

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8710160261 DOC. DATE: 87/10/12 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL: 50-387 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 1, Pennsylv 05000387
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 WEHRY, R. R. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.
 BYRAM, R. G. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 87-027-00: on 870910, Limiting Condition for Operation
 3.0.3 entered for 23 minutes for planned evolution for
 wiring mads. Summary of Tech Spec basis & intended use
 prepared & reviewed w/managers & supervisors. W/871012 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 4
 TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES: 1cy NMSS/FCAF/PM. LPDR 2cys Transcripts. 05000387

	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL
	PD1-2 LA	1 1	PD1-2 PD	1 1
	THADANI, M	1 1		
INTERNAL:	ACRS MICHELSON	1 1	ACRS MOELLER	2 2
	AEOD/DOA	1 1	AEOD/DSP/NAS	1 1
	AEOD/DSP/ROAB	2 2	AEOD/DSP/TPAB	1 1
	ARM/DCTS/DAB	1 1	DEDRO	1 1
	NRR/DEST/ADS	1 0	NRR/DEST/CEB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/ELB	1 1	NRR/DEST/ICSB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/MEB	1 1	NRR/DEST/MTB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/PSB	1 1	NRR/DEST/RSB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/SGB	1 1	NRR/DLPQ/HFB	1 1
	NRR/DLPQ/QAB	1 1	NRR/DOEA/EAB	1 1
	NRR/DREP/RAB	1 1	NRR/DREP/RPB	2 2
	NRR/DRIS/SIB	1 1	NRR/PMAS/ILRB	1 1
	<u>REG FILE</u> 02	1 1	RES DEPY GI	1 1
	RES TELFORD, J	1 1	RES/DE/EIB	1 1
	RGN1 FILE 01	1 1		
EXTERNAL:	EG&G GROH, M	5 5	H ST LOBBY WARD	1 1
	LPDR	2 2	NRC PDR	1 1
	NSIC HARRIS, J	1 1	NSIC MAYS, G	1 1
NOTES:		3 3		

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Susquehanna Steam Electric Station - Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 8 7	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3
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TITLE (4)
Entry Into L.C.O. for Modification Implementation

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 9	1 0	8 7	8 7	0 2 7	0 0	1 0	1 2	8 7			0 5 0 0 0
											0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)										
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 1 0	20.402(b)			20.405(c)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)	
	20.405(a)(1)(i)			50.38(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(c)	
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)			50.38(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vi)			OTHER (Specify in Abstract Below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)	
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)			X			50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)				
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)						50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)				
	20.405(a)(1)(v)						50.73(a)(2)(ix)				

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)							TELEPHONE NUMBER			
NAME R. R. Wehry - Power Production Engineer - Compliance							AREA CODE 7 1 7			
							5 4 2 3 6 6 4			

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)											
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On September 10, 1987, with Unit 1 operating at 100% power, Technical Specification L.C.O. 3.0.3 was entered for twenty-three minutes from 1009 to 1032 hours. This was a planned evolution for the purpose of performing wiring modifications which included temporarily declaring the Division I Essential 4160 volt buses inoperable due to de-energization of control power to their 84% degraded grid voltage protection circuitry. These modifications were performed to increase the reliability of the Plant Auxiliary LOCA load shed logic circuitry. It was subsequently recognized that an alternate method of performing the modifications could have precluded entry into STS Section 3.0.3.

Since both Division I buses were affected and loss of the 84% protection is not described in the Technical Specifications for two buses, L.C.O. 3.0.3 was entered. To reinforce the intended use of STS 3.0.3, a summary of the basis and use of STS 3.0.3 will be reviewed with Senior Station Managers and Supervisors and with the Plant Operations Review Committee, which is composed of representatives from all the major plant staff functional unit areas.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 8 7	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		87	027	00	0	2	0

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On September 10, 1987, with Unit 1 operating at 100% power, Technical Specification L.C.O. 3.0.3 was entered for twenty-three (23) minutes from 1009 to 1032 hours. This was a planned evolution for the purpose of performing wiring modifications per Plant Modification Request PMR 85-8005. The modification work was performed at this time to coincide with a Division I Emergency Service Water System (EIIS Code: BI) outage, thereby minimizing the related effects on that system, should the modification be implemented at a later time. The modification work included de-energizing control power to the Division I 84% degraded grid voltage protection circuits which necessitated declaring both Division I Essential 4160 volt buses (EIIS Code: EB) inoperable. Since both Division I buses were affected and loss of the 84% protection on two buses is not described in the Technical Specifications, L.C.O. 3.0.3 was entered.

CAUSE OF EVENT

This was a planned evolution for performing necessary wiring modifications. Since the loss of 84% degraded grid voltage protection on two buses is not addressed by the Technical Specifications, L.C.O. 3.0.3 was entered. As designed, the plant Auxiliary Load Shed fuses FU3 and FU1 in panels 1C221A and 1C222B were not directly connected to the DC positive bus. These fuses were branch fed from the load side of Emergency Service Water (ESW) system Loops' A and B Bypass Indication System (BIS) fuses. With that arrangement, if ESW Loop A or B BIS fuses would fail, the Auxiliary Load Shed scheme for that division would not have actuated. The modification removed the Aux Load Shed fuses from the load side of the ESW BIS fuses and reconnected them directly to the DC positive bus. This work was performed September 10, 1987 to coincide with an ESW Division I outage. Although Unit 1 was shutdown on September 12, 1987 for its third refueling outage, the ESW work was performed prior to the shutdown since ESW is required during plant cooldown to COLD SHUTDOWN status and also to minimize work force personnel impact had the ESW work been performed later in the Unit 1 third refueling outage.

REPORTABILITY/ANALYSIS

This event was determined reportable per 10CFR50.73(a) (2) (i) (B) in that operation with both Division I Essential 4160 volt buses inoperable is not described in the Technical Specifications. This required the entry into L.C.O. 3.0.3 which states: When a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met, except as provided in the associated ACTION requirements, within one hour action shall be initiated to place the unit in an OPERATIONAL CONDITION in which the Specification does not apply by placing it, as applicable, in:

1. At least STARTUP within the next 6 hours.
2. At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours, and
3. At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000387	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		87	027	00	03	OF	03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

L.C.O 3.0.3 was entered at 1009 hours and cleared at 1032 hours on September 10, 1987, a total of twenty-three (23) minutes.

PP&L recognizes that L.C.O. 3.0.3 is not intended to be used as an operational convenience which permits voluntary removal of redundant systems from service in lieu of other alternatives that would not result in redundant systems or components being inoperable. The main purpose of the modification, however, was to remove an existing vulnerability of the LOCA load shed function to potential loss of control power.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

In an effort to reinforce the proper application of STS 3.0.3, the Plant Staff Compliance Group of the Technical Section has prepared a summary of the basis and intended use of STS 3.0.3. This summary will be reviewed with Senior Station Managers and Supervisors and with the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC), which is composed of members from all major plant functional unit areas.



Pennsylvania Power & Light Company

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October 12, 1987

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SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 87-027-00
FILE R41-2
PLAS - 282

Docket No. 50-387
License No. NPF-14

Attached is Licensee Event Report 87-027-00. This event was determined reportable per 10CFR.73(a)(2)(i)(B) in that the plant entered L.C.O. 3.0.3 for twenty-three minutes on September 10, 1987 to perform necessary wiring modifications which increased the reliability of the Division I plant auxiliary LOCA load shed logic circuitry. This was a pre-planned evolution.

R. G. Byram
Superintendent of Plant - Susquehanna

RRW/cmw

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