

DEFINITIONS

CORE ALTERATION

1.7 CORE ALTERATION shall be the addition, removal, relocation or movement of fuel, sources, incore instruments or reactivity controls within the reactor pressure vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of the movement of a component to a safe conservative position.

CRITICAL POWER RATIO

1.8 The CRITICAL POWER RATIO (CPR) shall be the ratio of that power in the assembly which is calculated by application of the appropriate correlation(s) to cause some point in the assembly to experience boiling transition, divided by the actual assembly operating power.

DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131

1.9 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131, microcuries per gram, which alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131, I-132, I-133, I-134, and I-135 actually present. The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in Table III of TID-14844, "Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites."

E-AVERAGE DISINTEGRATION ENERGY

1.10  $\bar{E}$  shall be the average, weighted in proportion to the concentration of each radionuclide in the reactor coolant at the time of sampling, of the sum of the average beta and gamma energies per disintegration, in MeV, for isotopes, with half lives greater than 15 minutes, making up at least 95% of the total non-iodine activity in the coolant.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) RESPONSE TIME

1.11 The EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its ECCS actuation setpoint at the channel sensor until the ECCS equipment is capable of performing its safety function, i.e., the valves travel to their required positions, pump discharge pressures reach their required values, etc. Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays where applicable. The response time may be measured by any series of sequential, overlapping or total steps such that the entire response time is measured.

END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME

1.12 The END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval to energization of the recirculation pump circuit breaker trip coil from when the monitored parameter exceeds its trip setpoint at the channel sensor of the associated:

INSERT A

- a. Turbine stop valves, and
- b. Turbine control valves.

INSERT B

~~The response time may be measured by any series of sequential, overlapping or total steps such that the entire response time is measured.~~

INSERT A

... complete suppression of the electric arc between the fully open contacts of the recirculation pump circuit breaker from initial movement...

INSERT B

This total system response time consists of two components, the instrumentation response time and the breaker arc suppression time.

These times may be measured by any series of sequential, overlapping or total steps such that the entire response time is measured.



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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.4.2.1 Each end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip system instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.4.2.1-1.

4.3.4.2.2. LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months.

*Instrument response time portion of the*  
4.3.4.2.3 The ~~END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME~~ of each trip function shown in Table 3.3.4.2-3 shall be ~~demonstrated to be within its limit~~ *measured* at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least the logic of one type of channel input, turbine control valve fast closure or turbine stop valve closure, such that both types of channel inputs are tested at least once per 36 months. ~~The time allotted for breaker arc suppression, 60 ms, shall be verified at least once per 60 months.~~ *The measured time shall be added to the most recent breaker arc suppression time and the resulting END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be verified to be within its limit.*

4.3.4.2.4. *The time interval necessary for breaker arc suppression from energization of the recirculation pump circuit breaker trip coil shall be measured at least once per 60 months.*

BASES

3/4.3.4 RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

The anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) recirculation pump trip system provides a means of limiting the consequences of the unlikely occurrence of a failure to scram during an anticipated transient. The response of the plant to this postulated event falls within the envelope of study events in General Electric Company Topical Report NEDO-10349, dated March 1971 and NEDO-24222, dated December 1979.

The end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip (EOC-RPT) system is a part of the Reactor Protection System and is an essential safety supplement to the reactor trip. The purpose of the EOC-RPT is to recover the loss of thermal margin which occurs at the end-of-cycle. The physical phenomenon involved is that the void reactivity feedback due to a pressurization transient can add positive reactivity to the reactor system at a faster rate than the control rods add negative scram reactivity. Each EOC-RPT system trips both recirculation pumps, reducing coolant flow in order to reduce the void collapse in the core during two of the most limiting pressurization events. The two events for which the EOC-RPT protective feature will function are closure of the turbine stop valves and fast closure of the turbine control valves.

A fast closure sensor from each of two turbine control valves provides input to the EOC-RPT system; a fast closure sensor from each of the other two turbine control valves provides input to the second EOC-RPT system. Similarly, a position switch for each of two turbine stop valves provides input to one EOC-RPT system; a position switch from each of the other two stop valves provides input to the other EOC-RPT system. For each EOC-RPT system, the sensor relay contacts are arranged to form a 2-out-of-2 logic for the fast closure of turbine control valves and a 2-out-of-2 logic for the turbine stop valves. The operation of either logic will actuate the EOC-RPT system and trip both recirculation pumps.

Each EOC-RPT system may be manually bypassed by use of a keyswitch which is administratively controlled. The manual bypasses and the automatic Operating Bypass at less than 30% of RATED THERMAL POWER are annunciated in the control room.

The EOC-RPT response time is the time assumed in the analysis between initiation of valve motion and complete suppression of the electric arc, i.e., 190 ms, ~~less the time allotted for sensor response, i.e., 10 ms, and less the time allotted for breaker arc suppression determined by test, as correlated to manufacturer's test results, i.e., 65 ms, and plant pre-operational test results.~~

Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is equal to or less than the drift allowance assumed for each trip in the safety analyses.

