the license: (1) The equipment or system does not perform a safety function in the mode in which operation is to occur; (2) the safety function performed by the equipment or system is of only marginal safety benefit, provided remaining in the current mode increases the likelihood of an unnecessary plant transient; or (3) the TS or other license condition requires a test, inspection or system realignment that is inappropriate for the particular plant conditions, in that it does not provide a safety benefit, or may, in fact, be detrimental to safety in the particular plant condition.

The decision to exercise enforcement discretion does not change the fact that a violation will occur nor does it imply that enforcement discretion is being exercised for any violation that may have led to the violation at issue. In each case where the NRC staff has chosen to issue a NOED, enforcement action will normally be taken for the root causes, to the extent violations were involved, that led to the noncompliance for which enforcement discretion was used. The enforcement action is intended to emphasize that licensees should not rely on the NRC's authority to exercise enforcement discretion as a routine substitute for compliance or for requesting a license amendment.

Finally, it is expected that the NRC staff will exercise enforcement discretion in this area infrequently. Although a plant must shut down, refueling activities may be suspended, or plant startup may be delayed, absent the exercise of enforcement discretion, the NRC staff is under no obligation to take such a step merely because it has been requested. The decision to forego enforcement is discretionary. When enforcement discretion is to be exercised, it is to be exercised only if the NRC staff is clearly satisfied that such action is warranted from a health and safety perspective.

VIII. Enforcement Actions Involving Individuals

Enforcement actions involving individuals, including licensed operators, are significant personnel actions, which will be closely controlled and judiciously applied. An enforcement action involving an individual will normally be taken only when the NRC is satisfied that the individual fully understood, or should have understood, his or her responsibility; knew, or should have known, the required actions; and

knowingly, or with careless disregard (i.e., with more than mere negligence) failed to take required actions which have actual or potential safety significance. Most transgressions of individuals at the level of Severity Level III or IV violations will be handled by citing only the facility licensee.

More serious violations, including those involving the integrity of an individual (e.g., lying to the NRC) concerning matters within the scope of the individual's responsibilities, will be considered for enforcement action against the individual as well as against the facility licensee. Action against the individual, however, will not be taken if the improper action by the individual was caused by management failures. The following examples of situations illustrate this concept:

- Inadvertent individual mistakes resulting from inadequate training or guidance provided by the facility licensee.
- Inadvertently missing an insignificant procedural requirement when the action is routine, fairly uncomplicated, and there is no unusual circumstance indicating that the procedures should be referred to and followed step-by-step.
- Compliance with an express direction of management, such as the Shift Supervisor or Plant Manager, resulted in a violation unless the individual did not express his or her concern or objection to the direction.
- Individual error directly resulting from following the technical advice of an expert unless the advice was clearly unreasonable and the licensed individual should have recognized it as such.
- Violations resulting from inadequate procedures unless the individual used a faulty procedure knowing it was faulty and had not attempted to get the procedure corrected.

Listed below are examples of situations which could result in enforcement actions involving individuals, licensed or unlicensed. If the actions described in these examples are taken by a licensed operator or taken deliberately by an unlicensed individual, enforcement action may be taken directly against the individual. However, violations involving willful conduct not amounting to deliberate action by an unlicensed individual in these situations may result in enforcement action against a licensee that may impact an individual. The situations include, but are not limited to, violations that involve:

- Willfully causing a licensee to be in violation of NRC requirements.

- Willfully taking action that would have caused a licensee to be in violation of NRC requirements but the action did not do so because it was detected and corrective action was taken.
 - Recognizing a violation of procedural requirements and willfully not taking corrective action.
 - Willfully defeating alarms which have safety significance.
 - Unauthorized abandoning of reactor controls.
 - Dereliction of duty.
 - Falsifying records required by NRC regulations or by the facility license.
 - Willfully providing, or causing a licensee to provide, an NRC inspector or investigator with inaccurate or incomplete information on a matter material to the NRC.
 - Willfully withholding safety significant information rather than making such information known to appropriate supervisory or technical personnel in the licensee's organization.
 - Submitting false information and as a result gaining unescorted access to a nuclear power plant.
 - Willfully providing false data to a licensee by a contractor or other person who provides test or other services, when the data affects the licensee's compliance with 10 CFR part 50, appendix B, or other regulatory requirement.
 - Willfully providing false certification that components meet the requirements of their intended use, such as ASME Code.
 - Willfully supplying, by vendors of equipment for transportation of radioactive material, casks that do not comply with their certificates of compliance.
 - Willfully performing unauthorized bypassing of required reactor or other facility safety systems.
 - Willfully taking actions that violate Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or other license conditions (enforcement action for a willful violation will not be taken if that violation is the result of action taken following the NRC's decision to forego enforcement of the Technical Specification or other license condition or if the operator meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 (x), (i.e., unless the operator acted unreasonably considering all the relevant circumstances surrounding the emergency.)
- Normally, some enforcement action is taken against a licensee for violations caused by significant acts of wrongdoing by its employees, contractors, or contractors' employees. In deciding whether to issue an enforcement action to an unlicensed person as well as to the

licensee, the NRC recognizes that judgments will have to be made on a case by case basis. In making these decisions, the NRC will consider factors such as the following:

1. The level of the individual within the organization.
2. The individual's training and experience as well as knowledge of the potential consequences of the wrongdoing.
3. The safety consequences of the misconduct.
4. The benefit to the wrongdoer, e.g., personal or corporate gain.
5. The degree of supervision of the individual, i.e., how closely is the individual monitored or audited, and the likelihood of detection (such as a radiographer working independently in the field as contrasted with a team activity at a power plant).
6. The employer's response, e.g., disciplinary action taken.
7. The attitude of the wrongdoer, e.g., admission of wrongdoing, acceptance of responsibility.
8. The degree of management responsibility or culpability.
9. Who identified the misconduct.

