


UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION I  
631 PARK AVENUE  
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406



Docket Nos. 50-387  
50-388

FEB 13 1981



Pennsylvania Power and Light Company  
ATTN: Mr. Norman W. Curtis  
Vice President  
Engineering and Construction - Nuclear  
2 North Ninth Street  
Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101

Gentlemen:

The enclosed IE Bulletin No. 80-17, Supplement 5, "Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a Scram at a BWR," is forwarded to you information. No written response is required.

If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

*Boyce H. Grier*  
Boyce H. Grier  
Director

Enclosures:

- 1. IE Bulletin No. 80-17, Supplement 5, with 1 Attachment

CONTACT: D. L. Caphton  
(215-337-5266)

cc w/encls:

- A. R. Sabol, Manager, Nuclear Quality Assurance
- W. E. Barberich, Licensing Engineer
- H. W. Keiser, Superintendent of Plant

*Xor*

8103080386



SSINS No.: 6820  
Accession No.:  
801104259  
IEB 80-17, Supp. 5

UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

February 13, 1981

IE BULLETIN NO. 80-17, SUPPLEMENT 5: FAILURE OF CONTROL RODS TO INSERT  
DURING A SCRAM AT A BWR

Description of Circumstances:

On July 3, 1980, the NRC issued IE Bulletin No. 80-17, that required actions to be taken by licensees of all operating GE BWRs. Among the actions required, Item 6(a) required a prompt notification report by telephone to the appropriate Regional Office followed by a telecopy or other written submittal. These reports were required in the event that any of the systems (HPCI, RCIC, SLCS, RPT, RHR/pool cooling, and main steam bypass) were found to be less than fully operable.

These reports have served the purpose of notifying NRC of cases of potential reduction in operability of systems important to the mitigation of consequences of an anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) event. These reports are no longer necessary since improvements have been accomplished to increase the reliability of control rod scram.

Actions No Longer Necessary by Licensees:

Further reporting is not required in response to Item 6(a) of IE Bulletin No. 80-17. This does not change the reporting requirements set forth in your license technical specifications.

No written response to IE Bulletin 80-17, Supplement 5, is required. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

Attachment:  
Recently issued IE Bulletins



RECENTLY ISSUED  
IE BULLETINS

Bulletin No.	Subject	Date Issued	Issued To
81-01	Surveillance of Mechanical Snubbers	1/27/81	All holders of a power reactor OL or CP
80-25	Operating Problems with Target Rock Safety-Relief Valves at BWRs	12/19/80	All holders of a BWR power reactor OL or CP
Supplement 4 to 80-17	Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a Scram at a BWR	12/18/80	All holders of a BWR power reactor OL or CP
80-24	Prevention of Damage Due to Water Leakage Inside Containment (October 17, 1980 Indian Point 2 Event)	11/21/80	All holders of a power reactor OL or CP
80-23	Failures of Solenoid Valves Manufactured by Valcor Engineering Corporation	11/14/80	All holders of a power reactor OL or CP
80-22	Automation Industries, Model 200-520-008 Sealed-Source Connectors	9/12/80	All holders of a radiography license
80-21	Valve Yokes Supplied by Malcolm Foundry Company, Inc.	11/6/80	All holders of a power reactor OL or CP
Revision 1 to 79-26	Boron Loss from BWR Control Blades	8/29/80	All holders of a BWR power reactor OL
Revision 1 to 80-19	Failures of Mercury-Wetted Matrix Relays in Reactor Protective Systems of Operating Nuclear Power Plants Designed by Combustion Engineering	8/15/80	All holders of a power reactor OL or CP
80-20	Failures of Westinghouse Type W-2 Spring Return to Neutral Control Switches	7/31/80	All holders of a power reactor OL or CP