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 50-388 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 2, Pennsylv 05000388  
 AUTH. NAME: CURTIS, N.W. AUTHOR AFFILIATION: Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.  
 RECIP. NAME: SCHWENCER, A. RECIPIENT AFFILIATION: Licensing Branch 2

SUBJECT: Forwards update to 810519 & 0616 responses to FSAR Questions 121.14, 121.15 & 121.16, per SER Issue 19. Revision includes current info from preservice exam.

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APR 23 1982

Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief  
Licensing Branch No. 2  
Division of Licensing  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Docket Nos. 50-387  
50-388

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION  
SER ISSUE NO. 19  
ER 100450 FILE 841-2  
PLA-1053

References: letter dated 5/19/81 (PLA-813, Curtis to Schwencer)  
letter dated 6/16/81 (PLA-846, Curtis to Schwencer)

Dear Mr. Schwencer:

The attached information updates our responses to FSAR Questions 121.14, 121.15 and 121.16 provided in the above referenced correspondence. Pages from the initial transmittal have been revised to include current information obtained as a result of pre-service examinations performed subsequent to the last revision.

The following items are attached:

- 1) Revision 2 of Relief Request #4,
- 2) Revision 1 of Relief Request #5,
- 3) Revision 1 of Relief Request #6, and
- 4) Revision 0 of Relief Request #10.

We expect one additional submittal to incorporate revisions as needed, following essential completion of Unit #1 pre-service examinations.

Very truly yours,

N. W. Curtis  
Vice President-Engineering & Construction-Nuclear  
TEG/mks

Attachment

8204270267

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5/11



WELD IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	CODE CATEGORY AND ITEM NUMBER	SYSTEM	CONFIGURATION	NATURE OF OBSTRUCTION	% OF SCAN OBSTRUCTED (APPROXIMATE)
DBB-114-1-9E	CF C2.1	HPCI	Pipe to Cap	Two (2) Weldolets	16%
DBB-115-1-7F	CF C2.1	RHR	Pipe to Cap	One (1) Weldolet	8%
DBB-115-1-5D	CF C2.1	RHR	Pipe to Tee	One (1) Weldolet	16%
DBB-115-1-5G	CF C2.1	RHR	Pipe to Cap	Three (3) Weldolets	34%
HBB-110-2-3C	CF C2.1	RHR	Elbow to Tee	Instrumentation Nozzle	3%
DLA-104-1-FW1	BJ B4.5	Feedwater	Pipe to Valve	Permanent Hanger	50%
DLA-102-1-FW7	BJ B4.5	Feedwater	Pipe to Valve	Permanent Hanger	50%
HBB-111-2-3D	CF C2.1	RHR	Pipe to Elbow	Hanger Saddle Weld	13%
DBB-118-1-1A	CF C2.3	Feedwater	Sweepolet to Pipe	Hanger Lug Attachment Weld	6%
GBB-106-1-FW6	CF C2.1	RHR	Pipe to Elbow	Welded Hanger	20%
GBB-109-1-2A	CG C2.1	RHR	Pipe to Elbow	Hanger Saddle	5%

ASME  
SECTION III  
EXAMINATION

SAFETY IMPACT

RT	Leak detection systems detect weld leakage, resulting in either manual or automatic isolation of the leak. These lines are not required for normal safe shutdown, alternate safe shutdown methods are available.
RT	" " " " " "
RT	" " " " " "
RT	" " " " " "
RT	During normal plant power operation, weld is under approximately 20 feet of hydrostatic head. During normal system operation weld is under a maximum pressure of 165 psig. Leak detection systems can detect leakage during plant power or normal system operation. Weld can be isolated and alternate cooldown paths are available using redundant RHR loop or main condenser.
RT and PT	Reactor coolant pressure boundary leak detection system detect weld leakage; plant technical specifications require plant shutdown with unidentified leakage greater than 5 gpm.
RT and PT	" " " " " "
RT	During normal plant operation, weld is not pressurized. During normal system operation (maximum 165 psig), leakage is detected by leak detection systems. Alternate shutdown cooling path is unaffected and condenser is also available for cooldown.
RT	Leak detection system detects significant leakage; containment isolation valves (2) perform weld isolation function. HPCI performs back-up function for RPV water addition for safe shutdown.
RT	During normal plant power operation, welds are not under pressure. During normal system operation, significant leakage is detectable by leak detection system. Plant can be safely cooled down by unaffected RHR loop or main condenser.
RT	" " " " " "