Any proposed enforcement action involving individuals must be issued with the concurrence of the appropriate Deputy Executive Director. The particular sanction to be used should be determined on a case-by-case basis.¹⁰ Notices of Violation and Orders are examples of enforcement actions that may be appropriate against individuals. The administrative action of a Letter of Reprimand may also be considered. In addition, the NRC may issue Demands for Information to gather information to enable it to determine whether an order or other enforcement action should be issued.

Orders to NRC-licensed reactor operators may involve suspension for a specified period, modification, or revocation of their individual licenses. Orders to unlicensed individuals might include provisions that would:

- Prohibit involvement in NRC licensed activities for a specified period of time (normally the period of suspension would not exceed 5 years) or

¹⁰ Except for individuals subject to civil penalties under section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, NRC will not normally impose a civil penalty against an individual. However, section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) gives the Commission authority to impose civil penalties on "any person." "Person" is broadly defined in Section 11a of the AEA to include individuals, a variety of organizations, and any representatives or agents. This gives the Commission authority to impose civil penalties on employees of licensees or on separate entities when a violation of a requirement directly imposed on them is committed.

until certain conditions are satisfied, e.g., completing specified training or meeting certain qualifications.

- Require notification to the NRC before resuming work in licensed activities.
- Require the person to tell a prospective employer or customer engaged in licensed activities that the person has been subject to an NRC order.

In the case of a licensed operator's failure to meet applicable fitness-for-duty requirements (10 CFR 55.53(j)), the NRC may issue a Notice of Violation or a civil penalty to the Part 55 licensee, or an order to suspend, modify, or revoke the Part 55 license. These actions may be taken the first time a licensed operator fails a drug or alcohol test, that is, receives a confirmed positive test that exceeds the cutoff levels of 10 CFR Part 26 or the facility licensee's cutoff levels, if lower. However, normally only a Notice of Violation will be issued for the first confirmed positive test in the absence of aggravating circumstances such as errors in the performance of licensed duties or evidence of prolonged use. In addition, the NRC intends to issue an order to suspend the Part 55 license for up to 3 years the second time a licensed operator exceeds those cutoff levels. In the event there are less than 3 years remaining in the term of the individual's license, the NRC may consider not renewing the individual's license or not issuing a new license after the three year period is completed. The NRC intends to issue an order to revoke the Part 55 license the third time a licensed operator exceeds those cutoff levels. A licensed operator or applicant who refuses to participate in the drug and alcohol testing programs established by the facility licensee or who is involved in the sale, use, or possession of an illegal drug is also subject to license suspension, revocation, or denial.

In addition, the NRC may take enforcement action against a licensee that may impact an individual, where the conduct of the individual places in question the NRC's reasonable assurance that licensed activities will be properly conducted. The NRC may take enforcement action for reasons that would warrant refusal to issue a license on an original application. Accordingly, appropriate enforcement actions may be taken regarding matters that raise issues of integrity, competence, fitness-for-duty, or other matters that may not necessarily be a violation of specific Commission requirements.

In the case of an unlicensed person, whether a firm or an individual, an order modifying the facility license may



be issued to require (1) The removal of the person from all licensed activities for a specified period of time or indefinitely, (2) prior notice to the NRC before utilizing the person in licensed activities, or (3) the licensee to provide notice of the issuance of such an order to other persons involved in licensed activities making reference inquiries. In addition, orders to employers might require retraining, additional oversight, or independent verification of activities performed by the person, if the person is to be involved in licensed activities.

IX. Inaccurate and Incomplete Information

A violation of the regulations involving submittal of incomplete and/or inaccurate information, whether or not considered a material false statement, can result in the full range of enforcement sanctions. The labeling of a communication failure as a material false statement will be made on a case-by-case basis and will be reserved for egregious violations. Violations involving inaccurate or incomplete information or the failure to provide significant information identified by a licensee normally will be categorized based on the guidance herein, in Section IV, "Severity of Violations," and in Supplement VII.

The Commission recognizes that oral information may in some situations be inherently less reliable than written submittals because of the absence of an opportunity for reflection and management review. However, the Commission must be able to rely on oral communications from licensee officials concerning significant information. Therefore, in determining whether to take enforcement action for an oral statement, consideration may be given to factors such as (1) The degree of knowledge that the communicator should have had, regarding the matter, in view of his or her position, training, and experience; (2) the opportunity and time available prior to the communication to assure the accuracy or completeness of the information; (3) the degree of intent or negligence, if any, involved; (4) the formality of the communication; (5) the reasonableness of NRC reliance on the information; (6) the importance of the information which was wrong or not provided; and (7) the reasonableness of the explanation for not providing complete and accurate information.

Absent at least careless disregard, an incomplete or inaccurate unsworn oral statement normally will not be subject to enforcement action unless it involves significant information provided by a licensee official. However, enforcement

action may be taken for an unintentionally incomplete or inaccurate oral statement provided to the NRC by a licensee official or others on behalf of a licensee, if a record was made of the oral information and provided to the licensee thereby permitting an opportunity to correct the oral information, such as if a transcript of the communication or meeting summary containing the error was made available to the licensee and was not subsequently corrected in a timely manner.

