

**NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

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and 95003 Exit Meeting

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## U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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NRC 95003 INSPECTION EXIT MEETING AND

ANNUAL ASSESSMENT MEETING FOR

PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION

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PUBLIC MEETING

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TUESDAY, MARCH 21, 2017

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The Public Meeting met in the Main Auditorium of Plymouth Memorial Hall, 83 Court Street, Plymouth, Massachusetts, Brett Klukan, Facilitator, presiding

NRC ATTENDEES:

BRETT KLUKAN, Regional Counsel, Region I,  
Facilitator

ARTHUR BURRITT, Chief, Projects Branch 5, Division  
of Reactor Projects

ERIN CARFANG, Senior Resident Inspector, Pilgrim

DANIEL DORMAN, Regional Administrator, Region I

DONALD JACKSON, Chief, Operations Branch, Division  
of Reactor Safety

RAYMOND LORSON, Director, Division of Reactor Safety

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ALSO PRESENT:

REBECCA CHIN, Co-Chair, Duxbury Nuclear Advisory  
Committee

RORY CLARK, Office of U.S. Senator Edward Markey

WILL CROCKER, State Representative, Second  
Barnstable District

JON D'ANGELO, Office of U.S. Senator Elizabeth  
Warren

VINNY DEMACEDO, State Senator, Plymouth and  
Barnstable District

RANDY HUNT, State Representative, Fifth Barnstable  
District

MIKE JACKMAN, Office of Congressman Bill Keating

ELIZABETH MAHONY, Massachusetts Attorney General's  
Office

REVEREND JARVIS MCMILLAN, Co-Chair, Social Justice  
and Outreach Committee, Unitarian Church of  
Chatham

MATT MURATORE, State Representative, First Plymouth  
District

SARAH PEAKE, State Representative, Fourth Barnstable  
District

TIMOTHY WHELAN, State Representative, First  
Barnstable District

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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

(Time not provided.)

MR. KLUKAN: All right. Hello and welcome this evening to the annual Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Assessment meeting. My name is Brett Klukan. Normally by day I'm the regional counsel for Region I of the U.S. NRC, but tonight I'll be serving as I have done at past meetings as the meeting facilitator.

First off, before I get any further into my introduction, I would like to thank the Plymouth Memorial Hall for hosting us this evening. And it's this beautiful venue, so thank you very much to them.

The structure for the meeting tonight, as discussed in the meeting summary, will be bifurcated. The first half is going to consist of discussion between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Entergy to discuss the NRC's assessment of safety performance at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station for 2016.

This portion of the meeting will principally include the following: A discussion of NRC oversight over the past year, a discussion of preliminary results of the recent 95003 inspection, then an opportunity for Entergy to respond and to provide its own remarks on its performance over the past year. Then finally some NRC concluding remarks.

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1 Then we'll break for a short intermission, about 10  
2 minutes.

3 Then we'll begin with our second half of  
4 the meeting, which will principally be an opportunity  
5 for members of the public to ask the assembled NRC  
6 staff questions and comments regarding the performance  
7 of Pilgrim over the past year.

8 With respect to that second half of the  
9 meeting, on the registration table just near the doors  
10 or the entryway to the building there's a sign-up list  
11 for public speakers. When you registered to speak you  
12 should have received a ticket, or one half of a  
13 ticket, the other half of which we collected in a  
14 container, again currently at the registration table.  
15 The purpose of that is so that the -- I will then use  
16 that ticket or those -- that fishbowl of tickets for  
17 -- that's what it is, to pick the speaking order at  
18 random.

19 Just so you have an advanced warning, when  
20 it is your turn to speak, I will be writing the  
21 numbers I pull out of the fishbowl on the board here.  
22 And I will also be announcing them just so -- for  
23 those of you in the back who can't see.

24 If you'd like to speak this evening and  
25 have not already done so, please step outside and add

1 your name to the list prior to the end of  
2 intermission. I will be collecting the tickets once  
3 intermission -- as intermission is wrapping up and as  
4 we move into the second half of the meeting.

5 After intermission once we resume I will  
6 not add any more tickets to the container. Those who  
7 register late will only have an opportunity to speak  
8 if the container has been exhausted and as time  
9 otherwise permits.

10 I would like to emphasize at this time  
11 that there's no prohibition against trading or  
12 donating tickets, however, with that said, both  
13 individuals, the transferrer and the transferee, must  
14 be present at the time the number as I -- as -- when  
15 I call it. So you can't simply just leave your ticket  
16 with someone else and then leave the meeting. You  
17 both have to be here if you're going to exchange  
18 tickets.

19 I would like to ask that we keep the area;  
20 essentially there's a little piece of yellow tape up  
21 here, beyond that front row clear. If you have  
22 something you'd like to hand to the NRC staff, please  
23 hand it to me or to Justin (phonetic), who is standing  
24 right here.

25 Now for some very basic ground rules.

1 First off, recognizing that many of you have strongly  
2 held opinions about the matters we're going to discuss  
3 tonight, I nonetheless ask you, as I do at the outset  
4 of every meeting, to please adhere to civil decorum.  
5 And you've never failed me regarding this in the past,  
6 and for that I -- you have my utmost thanks. So  
7 please do not disrupt each other this evening, just as  
8 you wouldn't want to be interrupted during your  
9 opportunity to speak. Please respect the speaking  
10 times of others.

11 We will operate under a three strikes  
12 rule. I've never had to use it and I hope not to use  
13 it again this evening. But just so you're aware of  
14 how I'm going to conduct the meeting, you'll get three  
15 strikes. The first two will be verbal warnings and  
16 the third you'll be asked to leave the meeting. If  
17 you refuse to voluntarily leave at that time, we'll  
18 escort you from the room. Again, I've never had to do  
19 that. I hope not to do it again tonight, but I want  
20 to make you aware of how I plan to conduct the  
21 meeting.