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TABLE 3.3.4.2-3

END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME

TRIP FUNCTION

RESPONSE TIME (Milliseconds)

1. Turbine Stop Valve-Closure
2. Turbine Control Valve-Fast Closure

$\leq \pm 30$  175

$\leq \pm 30$  175

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.1 The emergency core cooling systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

- a. At least once per 31 days:
  1. For the CSS, the LPCI system, and the HPCI system:
    - a) Verifying that the system piping from the pump discharge valve to the system isolation valve is filled with water by:
      1. Venting at the high point vents
      2. Performing a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the condensate storage tank low level alarm instrumentation.
    - b) Verifying that each valve, manual, power operated or automatic, in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
  2. For the CSS, performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the core spray header delta P instrumentation.
  3. For the LPCI system, verifying that at least one LPCI system subsystem cross-tie valve is closed with power removed from the valve operator.
  4. For the HPCI system, verifying that the pump flow controller is in the correct position.
- b. Verifying that, when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:
  1. The two CSS pumps in each <sup>269</sup>subsystem together develop a total flow of at least 6350 gpm against a test line pressure of greater than or equal to ~~281~~ psig, corresponding to a reactor vessel steam dome pressure of  $\geq 105$  psig.
  2. ~~During single pump operation, each LPCI pump develops a flow of at least 12,200 gpm as adjusted for a system head equivalent to a reactor vessel steam dome pressure of 20 psid above drywell pressure and with reactor vessel water level below the jet pumps.~~
  3. The HPCI pump develops a flow of at least 5000 gpm against a test line pressure of  $> 1266$  psig when steam is being supplied to the turbine at 920, +140, - 20 psig.\*
- c. At least once per 18 months:
  1. For the CSS, the LPCI system, and the HPCI system, performing a system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system throughout its emergency operating sequence and verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position. Actual injection of coolant into the reactor vessel may be excluded from this test.

INSERT A

\*The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable provided the surveillance is performed within 12 hours after reactor steam pressure is adequate to perform the test.

INSERT A

Each LPCI pump in each subsystem develops a flow of at least 12,200 gpm against a test line pressure of 204 psig, corresponding to a reactor vessel to primary containment differential pressure of >20 psid.



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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT

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SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.5.1 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3 and \*.

ACTION:

Without SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY:

- a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3, restore SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 4 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
- b. In Operational Condition \*, suspend handling of irradiated fuel in the secondary containment, CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.5.1 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated by:

- a. Verifying at least once per 24 hours that the pressure within the secondary containment is less than or equal to 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge.
- b. Verifying at least once per 31 days that:
  1. All secondary containment railroad access hatches are closed and sealed or the railroad bay access door is closed.
  2. At least one door in each access to the secondary containment is closed.
  3. All secondary containment penetrations not capable of being closed by OPERABLE secondary containment automatic isolation dampers and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic dampers secured in position.
- c. At least once per 18 months:
  1. Verifying that one standby gas treatment subsystem will draw down the secondary containment to greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge in less than or equal to 60 seconds, and
  2. Operating one standby gas treatment subsystem for one hour and maintaining greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge in the secondary containment at a flow rate not exceeding 3050<sup>#</sup>cfm  $\pm$  10% for both Units 1 and 2.

\*When irradiated fuel is being handled in the secondary containment and during CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

# A value of 2300 may be used until Unit 2 is licensed.



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REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM ELECTRIC POWER MONITORING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.4.3 Two RPS electric power monitoring assemblies for each inservice RPS MG set or alternate power supply shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

- a. With one RPS electric power monitoring assembly for an inservice RPS MG set or alternate power supply inoperable, restore the inoperable power monitoring assembly to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or remove the associated RPS MG set or alternate power supply from service.
- b. With both RPS electric power monitoring assemblies for an inservice RPS MG set or alternate power supply inoperable, restore at least one electric power monitoring assembly to OPERABLE status within 30 minutes or remove the associated RPS MG set or alternate power supply from service.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.4.3 The above specified RPS electric power monitoring assemblies shall be determined OPERABLE:

- a. ~~At least once per 6 months~~ By performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, and during COLD SHUTDOWNS of greater than 48 hours, no more frequently than once per 6 months, and
- b. At least once per 18 months by demonstrating the OPERABILITY of over-voltage, under-voltage and under-frequency protective instrumentation by performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION including simulated automatic actuation of the protective relays, tripping logic and output circuit breakers and verifying the following setpoints:

	<u>RPS Division A</u>	<u>RPS Division B</u>
1. Over-voltage	< 128.3 VAC	< 129.5 VAC
2. Under-voltage	> 110.7 VAC	> 111.9 VAC
3. Under-frequency	≥ 57 Hz	≥ 57 Hz



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TABLE 4.3.9.1-1 (Continued)

FEEDWATER/MAIN TURBINE TRIP SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED</u>
a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, Level 8	NA D	M	<del>A</del> R	1

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