When a licensee has corrected inaccurate or incomplete information, the decision to issue a Notice of Violation for the initial inaccurate or incomplete information normally will be dependent on the circumstances, including the ease of detection of the error, the timeliness of the correction, whether the NRC or the licensee identified the problem with the communication, and whether the NRC relied on the information prior to the correction. Generally, if the matter was promptly identified and corrected by the licensee prior to reliance by the NRC, or before the NRC raised a question about the information, no enforcement action will be taken for the initial inaccurate or incomplete information. On the other hand, if the misinformation is identified after the NRC relies on it, or after some question is raised regarding the accuracy of the information, then some enforcement action normally will be taken even if it is in fact corrected. However, if the initial submittal was accurate when made but later turns out to be erroneous because of newly discovered information or advance in technology, a citation normally would not be appropriate if, when the new information became available or the advancement in technology was made, the initial submittal was corrected.

The failure to correct inaccurate or incomplete information which the licensee does not identify as significant normally will not constitute a separate violation. However, the circumstances surrounding the failure to correct may be considered relevant to the determination of enforcement action for the initial inaccurate or incomplete statement. For example, an unintentionally inaccurate or incomplete submission may be treated as a more severe matter if the licensee later determines that the initial submittal was in error and does not correct it or if there were clear opportunities to identify the error. If information not corrected was recognized by a licensee as significant, a separate citation may be made for the

failure to provide significant information. In any event, in serious cases where the licensee's actions in not correcting or providing information raise questions about its commitment to safety or its fundamental trustworthiness, the Commission may exercise its authority to issue orders modifying, suspending, or revoking the license. The Commission recognizes that enforcement determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the issues described in this section.

X. Enforcement Action Against Non-Licensees

The Commission's enforcement policy is also applicable to non-licensees, including employees of licensees, to contractors and subcontractors, and to employees of contractors and subcontractors, who knowingly provide components, equipment, or other goods or services that relate to a licensee's activities subject to NRC regulation. The prohibitions and sanctions for any of these persons who engage in deliberate misconduct or submission of incomplete or inaccurate information are provided in the rule on deliberate misconduct, e.g., 10 CFR 30.10 and 50.5.

Vendors of products or services provided for use in nuclear activities are subject to certain requirements designed to ensure that the products or services supplied that could affect safety are of high quality. Through procurement contracts with reactor licensees, vendors may be required to have quality assurance programs that meet applicable requirements including 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, and 10 CFR Part 71, Subpart H. Vendors supplying products or services to reactor, materials, and 10 CFR Part 71 licensees are subject to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21 regarding reporting of defects in basic components.

When inspections determine that violations of NRC requirements have occurred, or that vendors have failed to fulfill contractual commitments (e.g., 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B) that could adversely affect the quality of a safety significant product or service, enforcement action will be taken. Notices of Violation and civil penalties will be used, as appropriate, for licensee failures to ensure that their vendors have programs that meet applicable requirements. Notices of Violation will be issued for vendors that violate 10 CFR Part 21. Civil penalties will be imposed against individual directors or responsible officers of a vendor organization who knowingly and consciously fail to provide the notice required by 10 CFR 21.21(b)(1). Notices



of Nonconformance will be used for vendors which fail to meet commitments related to NRC activities.

XI. Referrals to the Department of Justice

Alleged or suspected criminal violations of the Atomic Energy Act (and of other relevant Federal laws) are referred to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for investigation. Referral to the DOJ does not preclude the NRC from taking other enforcement action under this policy. However, enforcement actions will be coordinated with the DOJ in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and the DOJ, 53 FR 50317 (December 14, 1988).

XII. Public Disclosure of Enforcement Actions

Enforcement actions and licensee responses, in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790, are publicly available for inspection. In addition, press releases are generally issued for orders and civil penalties and are issued at the same time the order or proposed imposition of the civil penalty is issued. In addition, press releases are usually issued when a proposed civil penalty is withdrawn or substantially mitigated by the same amount. Press releases are not normally issued for Notices of Violation that are not accompanied by orders or proposed civil penalties.

XIII. Reopening Closed Enforcement Actions

If significant new information is received or obtained by NRC which indicates that an enforcement sanction was incorrectly applied, consideration may be given, dependent on the circumstances, to reopening a closed enforcement action to increase or decrease the severity of a sanction or to correct the record. Reopening decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis, are expected to occur rarely, and require the specific approval of the appropriate Deputy Executive Director.

Supplement I—Reactor Operations

This supplement provides examples of violations in each of the four severity levels as guidance in determining the appropriate severity level for violations in the area of reactor operations.

A. Severity Level I—Violations involving for example:

1. A Safety Limit, as defined in 10 CFR 50.36 and the Technical Specifications being exceeded;
2. A system¹¹ designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event not being

¹¹ The term "system" as used in these supplements, includes administrative and

able to perform its intended safety function¹² when actually called upon to work;

3. An accidental criticality; or
4. A licensed operator at the controls of a nuclear reactor, or a senior operator directing licensed activities, involved in procedural errors which result in, or exacerbate the consequences of, an alert or higher level emergency and who, as a result of subsequent testing, receives a confirmed positive test result for drugs or alcohol.

B. Severity Level II—Violations involving for example:

1. A system designed to prevent or mitigate serious safety events not being able to perform its intended safety function;
2. A licensed operator involved in the use, sale, or possession of illegal drugs or the consumption of alcoholic beverages, within the protected area; or
3. A licensed operator at the control of a nuclear reactor, or a senior operator directing licensed activities, involved in procedural errors and who, as a result of subsequent testing, receives a confirmed positive test result for drugs or alcohol.

C. Severity Level III—Violations involving for example:

1. A significant failure to comply with the Action Statement for a Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation where the appropriate action was not taken within the required time, such as:

- (a) In a pressurized water reactor, in the applicable modes, having one high-pressure safety injection pump inoperable for a period in excess of that allowed by the action statement; or
- (b) In a boiling water reactor, one primary containment isolation valve inoperable for a period in excess of that allowed by the action statement.

