

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8709150059 DOC. DATE: 87/09/09 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL: 50-387 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 1, Pennsylv 05000387
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 WEHRY, R. R. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.
 BYRAM, R. G. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 87-025-00: on 870810, reactor bldg heating, ventilating &
 air conditioning Zones I & III discovered cross-tied due to
 open isolation dampers. Procedures & hardware reviewed &
 open/close position on dampers clearly labeled. W/870908 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 5
 TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES: 1cy NMSS/FCAF/PM. LPDR 2cys Transcripts. 05000387

	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL
	PD1-2 LA	1 1	PD1-2 PD	1 1
	THADANI, M	1 1		
INTERNAL:	ACRS MICHELSON	1 1	ACRS MOELLER	2 2
	AEOD/DOA	1 1	AEOD/DSP/NAS	1 1
	AEOD/DSP/ROAB	2 2	AEOD/DSP/TPAB	1 1
	DEDRO	1 1	NRR/DEST/ADS	1 0
	NRR/DEST/CEB	1 1	NRR/DEST/ELB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/ICSB	1 1	NRR/DEST/MEB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/MTB	1 1	NRR/DEST/PSB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/RSB	1 1	NRR/DEST/SGB	1 1
	NRR/DLPQ/HFB	1 1	NRR/DLPQ/QAB	1 1
	NRR/DOEA/EAB	1 1	NRR/DREP/RAB	1 1
	NRR/DREP/RPB	2 2	NRR/PMAS/ILRB	1 1
	<u>REG FILE</u> 02	1 1	RES DEPY GI	1 1
	RES TELFORD, J	1 1	RES/DE/EIB	1 1
	RGN1 FILE 01	1 1		
EXTERNAL:	EG&G GROH, M	5 5	H ST LOBBY WARD	1 1
	LPDR	2 2	NRC PDR	1 1
	NSIC HARRIS, J	1 1	NSIC MAYS, G	1 1
NOTES:		3 3		

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Susquehanna Steam Electric Station - Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 8 7	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3
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TITLE (4)
Reactor Bldg. Heating, Ventilating & Air Conditioning Zones I and III Cross-tied

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		
0 8	1 0	8 7	8 7	0 2 5	0 0	0 9	0 9	8 7	DOCKET NUMBER(S) 0 5 0 0 0		

OPERATING MODE (9) 1

POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	
20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	
20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Richard R. Wehry - Power Production Engineer	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE: 7 1 1 7 5 1 4 2 1 - 1 3 6 1 6 1 4

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On August 10, 1987 at 1400 hours, with Unit One operating at 100 percent power, it was discovered that the Reactor Building Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC, EIIIS Code:VA) Zones I and III had been cross-tied. This condition potentially existed from 7/30/87 through 8/7/87.

On 7/30/87, two isolation dampers between Zones I and III were closed to facilitate removal of a removable wall between Zone I and the Railroad Access Bay in support of work activities. Following completion of the work activities and reinstallation of the removable wall on 8/7/87, restoration was being performed which would have opened the isolation dampers, aligning the Railroad Access Bay to Zone III. However, the dampers were found to be already open. Thus Zones I and III were cross-tied for some unknown period of time between 7/30/87 and 8/7/87.

It can not be determined when the isolation dampers were opened. All applicable operating procedures were reviewed and the conclusion was made that the procedures did not contribute to the occurrence. During the time frame from 7/30/87 through 8/7/87, 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge pressure was maintained in Secondary Containment in accordance with Technical Specification requirements. Full power operation of the unit continued uninterrupted.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit One	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 8 7	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR 8 7	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 0 2 5	REVISION NUMBER 0 0			

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On August 10, 1987 at 1400 hours, with Unit One operating at 100% power, it was discovered that the Reactor Building Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC, EIIS Code:VA) Zones I and III had been cross-tied for an unknown period of time, potentially from 7/30/87 through 8/7/87. Full power operation of the unit continued uninterrupted and a 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge pressure was maintained in Secondary Containment throughout the time frame from 7/30/87 to 8/7/87, consistent with Technical Specification requirement 4.6.5.1.


CAUSE OF EVENT

It could not be determined when the isolation dampers were opened, resulting in cross-tying Zones I and III of Reactor Building HVAC. On 7/30/87, the Railroad Bay portion of the Reactor Building HVAC was aligned to Zone I with isolation dampers XD-17513 and XD-17514, between Zones I and III, being closed. This alignment was performed to facilitate the removal of a removable wall in support of transferring Control Rod Drive assemblies from Unit 2 to Unit 1 for the upcoming refueling outage on Unit 1. Following the transfers of the drive assemblies to Unit 1, the removable wall was reinstalled on 8/7/87. Restoration was then being performed, in accordance with the applicable operating procedure, which requires the opening of isolation dampers XD-17513 and XD-17514. However, both dampers were found to be already open. It is not known for how long a period of time between 7/30/87 and 8/7/87 the isolation dampers were open, nor why the isolation dampers were opened.

REPORTABILITY/ANALYSIS

This event was determined reportable per 10CFR50.73(a) (2) (i) (B) in that a plant system was aligned in a manner prohibited by the plant's Technical Specification. Namely, per Technical Specification 3.6.5.1, Secondary Containment Integrity (railroad bay door closed) shall be demonstrated in Operational Condition 1 by verifying that:

1. All Zone I and III hatches, removable walls, dampers and doors connected to the railroad access bay are closed or
2. Only Zone I removable walls and or/doors are open to the railroad access shaft, or
3. Only Zone III hatches and/or dampers are open to the railroad access shaft.



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit One	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 8 7	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 7	0 2 5	0 0	0 3	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Contrary to the above, on 8/10/87, isolation dampers XD-17513 and XD-17514 were discovered to be already open after the 719' elevation removable wall was restored, thus cross-tying Reactor Building HVAC Zones I and III for an unknown period of time between 7/30/87 and 8/7/87. Throughout the duration, however, the 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge pressure requirement for Secondary Containment was maintained on Zones I and III as verified by performance of SO-100-007, Daily Surveillance Operating Log, every 24 hours. Thus no safety consequences or compromise to public health or safety occurred.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Since the cause of this occurrence can not be determined, there is no specific action to prevent recurrence. However, as a result of this event, a review of procedures and installed hardware was conducted. One physical enhancement has been made. The open/close position on the isolation dampers proper was more clearly labeled to represent proper positioning, thus making isolation damper position more readily apparent.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

A historical review of significant operating events involving the Reactor Building HVAC system disclosed that, prior to 7/30/87, the cross-tying of Zone I to Zone III was a single occurrence event. On 8/31/87, Zones I and III were again inadvertantly cross-tied, this time to facilitate the opening of the Railroad Bay Access Door. This occurrence will be addressed in LER 87-026-00 and any relationship between the two occurrences will be addressed in that LER. Although the determination was made that the operating procedures did not contribute to the occurrences, some procedure revisions for enhancement purposes have been made to minimize any likelihood of similar type occurrences.





Pennsylvania Power & Light Company

P.O. Box 451 • Berwick, PA 18603-0451 • 717/542-2151

September 8, 1987

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 87-025-00
FILE R41-2
PLAS - 278

Docket No. 50-387
License No. NPF-14

Attached is Licensee Event Report 87-025-00. This event was determined reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) in that Reactor Building Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning Zones I and III were cross-tied, potentially from 7/30/87 through 8/07/87. This system alignment is prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

B. G. Byram
Superintendent of Plant - Susquehanna

RRW/cmw

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