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Regulatory Docket File

March 8, 1977



Mr. Bernard C. Rusche, Director
 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
 Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Dresden Station Units 2 and 3,
 Quad-Cities Station Units 1 and 2,
 Proposed Amendment to Facility
 Operating License Nos. DPR-19, 25, 29, and 30
NRC Docket Nos. 50-237, 249, 254, and 265

Reference (a): D. L. Ziemann (NRC) Letter to R. L. Bolger (CECO)
 dated January 5, 1977.


Dear Mr. Rusche:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59, Commonwealth Edison proposes to make amendments to Dresden Units 2 and 3 and Quad-Cities Units 1 and 2 technical specifications concerning surveillance testing of safety-relief valves as requested in Reference (a).

The proposed change to Dresden Units 2 and 3 will require amending pages 78, 86, and adding page 86A-1 to both DPR 19 and 25. Section 4.5.D.1.b should be changed to read "With the reactor at pressure, each relief valve shall be manually opened. Relief valve opening shall be verified by a compensating turbine bypass valve or control valve closure."

Bases: 4.5.A.-4.5.F on page 86 should be amended to include the basis for the charge. This basis will read:

"The verification of the main steam relief valve operability during manual actuation surveillance testing must be made independent of temperatures indicated by thermocouples downstream of the relief valves. It has been found that a temperature increase may result with the valve still closed. This is due to steam being vented through the valve actuation mechanism during the surveillance test. By first opening a turbine bypass valve and then observing its closure response during relief valve actuation, positive verification can be made for the relief valve opening and passing steam flow. Closure response of the turbine control valves during relief valve manual actuation would likewise serve as an adequate verification for the relief valve opening. This test method may be performed over a wide range of reactor pressure greater than 150 psig. Valve operation below 150 psig is limited by the spring tension exhibited by the relief valves."



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Page 86A-1 is being added because the above mentioned additional basis displaced part of the existing basis onto another page.

The proposed change to Quad-Cities Units 1 and 2 will require amending pages 3.5/4.5-5 (DPR-29 and 30), 3.5/4.5-15 (DPR-30), 3.5/4.5-16 (DPR-29) and adding pages 3.5/4.5-16A (DPR-29) and 3.5/4.5-15A (DPR-30). Section 4.5.D.1.b should be changed to read "With the reactor at pressure, each relief valve shall be manually opened. Relief valve opening shall be verified by a compensating turbine bypass valve or control valve closure." This wording is the same as Dresden's wording.

4.5 Surveillance Requirements Bases (pages 3.5/4.5-15 for DPR-30, page 3.5/4.5-16 for DPR-29) should be amended to include the basis for the charge. This basis will read:

"The verification of the main steam relief valve operability during manual actuation surveillance testing must be made independent of temperatures indicated by thermocouples downstream of the relief valves. It has been found that a temperature increase may result with the valve still closed. This is due to steam being vented through the pilot valves during the surveillance test. By first opening a turbine bypass valve, and then observing its closure response during relief valve actuation, positive verification can be made for the relief valve opening and passing steam flow. Closure response of the turbine control valves during relief valve manual actuation would likewise serve as an adequate verification for the relief valve opening. This test method may be performed over a wide range of reactor pressures greater than 150 psig. Valve operation below 150 psig is limited by the spring tension exhibited by the relief valves."

Pages 3.5/4.5-15A (DPR-30) and 3.5/4.5-16A (DPR-29) are being added because the above mentioned basis displaced part of the existing basis onto another page.

Attachment A contains Dresden Units 2 and 3's charges, Attachment B contains Quad-Cities Unit 1's charges, and Attachment C contains Quad-Cities Unit 2's charges.

These technical specification changes have received on-site and off-site review and approval. Please direct any additional questions to this office.

Three (3) signed originals and 57 copies are provided for your use.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO
before me this 8th day
of March, 1977.