2. A system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event:

- (a) Not being able to perform its intended function under certain conditions (e.g., safety system not operable unless offsite power is available; materials or components not environmentally qualified); or
- (b) Being degraded to the extent that a detailed evaluation would be required to determine its operability (e.g., component parameters outside approved limits such as pump flow rates, heat exchanger transfer characteristics, safety valve lift setpoints, or valve stroke times);

managerial control systems, as well as physical systems.

¹² "Intended safety function" means the total safety function, and is not directed toward a loss of redundancy. A loss of one subsystem does not defeat the intended safety function as long as the other subsystem is operable.

3. Inattentiveness to duty on the part of licensed personnel;

4. Changes in reactor parameters that cause unanticipated reductions in margins of safety;

5. A significant failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, including a failure such that a required license amendment was not sought;

6. A licensee failure to conduct adequate oversight of vendors resulting in the use of products or services that are of defective or indeterminate quality and that have safety significance;

7. A breakdown in the control of licensed activities involving a number of violations that are related (or, if isolated, that are recurring violations) that collectively represent a potentially significant lack of attention or carelessness toward licensed responsibilities; or

8. A licensed operator's confirmed positive test for drugs or alcohol that does not result in a Severity Level I or II violation.

9. Equipment failures caused by inadequate or improper maintenance that substantially complicates recovery from a plant transient.

D. Severity Level IV—Violations involving for example:

1. A less significant failure to comply with the Action Statement for a Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation where the appropriate action was not taken within the required time, such as:

- (a) In a pressurized water reactor, a 5% deficiency in the required volume of the condensate storage tank; or
- (b) In a boiling water reactor, one subsystem of the two independent MSIV leakage control subsystems inoperable;

2. A failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 that does not result in a Severity Level I, II, or III violation;

3. A failure to meet regulatory requirements that have more than minor safety or environmental significance; or

4. A failure to make a required Licensee Event Report.

Supplement II—Part 50 Facility Construction

This supplement provides examples of violations in each of the four severity levels as guidance in determining the appropriate severity level for violations in the area of Part 50 facility construction.

A. Severity Level I—Violations involving structures or systems that are completed¹³ in such a manner that they

¹³ The term "completed" as used in this supplement means completion of construction including review and acceptance by the construction QA organization.

would not have satisfied their intended safety related purpose.

B. Severity Level II—Violations involving for example:

1. A breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) program as exemplified by deficiencies in construction QA related to more than one work activity (e.g., structural, piping, electrical, foundations). These deficiencies normally involve the licensee's failure to conduct adequate audits or to take prompt corrective action on the basis of such audits and normally involve multiple examples of deficient construction or construction of unknown quality due to inadequate program implementation; or

2. A structure or system that is completed in such a manner that it could have an adverse effect on the safety of operations.

C. Severity Level III—Violations involving for example:

1. A deficiency in a licensee QA program for construction related to a single work activity (e.g., structural, piping, electrical or foundations). This significant deficiency normally involves the licensee's failure to conduct adequate audits or to take prompt corrective action on the basis of such audits, and normally involves multiple examples of deficient construction or construction of unknown quality due to inadequate program implementation;

2. A failure to confirm the design safety requirements of a structure or system as a result of inadequate preoperational test program implementation; or

3. A failure to make a required 10 CFR 50.55(e) report.

D. Severity Level IV—Violations involving failure to meet regulatory requirements including one or more Quality Assurance Criterion not amounting to Severity Level I, II, or III violations that have more than minor safety or environmental significance.

Supplement III—Safeguards

This supplement provides examples of violations in each of the four severity levels as guidance in determining the appropriate severity level for violations in the area of safeguards.

A. Severity Level I—Violations involving for example:

1. An act of radiological sabotage in which the security system did not function as required and, as a result of the failure, there was a significant event, such as:

(a) A Safety Limit, as defined in 10 CFR 50.36 and the Technical Specifications, was exceeded;

(b) A system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event was not

able to perform its intended safety function when actually called upon to work; or

(c) An accidental criticality occurred;

2. The theft, loss, or diversion of a formula quantity¹⁴ of special nuclear material (SNM); or

3. Actual unauthorized production of a formula quantity of SNM.

B. Severity Level II—Violations involving for example:

1. The entry of an unauthorized individual¹⁵ who represents a threat into a vital area¹⁶ from outside the protected area;

2. The theft, loss or diversion of SNM of moderate strategic significance¹⁷ in which the security system did not function as required; or

3. Actual unauthorized production of SNM.

C. Severity Level III—Violations involving for example:

1. A failure or inability to control access through established systems or procedures, such that an unauthorized individual (i.e., not authorized unescorted access to protected area) could easily gain undetected access¹⁸ into a vital area from outside the protected area;

2. A failure to conduct any search at the access control point or conducting an inadequate search that resulted in the introduction to the protected area of firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices and reasonable facsimiles thereof that could significantly assist radiological sabotage or theft of strategic SNM;

3. A failure, degradation, or other deficiency of the protected area intrusion detection or alarm assessment systems such that an unauthorized individual who represents a threat could predictably circumvent the system or defeat a specific zone with a high degree of confidence without insider knowledge, or other significant degradation of overall system capability;

4. A significant failure of the safeguards systems designed or used to prevent or detect the theft, loss, or diversion of strategic SNM;

5. A failure to protect or control classified or safeguards information

¹⁴ See 10 CFR 73.2 for the definition of "formula quantity."

