



Pennsylvania Power & Light Company

Two North Ninth Street • Allentown, PA 18101-1179 • 215/774-5151

Harold W. Keiser
Senior Vice President-Nuclear
215/774-4194

MAR 19 1993

Mr. Edward C. Wenzinger, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
RESPONSE TO UNRESOLVED ITEM 387/92-29-04
PLA-3938 **FILE R41-2**


Docket Nos. 50-387
50-388

Dear Mr. Wenzinger:

This letter provides Pennsylvania Power & Light Company's response to Unresolved Item 387/92-29-04 that was discussed in NRC Combined Inspection Report 50-387/92-29 and 50-388/92-29 dated January 27, 1993.

The cover letter to the Inspection Report required submittal of a written reply within forty five (45) days of the date of the letter. We trust that the commission will find the attached response acceptable.

Very truly yours,



H. W. Keiser

Attachment

cc: ~~NRC Document Control Desk~~ (original)
Mr. G. S. Barber, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector
Mr. R. J. Clark, NRC Sr. Project Manager

9285250176 830319
PDR ADDCK 05000387
Q PDR

RESPONSE TO UNRESOLVED ITEM

A. Unresolved Item (387/92-29-04)

The cause for the Auxiliary Boiler Contamination Event of November 12, 1992 was leakage of Unit 1 main steam past motor operated valve HV10752 and check valve 107027. Main steam that passes these valves condenses at steam trap ST10702, which discharges to the auxiliary boiler deaerator. Feedwater for both Susquehanna auxiliary boilers is supplied by a common deaerator. The deaerator is vented through an unmonitored and unisolated vent directly to the environment. The resulting radioactive release was only a minute fraction of the allowable limit pursuant to Technical Specification 3.11.2. Additionally, dose calculations performed using conservative assumptions showed the dose to be a small fraction of that allowed by Technical Specification 3.11.2.

As noted in the cover letter to NRC Combined Inspection Report 50-387/92-29; 50-388/92-29; auxiliary boiler contaminations had previously occurred through this leakage pathway in May 1988 and December 1989. These instances were documented and dispositioned via the Significant Operating Occurrence Report (SOOR) process. Previous actions taken to prevent recurrence included:

- corrective maintenance on leaking boundary valves, and
- procedure changes to enhance operator actions.

The corrective actions taken in response to this event include:

- revised operating procedures OP-172/272-001 to close manual valve 107077/207077 except when auxiliary steam is required to supply the steam jet air ejectors, and
- inspections and repairs, as necessary, have been scheduled for valves HV10752, 107027 and steam trap ST10701 (which is between HV10752 and 107027 and presently discharges to the main condenser).
- a plant modification is being designed which will re-route the condensate from steam trap ST10702, from the auxiliary boiler deaerator, to the Unit 1 condenser. This modification is scheduled to be installed during the Unit 1 refueling and inspection outage following completion of the design/procurement activities.

With respect to Unit 2, the piping is arranged differently such that an equivalent steam trap does not exist. However, as noted above operating procedure OP-272-001 was revised to close manual valve 207077 to provide additional isolation.

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 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 KEISER, H.W. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.
 RECIPIENT NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
 WENZINGER, E.C. Region 1 (Post 820201)

SUBJECT: Responds to NRC 930127 ltr re unresolved item noted in Insp Rept 50-387/92-29. Corrective actions: operating procedure to close manual valve, except when auxiliary steam required, revised & plant mod to reroute condensate written.

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
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