



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report No. 50-389/79-12

Licensee: Florida Power and Light Company
9250 West Flager Street
Miami, Florida 33101

Facility Name: St. Lucie, Unit 2

Docket No. 50-389

License No. CPPR-144

Inspection at St. Lucie Site near Ft. Pierce, Florida

Inspector: T. E. Burdette
T. E. Burdette

8/27/79
Date Signed

Approved by: J. C. Bryant
J. C. Bryant, Section Chief, RCES Branch

8/27/79
Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on August 13-17, 1979

Areas Inspected

This routine, unannounced inspection involved 36 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of licensee action on previous inspection findings; independent inspection of construction activities; review of quality assurance audits; observation of concrete placement; and review of Inspection and Enforcement bulletins and circulars.

Results

Of the six areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *B. J. Escue, Site Manager
- *J. E. Vessely, QA Director
- *N. T. Weems, Assistant QA Manager, Construction
- *W. M. Hayward, QA Supervisor
- *J. W. Adams, QA Engineer
- *W. F. Jackson, Welding Superintendent
- *J. D. Kirk, Assistant Site Manager
- *J. L. Parker, Project Quality Control Supervisor
- *E. W. Sherman, QA Engineer

Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, and office personnel.

Other Organizations

- *W. J. Taylor, EBASCO
- *T. J. Behres, EBASCO
- *R. A. Garramore, EBASCO

*Attended exit interview.

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 17, 1979, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Open) Infraction (389/79-09-01): Failure to follow document control procedures.

The licensee responded to this infraction in a letter to RII dated July 31, 1979. The licensee reported actions to avoid further noncompliance and to provide assurance of correct construction during the period of July, 1977 to present. The inspector selected two cases, where drawings were affected by changes, to inspect construction work for correct installations. In each of the cases (penetrations for reactor auxiliary building), the construction had been performed per the drawing change. This item will remain open pending completion of the licensee's corrective actions in September and further review by RII.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Inspector Follow-Up Items

- a. (Open) Inspector Follow-Up Item (389/79-12-01): NAMCO limit switches. The inspector informed the licensee of a 10 CFR Part 21 report to NRC from NAMCO on limit switches. The licensee is investigating to determine if a similar problem exists with NAMCO limit switches for St. Lucie Unit 2. The licensee has visited NAMCO and has conducted a review of procurement records. This item will remain open pending completion of the licensee's review of information on NAMCO limit switches.
- b. (Open) Inspector Follow-Up Item (389/79-12-02): Weld rod control. The inspector reviewed rod issue practices and noted a problem in rod oven practices in the rod issue storage area. The inspector observed that rod ovens were allowed to exceed the current procedure (SQP-8) temperature requirements of 325 degrees F. The licensee took immediate action to correct the problem. Investigations revealed that the manufacturer's recommended maximum temperature for weld rods was not exceeded. Also an earlier procedure (CSP-5) governing weld rod ovens had permitted temperatures of 350 degrees F. The weld rod issue personnel were adhering to requirements of the earlier procedure (CSP-5). This item will remain open pending completion of licensee actions in this area and review by RII of licensee corrective actions.

6. Independent Inspection Effort

- a. The inspector conducted an inspection of the reactor building and reactor auxiliary building to observe construction activities. The inspector observed installation of mechanical penetrations, electrical hanger support welding, and safety injection system pipe welding.
- b. The inspector selected five nonconformance reports for safety related material and inspected the material to ensure compliance with FP&L QI 15.1 on hold tags. The inspector found the material to be properly tagged in accordance with QI 15.1 requirements.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7. FP&L QA Audits

FP&L procedures QP 18.1 and QP 18.2 are the governing procedures for conducting and scheduling of quality assurance audits. The inspector reviewed the procedures and held discussions with personnel responsible for the site QA audit program. The inspector reviewed the following completed audits:

- a. Nonconformance and Corrective Action, QAC-PSL-78-22 dated June 5, 1978.
- b. Quality Assurance Audit Document Control, QAC-PSL-2-78-7 dated March 17, 1978.

- c. Inspection, Test, and Operating Status, QAC-PSL-78-23 dated June 13, 1978.
- d. Physical Control of Nonconforming Material, QAC-PSL-78-34 dated August 21, 1978.
- e. Welding Control, QAC-PSL-78-53 dated January 29, 1979.
- f. Welding and Heat Treating Control, QAC-PSL-2-79-09 dated April 13, 1979.

The inspector reviewed the audits to ensure corrective action for identified deficiencies and compliance with FP&L audit procedure requirements.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

8. Observation of Work - Concrete Placement

The inspector examined various stages of preparation, in-process testing and documentation, delivery of pumped concrete, and placement #162 of concrete for an exterior wall of the Reactor Auxiliary Building. The following documents governing concrete placement activities were used as inspection criteria:

- a. PSAR Sections 3.8.1 and 3.8.4
- b. FP&L Quality Instruction (QI) 10.3 and 10.71
- c. EBASCO Concrete Specification FLO-2998.473

The inspector also witnessed testing of coarse and fine aggregates in the site laboratory.

Within the above areas of observation, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

9. Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins (IEB's)

- a. (Closed) IEB 79-09: Failures of GE Type AK-2 Circuit Breaker In Safety Related Systems

On June 7, 1979, the licensee provided a response to this bulletin in a letter to RII. The licensee indicated that if the GE moded AK-2 circuit breaker is used in St. Lucie Unit 2 procedures similar to those used in St. Lucie Unit 1 will be developed prior to initial fuel loading. This item is closed.

- b. (Closed) IEB 79-11: Faulty Overcurrent Trip Device in Circuit Breaker for Engineered Safety Ststems



On July 31, 1979, the licensee provided a response to this bulletin in a letter to RII. The licensee indicated that the Westinghouse DB-50 and DB-75 circuit breakers will not be used in safety class IE equipment. This item is closed.

10. Inspection and Enforcement Circulars (IEC's)

The inspector held discussions with responsible site personnel to ensure that the following circulars were received, reviewed, evaluated, and appropriate action is taken on information in the following circulars:

- a. (Closed) IEC 79-02: Failure of 120 Volt Vital AC Power Supplies
- b. (Closed) IEC 79-04: Loose Locking Nut on Limitorque Valve Operators
- c. (Closed) IEC 79-05: Moisture Leakage in Stranded Wire Conductors
- d. (Closed) IEC 79-10: Pipe Fittings Manufactured from Unacceptable Material
- e. (Closed) IEC 79-11: Design/Construction Interface Problem
- f. (Closed) IEC 79-12: Potential Diesel Generator Turbocharger Problem
- g. (Closed) IEC 79-13: Replacement of Diesel Fire Pump Starting Contactors

The inspector discussed the above circulars with the licensee.

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