¹⁵ The term "unauthorized individual" as used in this supplement means someone who was not authorized for entrance into the area in question, or not authorized to enter in the manner entered.

¹⁶ The phrase "vital area" as used in this supplement includes vital areas and material access areas.

¹⁷ See 10 CFR 73.2 for the definition of "special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance."

¹⁸ In determining whether access can be easily gained, factors such as predictability, identifiability, and ease of passage should be considered.

considered to be significant while the information is outside the protected area and accessible to those not authorized access to the protected area;

6. A significant failure to respond to an event either in sufficient time to provide protection to vital equipment or strategic SNM, or with an adequate response force;

7. A failure to perform an appropriate evaluation or background investigation so that information relevant to the access determination was not obtained or considered and as a result a person, who would likely not have been granted access by the licensee, if the required investigation or evaluation had been performed, was granted access; or

8. A breakdown in the security program involving a number of violations that are related (or, if isolated, that are recurring violations) that collectively reflect a potentially significant lack of attention or carelessness toward licensed responsibilities.

D. Severity Level IV—Violations involving for example:

1. A failure or inability to control access such that an unauthorized individual (i.e., authorized to protected area but not to vital area) could easily gain undetected access into a vital area from inside the protected area or into a controlled access area;

2. A failure to respond to a suspected event in either a timely manner or with an adequate response force;

3. A failure to implement 10 CFR Parts 25 and 95 with respect to the information addressed under Section 142 of the Act, and the NRC approved security plan relevant to those parts;

4. A failure to make, maintain, or provide log entries in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71 (c) and (d), where the omitted information (i) is not otherwise available in easily retrievable records, and (ii) significantly contributes to the ability of either the NRC or the licensee to identify a programmatic breakdown;

5. A failure to conduct a proper search at the access control point;

6. A failure to properly secure or protect classified or safeguards information inside the protected area which could assist an individual in an act of radiological sabotage or theft of strategic SNM where the information was not removed from the protected area;

7. A failure to control access such that an opportunity exists that could allow unauthorized and undetected access into the protected area but which was neither easily or likely to be exploitable;

8. A failure to conduct an adequate search at the exit from a material access area;

9. A theft or loss of SNM of low strategic significance that was not detected within the time period specified in the security plan, other relevant document, or regulation; or
10. Other violations that have more than minor safeguards significance.

Supplement IV—Health Physics (10 CFR Part 20)

This supplement provides examples of violations in each of the four severity levels as guidance in determining the appropriate severity level for violations in the area of health physics, 10 CFR Part 20.¹⁹

A. Severity Level I - Violations involving for example:

1. A radiation exposure during any year of a worker in excess of 25 rems total effective dose equivalent, 75 rems to the lens of the eye, or 250 rads to the skin of the whole body, or to the feet, ankles, hands or forearms, or to any other organ or tissue;
2. A radiation exposure over the gestation period of the embryo/fetus of a declared pregnant woman in excess of 2.5 rems total effective dose equivalent;
3. A radiation exposure during any year of a minor in excess of 2.5 rems total effective dose equivalent, 7.5 rems to the lens of the eye, or 25 rems to the skin of the whole body, or to the feet, ankles, hands or forearms, or to any other organ or tissue;
4. An annual exposure of a member of the public in excess of 1.0 rem total effective dose equivalent;
5. A release of radioactive material to an unrestricted area at concentrations in excess of 50 times the limits for members of the public as described in 10 CFR 20.1302(b)(2)(i); or
6. Disposal of licensed material in quantities or concentrations in excess of 10 times the limits of 10 CFR 20.2003.

B. Severity Level II—Violations involving for example:

1. A radiation exposure during any year of a worker in excess of 10 rems total effective dose equivalent, 30 rems to the lens of the eye, or 100 rems to the skin of the whole body, or to the feet, ankles, hands or forearms, or to any other organ or tissue;
2. A radiation exposure over the gestation period of the embryo/fetus of a declared pregnant woman in excess of 1.0 rem total effective dose equivalent;
3. A radiation exposure during any year of a minor in excess of 1 rem total effective dose equivalent; 3.0 rems to the lens of the eye, or 10 rems to the

skin of the whole body, or to the feet, ankles, hands or forearms, or to any other organ or tissue;

4. An annual exposure of a member of the public in excess of 0.5 rem total effective dose equivalent;

5. A release of radioactive material to an unrestricted area at concentrations in excess of 10 times the limits for members of the public as described in 10 CFR 20.1302(b)(2)(i) (except when operation up to 0.5 rem a year has been approved by the Commission under Section 20.1301(c));

6. Disposal of licensed material in quantities or concentrations in excess of five times the limits of 10 CFR 20.2003; or

7. A failure to make an immediate notification as required by 10 CFR 20.2202 (a)(1) or (a)(2).

C. Severity Level III—Violations involving for example:

1. A radiation exposure during any year of a worker in excess of 5 rems total effective dose equivalent, 15 rems to the lens of the eye, or 50 rems to the skin of the whole body or to the feet, ankles, hands or forearms, or to any other organ or tissue;

2. A radiation exposure over the gestation period of the embryo/fetus of a declared pregnant woman in excess of 0.5 rem total effective dose equivalent (except when doses are in accordance with the provisions of Section 20.1208(d));

3. A radiation exposure during any year of a minor in excess of 0.5 rem total effective dose equivalent; 1.5 rems to the lens of the eye, or 5 rems to the skin of the whole body, or to the feet, ankles, hands or forearms, or to any other organ or tissue;

4. A worker exposure above regulatory limits when such exposure reflects a programmatic (rather than an isolated) weakness in the radiation control program;