Nancy M. Hollingsworth

Very truly yours,
M. S. Turbak for
R. L. Bolger
Assistant Vice President

3.5 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

D. Automatic Pressure Relief Subsystems

1. Except as specified in 3.5.D.2 and 3 below, the Automatic Pressure Relief Subsystem shall be operable whenever the reactor pressure is greater than 90 psig and irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel.
2. From and after the date that one of the five relief valves of the automatic pressure relief subsystem is made or found to be inoperable when the reactor is pressurized above 90 psig with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding seven days unless repairs are made and provided that during such time the HPCI Subsystem is operable.
3. From and after the date that more than one of five relief valves of the automatic pressure relief subsystem are made or found to be inoperable when the reactor is pressurized above 90 psig with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding 24 hours unless repairs are made and provided that during such time the HPCI Subsystem is operable.

4.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

D. Surveillance of the Automatic Pressure Relief Subsystem shall be performed as follows:

1. During each operating cycle the following shall be performed:
 - a. A simulated automatic initiation which opens all pilot valves, and
 - b. With the reactor at pressure each relief valve shall be manually opened. Relief valve opening shall be verified by a compensating turbine bypass valve or control valve closure.
 - c. A logic system functional test shall be performed each refueling outage.
2. When it is determined that one relief valve of the automatic pressure relief subsystem is inoperable, the HPCI shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and weekly thereafter.
3. When it is determined that more than one relief valve of the automatic pressure relief subsystem is inoperable, the HPCI subsystem shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately.

ATTACHMENT A

Bases:

4.5.A.-4.5.F.

The testing interval for the core and containment cooling systems is based on quantitative reliability analysis, judgement and practicality. The core cooling systems have not been designed to be fully testable during operation. For example the core spray final admission valves do not open until reactor pressure has fallen to 350 psig thus during operation even if high drywell pressure were simulated the final valves would not open. In the case of the HPCI, automatic initiation during power operation would result in pumping cold water into the reactor vessel which is not desirable.

The systems can be automatically actuated during a refueling outage and this will be done. To increase the availability of the individual components of the core and containment cooling systems the components which make up the system i.e., instrumentation, pumps, valve operators, etc., are tested more frequently. The instrumentation is functionally tested each month. Likewise the pumps and motor-operated valves are also tested each month to assure their operability. The combination of a yearly simulated automatic actuation test and monthly tests of the pumps and valve operators is deemed to be adequate testing of these systems.

With components or subsystems out-of-service overall core and containment cooling reliability is maintained by demonstrating the operability of the remaining cooling equipment. The degree of operability to be demonstrated depends on the nature of the reason for the out-of-service equipment. For routine out-of-service periods caused by preventative maintenance, etc., the pump and valve operability checks will be performed to demonstrate operability of the remaining components. However, if a failure, design deficiency, etc., caused the out-of-service period, then the demonstration of operability should be thorough enough to assure that a similar problem does not exist on the remaining components. For example, if an out-of-service period were caused by failure of a pump to deliver rated capacity due

to a design deficiency, the other pumps of this type might be subjected to a flow rate test in addition to the operability checks.

The requirement of 180 psig at 3500 gpm at the containment cooling service water (CCSW) pump discharge provides adequate margin to ensure that the LPCI/CCSW system provides the design bases cooling water flow and maintains 20 psig differential pressure at the containment cooling heat exchanger. This differential pressure preclude reactor coolant from entering the river water side of the containment cooling heat exchangers.

The verification of Main Steam Relief Valve operability during manual actuation surveillance testing must be made independent of temperatures indicated by thermocouples downstream of the relief valves. It has been found that a temperature increase may result with the valve still closed. This is due to steam being vented through the valve actuation mechanism during the surveillance test. By first opening a turbine bypass valve, and then observing its closure response during relief valve actuation, positive verification can be made for the relief valve opening and passing steam flow. Closure during response of the turbine control valves during relief valve manual actuation would likewise serve as an adequate verification for relief valve opening. This test method may be performed over a wide range of reactor pressure greater than 150 psig. Valve operation below 150 psig is limited by the spring tension exhibited by the relief valves.

