



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
*3.2.3-1 FLOW DEPENDENT MCPR OPERATING LIMIT*  
*3.2.3-2 REDUCED POWER MCPR OPERATING LIMIT*






MAXIMUM AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (MAPLHGR) VERSUS AVERAGE PLANAR EXPOSURE  
GE FUEL TYPES 8CR233 (2.33% ENRICHED)  
FIGURE 3.2.1-1


Replace with revised  
figure 3.2.1-1







MAXIMUM AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (MAPLHGR) VERSUS AVERAGE PLANAR EXPOSURE  
 GE FUEL TYPES 8CR233 (2.33% ENRICHED)  
 FIGURE 3.2.1-1

Replace with revised  
Figure 3.2.1-2




MAXIMUM AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT  
GENERATION RATE (MAPLHGR) VERSUS  
AVERAGE BUNDLE EXPOSURE  
EXXON 8X8 FUEL  
FIGURE 3.2.1-2





MAXIMUM AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT  
 GENERATION RATE (MAPLHGR) VERSUS  
 AVERAGE BUNDLE EXPOSURE  
 EXXON 8X8 FUEL  
 FIGURE 3.2.1-2





POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

3/4.2.3 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.3. The MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) shall be:

- ~~a. greater than or equal to the applicable MCPR limit determined from Table 3.2.3-1 during steady state operation at rated core flow, or~~
- b. <sup>Figure</sup> greater than or equal to the greater <sup>2</sup> of the two values determined from ~~Table 3.2.3-1 and Figure 3.2.3-1~~ during steady state operation at other than rated core flow.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, when THERMAL POWER is greater than or equal to 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION:

With MCPR less than the applicable MCPR limit determined <sup>above,</sup> from ~~Table 3.2.3-1 and Figure 3.2.3-1~~, initiate corrective action within 15 minutes and restore MCPR to within the required limit within 2 hours or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.3.1 MCPR shall be determined to be greater than or equal to the applicable MCPR limit determined ~~from Table 3.2.3-1 and Figure 3.2.3-1~~ <sup>from Figure 3.2.3-1 and Figure 3.2.3-2:</sup>

- a. At least once per 24 hours,
- b. Within 12 hours after completion of a THERMAL POWER increase of at least 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and
- c. Initially and at least once per 12 hours when the reactor is operating with a LIMITING CONTROL ROD PATTERN for MCPR.

*d. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.*


*(Note: Previously proposed in Proposed Amendment 85 to NPF-14)*

TABLE 3.2.3-1


M CPR OPERATING LIMITS FOR RATED CORE FLOW

<u>EQUIPMENT STATUS</u>	<u>M CPR OPERATING LIMIT</u>
1. EOC-RPT and Main Turbine Bypass OPERABLE, RBM setpoint $\leq$ 108%	1.29
2. EOC-RPT Inoperable, Main Turbine Bypass OPERABLE, RBM setpoint $\leq$ 108%	1.33
3. Main Turbine Bypass Inoperable, EOC-RPT OPERABLE, RBM Setpoint $\leq$ 108%	1.29
4. EOC-RPT and Main Turbine Bypass OPERABLE, RBM Setpoint $\leq$ 106%	1.25
5. EOC-RPT Inoperable, Main Turbine Bypass OPERABLE, RBM Setpoint $\leq$ 106%	1.33
6. Main Turbine Bypass Inoperable, EOC-RPT OPERABLE, RBM Setpoint $\leq$ 106%	1.26

