

TABLE 3.6.3-1 (Continued)
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

<u>VALVE FUNCTION AND NUMBER</u>		<u>MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (Seconds)</u>	<u>ISOLATION SIGNAL(S)^(a)</u>
<u>Automatic Isolation Valves (Continued)</u>			
<u>Containment Atmosphere Sample</u>			
SV-25734	A,B	N/A	B,Y
SV-25736	A	N/A	B,Y
SV-25736	B	N/A	B,Y
SV-25740	A,B	N/A	B,Y
SV-25742	A,B	N/A	B,Y
SV-25750	A,B	N/A	B,Y
SV-25752	A,B	N/A	B,Y
SV-25774	A,S	N/A	B,Y
SV-25776	A	N/A	B,Y
SV-25776	B	N/A	B,Y
SV-25780	A,B	N/A	B,Y
SV-25782	A,B	N/A	B,Y
<u>Nitrogen Makeup</u>			
SV-25737		N/A	B,Y,R
SV-25738		N/A	B,Y,R
SV-25767		N/A	B,Y,R
SV-25789		N/A	B,Y,R
<u>Reactor Coolant Sample</u>			
HV-243F019		2	B,C
HV-243F020		2	B,C
<u>Liquid Radwaste</u>			
HV-26108	A1,A2	15	B,Z
HV-26116	A1,A2	15	B,Z
<u>RHR - Suppression Pool</u>			
<u>Cooling/Spray</u> ^(c)			
HV-25129 A,B →	HV-251F011	A,B	X,Z
	HV-251F028	A,B	X,Z
		90	X,Z
<u>CS Test</u> ^{(b)(c)}			
HV-252F015 A,B			
<u>HPCI Suction</u> ^{(b)(c)}			
HV-255F042			
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2		3/4 6-21	Amendment No. 2

8712300092 871223
PDR ADDCK 05000388
P DCD

TABLE 3.6.3-1 (Continued)
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

VALVE FUNCTION AND NUMBER

Manual Isolation Valves (Continued)

SLCS^(b)

HV-248F006

Demineralized Water

2-41-017

2-41-018

ILRT

2-57-199

2-57-200

HPCI Turbine Exhaust^(b)

HV-255F066

RHR-Shutdown Cooling Return/
LPCI Injection

HV-251F122 A,B

c. Other Valves

Feedwater

241F010 A,B

RHR - Shutdown Cooling Suction^(b)

PSV-251F126

RHR - Shutdown Cooling Return/
LPCI Injection

HV-251F050 A,B

RHR-Minimum Recirculation Flow^{(b)(c)}

HV-251F007 A,B



CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

Because of the large volume and thermal capacity of the suppression pool, the volume and temperature normally changes very slowly and monitoring these parameters daily is sufficient to establish any temperature trends. By requiring the suppression pool temperature to be frequently recorded during periods of significant heat addition, the temperature trends will be closely followed so that appropriate action can be taken. The requirement for an external visual examination following any event where potentially high loadings could occur provides assurance that no significant damage was encountered. Particular attention should be focused on structural discontinuities in the vicinity of the relief valve discharge since these are expected to be the points of highest stress.

In addition to the limits on temperature of the suppression chamber pool water, operating procedures define the action to be taken in the event a safety-relief valve inadvertently opens or sticks open. As a minimum this action shall include: (1) use of all available means to close the valve, (2) initiate suppression pool water cooling, (3) initiate reactor shutdown, and (4) if other safety-relief valves are used to depressurize the reactor, their discharge shall be separated from that of the stuck-open safety relief valve to assure mixing and uniformity of energy insertion to the pool.

INSERT
A →


3/4.6.3 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the primary containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of GDC 54 through 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50. Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

3/4.6.4 VACUUM RELIEF

Vacuum relief breakers are provided to equalize the pressure between the suppression chamber and drywell. This system will maintain the structural integrity of the primary containment under conditions of large differential pressures.

The vacuum breakers between the suppression chamber and the drywell must not be inoperable in the open position since this would allow bypassing of the suppression pool in case of an accident. There are five pairs of valves to provide redundancy so that operation may continue for up to 72 hours with no more than one pair of vacuum breakers inoperable in the closed position.



INSERT (A)

Specification 3/4.6.2.3, "Suppression Pool Cooling", is provided to ensure that containment design temperatures and pressures are not exceeded following an accident, and that the suppression pool temperature does not exceed the limits required to provide adequate NPSH for the ECCS pumps. As such, only the valves which support these post accident functions are required to be OPERABLE to achieve the flowpath required by this LCO.