22 Threatening gestures or statements under  
23 no circumstances will be tolerated and will be cause  
24 for immediate objection from the -- or ejection from  
25 the meeting. I want to make that very plain. If you



1 feel you've been threatened, please let me know or  
2 tell one of the NRC security personnel or the police  
3 officers you see positioned around the room.

4 A few minor housekeeping matters: The  
5 bathrooms are straight through those back doors on the  
6 first level, like beneath the stairs.

7 The exits are through the back. And then  
8 again, up the stairs as well. And I think there's a  
9 door over here as well for exit.

10 Cameras are of course permitted, but  
11 please try not to obstruct the view of others. The  
12 same goes for signs that you may have. You can hold  
13 them up periodically, but don't hold them up for the  
14 entire meeting so the person behind you can't see, you  
15 know, a matter of courtesy.

16 And if you'd be so kind to please silence  
17 your cell phones at this time.

18 Okay. At this point I'd like to offer any  
19 elected officials or official representatives of any  
20 elected officials here tonight on their behalf to  
21 stand and be recognized.

22 (Pause.)

23 MR. KLUKAN: Okay. Justin will bring you  
24 the microphone.

25 MS. CHIN: Thank you. Rebecca Chin, Co-

1 Chairman of the Duxbury Nuclear Advisory Committee.

2 MS. PEAKE: Hi, Sarah Peake, state  
3 representative, Fourth Barnstable District.

4 MR. CROCKER: Will Crocker, state  
5 representative Second Barnstable District.

6 MR. HUNT: Randy Hunt, state  
7 representative, Fifth Barnstable District.

8 MR. DEMACEDO: Vinny Demacedo, state  
9 senator from the Plymouth and Barnstable District.

10 REV. MCMILLAN: Reverend McMillan, Co-  
11 Chair of the Social Justice Committee of the Unitarian  
12 Church in Chatham.

13 MR. MURATORE: Matt Muratore, state rep  
14 for the First Plymouth District.

15 MR. WHELAN: Tim Whelan, state  
16 representative for the First Barnstable District.

17 MR. D'ANGELO: Jon D'Angelo, Senator  
18 Elizabeth Warren's office.

19 MS. CLARK: Rory Clark, Senator Ed  
20 Markey's office.

21 MR. JACKMAN: Mike Jackman from  
22 Congressman Bill Keating's office.

23 MS. MAHONY: Elizabeth Mahony from the  
24 Attorney General's office.

25 MR. KLUKAN: Any other elected official or

1 representative that we missed? I want to make sure  
2 you're -- you get an opportunity to be recognized.

3 Again, you will have an opportunity to  
4 give prepared remarks at the beginning or the outset  
5 of the second half of the meeting, but I would just  
6 like to give those elected officials or their  
7 representatives an opportunity to be recognized at  
8 this time.

9 (No audible response.)

10 MR. KLUKAN: Seeing no others, thank you  
11 very much for attending this evening. We appreciate  
12 it.

13 Now finally let me introduce the NRC staff  
14 you see assembled on the stage, and first I'll begin  
15 with Mr. Dan Dorman who's seated in the middle. Mr.  
16 Dan Dorman is a regional administrator for Region I.  
17 He has been in that position since 2014. Dan has 34  
18 years of nuclear experience including nearly 10 years  
19 in the U.S. Navy and over 24 years at the NRC. He has  
20 served as the deputy office director in both the  
21 Nuclear Materials and Operating Reactor Programs in  
22 the NRC Headquarter Offices and was a member of the  
23 NRC's Near-Term Task Force on Lessons Learned from the  
24 Fukushima Accident.

25 Next we have Mr. Ray Lorson. Mr. Ray

1 Lorson is the director for the Division of Reactor  
2 Safety in the NRC's Region I Office. He joined the  
3 NRC in 1991 as a reactor engineer in Region I. He  
4 subsequently was the NRC in 1991 as a reactor engineer  
5 in Region I. He subsequently was the resident  
6 inspector at Peach Bottom and the Salem Nuclear Power  
7 Plants and the senior resident inspector at the  
8 Seabrook and Salem Nuclear Power Plants. Prior to  
9 joining the NRC Ray served in the United States Navy.

10 Next we have Mr. Don Jackson. Mr. Don  
11 Jackson was assigned to his current position as chief,  
12 Operations Branch, Region I, Division of Reactor  
13 Safety in August of 2011. Previously was the chief,  
14 Project Branch 5, Region I, Division of Reactor  
15 Projects. Don joined the NRC in 2003 as an operating  
16 licensing -- operator licensing examiner. There we  
17 go. Prior to joining the NRC Don was an NRC licensing  
18 senior operator at both the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear  
19 Power Plant and the Salem Nuclear Generating Station.  
20 Prior to that Don served -- or spent five years in the  
21 Navy's Nuclear Power Program as a submarine officer.

22 Next we have Mr. Art Burritt. Mr. Burritt  
23 is a branch chief in Branch 5 for Region I's Division  
24 of Reactor Projects. Branch 5 includes oversight of  
25 Pilgrim and FitzPatrick Nuclear Generation Station.

1 Art has 40 years of nuclear experience including 25  
2 with the NRC. Prior to joining the NRC he was a  
3 licensed senior reactor operator and worked for three  
4 nuclear utilities as a plant operator and trainer  
5 after serving in the Navy's Nuclear Program.

6 Finally, we have Ms. Erin Carfang. Ms.  
7 Carfang is the senior resident inspector at Pilgrim.  
8 She's been in that position since 2014. Prior to that  
9 she was a resident inspector at Beaver Valley. Prior  
10 to joining the NRC she served as a United States  
11 officer aboard the USS *The Sullivans* and the USS  
12 *Dwight D. Eisenhower*.

