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 FACIL: 50-388 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 2, Pennsylvania 05000388
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 RYDER, T.S. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.
 BYRAM, R.G. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 88-016-00: on 881114, failure to take applicable Tech Spec
 action upon determination that CI valves inoperable.
 W/8 ltr.

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 TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Susquehanna Steam Electric Station - Unit Two	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 8 8	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3
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TITLE (4) **Failure to Take Applicable Technical Specification Action Statement Upon Determination that Containment Isolation Valves were Inoperable**

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
11	14	88	88	016	00	12	14	88			0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)							
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)								

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME T.S. Ryder - Power Production Engineer	TELEPHONE NUMBER 717 542-3235
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
B	B	I SVI	T020	N					
B	B	I SVI	T020	N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH DAY YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On November 14, 1988, it was determined that two containment isolation valves were inoperable after noting position indication problems. Manual valves were closed to isolate the affected penetrations and were administratively controlled in accordance with plant Technical Specifications. However, it was later observed that one PASS sample line for each affected penetration had not been isolated. This constitutes a failure to fully comply with applicable Technical Specification action statements. When the non-compliance was verified, LCO 3.0.3 was immediately entered and actions were then taken to properly isolate the penetrations. The cause of failure to identify all the isolation paths from the penetrations is attributed to inattention to detail on the part of Operations personnel reviewing the drawings. This event was determined to be reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) in that the applicable Technical Specification action statement was not fulfilled. There was no safety impact because the lines which were not isolated did contain closed solenoid valves. Furthermore, the outboard containment isolation valves for the affected penetrations were operable and would have fulfilled their function of containment isolation if called upon. One containment isolation valve was repaired and returned to operability. Repair of the other valve is anticipated to be completed in the fall of 1989 during the scheduled Unit 2 refueling outage. Applicable Operations personnel will receive training on this event with special emphasis on the need for attention to detail when reviewing prints and drawings in the course of work.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On November 14, 1988 during performance of a quarterly containment atmosphere control valve exercising surveillance, it was determined that containment isolation valves SV-25780A and SV-25740A were inoperable after receiving dual indication for SV-25780A and full open indication for SV-25740A on local panel 2CB220A during valve cycling operations. SV-25780A is the inboard containment isolation valve for the suppression pool sampling line supplying the "A" H202 Analyzer (EIIS Code: BB), the "A" Containment Radiation Monitor (CRM, EIIS Code: IL) and the Post Accident Sampling system (PASS, EIIS Code: IP). SV-25740A is the inboard containment isolation valve for the upper drywell sampling line supplying those same systems. Manual valves were closed to isolate the affected penetrations and were administratively controlled by yellow tags in accordance with Technical Specification 3.6.3.a.2. However, it was observed on November 16, 1988 during a review of the yellow tag form, that the manual valves that had been closed and tagged did not isolate the PASS sample lines from the two penetrations. Although the associated PASS solenoid valves were closed preventing a release path outside of containment, they were not deenergized and under administrative control. This constitutes a failure to fully comply with applicable Technical Specification action statements. The non-compliance was verified at 1130 hours on November 16, 1988, 39 hours after LCO 3.6.3.a.2 was entered. LCO 3.0.3 was immediately entered and actions were then taken to properly isolate the penetrations.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

The cause of failure to identify all the isolation paths from the penetration is attributed to inattention to detail on the part of Operations personnel reviewing the drawings.

REPORTABILITY/ANALYSIS

This event was determined to be reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) in that the applicable Technical Specification action statement of isolating the affected penetrations upon determination that containment isolation valves for these penetrations were inoperable was not fulfilled. There was no safety impact because the lines which were not isolated did contain closed solenoid valves. Furthermore, the outboard containment isolation valves for the affected penetrations were operable and would have fulfilled their function of containment isolation if called upon.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

LCO 3.0.3 was immediately entered upon recognizing that LCO Action Statement 3.6.3.a.2 had not been met. The steps to assure complete compliance to LCO 3.6.3.a.2 were completed and LCO 3.0.3 was cleared 2 hours and 20 minutes after it was entered. A faulty reed switch for SV-25780A was replaced, the valve was disassembled, rebuilt, and stroked several times with satisfactory valve position indication. Outboard containment isolation valve SV-25742A, downstream of SV-25740A, was closed, deactivated, and placed under administrative control as an interim measure until SV-25740A can be repaired. Repair is anticipated to be completed in the fall of 1989 during the scheduled Unit 2 refueling outage. Applicable Operations personnel will receive training on this event with special emphasis on the need for attention to detail when reviewing prints and drawings in the course of work.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Failed Component Identification: Both failed components were 1 inch Target Rock solenoid valves, model 75KK-201.

Previous Similar Events: None.



Pennsylvania Power & Light Company

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December 14, 1988

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 88-016-00
FILE R41-2
PLAS - 347

Docket No. 50-388
License No. NPF-22

Attached is Licensee Event Report 88-016-00. This event was determined to be reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) in that there was a failure to fully complete the applicable Technical Specification action statement of isolating the affected penetrations upon determination that containment isolation valves for these penetrations were inoperable.

R.G. Byram
Superintendent of Plant - Susquehanna

TSR/mjm

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