WELD IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	CODE CATEGORY AND ITEM NUMBER	SYSTEM	CONFIGURATION	NATURE OF OBSTRUCTION	% OF SCAN OBSTRUCTED
VRR-B31-2-9G	BJ B4.5	Recirculation	Longitudinal Weld	Pipe Whip Restraint	7%


ASME  
SECTION III  
EXAMINATION

SAFETY IMPACT

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RT and PT

Reactor coolant pressure boundary leak detection system detect leakage. Plant technical specification require plant shutdown with leakage greater than 5 gpm.





WELD IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	CODE CATEGORY AND ITEM NUMBER	SYSTEM	CONFIGURATION	NATURE OF OBSTRUCTION	% OF SCAN OBSTRUCTED
HBB-101-1-FW-7	CG C2.1	RCIC	Pipe to Sparger	Piping located in the wetwell	Totally Obstructed
HBB-101-1-1A	CG C2.1	RCIC	Pipe to reducing elbow	" "	"
HBB-101-1-1B	CG C2.1	RCIC	Pipe to Elbow	" "	"
HBB-101-1-FW6	CG C2.1	RCIC	Flued Head to Pipe	" "	"
HBB-108-2-3A	CG C2.1	HPCI	Pipe to Elbow	" "	"
HBB-108-2-FW10	CG C2.1	HPCI	Elbow to Reducer	" "	"
HBB-108-2-FW7	CG C2.1	HPCI	Reducer to Penetration	" "	"
HBB-108-2-FW1	CG C2.1	HPCI	Pipe to Elbow	" "	"
DCA-108-1-1B	BJ B4.5	RHR	Longitudinal Weld	Welded Hanger	Totally Obstructed
DCA-108-1-1C	BJ B4.5	RHR	Longitudinal Weld	Welded Hanger	Totally Obstructed
DCA-108-1-FW2	BJ B4.5	RHR	Valve to Pipe	Welded Hanger	Totally Obstructed

ASME  
SECTION III  
EXAMINATION

SAFETY IMPACT

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RT	Weld is inaccessible and below approximately 20 feet of suppression pool water. Adequate steam condensation of any leakage is expected. System is not pressurized during power plant operation. During system operation, maximum pressure is less than 25 psig. System is not required for normal shutdown and backed up by either HPCI or feedwater.
RT	Leakage would be detected by wetwell temperature/pressure increase. Upon such signals RCIC system operation could be terminated. RCIC operation is backed up by HPCI or feedwater. Weld is not pressurized during plant power operation. Maximum pressure the weld could be subjected to is 25 psig.
RT	" " " "
RT	" " " "
RT	Leakage would be detected by wetwell temperature/pressure increase. Upon such signals HPCI system operation could be terminated. HPCI operation is backed up by the auto-depressurization system and RHR. Weld is not normally pressurized during plant power operation.
RT	" " " "
RT	" " " "
RT	Leak detection systems detect weld leakage, resulting in manual or automatic isolation of the leak. Line is not required for normal safe shutdowns. Alternate shutdown methods are available.
RT and PT	Reactor coolant leakage detection systems will detect leakage. Plant technical specifications require plan shutdown with leakage greater than 5 gpm.
RT and PT	" " " "
RT and PT	" " " "