13 Finally, let me turn it over to Dan  
14 Dorman, again Region I's regional administrator for  
15 our first portion of the meeting. Thank you very  
16 much.

17 MR. DORMAN: Thank you, Brett. And thank  
18 you, everyone, for coming out tonight. As Brett has  
19 indicated, our purpose here in the first part of the  
20 meeting is twofold: First, we'll be sharing our  
21 assessment of Pilgrim's performance through the year  
22 2016 based on our oversight results. And then  
23 secondly, we'll be sharing -- we'll be conducting a  
24 public exit meeting of the 95003 inspection.

25 For those of you were here seven weeks ago

1 for our public meeting, that inspection was still in  
2 process at that time. Don talked through the  
3 perspectives that the team had at that time on the  
4 email that was issued in December. Now he is going to  
5 be presenting to the licensee, to Entergy the  
6 preliminary findings of that inspection. So the two  
7 parts are the annual assessment and the inspection  
8 results. This part of the meeting will be between us  
9 and Entergy. And after Art and Don finish their  
10 presentations, we'll turn it over to Entergy for a  
11 response.

12 At this point, John, I'd ask you to  
13 introduce your team at the table.

14 MR. DENT: Thank you, Mr. Dorman. My name  
15 is John Dent. I'm Pilgrim's Site Vice-President.

16 MR. McDONALD: My name is John McDonald.  
17 I'm the General Manager of Plant Operations at  
18 Pilgrim.

19 MR. ROMEO: My name is Mike Romeo. I'm  
20 the Regulatory and Performance Improvement Director.

21 MR. NOYES: Dave Noyes. I'm Director of  
22 Recovery at Pilgrim.

23 MR. CHENARD: Bruce Chenard. I'm the  
24 Engineer and Director at Pilgrim Station.

25 MR. DORMAN: All right. Thank you. So

1 with those introductions, now I'll turn it to Art  
2 Burritt to begin the presentation.

3 MR. BURRITT: Thank you, Dan.

4 Good evening. After a thorough review we  
5 have determined that Pilgrim operated safely in 2016.  
6 Our assessment of Entergy's performance in 2016 is  
7 that Pilgrim remains in column 4 of the action matrix.

8 The issues that led into the graded  
9 performance were longstanding weaknesses in  
10 implementation of programs for identifying and  
11 resolving problems and a safety culture that allowed  
12 them to persist. The increased oversight tools made  
13 available by column 4 provide the additional  
14 monitoring necessary to ensure that safety margins,  
15 although degraded, are maintained. To date we have  
16 determined that our regulatory actions are adequate to  
17 ensure the plant continues to operate safely.

18 Our conclusions regarding Pilgrim's safety  
19 are based on a number of criteria contained in our  
20 manual chapters. This procedure describes situations  
21 where the NRC lacks reasonable assurance licensee can  
22 or will conduct its activities to ensure protection of  
23 public health and safety.

24 It provides us examples of what acceptable  
25 performance looks like. These include multiple

1 escalated violations of the facility license, tech  
2 specs or regulations. Multiple safety-significant  
3 examples were the facility was determined to be  
4 outside of its design-basis or a pattern of failure of  
5 management controls to effectively address previous  
6 safety-significant findings.

7 We applied these examples to both our  
8 baseline and supplemental inspections to date and  
9 concluded that Pilgrim has adequate safety margins and  
10 has not entered the unacceptable column of the action  
11 matrix, otherwise known as column 5. This is because  
12 there were no additional escalated enforcement  
13 violations in 2016, and to date there is only one  
14 potential greater than green or safety-significant  
15 issue that is currently being addressed by Don's 95003  
16 inspection team.

17 Since entry into column 4 there has not  
18 been multiple safety-significant examples where the  
19 licensee was determined to be outside of your design-  
20 basis. There has not been a pattern of failure of  
21 licensee management controls to effectively address  
22 previous safety-significant findings or to prevent  
23 recurrence.

24 Our assessment of performance is based on  
25 over 12,000 hours of inspection activity in 2016.



1 This is more than twice or double the effort applied  
2 to most other plants. This is equivalent to about  
3 eight full-time inspectors working at the site over  
4 the course of the year on average.

5 These inspections resulted in 23 findings  
6 distributed across all areas of safety performance,  
7 along with a Severity Level 3 violation for falsified  
8 fire watches. However, there is evidence of some  
9 improvement this year. This is about a third less of  
10 the findings compared to 2015, and in 2016 we  
11 conducted more inspections than in 2015.

12 Also, our Phase A and B supplemental  
13 inspections in early 2016 verified that significant  
14 issues were being adequately addressed, actions were  
15 being taken to address the Corrective Action Program  
16 weaknesses and that no additional regulatory actions  
17 were needed. The Phase C inspection that will be  
18 discussed in a minute is still in progress at the end  
19 of the year. In 2016 all performance indicators were  
20 also green with a fair amount of margin.

21 In addition to completing the 95003  
22 inspection and issuing a confirmatory action and  
23 issuing a confirmatory action letter, we plan to  
24 continue to devote additional inspection resources to  
25 the site including a third resident inspector. These

1 additional resources allow us to complete more  
2 inspections in targeted areas including problem  
3 identification and resolution areas to address  
4 previous performance, as well as more in-depth  
5 inspections in all areas. It provides more manpower  
6 to observe more site activities as they occur, and we  
7 use this additional information by each of these  
8 activities in our senior management performance  
9 assessments that are now being conducted on a  
10 quarterly basis.

11 We also continue to engage your staff with  
12 more frequent staff visits by our management team. To  
13 date these assessments have concluded that our  
14 regulatory actions are adequate to continue to monitor  
15 plant performance and assure that adequate safety  
16 margins are maintained.