ATTACHMENT A

H. Maintenance of Filled Discharge Pipe

The surveillance requirements to assure that the discharge piping of the core spray, LPCI, and HPCI systems are filled provides for a visual observation that water flows from a high point vent. This ensures that the line is in a full condition.

Between the monthly intervals at which the lines are vented, instrumentation has been provided to monitor the presence of water in the discharge piping. This instrumentation will be calibrated on the same frequency as the safety system instrumentation.

This period of periodic testing ensures that during the intervals between the monthly checks the status of the discharge piping is monitored on a continuous basis.

ATTACHMENT B
QUAD-CITIES
DPR-29

provided that during such 7 days all active components of the automatic pressure relief subsystems, the core spray subsystems, LPCI mode of the RHR system, and the RCIC system are operable.

3. If the requirements of Specification 3.5.C cannot be met, an orderly shut-down shall be initiated, and the reactor pressure shall be reduced to 90 psig within 24 hours.

D. Automatic Pressure Relief Subsystems

1. The automatic pressure relief subsystem shall be operable whenever the reactor pressure is greater than 90 psig, irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and prior to reactor startup from a cold condition.
2. From and after the date that one of the five relief valves of the automatic pressure relief subsystem is made or found to be inoperable when the reactor is pressurized above 90 psig with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding 30 days unless repairs are made and provided that during such time the HPCI subsystem is operable.
3. From and after the date that more than one of five relief valves of the automatic pressure relief subsystem are made or found to be inoperable when the reactor is pressurized above 90 psig with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding 24 hours unless repairs are made and provided that during such

operable immediately. The automatic pressure relief and RCIC systems shall be demonstrated to be operable daily thereafter.

D. Automatic Pressure Relief Subsystems

Surveillance of the automatic pressure relief subsystems shall be performed as follows:

1. During each operating cycle the following shall be performed:
 - a. A simulated automatic initiation which opens all pilot valves.
 - b. With the reactor at pressure each relief valve shall be manually opened. Relief valve opening shall be verified by a compensating turbine bypass valve or control valve closure.
 - c. A logic system functional test shall be performed each refueling outage.
2. When it is determined that one relief valve of the automatic pressure relief subsystem is inoperable, the HPCI shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and weekly thereafter.
3. When it is determined that more than one relief valve of the automatic pressure relief subsystem is inoperable, the HPCI subsystem shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately.

ATTACHMENT B
QUAD-CITIES
DPR-29

4.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS BASES

The testing interval for the core and containment cooling systems is based on a quantitative reliability analysis, judgment, and practicality. The core cooling systems have not been designed to be fully testable during operation. For example, the core spray final admission valves do not open until reactor pressure has fallen to 350 psig. Thus, during operation, even if high drywell pressure were simulated, the final valves would not open. In the case of the HPCI, automatic initiation during power operation would result in pumping cold water into the reactor vessel which is not desirable.

The systems can be automatically actuated during a refueling outage and this will be done. To increase the availability of the individual components of the core and containment cooling systems, the components which make up the system, i.e., instrumentation, pumps, valve operators, etc., are tested more frequently. The instrumentation is functionally tested each month. Likewise the pumps and motor-operated valves are also tested each month to assure their operability. The combination of a yearly simulated automatic actuation test and monthly tests of the pumps and valve operators is deemed to be adequate testing of these systems.

With components or subsystems out of service, overall core and containment cooling reliability is maintained by demonstrating the operability of the remaining cooling equipment. The degree of operability to be demonstrated depends on the nature of the reason for the out-of-service equipment. For routine out-of-service periods caused by preventative maintenance, etc., the pump and valve operability checks will be performed to demonstrate operability of the remaining components. However, if a failure, design deficiency, etc., causes the out-of-service period, then the demonstration of operability should be thorough enough to assure that a similar problem does not exist on the remaining components. For example, if an out-of-service period caused by failure of a pump to deliver rated capacity due to a design deficiency, the other pumps of this type might be subjected to a flow rate test in addition to the operability checks.

