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Office of the Secretary  
Docket & Service  
Branch

May 12, 1981

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

In The Matter Of:

PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO.  
AND  
ALLEGHENY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.

Berwick Atomic Power Plant  
Susquehanna Units 1 and 2  
Docket Nos. 50-387 & 50-388

CITIZENS AGAINST NUCLEAR DANGERS  
MOTION OPPOSED TO DISMISSAL OF CONTENTION 10,  
AND A NEW CONTENTION ON THE POTENTIAL DANGEROUS FLAW  
IN THE DESIGN OF THE PRIMARY COOLING SYSTEM.



The Citizens Against Nuclear Dangers (Citizens) oppose the Applicants motion to dismiss Contention 10, and move the Licensing Board to deny that motion. This unorthodox step taken by the Applicants has for its rationale the theory that the Citizens have not as yet "identified any structures, systems, or components important to safety which might arguably be affected by an on-site rail accident." Because of this, the Applicants allege that there isn't any justification for the Licensing Board to hear any testimony on Contention 10. That speculative theory by no means is sufficient grounds for dismissal of a contention, as the Board well knows. Contention 10 is, in fact, a restrictive contention which the Licensing Board formulated. The Citizens proposed a much more encompassing contention as the record shows.

That being what it may, the Licensing Board is hereby informed that new relevant information, which will definitely impact on Contention No. 10, must now be evaluated by the NRC. The Consolidated Rail Corp. (CONRAIL), a quasi-governmental transportation system, on or about May 7, 1981, published in the legal column of newspapers throughout the Northeast region of the United States notices of the wholesale abandonment of CONRAIL service and trackage, especially in the state of Pennsylvania. The Citizens hereby move the Licensing Board to order an investigation of this development, as it relates to rail shipments


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to Berwick, because the Applicants will, under the CONRAIL divestiture plan, have to purchase or lease miles of railroad tracks in order to ship hazardous cargo to and from Berwick. Thus, the "on site" right-of-way property of the Applicants will, within the next few years, extend miles from the reactor itself. So, Contention 10 now takes on a much greater importance as a public safety issue, since the trackage in question is deteriorating rapidly from lack of proper maintenance, and that is precisely why the Applicants are unscrupulously trying to sneak this safety issue past the NRC and the Licensing Board, under the guise of a motion for dismissal, before the aforementioned developments become a reality, whereupon the PP&L must of necessity go into the railroad business, a business they are not qualified to operate.

The Pennsylvania PUC, the United States ICC, and all other regulatory agencies have refused to deal with the shipment of radioactive cargoes. It is claimed to be under the jurisdiction of the NRC. So...the buck stops with the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board!

Concerning the alleged noncompliance with discovery, the Citizens will fully answer the three specific discovery interrogatories for the Applicants, and thereby remove the impediment they claim exists, if the Applicants will concur with the following reasonable offer. The Citizens are willing to send a small delegation to the Berwick Nuke construction site, on a mutually agreed upon date and time, if granted permission to do so by PP&L, and inspect the rail facilities on location while being escorted by PP&L personnel and the NRC Resident Safety Inspector. The Citizens will then prepare a concise written response to the outstanding discovery inquires on Contention 10, and present it to the PP&L that same day.

The Citizens hereby submit the following new contention, pursuant to the revised rules of the NRC; namely, the NRC Statement of Interim Policy, June 13, 1980, "Nuclear Power Plant Accident Considerations



Under NEPA." et al., based, in part, on the premise that a catastrophic atomic accident might occur as a result of the worse case scenario postulated in the NRC report entitled "Safety Concerns Associated With Pipe Breaks In The Boiling Water Reactor Scram System" (NUREG-0785) issued by the NRC Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data.

Whereas, the NRC has identified General Electric atomic reactors as having a potentially dangerous flaw in the design of their primary cooling systems;

Whereas, the flaw could permit an uncontrollable leak in the system (known as the SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME SUBSYSTEM) that would first cause the reactor core to overheat and might subsequently flood the pumps that operate the emergency core cooling system;

Whereas, unless the operators can isolate the pipe break in time, the leak will threaten the safety systems upon which the operators rely to mitigate the accident;

Whereas, the high radioactivity of the leaking water would prevent the operators from getting into the reactor building to correct the problem;

Whereas, the scram system is used to drain radioactive water from the reactor core during a shutdown--whether planned or emergency--of the reactor, and the water is drained to make room for the control rods to be inserted in the reactor core;

Whereas, because the ability to shut down the reactor when necessary is crucial, the valves on the scram system were designed to fail in the open position so that water can continue to drain from the system;

Whereas, although that is not a problem under normal conditions, because the amount of water leaving the core is limited by the size of the holding tank into which it flows, NRC researchers have found out that if a pipe in the system should break, water would continue to drain from the core indefinitely, leading to the twin problems of core overheating and flooding of emergency pumping equipment.


Therefore, the Citizens Against Nuclear Dangers, in the public interest, call for the re-design of all systems, and the retro-fitting of all equipment at the Berwick facility, that would be required to eliminate the major safety problems postulated in the above cited NRC analysis and report, and any other forthcoming NRC safety directives on this crucial issue. It may be necessary and prudent for the NRC to order the Applicants to temporarily halt all reactor construction as an interim precaution as well, until the site-specific engineering safety problems are resolved.

Dated: May 12, 1981.

*Thomas J. Halligan*  
Correspondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that copies of Citizens Against Nuclear Dangers Motion Opposed To Dismissal Of Contention 10, And A New Contention On The Potential Dangerous Flaw In The Design Of The Primary Cooling System. have been served on all parties to this proceeding by deposit in the United States mail, first class, this 12th day of May, 1981.



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