17 Now I'd like to turn it over to Don  
18 Jackson for a discussion of the 95003 inspection.

19 MR. JACKSON: Thanks, Art. Move to the  
20 next slide, please.

21 Okay. The major purposes of the  
22 inspection procedure 95003, specifically the Charlie  
23 phase of that, are to provide an independent review  
24 and assessment of your actions to identify and correct  
25 causal factors related to Pilgrim's performance

1 decline. This includes an independent review of  
2 Pilgrim's nuclear safety culture, which the team did  
3 conduct and will talk about shortly. Additionally,  
4 the process is designed to identify any additional  
5 regulatory actions warranted to ensure continued  
6 nuclear safety. So those are the major purposes of  
7 the inspection.

8 Move onto the next slide. Pilgrim's  
9 Recovery Plan was an outfall of your collective  
10 evaluation that you conducted 9, 10 months ago, in  
11 that time frame. The collective evaluation reviewed  
12 -- identified problems going back several years and  
13 coupled that with real-time observations and  
14 assessment by a group that -- of our staff and some  
15 other folks that came into assist in that project.  
16 And systematically those were rolled up into issues  
17 that were identified as fundamental problem areas and  
18 problem areas.

19 The fundamental problem areas are issues  
20 that tend to drive the other problems at the station,  
21 and then the problem areas were things that really  
22 were significant enough that required their own  
23 evaluation. So fundamental problem areas received a  
24 higher level of causal analysis and the other areas  
25 received a lower level of causal analysis.

1           Fundamental problem areas were identified  
2           as the Corrective Action Program implementation,  
3           nuclear safety culture at Pilgrim Station, decision  
4           making and risk recognition at Pilgrim. And then the  
5           problem areas were determined to be equipment  
6           reliability, engineering programs, work management,  
7           procedure quality, procedure use and adherence and  
8           industrial safety.

9           Throughout the completion of that Recovery  
10          Plan I know you also took a look at operability  
11          determinations and did a causal analysis on that, and  
12          then also took a look at the root cause for the SR --  
13          Alpha SRV issue that occurred in 2013. So all of  
14          those issues were encompassed in what the team looked  
15          at.

16          The team independently reviewed these  
17          causal factors and the major actions to correct the  
18          issues, and ultimately the team agreed with your  
19          assessment of your identified problem areas and also  
20          with the root and apparent causes that you identified.

21          The level of inspection. I know Art  
22          talked about that for his group. My group that did  
23          this inspection -- it was greater than 6,000 person  
24          hours of preparation, documentation and also actual  
25          conduct of the inspection, which again equates to 3 or

1 4 person years, depending on how you add that up. So  
2 it certainly from an agency standpoint is not an  
3 insignificant effort.

4 To the next slide. Yes, there we go.  
5 Team composition. I mentioned this at the last  
6 meeting we were at, but just in case folks want to  
7 hear, we had 20 inspectors on the team, not just in  
8 Region I. There are four regions in the agency.  
9 There are regions in Atlanta, Chicago and the Dallas  
10 area. We brought in resources from all of those  
11 areas, specifically eight senior resident inspectors,  
12 the same level of what Erin does here at Pilgrim, two  
13 resident inspectors from again outside power stations,  
14 six specialist inspectors. And these are individuals  
15 that may have an engineering specialty or an emergency  
16 planning specialty, those kind of things. Two branch  
17 chiefs. I was one and we actually had -- one of our  
18 group leads just happened to be a branch chief. And  
19 then two safety culture specialists that are not  
20 technical experts on the plant, but they've had  
21 specialized training in safety culture.

22 The inspection methods we used were direct  
23 observation, interviews, focus group discussions;  
24 mainly for the safety culture piece we would pull  
25 groups of people together and talk to them in a group

1 setting, records reviews and also plant inspection  
2 tours.

3 Next slide. Just to kind of show you  
4 where we're at right now in this process. This exit  
5 meeting signifies the end of the inspection, as Dan  
6 had mentioned. The inspection report will be issued  
7 as soon as possible with a goal of 45 days from this  
8 exit meeting. The results discussed are considered  
9 preliminary until NRC senior management approves the  
10 inspection report. And that will be signed out under  
11 Mr. Dorman. It is possible that performance  
12 deficiencies as discussed may change between now and  
13 the end of the inspection, or the end of the period  
14 where we issue the report.

15 Next slide. The team found, the team  
16 determined that the plant -- as a result of this  
17 inspection, the plant is safe to operate and we  
18 identified no immediate safety concerns during the  
19 three weeks that we were on site. We identified 11  
20 violations, findings, what we call performance  
21 deficiencies. Ten of those issues that we identified  
22 were determined to be of very low safety significance,  
23 or in our vernacular green. And we did have one issue  
24 that we'll talk about in a minute involving the Alpha  
25 emergency diesel generator, which preliminarily has a

1 significance that's been determined to be greater than  
2 green. So that would be white or higher.

3 We did observe improvement in the areas of  
4 corrective action and safety culture, although we do  
5 have violations documented in both of these areas. In  
6 consultation with the resident inspector staff we  
7 could compare what we observed with a more historical  
8 perspective. So we spent a lot of time talking to  
9 Erin and the other resident inspectors. You will need  
10 to take a hard look at what this team has concluded  
11 and what we document in the report and expand the  
12 Recovery Plan to address our results. It's obvious to  
13 the team that continued enhanced oversight by the NRC  
14 is warranted.

15 Okay. So right now I'm going to go  
16 through each of the violations that we identified.  
17 For folks that were here several weeks ago this has  
18 not changed very much, but I will go into a little bit  
19 more detail on each of the issues.