The verification of the main steam relief valve operability during manual actuation surveillance testing must be made independent of temperatures indicated by thermocouples downstream of the relief valves. It has been found that a temperature increase may result with the valve still closed. This is due to steam being vented through the pilot valves during the surveillance test. By first opening a turbine bypass valve, and then observing its closure response during relief valve actuation, positive verification can be made for the relief valve opening and passing steam flow. Closure response of the turbine control valves during relief valve manual actuation would likewise serve as an adequate verification for the relief valve opening. This test method may be performed over a wide range of reactor pressures greater than 150 psig. Valve operation below 150 psig is limited by the spring tension exhibited by the relief valves.

The surveillance requirements to ensure that the discharge piping of the core spray, LPCI mode of the RHR, HPCI, and RCIC systems is filled provides for a visual observation that water flows from a high point vent. This ensures that the line is in a full condition. Instrumentation has been provided to monitor the presence of water in the discharge piping between the monthly intervals at which the lines are vented and alarm the control room if it is not. This instrumentation will be calibrated on the same frequency as the safety system instrumentation and the alarm system tested monthly. This testing ensures that, during the interval between the monthly venting checks, the status of the discharge piping is monitored on a continuous basis.

An alarm point of ≥ 40 psig for the low pressure of the fill system has been chosen because, due to elevations of piping within the plant, 39 psig is required to keep the lines full. The shutoff head of the fill system pumps is 74 psig and therefore will not defeat the low-pressure cooling pump discharge press interlock of ≥ 75 psig as shown in Table 3.2-2.

The watertight bulkhead door and the penetration seals for pipes and cables penetrating the vault walls and ceilings have been designed to withstand the maximum flood conditions. To assure that their installation is adequate for maximum flood conditions, a method of testing each seal has been devised.

To test a pipe seal, another test seal is installed in the opposite side of the penetration creating a space between the two seals that can be pressurized. Compressed air is then supplied to a fitting on the test seal and the space inside the sleeve is pressurized to approximately 15 psi. The outer face of the permanent seal is then tested for leaks using a soap bubble solution.

On completion of the test, the test seal is removed for use on other pipes and penetrations of the same size.

In order to test an electrical penetration, compressed air is supplied to a test connection and the space between the fittings is pressurized to approximately 15 psig. The outer faces are then tested for leaks using a soap bubble solution.

ATTACHMENT C

QUAD-CITIES
DPR-30

provided that during such 7 days all active components of the automatic pressure relief subsystems, the core spray subsystems, LPCI mode of the RHR system, and the RCIC system are operable.

3. If the requirements of Specification 3.5.C cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated, and the reactor pressure shall be reduced to 90 psig within 24 hours.

D. Automatic Pressure Relief Subsystems

1. The automatic pressure relief subsystem shall be operable whenever the reactor pressure is greater than 90 psig, irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and prior to reactor startup from a cold condition.
2. From and after the date that one of the five relief valves of the automatic pressure relief subsystem is made or found to be inoperable when the reactor is pressurized above 90 psig with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding 30 days unless repairs are made and provided that during such time the HPCI subsystem is operable.
3. From and after the date that more than one of five relief valves of the automatic pressure relief subsystem are made or found to be inoperable when the reactor is pressurized above 90 psig with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding 24 hours unless repairs are made and provided that during such

operable immediately. The automatic pressure relief and RCIC systems shall be demonstrated to be operable daily thereafter.

