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ACCESSION NBR: 9310250295 DOC. DATE: 93/10/20 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL: 50-387 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 1, Pennsylvania 05000387
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 RYDER, T.S. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.
 STANLEY, H.G. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 93-013-00: on 930921, unplanned ESF occurred. Caused by repositioning of applicable instrument isolation valves too rapidly during restoration from test. Personnel will review event at shop meeting. W/931020 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 4
 TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

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	<u>REG FILE</u> 02	1 1	RES/DSIR/EIB	1 1
	RGNI FILE 01	1 1		
EXTERNAL:	EG&G BRYCE, J.H	2 2	L ST LOBBY WARD	1 1
	NRC PDR	1 1	NSIC MURPHY, G.A	1 1
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
October 20, 1993

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 93-013-00
FILE R41-2
PLAS - 577

Docket No. 50-387
License No. NPF-14

Attached is Licensee Event Report 93-013-00. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv), in that an unplanned Engineered Safety Feature actuation occurred when the RCIC steam line inboard containment isolation valve automatically closed during excess flow check valve testing.


H.G. Stanley
VP - Nuclear Operations

TSR/mjm

cc: Mr. T. T. Martin
Regional Administrator, Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Mr. G. S. Barber
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503

FACILITY NAME (1) Susquehanna Steam Electric Station - Unit 1							DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 8 7			PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3		
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TITLE (4)
Unplanned ESF Actuation - Primary Containment Isolation Valve Closure

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)														
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)												
0	9	2	1	9	3	9	3	0	1	3	0	0	1	0	2	0	9	3	0	5	0	0	0

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §. (Check one or more of the following) (11)										
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)						
	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.38(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)						
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.38(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)						
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)							
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							
20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(ix)								

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME T.S. Ryder, Power Production Engineer	TELEPHONE NUMBER 7 1 7 5 4 2 - 3 2 3 5
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input type="checkbox"/> YES (if yes complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 1750 hours on September 21, 1993, with Unit 1 operating at 100% power, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling steam line isolated during the performance of excess flow check valve testing. RCIC was in a standby alignment at the time of the event. RCIC steam supply inboard isolation valve HV-149-F007 closed isolating the RCIC steam supply and generated a RCIC turbine trip signal closing the trip and throttle valve HV-150-012. All systems functioned as required following the instrument channel trip on logic 'B' high differential pressure which was being tested at the time of the event. RCIC was reset and was OPERABLE at 1803 hours. This event was determined to be reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) in that an unplanned Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation occurred when the RCIC steam line containment isolation valve automatically closed. The subject valve is used for primary containment isolation in the event of an accident. The valve automatically repositioned to the closed position which is the required position for it to fulfill its design safety function, had it been needed. There were no safety consequences or compromise to public health or safety during this incident, nor would there have been under different initial operating conditions. The most probable cause is believed to have been the repositioning of the applicable instrument isolation valves too rapidly during restoration from the test. The surveillance test was attempted again and was successfully completed at 2006 hours with no further problems. For added assurance, the surveillance was again performed on September 22, 1993 and the test was successfully completed at 0600 hours. As action to prevent recurrence, I&C personnel will review this event at a shop meeting with emphasis on the significance of proper instrument valving operations.



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104) OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Unit 1 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 8 7 9 3 - 0 1 3 - 0 0 0 2 OF 0 3	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

At 1750 hours on September 21, 1993, with Unit 1 operating at 100% power, the Unit 1 Control Room received the "RCIC Steamline logic 'B' Hi Differential pressure" and "RCIC Out of Service" alarms. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC, EIIS Code: BN) steam line isolated during the performance of excess flow check valve testing. RCIC was in a standby alignment at the time of the event. SI-199-231, 18 Month Functional Test of Excess Flow Check Valves for RCIC Isolation, was being performed when a RCIC steam line isolation occurred. RCIC steam supply inboard isolation valve HV-149-F007 closed isolating the RCIC steam supply and generated a RCIC turbine trip signal closing the trip and throttle valve HV-150-012. All systems functioned as required following the instrument channel trip on logic 'B' high differential pressure which was being tested at the time of the event. The isolation occurred during the restoration of the test. RCIC was reset and was OPERABLE at 1803 hours.

CAUSE OF EVENT

Although the cause of the RCIC steam line isolation cannot be conclusively proven, the most probable cause is believed to be the result of an Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) technician (utility, non-licensed) repositioning the applicable instrument isolation valves too rapidly during restoration from the test. This action is thought to have introduced a momentary high differential pressure condition sensed by the RCIC steam line isolation logic resulting in the automatic closure of HV-149-F007.

REPORTABILITY/ANALYSIS

This event was determined to be reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) in that an unplanned Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation occurred when the RCIC steam line containment isolation valve automatically closed. The subject valve is used for primary containment isolation in the event of an accident. The valve automatically repositioned to the closed position which is the required position for it to fulfill its design safety function, had it been needed. There were no safety consequences or compromise to public health or safety during this incident, nor would there have been under different initial operating conditions.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST. 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Unit 1 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 8 7 9 3 -	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		0 1 3 -	0 0	0 3	OF	0 3	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

In accordance with the guidance provided in NUREG 1022 Supplement 1 Item 14, the required submission date for this report was determined to be October 21, 1993.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

RCIC was reset and was OPERABLE at 1803 hours. The surveillance test was attempted again and was successfully completed at 2006 hours with no further problems. For added assurance, the surveillance was again performed on September 22, 1993 and the test was successfully completed at 0600 hours. As action to prevent recurrence, I&C personnel will review this event at a shop meeting with emphasis on the significance of proper instrument valving operations.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Failed Component Identification:

None

Previous Similar Events:

There have been no previous LER's identified for either unit involving RCIC containment isolation valve automatic closures during excess flow check valve testing.