20 So the first violation, and this is the  
21 one that has preliminarily been determined to be of  
22 greater than green safety significance, which is low  
23 to moderate risk significance. So the team identified  
24 an apparent violation again of low to moderate safety  
25 significance of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion 3,

1 which is Design Control, associated with your failure  
2 to ensure that design changes were subject to design  
3 control measures commensurate with those applied to  
4 the original design.

5 Specifically, for the Alpha diesel  
6 generator you did not identify and mitigate a new  
7 failure mechanism of a new component you changed out  
8 in the 2000-2002 time frame. And there should have  
9 been, as a part of the engineering evaluation  
10 recognized -- that the part that you put in was  
11 different than the part that came out and that it  
12 required further engineering evaluation to determine  
13 that there may be a failure mechanism that you had not  
14 considered. And it did -- in the August time frame  
15 did have a failure that causes the emergency diesel  
16 generator to be inoperable.

17 The second violation. Again, this is all  
18 under Operations and Engineering Performance  
19 Deficiencies. The team identified a Severity Level 4  
20 traditional enforcement violation of 10 CFR 50.73,  
21 which is Licensee Event Report. That's associated  
22 with your failure to submit a licensee event report  
23 within 60 days following discovery of an event meeting  
24 the reporting criteria. So this was something that  
25 was identified by the team at the end of November,



1 beginning of the December time frame. It was outside  
2 of the 60 days and the team determined that based off  
3 of the failure and the time failed for the Alpha  
4 diesel generator you owed a report to the NRC to  
5 explain what corrective actions that you had taken.

6 Next we had a -- the team identified a  
7 non-cited violation, again a very low safety  
8 significance, green, of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2). And these  
9 are the requirements for monitoring the effectiveness  
10 of maintenance at nuclear power stations.

11 Specifically, in this case you failed to  
12 demonstrate the performance of 18 maintenance rule  
13 scoped components. These are components that receive  
14 special care under regulation and testing and  
15 maintenance. In the 2007 time frame you removed these  
16 18 components from the Preventative Maintenance  
17 Program. You determined in 2016 that that was an  
18 error and you placed them back into the Preventative  
19 Maintenance Program.

20 However, to be in compliance with the  
21 maintenance rule, the (a)(2) portion of the  
22 maintenance rule says that you're supposed to have  
23 ongoing preventive maintenance. Well, for that period  
24 of time you did not. And those should have been  
25 brought back into (a)(1) status and treated specially

1 for a period of time until you could prove performance  
2 while conducting that preventative maintenance that  
3 the components would function.

4 The next, the last one on the slide is the  
5 team identified a non-cited violation of very low  
6 safety significance, again green, of 10 CFR 50,  
7 Appendix B, Criterion 5, which is Instructions,  
8 Procedures and Drawings, for failure to follow the  
9 operability determination process in accordance with  
10 Entergy procedures. And the specific examples that we  
11 documented in the report had to do with how you  
12 handled the operability determination for the Alpha  
13 emergency diesel generator and then the questions that  
14 we brought up associated with the Bravo emergency  
15 diesel generator. Yes, that was an extended condition  
16 in corrective action space, but when that issue was  
17 brought up, there was also an operability  
18 determination that should have been conducted on that  
19 diesel. And we didn't feel that that was at the  
20 appropriate level.

21 And there was also an issue with the Bravo  
22 RHR heat exchanger that had been leaking for a number  
23 of years. Your operability determination deemed that  
24 as being operable vice operable non-conforming. It's  
25 a difference in how you take actions based off of that

1 inoperability determination space.

2 And then finally, in our review of the  
3 emergency diesel generator room we found temporary  
4 equipment mounted near the diesel that we raised  
5 questions about and it should have spawned an  
6 operability determination with adequate engineering  
7 components to that. Your first maneuver through your  
8 process got to a point that it was not sufficient in  
9 engineering depth to show that the diesels were  
10 operable and you had to go back and take a look at it  
11 again. And I think your second review of it was  
12 satisfactory to the team.

13 Each of these -- I want to note each of  
14 these technical issues that I'm talking about were  
15 resolved adequately and shortly after the team  
16 identified them. Even in the case of the Alpha diesel  
17 generator the Alpha diesel generator was fixed and  
18 made operable well before the team showed up on site.  
19 So I don't want to leave you with the impression that  
20 we don't think you've actually fixed the component.  
21 It's clear to us it was fixed, but there were  
22 programmatic issues that spawned violations of  
23 regulatory requirements.

24 Any questions on that to this point?

25 (No audible response.)

1 MR. JACKSON: Okay. Next slide. And I  
2 got these all racked up under one slide.

3 I got to get a drink here really quick  
4 because I'm starting to run out of -- I'll start  
5 making a squeaking noise if I don't get some water in  
6 there.

7 The first one has to do -- the team  
8 identified a non-cited violation of very low safety  
9 significance, again green, of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,  
10 Criterion 16, Corrective Action, for your failure to  
11 take corrective actions to preclude repetition of a  
12 significant condition adverse to quality identified in  
13 your root cause evaluation. As a part of your  
14 collective evaluation you identified a fundamental  
15 problem area associated with the Corrective Action  
16 Program.

17 Your corrective actions to preclude  
18 repetition are supposed to be stand-alone actions that  
19 would preclude repetition or prevent recurrence at  
20 issue. We found fault with the depth of the actions  
21 that you took. Specifically, you utilized a concept  
22 of mentors and SMEs to fix a leadership problem in the  
23 Corrective Action Program.

24 The team determined that a part of the  
25 process which actually does the work of the corrective

1 action process was kind of left wanting in that  
2 process. It did not have the level of coaching and  
3 mentoring that other parts of the corrective action  
4 process had. We came to the conclusion that just  
5 those actions being done would not cause  
6 sustainability for the improvements that you were  
7 making in the corrective action process. So I do want  
8 to hold that thought for a minute, because I do have  
9 an overall thought of all of these bullets.