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


M CPR Operating Limit





REDUCED FLOW M CPR OPERATING LIMIT  
FIGURE 3.2.3-1

Replace with  
revised Figure 3.2.3-1



**FLOW DEPENDENT MCPR OPERATING LIMIT  
FIGURE 3.2.3-1**





REDUCED POWER MCPR OPERATING LIMIT

Figure 3.2.3-2



TABLE 3.3.6-2

## CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS

TRIP FUNCTION	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
1. <u>ROD BLOCK MONITOR</u>		
a. Upscale##	<del><math>&lt; 0.66 W + 40\%</math></del> $\leq 0.66 W + 42\%$	<del><math>&lt; 0.66 W + 43\%</math></del> $\leq 0.66 W + 45\%$
<del>1) ***</del>		
<del>2) ***</del>		
b. Inoperative	NA	NA
c. Downscale	$\geq 5/125$ divisions of full scale	$\geq 3/125$ of divisions full scale
2. <u>APRM</u>		
a. Flow Biased Neutron Flux - Upscale##	$< 0.58 W + 50\%*$	$< 0.58 W + 53%*$
b. Inoperative	NA	NA
c. Downscale	$\geq 5\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER	$\geq 3\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER
d. Neutron Flux - Upscale Startup	$< 12\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER	$< 14\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER
3. <u>SOURCE RANGE MONITORS</u>		
a. Detector not full in	NA	NA
b. Upscale	$< 2 \times 10^5$ cps	$< 4 \times 10^5$ cps
c. Inoperative	NA	NA
d. Downscale	$\geq 0.7$ cps**	$\geq 0.5$ cps**
4. <u>INTERMEDIATE RANGE MONITORS</u>		
a. Detector not full in	NA	NA
b. Upscale	$< 108/125$ divisions of full scale	$< 110/125$ divisions of full scale
c. Inoperative	NA	NA
d. Downscale	$\geq 5/125$ divisions of full scale	$\geq 3/125$ divisions of full scale
5. <u>SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME</u>		
a. Water Level - High	$\leq 44$ gallons	$\leq 44$ gallons
6. <u>REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RECIRCULATION FLOW</u>		
a. Upscale	$< 108/125$ divisions of full scale	$< 111/125$ divisions of full scale
b. Inoperative	NA	NA
c. Comparator	$< 10\%$ flow deviation	$< 11\%$ flow deviation

\*The Average Power Range Monitor rod block function is varied as a function of recirculation loop flow (W). The trip setting of this function must be maintained in accordance with Specification 3.2.2.

\*\*Provided signal-to-noise ratio is  $>2$ . Otherwise, 3cps as trip setpoint and 2.8cps for allowable value.

\*\*\*~~Trip functions 1.0.1 and 1.0.2 shall be used in conjunction with the MCPR limits specified in Table 3.2.3.1 for the RBM setpoints of 100% and 108%.~~

## See Specification 3.4.1.1.2.a for single loop operation requirements.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

RECIRCULATION LOOPS - SINGLE LOOP OPERATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.1.1.2 One reactor coolant recirculation loop shall be in operation with the pump speed  $\leq$  80% of the rated pump speed, and

a. the following revised specification limits shall be followed:

1. Specification 2.1.2: the MCPR Safety Limit shall be increased to 1.07.
2. Table 2.2.1-1: the APRM Flow-Biased Scram Trip Setpoints shall be as follows:

<u>Trip Setpoint</u>	<u>Allowable Value</u>
$\leq 0.58W + 55\%$	$\leq 0.58W + 58\%$

3. Specification 3.2.1: The MAPLHGR limits shall be as follows:

- a. GE fuel: the limits specified in Figure ~~3.2.1-1 and 3.2.1-2~~, multiplied by 0.81.
- b. Exxon fuel: the limits specified in Figure 3.2.1-2 multiplied by ~~0.81~~  
0.8

4. Specification 3.2.2: the APRM Setpoints shall be as follows:

<u>Trip Setpoint</u>	<u>Allowable Value</u>
$S \leq (0.58W + 55\%)T$	$S \leq (0.58W + 58\%)T$
$S_{RB} \leq (0.58W + 46\%)T$	$S_{RB} \leq (0.58W + 49\%)T$

5. Table 3.3.6-2: the RBM/APRM Control Rod Block Setpoints shall be as follows:

<u>RBM - Upscale</u>	<u>Trip Setpoint</u>	<u>Allowable Value</u>
<del>1.</del>	<del><math>\leq 0.66W + 35\%</math></del>	<del><math>\leq 0.66W + 38\%</math></del>
<del>2.</del>	$\leq 0.66W + 37\%$	$\leq 0.66W + 40\%$