5. An annual exposure of a member of the public in excess of 0.1 rem total effective dose equivalent (except when operation up to 0.5 rem a year has been approved by the Commission under Section 20.1301(c));

6. A release of radioactive material to an unrestricted area at concentrations in excess of two times the effluent concentration limits referenced in 10 CFR 20.1302(b)(2)(i) (except when operation up to 0.5 rem a year has been approved by the Commission under Section 20.1301(c));

7. A failure to make a 24-hour notification required by 10 CFR 20.2202(b) or an immediate notification required by 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i);

8. A substantial potential for exposures or releases in excess of the

applicable limits in 10 CFR Part 20 Sections 20.1001–20.2401 whether or not an exposure or release occurs;

9. Disposal of licensed material not covered in Severity Levels I or II;

10. A release for unrestricted use of contaminated or radioactive material or equipment that poses a realistic potential for exposure of the public to levels or doses exceeding the annual dose limits for members of the public, or that reflects a programmatic (rather than an isolated) weakness in the radiation control program;

11. Conduct of licensee activities by a technically unqualified person;

12. A significant failure to control licensed material; or

13. A breakdown in the radiation safety program involving a number of violations that are related (or, if isolated, that are recurring) that collectively represent a potentially significant lack of attention or carelessness toward licensed responsibilities.

D. Severity Level IV—Violations involving for example:

1. Exposures in excess of the limits of 10 CFR 20.1201, 20.1207, or 20.1208 not constituting Severity Level I, II, or III violations;

2. A release of radioactive material to an unrestricted area at concentrations in excess of the limits for members of the public as referenced in 10 CFR 20.1302(b)(2)(i) (except when operation up to 0.5 rem a year has been approved by the Commission under Section 20.1301(c));

3. A radiation dose rate in an unrestricted or controlled area in excess of 0.002 rem in any 1 hour (2 millirem/hour) or 50 millirems in a year;

4. Failure to maintain and implement radiation programs to keep radiation exposures as low as is reasonably achievable;

5. Doses to a member of the public in excess of any EPA generally applicable environmental radiation standards, such as 40 CFR Part 190;

6. A failure to make the 30-day notification required by 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) or 20.2203(a);

7. A failure to make a timely written report as required by 10 CFR 20.2201(b), 20.2204, or 20.2206; or

8. Any other matter that has more than a minor safety, health, or environmental significance.

Supplement V—Transportation

This supplement provides examples of violations in each of the four severity levels as guidance in determining the appropriate severity level for violations

¹⁹ Personnel overexposures and associated violations incurred during a life-saving or other emergency response effort will be treated on a case-by-case basis.

in the area of NRC transportation requirements²⁰.

A. Severity Level I—Violations involving for example:

1. Failure to meet transportation requirements that resulted in loss of control of radioactive material with a breach in package integrity such that the material caused a radiation exposure to a member of the public and there was clear potential for the public to receive more than .1 rem to the whole body;
2. Surface contamination in excess of 50 times the NRC limit; or
3. External radiation levels in excess of 10 times the NRC limit.

B. Severity Level II—Violations involving for example:

1. Failure to meet transportation requirements that resulted in loss of control of radioactive material with a breach in package integrity such that there was a clear potential for the member of the public to receive more than .1 rem to the whole body;
2. Surface contamination in excess of 10, but not more than 50 times the NRC limit;
3. External radiation levels in excess of five, but not more than 10 times the NRC limit; or
4. A failure to make required initial notifications associated with Severity Level I or II violations.

C. Severity Level III—Violations involving for example:

1. Surface contamination in excess of five but not more than 10 times the NRC limit;
2. External radiation in excess of one but not more than five times the NRC limit;
3. Any noncompliance with labeling, placarding, shipping paper, packaging, loading, or other requirements that could reasonably result in the following:
 - (a) A significant failure to identify the type, quantity, or form of material;
 - (b) A failure of the carrier or recipient to exercise adequate controls; or
 - (c) A substantial potential for either personnel exposure or contamination above regulatory limits or improper transfer of material;
4. A failure to make required initial notification associated with Severity Level III violations; or
5. A breakdown in the licensee's program for the transportation of licensed material involving a number of violations that are related (or, if isolated, that are recurring violations) that

²⁰ Some transportation requirements are applied to more than one licensee involved in the same activity such as a shipper and a carrier. When a violation of such a requirement occurs, enforcement action will be directed against the responsible licensee which, under the circumstances of the case, may be one or more of the licensees involved.

collectively reflect a potentially significant lack of attention or carelessness toward licensed responsibilities:

D. Severity Level IV—Violations involving for example:

1. A breach of package integrity without external radiation levels exceeding the NRC limit or without contamination levels exceeding five times the NRC limits;
2. Surface contamination in excess of but not more than five times the NRC limit;
3. A failure to register as an authorized user of an NRC-Certified Transport package;
4. A noncompliance with shipping papers, marking, labeling, placarding, packaging or loading not amounting to a Severity Level I, II, or III violation;
5. A failure to demonstrate that packages for special form radioactive material meets applicable regulatory requirements;
6. A failure to demonstrate that packages meet DOT Specifications for 7A Type A packages; or
7. Other violations that have more than minor safety or environmental significance.

Supplement VI—Fuel Cycle and Materials Operations

This supplement provides examples of violations in each of the four severity levels as guidance in determining the appropriate severity level for violations in the area of fuel cycle and materials operations.

A. Severity Level I—Violations involving for example:

1. Radiation levels, contamination levels, or releases that exceed 10 times the limits specified in the license;
2. A system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event not being operable when actually required to perform its design function;
3. A nuclear criticality accident; or
4. A failure to follow the procedures of the quality management program, required by Section 35.32, that results in a death or serious injury (e.g., substantial organ impairment) to a patient.