10 The second violation is associated with  
11 the safety culture fundamental problem area. The NRC  
12 team identified -- actually this is a finding of very  
13 low safety significance. It was not a direct  
14 violation of a regulatory requirement. There was a  
15 finding of very low safety significance, green,  
16 because you did not adequately implement a corrective  
17 action to preclude repetition of the root cause of the  
18 issue associated with the safety culture.

19 So your safety culture -- I actually have  
20 the root cause written on another slide here. But you  
21 took actions to improve the leadership at the site,  
22 and you did that by generating Performance Improvement  
23 Plans for each one of your supervisors and above up to  
24 and including your level at site VP.

25 We found fault with a number of the

1 implementation actions associated with those  
2 Performance Improvement Plans. Specifically, there --  
3 safety culture generally takes three to five, maybe  
4 even more years than that to fix. The targeted  
5 Performance Improvement Plans were very short order on  
6 the term of 30 to 90 days. And again, most of those  
7 were closed out by the time that we got on site and we  
8 didn't feel that those had enough run time to be able  
9 to be effective.

10 And the team also did note, since it  
11 involved such a large number of supervisors, the  
12 acuity of getting all those actions done with all the  
13 supervisors, there were a lot of misses in that.  
14 There were some supervisors that didn't know they were  
15 on Performance Improvement Plans. There were other  
16 supervisors that clerically the wrong name was on the  
17 Performance Improvement Plan.

18 So the overall implementation of that  
19 product, although we think if implemented properly  
20 would certainly gain some traction in that area -- and  
21 I know you've taken some actions to reassess and  
22 reevaluate and make happen the targeted Performance  
23 Improvement Plans successfully, but at the time the  
24 team reviewed it they did not -- had very good  
25 implementation.

1           The third one here has to do with the  
2           safety relief valve root cause. Again, part of our  
3           inspection went back to look at the supplemental  
4           inspection associated with the 2013 failure of the  
5           Alpha safety relief valve in the plant. And I knew  
6           you took a number of runs at what the root cause. Our  
7           inspector went through each of your methodologies of  
8           trying to determine the root cause of that specific  
9           problem, and in each of the cases one of the areas  
10          that we actually thought was the root cause was  
11          discounted. And specifically that's in the area of  
12          shift manager rigor of the operability determination  
13          process.

14                 So what that basically means is -- and we  
15          interviewed the shift manager. The shift manager had  
16          a product in front of him that he did not review in  
17          detail and approved as being the problem with the  
18          safety relief valve and ultimately it was not the  
19          problem for the safety relief valve. We believe that  
20          had the shift manager reviewed the documentation that  
21          he had in front of him and/or caused his shift to add  
22          more documentation to really get to the correct  
23          answer, it's his accountability to cause the processes  
24          to get to the point where it actually fixes the safety  
25          relief valve for good. In this case it went a

1 different direction and you fixed a different part of  
2 the safety relief valve, and we find that is being in  
3 violation.

4 Next one is one I know we had mentioned  
5 several times before. The team identified a -- flip  
6 pages. On August 22nd, 2016 NRC inspectors identified  
7 a number of drywell -- this is the primary containment  
8 at the plant -- drywell locations where non-seismic  
9 equipment was either in contact or in close proximity  
10 to the drywell liner. These problems could cause  
11 drywell damage during a design-basis seismic event.  
12 There were several areas that could not be inspected  
13 due to elevated radiation levels normal after a plant  
14 shutdown.

15 You wrote four condition reports to  
16 address these at a later point in time. When the team  
17 came in -- one of the members on the team actually  
18 happened to be the one that did that review back in  
19 August, and we noted that those four condition reports  
20 had been closed out with no actions taken. And being  
21 that they were closed out with no actions taken,  
22 that's a violation of regulatory requirements. And  
23 again, you have to fix that.

24 You wrote new corrective actions. Those  
25 are something we will certainly be following up with



1 the next time you have access to the drywell, which  
2 will likely be your upcoming outage.

3 The next one has to do with the team  
4 identified a non-cited violation of very low safety  
5 significance of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion 16,  
6 Corrective Action, associated with your failure to  
7 take timely corrective action for a previously  
8 identified condition adverse to quality.

9 Specifically, over a number of years you  
10 failed to adequately resolve gasket leakage coming  
11 from the Bravo R -- residual heat removal heat  
12 exchanger which resulted in continued degradation and  
13 leakage from that heat exchanger.

14 We do know that it was not such leakage  
15 that it would cause a radiation concern or a  
16 operability concern. It was not at that level of  
17 leakage. However, this component is a component that  
18 is not expected to leak in the location that it's at.  
19 And over those number of years the engineering code  
20 and the actions you took to temporarily fix the  
21 leakage by injecting sealant into it, that's  
22 considered in our process as a temporary repair. You  
23 consider those permanent repairs. And they didn't  
24 permanently repair because it did continue to leak.

25 So we expected that over the course of

1 utilizing the Corrective Action Program that would  
2 cause that problem to get permanently fixed, and it  
3 did not. So that's a violation of the Corrective  
4 Action Program.

5 A couple more here and then we'll have  
6 some dialogue.

7 So the team identified again a non-cited  
8 violation of very low safety significance, green, of  
9 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion 16, again Corrective  
10 Action, because you failed to implement adequate  
11 corrective actions to address a procedure quality  
12 issue that was identified during your apparent cause  
13 evaluation associated with your Recovery Plan.

14 Specifically, the apparent cause  
15 identified a wide range or a broader range of  
16 procedures that had procedure quality issues.  
17 However, when you went to take the corrective actions,  
18 you limited that scope of what you were going to work  
19 on based off of the risk associated with those  
20 procedures not being of high quality.