~~5.a.1 and 5.a.2 shall be used in conjunction with the MCPR limits specified in Table 3.2.3-1 for RBM Setpoints of 106% and 108%, respectively.~~

<u>APRM-Flow Biased</u>	<u>Trip Setpoint</u>	<u>Allowable Value</u>
	$\leq 0.58W + 46\%$	$\leq 0.58W + 49\%$

- b. APRM and LPRM\*\*\* neutron flux noise levels shall be less than three times their established baseline levels when THERMAL POWER is greater than the limit specified in Figure 3/4.1.1.1-1.
- c. Total core flow shall be greater than or equal to 42 million lbs/hr when THERMAL POWER is greater than the limit specified in Figure 3.4.1.1.1-1.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1\* and 2\*, except during two loop operation.#



## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### BASES

### 3/4.2.3 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO

The required operating limit MCPRs at steady state operating conditions as specified in Specification 3.2.3 are derived from the established fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit MCPR, and an analysis of abnormal operational transients. For any abnormal operating transient analysis evaluation with the initial condition of the reactor being at the steady state operating limit, it is required that the resulting MCPR does not decrease below the Safety Limit MCPR at any time during the transient assuming instrument trip setting given in Specification 2.2.

To assure that the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit is not exceeded during any anticipated abnormal operational transient, the most limiting transients have been analyzed to determine which result in the largest reduction in CRITICAL POWER RATIO (CPR). The type of transients evaluated were loss of flow, increase in pressure and power, positive reactivity insertion, and coolant temperature decrease. The limiting transient yields the largest delta MCPR. When added to the Safety Limit MCPR, the required minimum operating limit MCPR of Specification 3.2.3 is obtained and presented in ~~Table 3.2.3-1~~. *Figures 3.2.3-1 and*

~~When the less operationally limiting Rod Block Monitoring trip setpoint (66W + 42% from Table 3.3.6-2) is used, a more limiting MCPR value Table 3.2.3-1 is applicable due to a larger delta MCPR from the limiting Rod Withdrawal Error (RWE) transient.~~ *3.2.3-2 and XN-NF-84-105*

The evaluation of a given transient begins with the system initial parameters shown in the cycle specific transient analysis report that are input to a Exxon-core dynamic behavior transient computer program. The outputs of this program along with the initial MCPR form the input for further analyses of the thermally limiting bundle. The codes and methodology to evaluate pressurization and non-pressurization events are described in XN-NF-79-71. The principal result of this evaluation is the reduction in MCPR caused by the transient.

The purpose of Figure 3.2.3-1 is to define MCPR operating limits at other than rated core flow conditions. At less than 100% of rated flow the required MCPR is the maximum of the rated flow MCPR determined from Table 3.2.3-1 and the reduced flow MCPR determined from Figure 3.2.3-1. The reduced flow MCPR assures that the Safety Limit MCPR will not be violated during a flow increase transient resulting from a motor-generator speed control failure. The reduced flow MCPR is only calculated for the manual flow control mode. Therefore, automatic flow control operation is not permitted.


INSERT C → At THERMAL POWER levels less than or equal to 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER, the reactor will be operating at minimum recirculation pump speed and the moderator void content will be very small. For all designated control rod patterns which may be employed at this point, operating plant experience indicates that the resulting MCPR value is in excess of requirements by a considerable margin. During initial start-up testing of the plant, a MCPR evaluation



## Insert C

Figure 3.2.3-1 defines core flow dependent MCPR operating limits which assure that the Safety Limit MCPR will not be exceeded during a flow increase transient resulting from a motor-generator speed control failure. The flow dependent MCPR is only calculated for the manual flow control mode. Therefore, automatic flow control operation is not permitted. Figure 3.2.3-2 defines the power dependent MCPR operating limit which assures that the Safety Limit MCPR will not be exceeded in the event of a feedwater controller failure initiated from a reduced power condition.

