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 FACIL: 50-387 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 1, Pennsylv 05000387  
 50-388 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 2, Pennsylv 05000388

AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION  
 CURTIS, N.W. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.  
 RECIPIENT NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION  
 SCHWENCER, A. Licensing Branch 2

SUBJECT: Responds to NRC 820701 request for additional info re NUREG-0803.

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Norman W. Curtis  
Vice President-Engineering & Construction-Nuclear  
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JUL 15 1982

Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief  
Licensing Branch No. 2  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION  
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON RESPONSE TO NUREG 0803  
ER 100450 FILE 841-2,9  
PLA-1201

Docket Nos. 50-387  
50-388

Dear Mr. Schwencer:

In response to questions posed by your Mr. E. Sylvester on July 1, 1982, the following responses are submitted.


Question 1: Do plant procedures specify that valve lineups must be verified when surveillance or maintenance is completed?

Response 1: Yes, operating procedures for the control rod drive system contain specific steps to provide such verification and also contain cautions to assure the hydraulic control unit function is not compromised.

Question 2: Can water from an SDV break leak down stairways and impinge on or flood equipment necessary to mitigate the consequences of this accident?

Response 2: No, all stairway landings have doors which would prevent splashing or impingement of equipment. Leakage underneath the doors would run out the drains provided on each level to prevent flooding via stairways. No equipment necessary to mitigate this accident is on the level immediately below the SDV. The bottom level which houses the ECCS equipment has watertight doors to prevent flooding via stairways.

Question 3: Can water from an SDV break leak through hatches and flood equipment necessary to mitigate this accident?



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Mr. A. Schwencer

Response 3: No, there are no hatches on the SDV level. Lower levels do have hatches with curbs or elastomer seals. Water which leaks down stairways and under doors would not accumulate to leak over curbs or through seals because of the drain system.

Question 4: Is there any feedwater or condensate system equipment in the reactor building?

Response 4: All feedwater and condensate system equipment is outside the reactor building except for piping and valves in the steam tunnel. This area is not subjected to a harsh environment from this accident. The maximum temperature and pressure predicted by our analysis is 130°F and 15 psia.

Question 5: What is the minimum equipment necessary to mitigate the consequences of an SDV break and is it qualified to 212°F and 100% humidity?

Response 5: The minimum equipment necessary to mitigate this accident includes the depressurization system, the low pressure coolant injection system, vessel instrumentation, the emergency service water system, and the residual heat removal service water system. All necessary components of these systems are included on the equipment qualification program as described in a letter from N. W. Curtis to A. Schwencer on June 18, 1982 (PLA-1132). This letter excludes some equipment which are insensitive to the environment from this accident, e.g., heat exchangers or pump lubricants and seals.

Very truly yours,



N. W. Curtis  
Vice President-Engineering & Construction-Nuclear

DPM/mks

cc: R. Perch - NRC

11-11-68

Dear Mr. [Name obscured]

[The remainder of the letter is extremely faint and illegible due to low contrast and scan quality. It appears to be a standard business letter with several paragraphs of text.]