21 There's a couple angles to that. One is  
22 the cause does not match what you did, okay, or what  
23 you planned to do. But there's another piece of that  
24 that many of these procedures are tech spec-required  
25 procedures and under Regulating Guide 1.33 you are

1 expected to maintain procedures. So there's not an  
2 avenue to restrict what you're going to fix in those  
3 procedures just based off of risk and then not do the  
4 other piece of it.

5 So that was a -- that's kind of a dual  
6 thing there. You didn't match what you did in your  
7 own corrective actions, but there is a regulatory  
8 piece that when you identify a problem with a  
9 procedure, you're compelled to fix it.

10 And then finally, at least on this slide  
11 finally, the inspectors identified a finding of very  
12 low safety significance associated with your failure  
13 to appropriately -- to provide appropriate corrective  
14 actions to preclude repetition.

15 Specifically, there was a scram that  
16 occurred in September of 2016 that was as a result of  
17 a feedwater regulating valve failure. Ultimately  
18 there was a cause for that, a mechanical cause of some  
19 work that was done on that feedwater regulating valve  
20 in the past. That was again repaired before you  
21 restarted the unit.

22 When you did your root cause associated  
23 with that, it identified an issue with the work  
24 planning process where some individuals were not  
25 knowledgeable of some components of the work planning

1 process. And it appeared in the root cause there was  
2 a knowledge issue. You took actions to change a  
3 procedure.

4 We're still taking a look at one aspect of  
5 that, but again it comes down to the corrective action  
6 system matching what you said the cause was with what  
7 you actually did to go fix it. And as it sits right  
8 now you had a knowledge issue and you fixed a  
9 procedure issue. So it still sits right now as a  
10 corrective action violation.

11 So the one thing -- part of the reason I  
12 racked it up on one slide like this is these are all  
13 corrective action system performance deficiencies. So  
14 the one question I do have before we continue with  
15 this is why was the team able to identify so many  
16 performance deficiencies associated with your  
17 corrective action program including actions that were  
18 designed to improve your Corrective Action Program?  
19 So you ultimately had a corrective action in here that  
20 was designed to fix the -- or to improve your  
21 Corrective Action Program and that was identified by  
22 the team as having a problem.

23 So again, this is a fairly high percentage  
24 of the things we found, 7 out of 11 issues related  
25 directly to your Corrective Action Program, which was

1 one of your fundamental problem areas. And I wondered  
2 if you had some insight and maybe some actions that  
3 you've taken on that.

4 PARTICIPANT: Mr. Jackson, the analysis  
5 was very thorough. We engaged some of the industry's  
6 top performers in conducting those causal analyses.  
7 Within that, those very complex analyses, we have an  
8 opportunity to go back and take a look at that and  
9 figure out exactly what the reason for those  
10 shortfalls are.

11 What we've done is we've immediately  
12 applied the lessons learned of those specific  
13 shortfalls with our dedicated cause analysts to make  
14 sure for ongoing causal analyses we understand what  
15 kind of mechanistic issues occurred as a result of  
16 that, but we need to do some additional review to  
17 determine how we received those high number of misses.

18 PARTICIPANT: And to further just kind of  
19 amplify that, we're doing that in a very formal  
20 structured way so that we get to the right place in  
21 terms of taking the right and appropriate corrective  
22 actions to address those very gaps.

23 MR. JACKSON: Anything further on that?

24 (No audible response.)

25 MR. JACKSON: Okay. Go to the next slide.

1 Okay. The team agrees with Entergy's root cause for  
2 safety culture. Your root cause identified Pilgrim  
3 leaders not holding themselves and subordinates  
4 accountable to high performance standards.

5 The NRC independent safety culture  
6 assessment determined that the station has made some  
7 improvements with respect to safety culture behaviors,  
8 however the team did note some differences between the  
9 results of our focus group discussions and field  
10 observations.

11 And it's interesting, it may be due in  
12 part due to a frame of reference issue, because one of  
13 the aspects of safety culture is conducting  
14 benchmarking and looking out beyond your site  
15 boundaries and see what other fleets or your own fleet  
16 are doing as the industry moves forward. It appears  
17 that not a lot of that has been occurring. Pilgrim  
18 only completed 11 formal benchmarking activities since  
19 2013 and a number of planned activities were canceled.

20 So there was an indication to the team  
21 that there had been incremental improvements, though  
22 when you talk to your staff, they were -- it seemed to  
23 them like these were huge improvements: the way the  
24 leadership now communicated about safety, some of the  
25 meetings that you were having on how you conducted

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1 work, your work management process. People saw that  
2 as being large improvements, however, the team looked  
3 at it as those appeared to be smaller incremental  
4 improvements. And I think we think the -- partially  
5 the reason for that is if they had a concept or a  
6 frame of reference that's beyond the Pilgrim  
7 boundaries, they would be able to place that in better  
8 context. So that was on idea that -- or one result  
9 that the independent safety culture review came up  
10 with.

11 And I guess we do come up with the fact  
12 that there's still much room for improvement in the  
13 area of safety culture. One thing that we did  
14 identify is I mentioned earlier you did nine causal  
15 evaluations associated with your evaluation of the  
16 collective evaluation and then you had two more after  
17 that. So there was 11 root and apparent causes that  
18 were conducted. Ten of the eleven indicated some form  
19 of leadership or management shortfalls. So like the  
20 one that I wrote up on the screen, many of them look  
21 a lot like that.

22 So the team found that in many areas  
23 you've utilized -- you've brought the outside to you.  
24 You've brought in a cadre of mentors and subject  
25 matter experts in certain areas to come in and bring

1 a refreshing or an expert implementation in a number  
2 of your different processes. We believe that method  
3 is a way to get to an end point with that. It will  
4 improve. And it apparently -- we have seen improved  
5 performance. However, we do believe that this method  
6 is in need of further evaluation for expansion into  
7 other problem areas.

