

MAR 30 1984

Docket No. 50-388

APPLICANT: Pennsylvania Power & Light Company (PP&L)
FACILITY: Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 2
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF MEETING HELD WITH PP&L AT THE SUSQUEHANNA
SITE ON MARCH 8, 1984 REGARDING NRC MANAGEMENT REVIEW
IN PREPARATION FOR LICENSE ISSUANCE FOR UNIT 2

On March 8, 1984, representatives of the Pennsylvania Power & Light Company met with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation) to discuss the readiness of Susquehanna Unit 2 for an operating license. A list of attendees is provided in Attachment 1.

A plant tour was conducted in three separate groups which observed and discussed utility readiness in three specific areas: (1) technical specifications, (2) safety/safeguards interfaces, and (3) maintenance. The plant tour was followed by a presentation by PP&L which covered the Unit 2 schedule, license status, work remaining to fuel load, Unit 1 operating experience, organization and staffing (experience). Unit 1/Unit 2 design differences, modifications for two unit operation, and pipe crack mitigation. The presentation was followed by an operating shift demonstrating their ability to respond to an off-normal condition (power oscillation leading to a reactor scram) on the Susquehanna simulator.

There was only a few items needing resolution prior to licensing and none appeared to be on the critical path to readiness for fuel loading. A brief summary of the specific discussions is provided in Attachment 2.

Original signed by

R. L. Perch, Project Manager
Licensing Branch No. 2
Division of Licensing

Attachments:
As stated

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ATTACHMENT 1

LIST OF ATTENDEES
MARCH 8, 1984
SUSQUEHANNA SITE VISIT

<u>NRC</u>	<u>PP&L</u>
R. Purple, DL	N. Curtis
R. Russell, DHFS	B. Kenyon
L. Rubenstein, DSI	H. Keiser
F. Schroeder, DST	T. Crimmins
R. Perch, DL	W. Barberich
D. Wagner, DL	F. Eisenhuth
R. Jacobs, SRI	R. Gaudreau, et. al.
L. Plesco, Reg. I	

Special Discussion Topics

1. Technical Specifications (R. Purple)

PP&L will provide certification of the accuracy of the Unit 2 technical specifications, although the short time available precludes the formal review they would prefer to make for a certification of this type. I suggested that the pre-licensing certification be made as requested, along with an explanation of the qualitative basis of that "certification", indicating that a more formal and thorough review would be done and reported to the NRC prior to requesting authorization for operation at power levels greater than 5%.

There was an extensive discussion of the differences that will exist in the Technical Specifications for Unit 1 and Unit 2 at the time of licensing Unit 2. PP&L has evaluated these differences and concluded that they are not of a nature or extent that would be confusing to the operators or otherwise counter-productive to safety. They plan to submit requests for amendment to the Unit 1 Tech Specs over the next several months to eliminate all unnecessary differences. To accomplish that objective prior to licensing of Unit 2 would require an extensive delay in the Unit 2 license issuance. From my review of the differences and discussions with PP&L (including a Shift Supervisor), I agree with PP&L's view that this conformance is more administrative than substantive, and need not be completed prior to Unit 2 licensing. I recommended strongly, however, that PP&L accelerate its present plans for submitting the appropriate Tech Spec amendment requests for Unit 1 so that they could be in place prior to exceeding 5% of full power in Unit 2. They agreed to put this effort on a higher priority basis.

2. Safety/Safeguards Interface (Les Rubenstein)

As part of our management meeting, as you requested, we split into three groups. Bob Perch (LPM) and I met with R. Stotler, R. Gaudreau, T. Markowski and T. Baileys to discuss Emergency Response Capability with emphasis on Security/Operator interface and fire protection.

To be efficient in the approximately two hours available, I told the Plant Superintendent, Dave Smith, to talk me through the procedure for evacuating the control room and setting up the alternate shutdown panel. I did the same with R. Gaudreau and R. Stotler, plant security. I then did an actual walk-through with the Shift Supervisor for SSES-2. All three groups were knowledgeable in the procedure and when we actually assumed a fire in the control room and moved through the various safeguards security steps in the procedure, we were able to transit from the control room to the panel and simulate activation of the panel in less than ten minutes. We actually used the non-emergency key card system, with escort; although the "crash" procedure would probably cut that time to under five minutes from when the decision was made.