B. Severity Level II—Violations involving for example:

1. Radiation levels, contamination levels, or releases that exceed five times the limits specified in the license;
2. A system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event being inoperable; or
3. A substantial programmatic failure in the implementation of the quality management program required by 10 CFR 35.32 that results in a misadministration.

C. Severity Level III—Violations involving for example:

1. A failure to control access to licensed materials for radiation purposes as specified by NRC requirements;
2. Possession or use of unauthorized equipment or materials in the conduct of licensee activities which degrades safety;
3. Use of radioactive material on humans where such use is not authorized;
4. Conduct of licensed activities by a technically unqualified person;
5. Radiation levels, contamination levels, or releases that exceed the limits specified in the license;
6. Substantial failure to implement the quality management program as required by Section 35.32 that does not result in a misadministration; failure to report a misadministration; or programmatic weakness in the implementation of the quality management program that results in a misadministration.
7. A breakdown in the control of licensed activities involving a number of violations that are related (or, if isolated, that are recurring violations) that collectively represent a potentially significant lack of attention or carelessness toward licensed responsibilities;
8. A failure, during radiographic operations, to have present or to use radiographic equipment, radiation survey instruments, and/or personnel monitoring devices as required by 10 CFR Part 34;
9. A failure to submit an NRC Form 241 in accordance with the requirements in Section 150.20 of 10 CFR Part 150;
10. A failure to receive required NRC approval prior to the implementation of a change in licensed activities that has radiological or programmatic significance, such as, a change in ownership; lack of an RSO or replacement of an RSO with an unqualified individual; a change in the location where licensed activities are being conducted, or where licensed material is being stored where the new facilities do not meet safety guidelines; or a change in the quantity or type of radioactive material being processed or used that has radiological significance; or
11. A significant failure to meet decommissioning requirements including a failure to notify the NRC as required by regulation or license condition, substantial failure to meet decommissioning standards, failure to conduct and/or complete decommissioning activities in

accordance with regulation or license condition, or failure to meet required schedules without adequate justification.

D. Severity Level IV—Violations involving for example:

1. A failure to maintain patients hospitalized who have cobalt-60, cesium-137, or iridium-192 implants or to conduct required leakage or contamination tests, or to use properly calibrated equipment;

2. Other violations that have more than minor safety or environmental significance; or

3. Failure to follow the quality management program, including procedures, whether or not a misadministration occurs, provided the failures are isolated, do not demonstrate a programmatic weakness in the implementation of the QM program, and have limited consequences if a misadministration is involved; failure to conduct the required program review; or failure to take corrective actions as required by Section 35.32; or

4. A failure to keep the records required by Sections 35.32 or 35.33.

Supplement VII—Miscellaneous Matters

This supplement provides examples of violations in each of the four severity levels as guidance in determining the appropriate severity level for violations involving miscellaneous matters.

A. Severity Level I—Violations involving for example:

1. Inaccurate or incomplete information²¹ that is provided to the NRC (a) deliberately with the knowledge of a licensee official that the information is incomplete or inaccurate, or (b) if the information, had it been complete and accurate at the time provided, likely would have resulted in regulatory action such as an immediate order required by the public health and safety.

2. Incomplete or inaccurate information that the NRC requires be kept by a licensee that is (a) incomplete or inaccurate because of falsification by or with the knowledge of a licensee official, or (b) if the information, had it been complete and accurate when reviewed by the NRC, likely would have resulted in regulatory action such as an immediate order required by public health and safety considerations;

3. Information that the licensee has identified as having significant implications for public health and safety

²¹In applying the examples in this supplement regarding inaccurate or incomplete information and records, reference should also be made to the guidance in Section IX, "Inaccurate and Incomplete Information," and to the definition of "licensee official" contained in Section IV.C.

or the common defense and security ("significant information identified by a licensee") and is deliberately withheld from the Commission;

4. Action by senior corporate management in violation of 10 CFR 50.7 or similar regulations against an employee;

5. A knowing and intentional failure to provide the notice required by 10 CFR Part 21; or

6. A failure to substantially implement the required fitness-for-duty program.²²

B. Severity Level II—Violations involving for example:

1. Inaccurate or incomplete information that is provided to the NRC (a) by a licensee official because of careless disregard for the completeness or accuracy of the information, or (b) if the information, had it been complete and accurate at the time provided, likely would have resulted in regulatory action such as a show cause order or a different regulatory position;

2. Incomplete or inaccurate information that the NRC requires be kept by a licensee which is (a) incomplete or inaccurate because of careless disregard for the accuracy of the information on the part of a licensee official, or (b) if the information, had it been complete and accurate when reviewed by the NRC, likely would have resulted in regulatory action such as a show cause order or a different regulatory position;

3. "Significant information identified by a licensee" and not provided to the Commission because of careless disregard on the part of a licensee official;

4. An action by plant management above first-line supervision in violation of 10 CFR 50.7 or similar regulations against an employee;

5. A failure to provide the notice required by 10 CFR Part 21;

6. A failure to remove an individual from unescorted access who has been involved in the sale, use, or possession of illegal drugs within the protected area or take action for on duty misuse of alcohol, prescription drugs, or over-the-counter drugs;

7. A failure to take reasonable action when observed behavior within the protected area or credible information concerning activities within the protected area indicates possible unfitness for duty based on drug or alcohol use;

8. A deliberate failure of the licensee's Employee Assistance Program (EAP) to notify licensee's management when

²²The example for violations for fitness-for-duty relate to violations of 10 CFR Part 26.