D. Automatic Pressure Relief Subsystems

Surveillance of the automatic pressure relief subsystems shall be performed as follows:

1. During each operating cycle the following shall be performed:
 - a. A simulated automatic initiation which opens all pilot valves.
 - b. With the reactor at **pressure** each relief valve shall be manually opened. **Relief valve opening shall be verified by a compensating turbine bypass valve or control valve closure.**
 - c. A logic system functional test shall be performed each refueling outage.
2. When it is determined that one relief valve of the automatic pressure relief subsystem is inoperable, the HPCI shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and weekly thereafter.
3. When it is determined that more than one relief valve of the automatic pressure relief subsystem is inoperable, the HPCI subsystem shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately.

ATTACHMENT C

QUAD-CITIES DPR-30

4.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS BASES

The testing interval for the core and containment cooling systems is based on a quantitative reliability analysis, judgment, and practicality. The core cooling systems have not been designed to be fully testable during operation. For example, the core spray final admission valves do not open until reactor pressure has fallen to 350 psig. Thus, during operation, even if high drywell pressure were simulated, the final valves would not open. In the case of the HPCI, automatic initiation during power operation would result in pumping cold water into the reactor vessel which is not desirable.

The systems can be automatically actuated during a refueling outage and this will be done. To increase the availability of the individual components of the core and containment cooling systems, the components which make up the system, i.e., instrumentation, pumps, valve operators, etc., are tested more frequently. The instrumentation is functionally tested each month. Likewise the pumps and motor-operated valves are also tested each month to assure their operability. The combination of a yearly simulated automatic actuation test and monthly tests of the pumps and valve operators is deemed to be adequate testing of these systems.

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The verification of the main steam relief valve operability during manual actuation surveillance testing must be made independent of temperatures indicated by thermocouples downstream of the relief valves. It has been found that a temperature increase may result with the valve still closed. This is due to steam being vented through the pilot valves during the surveillance test. By first opening a turbine bypass valve, and then observing its closure response during relief valve actuation, positive verification can be made for the relief valve opening and passing steam flow. Closure response of the turbine control valves during relief valve manual actuation would likewise serve as an adequate verification for the relief valve opening. This test method may be performed over a wide range of reactor pressures greater than 150 psig. Valve operation below 150 psig is limited by the spring tension exhibited by the relief valves.

The surveillance requirements to ensure that the discharge piping of the core spray, LPCI mode of the RHR, HPCI, and RCIC systems is filled provides for a visual observation that water flows from a high point vent. This ensures that the line is in a full condition. Instrumentation has been provided to monitor the presence of water in the discharge piping between the monthly intervals at which the lines are vented and alarm the control room if it is not. This instrumentation will be calibrated on the same frequency as the safety system instrumentation and the alarm system tested monthly. This testing ensures that, during the interval between the monthly venting checks, the status of the discharge piping is monitored on a continuous basis.

An alarm point of ≥ 40 psig for the low pressure of the fill system has been chosen because, due to elevations of piping within the plant, 39 psig is required to keep the lines full. The shutoff head of the fill system pumps is 74 psig and therefore will not defeat the low-pressure cooling pump discharge pressure interlock of ≥ 75 psig as shown in Table 3.2-2.

ATTACHMENT C

**QUAD-CITIES
DPR-30**

The watertight bulkhead door and the penetration seals for pipes and cables penetrating the vault walls and ceilings have been designed to withstand the maximum flood conditions. To assure that their installation is adequate for maximum flood conditions, a method of testing each seal has been devised.

To test a pipe seal, another test seal is installed in the opposite side of the penetration creating a space between the two seals that can be pressurized. Compressed air is then supplied to a fitting on the test seal and the space inside the sleeve is pressurized to approximately 15 psi. The outer face of the permanent seal is then tested for leaks using a soap bubble solution.

On completion of the test, the test seal is removed for use on other pipes and penetrations of the same size.

In order to test an electrical penetration, compressed air is supplied to a test connection and the space between the fittings is pressurized to approximately 15 psig. The outer faces are then tested for leaks using a soap bubble solution.