

Regulatory

File Cy.

Commonwealth Edison Company

ONE FIRST NATIONAL PLAZA ★ CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Address Reply to:

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July 31, 1972

Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director
Directorate of Licensing
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D.C. 20545



Subject: Supplement to Proposed Change No. 10 to Appendix A
DPR-19, AEC Dkt 50-237

Dear Mr. O'Leary:

Attached is a report by the technical staff of Dresden Nuclear Power Station concerning the results of the Dresden Unit 2 Inservice Inspection Report performed during the second partial refueling outage. This inservice inspection is required by the technical specifications for Dresden Unit 2.

This report is being forwarded to you as a supplement to Proposed Change No. 10 to facilitate review of this change by your staff. Discussions held with the AEC staff have indicated that this Inspection Report would be required prior to completion of the review of Proposed Change No. 10.

It is hoped that with the submission of this report, completion of your review will be possible. If further information is required, please do not hesitate to call on us.

In addition to three signed originals, 19 copies of this supplement are also enclosed.


Very truly yours,

Byron Lee Jr.
Byron Lee, Jr.

Assistant to the President

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to
before me this 31st day
of July, 1972.

Patricia A. Nelson
Notary Public



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AW

June 1, 1972

To: Mr. W. P. Worden

Subject: 1972 Dresden 2 Inservice Inspection Report

Following the shutdown of Unit #2 for its second partial refueling outage on February 19, 1972; inservice inspection was started on the primary system. All insulating work and examinations were performed by General Electric under Commonwealth Edison personnel observation.

The examinations performed during the inservice inspection meet the requirements specified in Dresden 2 Technical Specifications, section 3.6.F, table 4.6.1 and the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, sections III and XI.

The following lists the components which were examined during the outage and the results of the inspection.

ISI
CATEGORY

COMPONENT

B

U.T. of one (1) foot of three (3) longitudinal (vertical vessel) weld.

U.T. of one (1) meridional seam weld in reactor vessel closure head @ 120° between bolt holes 31 & 32.

U.T. of 10% of the circumferential weld in the reactor vessel head.

C

U.T. of 10% of the vessel-to-flange and head-to-flange circumferential weld between bolt holes 10 & 20.

D

U.T. and P.T. 100% of the following primary nozzle-to-vessel welds:

- one (1) recirculation outlet (N1B)
- one (1) isolation condenser outlet (N5B)
- one (1) control rod drive return (N9)

U.T. of 100% of the primary nozzle-to-vessel in radius section by "Pulse Echo Mode" are as follows:

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June 1, 1972

one (1) recirculation outlet (N1B)
one (1) isolation condenser outlet (N5B)
one (1) control rod drive return (N9)

E U.T. of five (5) control rod drive stub-
to-housing welds on the following drive
locations:

46-43, 50-43, 54-35, 54-39, and 58-35

F Visual, P.T. and U.T. of all furnace
sensitized stainless steel safe-ends and
safe-end welds on primary system.

G Visual and U.T. of 100% of reactor vessel
closure head studs and nuts

U.T. of 10% of reactor vessel ligaments
between studs 11 and 21.

I Visual and P.T. of one (1) 36 sq. in. patch
of vessel closure head cladding opposite
bolt hole #50 about 2 ft. above bottom of
flange.

Visual inspection of the upper portion of
the vessel cladding.

J Visual and U.T. of 10% of the system pipe
welds. (See table 1)

K Visual and U.T. of 10% of the pipe hanger
weld attachments. (See table 2)

N Visual inspection of interior surfaces
and internals. Also integrally welded
internal supports of the reactor vessel,
including core spray spargers, core
spray nozzles, and upper portions of
jet pumps.

Others Visual and U.T. of two (2) safety valve
riser to main steam line and safety valve
riser thickness measurements.

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The results of the inspection revealed only very minor, acceptable surface defects, which were removed with a light polishing, with the exception of the following:

- 1) Reactor head closure nut #25 was found to have an internal crack or defect which was located by ultrasonic testing. The crack does not reach either surface of the nut and is believed to be a manufacturing defect. This nut is being examined by G.E. and a report will be issued summarizing their findings. A new nut has replaced the original #25 nut.
- 2) Nozzle N20B (jet pump instrumentation) showed a minor dot type indication (less than 5 mils). While polishing out this indication two additional indications were uncovered in the area (10-20 mils in depth). The defect appears to be a manufacturing defect (forging lap). Grinding approximately 20 mils removed the indication.

T. P. Suchocki
T. P. Suchocki

TPS:sds

cc: F. S. Morris
G. J. Diederich
G. P. Wagner
D. W. Anderson (Travelers Insurance Co.)

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TABLE 1
PIPING SYSTEM WELD INSPECTION

<u>System</u>	<u>No. Welds U.T.</u>	<u>Weld Identification</u>
LPCI	3	2-1519-16-K6 2-1519-16-K7 2-1519-16-K8
FEEDWATER	11	2-3204D-12-10 2-3204A-18-K4 2-3204A-18-K2 2-3204A-18-K5 2-3204A-18-9 2-3204B-18-11 2-3204B-18-K6 2-3204E-12-1 2-3204F-12-12 2-3204F-12-1 2-3204F-12-K2
MAIN STEAM	20	2-3001D-20-4 2-3001D-20-5 2-3001D-20-K10 2-3001C-20-K6A 2-3001C-20-K10 2-3001C-20-4 2-3001B-20-K10 2-3001B-20-4 2-3001B-20-K11 2-3001B-20-K12 2-3001B-20-5 2-3001A-20-K10 2-3001A-20-4 2-3001A-20-K11 2-3001A-20-K12 2-3001A-20-5 2-3001D-20-K11 2-3001D-20-K12 2-3001C-20-K11 2-3001C-20-K12

TABLE 2

PIPE HANGER WELDS

<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>Number of Hangers U.T.</u>	<u>Weld Identification</u>
HPCI	1	2-2305-10-5
SHUTDOWN COOLING	1	2-1001B-16-K11
MAIN STEAM	3	2-3001A-20-3 2-3001A-20-K11 2-3001B-20-K11
RECIRCULATION	1	PD1A-D14 & D15
LPCI	1	2-1506-16-12 & K9
CORE SPRAY	2	2-1404-10-K15 & K16
CRD	1	2-0308-4-1B
ISO. COND.	2	2-1302-14-K3 2-1302-14-K4
FEEDWATER	1	2-3204-A-18-K4
REACTOR CLEANUP	1	2-1201-8-12