This small sample and our other general discussions gave me confidence that SSES-2 is ready for an OL. The attitudes of the people were professional and their responses to my questions displayed competence. Overall, recognizing that this was a short visit and not a detailed review, I was favorably impressed and would rate their readiness from very good to excellent. This includes my impressions of housekeeping, too.

3. Review of Maintenance Program Implementation, Emergency Procedures and Control Room Design Review Status (W. Russell)

Discussed plant preventive maintenance, surveillance and work authorization procedures with emphasis on operations interface with maintenance and I&C personnel. Reviewed Tag Out procedure and method of identification of plant deficiencies. Operators do not log the commencement and completion of surveillance testing, rather they maintain active procedures in a file cabinet in the control room. Similarly, Work Authorizations which impact equipment line up or system availability are not logged. This could be a problem in ensuring effective system turnover status at watch relief. This item will be followed up by the Resident Inspector, however, it is not a licensing requirement rather it relates to efficiency and efficacy of watch turnover procedures.

Observed 24 VDC battery service test in progress. The Technician was using the appropriate procedures and was knowledgeable concerning the objectives and procedures for the test.

Labeling and identification of plant mechanical equipment was poor. The operations supervisor, plant superintendent, and mechanical maintenance supervisor, plant superintendent, and mechanical maintenance supervisor could not identify the function or system for several randomly selected large valves in the turbine building. While not a regulatory requirement, system color coding, flow direction arrows and use of noun name for valves and components would significantly improve system and component identification.

Procedures for swapping I&C components between plants is effective with PMs scheduled by plant location vice component serial number. This may increase the PMs for some swapped components but will also assure that no surveillance or PMs are missed.

The plant is moving toward predictive maintenance by using vibration monitoring on all large rotating equipment. Baseline data is currently being obtained. The plant has also obtained equipment for infra-red heat monitoring and is evaluating its use for terminal connections, insulation, etc.

Plant housekeeping is good with a significant effort underway to preserve and close out spaces in the Reactor Building.

The status of closeout of DCRDR items needs to be resolved. New instrumentation (i.e., RG 1.97 and TMI modifications) have been received and recently installed. These instruments have introduced new HEDs in the control room.

The use of an overall emergency procedure flow chart mounted on a 4' x 5' tilt table with plexiglass provides the shift supervisor with an overview of all emergency procedures and their relationship. This appeared very detailed and was commented upon favorably by the control room operators. It's probably an effective tool if used in conjunction with the actual procedures and not in place of them.

Susquehanna

Mr. Norman W. Curtis
Vice President
Engineering and Construction
Pennsylvania Power & Light Company
2 North Ninth Street
Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101

ccs: Jay Silberg, Esquire
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
1800 M Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

Edward M. Nagel, Esquire
General Counsel and Secretary
Pennsylvania Power & Light Company
2 North Ninth Street
Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101

Mr. William E. Barberich
Nuclear Licensing Group Supervisor
Pennsylvania Power & Light Company
2 North Ninth Street
Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101

Mr. G. Rhodes
Resident Inspector
P. O. Box 52
Shickshinny, Pennsylvania 18655

Gerald R. Schultz, Esquire
Susquehanna Environmental Advocates
P. O. Box 1560
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania 18703

Mr. E. B. Poser
Project Engineer
Bechtel Power Corporation
P. O. Box 3965
San Francisco, California 94119

Dr. Judith H. Johnsrud
Co-Director
Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power
433 Orlando Avenue
State College, Pennsylvania 16801

Mr. Thomas M. Gerusky, Director
Bureau of Radiation Protection Resources
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
P. O. Box 2063
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120

Ms. Colleen Marsh
P. O. Box 538A, RD #4
Mountain Top, Pennsylvania 18707

Mr. Thomas J. Halligan
Correspondent
The Citizens Against Nuclear Dangers
P. O. Box 5
Scranton, Pennsylvania 18501

Mr. N. D. Weiss
Project Manager
Mail Code 391
General Electric Company
175 Curtner Avenue
San Jose, California 95125

Robert W. Adler, Esquire
Office of Attorney General
505 Executive House
P. O. Box 2357
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120



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