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ACCESSION NBR:9301050022 DOC.DATE: 92/12/31 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
FACIL:50-387 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 1, Pennsylv 05000387.
AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
LLOYD,H. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.
STANLEY,H.G. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 92-019-00:on 921202,determined that several surveillance
were incorrectly signed off as operable.Caused by
procedural deficiencies.Fire doors will be repaired.
W/921231 ltr.

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TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

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December 31, 1992

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 92-019-00
FILE R41-2
PLAS - 554

Docket No. 50-387
License No. NPF-14

Attached is Licensee Event Report 92-019-00. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), in that Susquehanna Unit 1 was in a condition prohibited by Technical Specification when required LCO action was not taken within the required time frame for inoperable fire doors.


H.G. Stanley
Superintendent of Plant - Susquehanna

HL/mjm

cc: Mr. T. T. Martin
Regional Administrator, Region I
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PDR ADOCK 05000387
S PDR

Handwritten initials/signature

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Susquehanna Steam Electric Station - Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 8 7	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3
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TITLE (4)
Fire Doors Inoperable - Operation Prohibited by Technical Specifications

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)											
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)										
1	0	2	2	9	2	9	2	0	1	9	0	0	1	2	3	1	9	2	SSES - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 8 8

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 1 0 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)							
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)								

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)	
NAME H. Lloyd, Jr. - Power Production Engineer	TELEPHONE NUMBER 7 1 7 5 4 2 - 3 9 1 7

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On December 2, 1992, following a review of past performances of fire door inspection surveillances, it was determined that several surveillances were incorrectly signed off as operable. This review resulted from an internal self-assessment initiated via a Quality Assurance Surveillance. The surveillance procedure contained acceptance criteria which was misleading to the personnel who performed the procedure and lead to acceptance of doors with greater than allowed gaps between doors and frames and between meeting edges of swinging doors. The cause of the failure to identify these problems during performance of the surveillance was procedural inadequacy. This condition was determined to be reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications in that the required actions specified by the Limiting Condition for Operation ACTION STATEMENT were not maintained throughout the time in which the fire doors were inoperable. The safety consequences as a result of this event were minimal. The subject fire doors will be repaired. The applicable surveillance procedures are being revised to more clearly specify acceptance criteria in such a manner as to prevent recurrence of this problem.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 60.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Unit 1 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 8 7	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		9 2	- 0 1 9	- 0 0	0 2	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On October 22, 1992, several fire doors failed the Six Month Fire Door Inspection Surveillance Test due to excessive gaps between doors and frames and meeting edges of doors swinging in pairs. The appropriate Technical Specification Action Statement was entered and fire watches were established. Prior to this event, an internal self-assessment was initiated via a Quality Assurance Surveillance Record which identified other mechanical problems with fire doors. As a result of this QA surveillance, PP&L's Nuclear Systems Engineering (NSE) group began an evaluation of fire barrier surveillance procedures for potential procedural weaknesses. On December 2, 1992 it was determined by NSE that several past performances of fire door surveillances were incorrectly signed off as operable, when in fact some of the doors were not operable due to excessive gaps.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of the failure to recognize these documented door deficiencies during previous performance of the surveillance was procedural inadequacy in that acceptance criteria were not clearly defined. The Surveillance Procedure contained acceptance criteria that stated "procedure checklist complete" but failed to provide direction on what actions to take if any discrepancies were noted during the completion of the checklist. It was interpreted by those persons performing and reviewing the surveillance that as long as the checklist was completely filled out, the acceptance criteria were satisfied.

REPORTABILITY/ANALYSIS

This condition was determined to be reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as a condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specification in that certain fire doors did not meet operability requirements during previously performed surveillances and the required Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement was not entered.

The safety consequences as a result of this event were negligible. Even though the deficient gap may have allowed the doors to be prematurely forced open in the unlikely event of a fire, fire detection and/or suppression exist in the affected areas.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Unit 1 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 8 7 9 2	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		9 2	- 0 1 9	- 0 0	0 3	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

This event would not have been more significant at any other initial operating condition.

This condition was determined to be reportable on December 2, 1992. The initial step in reportability assessment was to attempt to determine if firm evidence existed for when the doors became inoperable. This included a search of work documents and equipment history. No firm evidence of when this occurred was discovered. In addition, a review was performed of previously performed surveillances, previous surveillance procedure revisions and our structural specification for fire doors. Part of the evaluation included the validity of door gap for operability. As of December 2, 1992, PP&L concluded that although not clearly defined in the procedure, maintaining proper gap should have been required for fire door operability and evaluation concluded that this condition (doors not meeting gap criteria) has existed for a considerable period of time.

In accordance with guidance provided in NUREG 1022, Supplement 1, item 14.10 and 10CFR50.4(d), the required submission date for this report was determined to be January 4, 1993.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The subject fire doors will be repaired/restored such that the doors meet all criteria for operability. Until the doors are repaired, the required LCO action will be continued.

The applicable surveillance procedures are being revised to more clearly specify the fire door acceptance criteria and will be formatted in such a manner as to prevent recurrence of this problem.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Failed Component Identification: N/A

Previous Similar Events:

Docket No. 50-387 LER 92-011-00, Fire Doors Inoperable Operation Prohibited by Technical Specifications.