Cycle specific analyses are performed for the most limiting local and core wide transients to determine thermal margin. Additional analyses are performed to determine the MCPR operating limit with either the Main Turbine Bypass inoperable or the EOC-RPT inoperable. Analyses to determine thermal margin with both the EOC-RPT inoperable and Main Turbine Bypass inoperable have not been performed. Therefore, operation in this condition is not permitted.



## 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

#### 3/4.4.1 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM

Operation with one reactor recirculation loop inoperable has been evaluated and found acceptable, provided that the unit is operated in accordance with Specification 3.4.1.1.2.

For single loop operation, the MAPLHGR limits <sup>for Exxon fuel</sup> are multiplied by a factor of 0.0. ~~of 0.81. Use of this factor in conjunction with the GE high enriched fuel MAPLHGR is conservative to use as a limit for the Exxon fuel. The multiplication factor is derived from LOCA analyses initiated from single loop operation; it maintains the same peak clad temperature margin to the licensing limit of 2200°F as in two loop operation. This multiplication factor precludes extended operation with one loop out of service.~~

For single loop operation, the RBM and APRM setpoints are adjusted by a 7% decrease in recirculation drive flow to account for the active loop drive flow that bypasses the core and goes up through the inactive loop jet pumps.

Surveillance on the pump speed of the operating recirculation loop is imposed to exclude the possibility of excessive reactor vessel internals vibration. Surveillance on differential temperatures below the threshold limits on THERMAL POWER or recirculation loop flow mitigates undue thermal stress on vessel nozzles, recirculation pumps and the vessel bottom head during extended operation in the single loop mode. The threshold limits are those values which will sweep up the cold water from the vessel bottom head.

THERMAL POWER, core flow, and neutron flux noise level limitations are prescribed in accordance with the recommendations of General Electric Service Information Letter No. 380, Revision 1, "BWR Core Thermal Hydraulic Stability," dated February 10, 1984.

An inoperable jet pump is not, in itself, a sufficient reason to declare a recirculation loop inoperable, but it does, in case of a design-basis-accident, increase the blowdown area and reduce the capability of reflooding the core; thus, the requirement for shutdown of the facility with a jet pump inoperable. Jet pump failure can be detected by monitoring jet pump performance on a prescribed schedule for significant degradation.

Recirculation pump speed mismatch limits are in compliance with the ECCS LOCA analysis design criteria for two loop operation. The limits will ensure an adequate core flow coastdown from either recirculation loop following a LOCA. In the case where the mismatch limits cannot be maintained during the loop operation, continued operation is permitted in the single loop mode.

In order to prevent undue stress on the vessel nozzles and bottom head region, the recirculation loop temperatures shall be within 50°F of each other prior to startup of an idle loop. The loop temperature must also be within 50°F of the reactor pressure vessel coolant temperature to prevent thermal shock to the recirculation pump and recirculation nozzles. Since the coolant in the bottom of the vessel is at a lower temperature than the coolant in the upper regions of the core, undue stress on the vessel would result if the temperature difference was greater than 145°F.



## PLANT SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### 3/4 7.6 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS (continued)

The surveillance requirements provide assurances that the minimum OPERABILITY requirements of the fire suppression systems are met. An allowance is made for ensuring a sufficient volume of Halon in the Halon storage tanks by verifying the weight and pressure of the tanks.

In the event the fire suppression water system becomes inoperable, immediate corrective measures must be taken since this system provides the major fire suppression capability of the plant. The requirement for a twenty-four hour report to the Commission provides for prompt evaluation of the acceptability of the corrective measures to provide adequate fire suppression capability for the continued protection of the nuclear plant.

#### 3/4 7.7 FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES

The OPERABILITY of the fire barriers and barrier penetrations ensure that fire damage will be limited. These design features minimize the possibility of a single fire involving more than one fire area prior to detection and extinguishment. The fire barriers, fire barrier penetrations for conduits, cable trays and piping, fire windows, fire dampers, and fire doors are periodically inspected to verify their OPERABILITY.

#### 3/4 7.8 MAIN TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM

The required OPERABILITY of the main turbine bypass system is consistent with the assumptions of the feedwater controller failure analysis in ~~Chapter 15 of the FSAR.~~ *the cycle specific transient analysis.*