

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Susquehanna Steam Electric Station - Unit 1		DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000387	PAGE (3) 1 OF 3
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TITLE (4)
Safeguards Event

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
08	06	99	99	-- 005	-- 00	09	07	99	Susquehanna SES Unit 2	05000388
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 100	20.2201(b)	20.2203(a)(2)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)						
	20.2203(a)(1)	20.2203(a)(3)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)						
	20.2203(a)(2)(i)	20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	X 73.71						
	20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	20.2203(a)(4)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	OTHER						
	20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A						
	20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)							

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Cornelius T. Coddington - Senior Engineer, Licensing	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 610 / 774-4019
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On August 6, 1999, at 0911 hours with both Unit 1 and Unit 2 in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 100 % power, a safeguards violation occurred in that safeguards information was distributed via an uncontrolled electronic mail system. The Manager – Nuclear Security (utility; non-licensed) was communicating to various Nuclear Department personnel an overview of Security's performance during the recent Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE). This communication inadvertently contained an observation that was safeguards information, and was transmitted via PP&L's e-mail system, which is unsecured. Transmitting of safeguards information via an unsecured electronic mail system is a compromise of safeguards information and thus reportable per 10CFR73.71. The cause of the event was determined to be that the originator, who had been assigned to Security for approximately 4 months, did not recognize that he had created Safeguards Information (SI) because the originator had not yet taken specific Security Group training (part of the new officers' training requirements) on protection of safeguards material and had not yet read all applicable references on Safeguards Information. Corrective actions that were taken included: (1) the electronic mail message was deleted from those individuals who received it, (2) immediate and follow-on compensatory measures were taken, and (3) originator was thoroughly trained on Safeguards Information. Corrective actions to be completed are: (1) the establishment of a requirement for new Nuclear Security personnel not assigned to new officers' training to read all applicable references on SI or receive security specific training on SI within the first week of assignment to Security, and (2) review the need for additional training for those individuals within the Nuclear Department who create SI. The potentially compromised information was not used in an actual incident at the site. Also, once the compensatory measures were implemented, the electronic message no longer contained valid SI. There were no consequences to the health and safety of the public due to this event.

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TEXT CONTINUATION

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	387	99	-- 005	-- 00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On August 6, 1999, at 0911 hours with both Unit 1 and Unit 2 in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 100 % power, a safeguards violation occurred in that safeguards information was distributed via an uncontrolled electronic mail system. The Manager – Nuclear Security (utility; non-licensed) was communicating to various Nuclear Department personnel an overview of Security's performance during the recent Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE). This communication inadvertently contained an observation that was safeguards information (SI), and was transmitted via PP&L's e-mail system, which is unsecured. Transmitting of safeguards information via an unsecured electronic mail system is a compromise of safeguards information and thus reportable per 10CFR73.71.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of the event was determined to be that the originator, who had been assigned to Security for approximately 4 months, did not recognize that he had created Safeguards Information (SI) because the originator had not yet taken specific Security Group training on protection of safeguards material and had not yet read all applicable references on Safeguards Information. This Security Group training is part of new officers' pipeline training and there was no requirement for a new Manager to take the pipeline training, or any specific part of it. The originator's focus the entire time he was assigned to Security had been preparation for the OSRE.

REPORTABILITY/ANALYSIS

An electronic message on the observation of the NRC OSRE Team containing Safeguards Information was distributed via an unsecured electronic mail system. The information was sent to select company individuals who were cleared for Safeguards Information. The electronic mail system used is a self-contained system within the company, which requires a password to access the Local Area Network (LAN) and another password to access the mail system. However, this system is not a secure system for transmitting Safeguards Information. Transmitting of safeguards information via an unsecured electronic mail system is a compromise of safeguards information and thus reportable per 10CFR73.71. The safety significance of this occurrence was limited by the defense in depth approach to security, and was eliminated by compensatory measures. While some information was potentially compromised, the bulk of Safeguards Information associated with the Physical Security Plan has not been compromised. There was no indication that the information was intercepted or compromised. The potentially compromised information was not used in an actual incident at the site. Also, once the compensatory measures were implemented, the electronic message no longer contained valid SI. Therefore, there were no consequences to the health and safety of the public due to this event.

In accordance with the requirements provided in 10CFR73.71, the required submission date for this report was determined to be September 7, 1999.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The following corrective actions have been completed:

- A non-safeguards electronic mail message was sent to inform the recipients of the SI to delete it.
- The subject electronic mail message was deleted from those individuals' files who received it.
- Immediate and follow-on compensatory measures were taken which made the SI contained in the electronic message no longer valid.
- Thorough SI training was provided to the originator of the electronic mail message.

The following corrective actions will be completed:

- A requirement for new senior security personnel to read all applicable references on SI or to receive thorough training on it within the first week of assignment to Security will be implemented.
- Review the need for additional training for those individuals within the Nuclear Department who create SI.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Past Similar Events: None

Failed Component: None