EAP's staff is aware that an individual's condition may adversely affect safety related activities; or

9. The failure of licensee management to take effective action in correcting a hostile work environment.

C. Severity Level III—Violations involving for example:

1. Incomplete or inaccurate information that is provided to the NRC (a) because of inadequate actions on the part of licensee officials but not amounting to a Severity Level I or II violation, or (b) if the information, had it been complete and accurate at the time provided, likely would have resulted in a reconsideration of a regulatory position or substantial further inquiry such as an additional inspection or a formal request for information;

2. Incomplete or inaccurate information that the NRC requires be kept by a licensee that is (a) incomplete or inaccurate because of inadequate actions on the part of licensee officials but not amounting to a Severity Level I or II violation, or (b) if the information, had it been complete and accurate when reviewed by the NRC, likely would have resulted in a reconsideration of a regulatory position or substantial further inquiry such as an additional inspection or a formal request for information;

3. A failure to provide "significant information identified by a licensee" to the Commission and not amounting to a Severity Level I or II violation;

4. An action by first-line supervision in violation of 10 CFR 50.7 or similar regulations against an employee;

5. An inadequate review or failure to review such that, if an appropriate review had been made as required, a 10 CFR Part 21 report would have been made;

6. A failure to complete a suitable inquiry on the basis of 10 CFR Part 26, keep records concerning the denial of access, or respond to inquiries concerning denials of access so that, as a result of the failure, a person previously denied access for fitness-for-duty reasons was improperly granted access;

7. A failure to take the required action for a person confirmed to have been tested positive for illegal drug use or take action for onsite alcohol use; not amounting to a Severity Level II violation;

8. A failure to assure, as required, that contractors or vendors have an effective fitness-for-duty program;

9. A breakdown in the fitness-for-duty program involving a number of violations of the basic elements of the fitness-for-duty program that collectively reflect a significant lack of attention or carelessness towards

meeting the objectives of 10 CFR 26.10; or

10. Threats of discrimination or restrictive agreements which are violations under NRC regulations such as 10 CFR 50.7(f).

D. Severity Level IV—Violations involving for example:

1. Incomplete or inaccurate information of more than minor significance that is provided to the NRC but not amounting to a Severity Level I, II, or III violation;

2. Information that the NRC requires be kept by a licensee and that is incomplete or inaccurate and of more than minor significance but not amounting to a Severity Level I, II, or III violation;

3. An inadequate review or failure to review under 10 CFR Part 21 or other procedural violations associated with 10 CFR Part 21 with more than minor safety significance;

4. Violations of the requirements of Part 26 of more than minor significance;

5. A failure to report acts of licensed operators or supervisors pursuant to 10 CFR 26.73; or

6. Discrimination cases which, in themselves, do not warrant a Severity Level III categorization.

Supplement VIII—Emergency Preparedness

This supplement provides examples of violations in each of the four severity levels as guidance in determining the appropriate severity level for violations

in the area of emergency preparedness. It should be noted that citations are not normally made for violations involving emergency preparedness occurring during emergency exercises. However, where exercises reveal (i) training, procedural, or repetitive failures for which corrective actions have not been taken, (ii) an overall concern regarding the licensee's ability to implement its plan in a manner that adequately protects public health and safety, or (iii) poor self critiques of the licensee's exercises, enforcement action may be appropriate.

A. Severity Level I—Violations involving for example:

In a general emergency, licensee failure to promptly (1) correctly classify the event, (2) make required notifications to responsible Federal, State, and local agencies, or (3) respond to the event (e.g., assess actual or potential offsite consequences, activate emergency response facilities, and augment shift staff).

B. Severity Level II—Violations involving for example:

1. In a site emergency, licensee failure to promptly (1) correctly classify the event, (2) make required notifications to responsible Federal, State, and local agencies, or (3) respond to the event (e.g., assess actual or potential offsite consequences, activate emergency response facilities, and augment shift staff); or

2. A licensee failure to meet or implement one emergency planning

standard involving assessment or notification.

C. Severity Level III—Violations involving for example:

1. In an alert, licensee failure to promptly (1) correctly classify the event, (2) make required notifications to responsible Federal, State, and local agencies, or (3) respond to the event (e.g., assess actual or potential offsite consequences, activate emergency response facilities, and augment shift staff);

2. A licensee failure to meet or implement more than one emergency planning standard involving assessment or notification; or

3. A breakdown in the control of licensed activities involving a number of violations that are related (or, if isolated, that are recurring violations) that collectively represent a potentially significant lack of attention or carelessness toward licensed responsibilities.

D. Severity Level IV—Violations involving for example:

A licensee failure to meet or implement any emergency planning standard or requirement not directly related to assessment and notification

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 23rd day of June 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
John C. Hoyle,
Secretary of the Commission.

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11. ABSTRACT (200 words or less)

This document includes the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's or Commission's) revised General Statement of Policy and Procedure for Enforcement Actions (Enforcement Policy) as it was published in the *Federal Register* on June 30, 1995 (60 FR 34381). This document also includes the notice announcing the removal of the Enforcement Policy from the Code of Federal Regulations (60 FR 34380; June 30, 1995). The Enforcement Policy is a general statement of policy explaining the NRC's policies and procedures in initiating enforcement actions, and of the presiding officers and the Commission in reviewing these actions. This policy statement is applicable to enforcement in matters involving the radiological health and safety of the public, including employees' health and safety, the common defense and security, and the environment. This statement of general policy and procedure is published as NUREG-1600 to provide widespread dissemination of the Commission's Enforcement Policy. However, this is a policy statement and not a regulation. The Commission may deviate from this statement of policy and procedure as appropriate under the circumstances of a particular case.

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