WELD IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	CODE CATEGORY AND ITEM NUMBER	SYSTEM	CONFIGURATION	NATURE OF OBSTRUCTION	% OF SCAN OBSTRUCTED
DCA-110-1-FW11	BJ B4.5	RHR	Valve to Tee	Part Geometry	Totally
DCA-110-2-FW11	BJ B4.5	RHR	Valve to Tee	Part Geometry	Totally
DCA-107-1-FW3	BJ B4.5	Core Spray	Valve to Valve	Part Geometry	Totally
DCA-107-2-FW7	BJ B4.5	Core Spray	Valve to Valve	Part Geometry	Totally
DBB-115-1-FW13	CF C2.1	RHR	Valve to Valve	Part Geometry	Totally
GBB-105-1-FW1	CF C2.1	RHR	Valve to Reducer	Part Geometry	Totally
DCA-110-1-FW2	BJ B4.5	RHR	Valve to Flued Head	Part Geometry	Totally
DCA-110-2-FW2	BJ B4.5	RHR	Valve to Flued Head	Part Geometry	Totally
DCA-108-1-FW10	BJ B4.5	RHR	Valve to Reducer	Part Geometry	Total
GBB-108-1-FW4	CF C2.1	RHR	Valve to Reducer	Part Geometry	Totally
VRR-B31-1-FWA24	BJ B4.5	Recirculation	Valve to Pipe	Part Geometry	Totally
VRR-B31-2-FWB24	BJ B4.5	Recirculation	Valve to Pipe	Part Geometry	Totally

Rev. 1 1/29/82  
Relief Request #6

ASME  
SECTION III  
EXAMINATION

SAFETY IMPACT

RT and PT	Reactor coolant pressure boundary leak detection system will detect weld leakage. Technical specifications require plant shutdown with unidentified leakage greater than 5 gpm.
RT and PT	" " " "
RT and PT	" " " "
RT and PT	" " " "
RT	During normal plant operation, welds are not under pressure. During normal system operation, any leakage is detectable by leak detection systems. Plant can be safely cooled down by unaffected RHR loop or main condenser.
RT	" " " "
RT and PT	Inside containment isolation valve perform reactor coolant pressure boundary inside function. Any significant leakage would be detected by leak detection system.
RT and PT	" " " "
RT and PT	During power plant operation, weld is not pressurized. During normal system operation, significant leakage detected by leak detection system. Alternate shutdown cooling is unaffected and condenser is also available for cool down.
RT	During normal plant operation, welds are not under pressure. During normal system operation, any leakage is detectable by leak detection systems. Plant can be safely cooled down by unaffected RHR loop or main condenser.
RT and PT	Reactor coolant pressure boundary leak detection system will detect weld leakage. Technical specifications require plant shutdown with unidentified leakage greater than 5 gpm.
RT and PT	" " " "

RELIEF REQUEST #10

I. IDENTIFICATION OF COMPONENTS:

Bodies of Class 1 valves exceeding 4 inch nominal pipe size.

II. CODE REQUIREMENTS:

Category B-M-2 of ASME Section XI, 1974 Edition to Summer 1975 Addenda requires Visual Examination of the internal pressure boundary surfaces on valves exceeding 4 inches nominal pipe size.

III. BASIS FOR RELIEF:

Relief is requested from the ASME Section XI examination requirements on the basis of inaccessibility of the valve internal pressure boundary surfaces.

IV. JUSTIFICATION:

The justification for requesting relief from ASME Section XI Preservice Examination requirements is as follows:

1. The structural integrity of the piping pressure boundary has been verified by Construction Code testing requirements; therefore, the intent of ASME Section XI has been met.
2. Shop Surface Examinations, liquid penetrant and/or magnetic particle, have been performed on the body, bonnet, and disc. Radiography was also performed on the body.
3. All valve pressure retaining materials have met ASME Section II Specifications which require Visual Examination of the casting or forging, and surfaces free of injurious defects.

V. ALTERNATE PROVISIONS:

Should any of the subject valve internal surfaces become accessible during maintenance activities, a Visual Examination will be performed at that time.