8 I know you've had issues here recently and  
9 operations issues, which I'll talk about in a second,  
10 and issues in security. It would appear that the  
11 focus right now, at least in your evaluation after  
12 this inspection is complete -- you would need to  
13 clearly capture and use the mentor and SME feedback  
14 and determine if that -- at any given time is that  
15 tool the right tool to be using -- used in a given  
16 performance area at the site and is it appropriate to  
17 either expand or contract as time goes on?

18 And that is going to be key, utilizing the  
19 subject matter expert feedback and mentor feedback  
20 coupled with your own assessments, and frankly, as we  
21 move forward, our enhanced oversight to determine if  
22 that needs any check and adjust as time goes on.

23 So I guess the one question we would have  
24 is if it takes three to five years or so to move  
25 safety culture and you're utilizing these subject



1 matter experts as a method to improve overall site  
2 leadership in that area -- we did notice in your  
3 Recovery Plan that there are plans in there that as  
4 you do effectiveness reviews you would demobilize  
5 mentors and subject matter experts in -- frankly in  
6 the fairly near term as you go forward if those  
7 individuals assessments are satisfactory. Is that  
8 something that as a result of the discussions we've  
9 that this inspection -- is that something that's being  
10 looked at a rethink?

11 Because again, safety culture was one of  
12 the leadership areas. It takes a period of time to  
13 impact that. It would seem to be longer than the  
14 period of time it looked like you were going to  
15 potentially demobilize some of these subject matter  
16 experts and mentors.

17 PARTICIPANT: It is an area that's under  
18 review. It's also caused us to go back and look at  
19 the specific attributes of those effectiveness reviews  
20 and make sure that we convince ourselves and are able  
21 to display that we've got sustainability captured in  
22 those as well.

23 MR. JACKSON: Okay. Next slide. We had  
24 some observations in the area of licensed operator  
25 standards. It's interesting, because the -- I just

1 observed a couple weeks ago your initial licensed  
2 operator class. They were very well trained. They  
3 performed very well in the simulator and in the plant  
4 doing the evolutions as a part of their licensed  
5 operator exam and they performed well on the written  
6 exam. So your Training Department was able to very  
7 clearly move these people over 18 months to be  
8 competent operators.

9 We also see the same thing in the re-  
10 qualification arena of your current licensed  
11 operators. So we believe there's a demonstrated  
12 ability to safely operate and respond to off-normal  
13 and emergency situations.

14 But what we did see was some things that  
15 were a little more esoteric. What we're used to  
16 seeing at column 1-type performers is a leadership  
17 role amongst operations where they cause -- if another  
18 organization is faltering, they utilize their  
19 leadership to cause that organization to come into  
20 alignment.

21 And we noted issues that needed further  
22 improvement in the area of operability determinations  
23 as we discussed with the violation. Compliance with  
24 technical specification and reportability  
25 requirements. There were some reportability issues

1 that we discussed. And there's an issue with  
2 benchmarking as far as reaching out again outside the  
3 confines of Pilgrim. And then holding all station  
4 groups accountable.

5 And we did notice -- again at column 1  
6 plans we noticed some things like some operators  
7 leaning on the bench boards. We noted some alarm  
8 control-type things that would not have met Entergy  
9 standards. And then frankly, we were in doing an  
10 observation and we heard a loud noise in the back of  
11 the control room and we could say whether it was a  
12 loud conversation or whether we heard laughter or  
13 whatever. Typically we don't hear that in level 1 or  
14 column 1-type control rooms.

15 So I know one of the conversations that we  
16 previously had is -- and I want to lead with this, is  
17 it is my belief that your shift managers, your cadre  
18 of your senior leaders on site that are the senior  
19 licensed operators frankly got you into column 4 and  
20 that they are going to be the group that's going to  
21 get you out of column 4.

22 And it was not my sense when we were on  
23 site that they think that way, that they hold the  
24 accountability that they own the rest of these  
25 processes that have kind of gone awry and have led to

1 a need for a significant improvement at Pilgrim. And  
2 we did not notice that level of ownership in the  
3 Operations Department. And you can see that in the  
4 conduct of control room activities. So we can talk  
5 about that more in a second, but I wanted to end with  
6 that as far as the licensed operator standards piece  
7 of this.

8 So in summary, we did note some  
9 improvements, and again we were able to work with the  
10 resident staff and really be able to put those  
11 improvements in context.

12 Your plant staff is competent. Okay? And  
13 that's not just -- that's beyond the control room.  
14 Your plant staff is competent in station operation.  
15 We did note some incremental improvements as the team  
16 conducted their business. And there's still a  
17 significant amount of improvement needed to exit the  
18 column 4 performance.

19 Additionally, a strong focus by you will  
20 be needed to further drive performance at the site to  
21 improve. Further improvement plans as you go through  
22 and generate a revision to your Recovery Plan, that  
23 will be -- that will form the basis I know of -- when  
24 we put together the confirmatory action letter and  
25 it's signed out by Mr. Dorman, that will be a

1 fundamental piece of that that we get to the same  
2 place with what that plan looks like. And again,  
3 there will be continued enhanced NRC oversight as we  
4 go forward to make sure that those improvements are  
5 driving you to a higher level of performance.

6 MR. DORMAN: Thanks, Don. Let me just add  
7 a piece of perspective to that. Don talked about the  
8 makeup of his team. He had senior resident inspectors  
9 and resident inspectors from roughly one out of every  
10 five nuclear power plants in the country.

11 The team observed in their discussions  
12 with your staff that your staff recognizes improvement  
13 that has been made at the station in the past year,  
14 but I would emphasize that these inspectors who work  
15 at other nuclear power plants every day saw a gap  
16 between where you are and what they see every day. So  
17 when Don talks about getting out and benchmarking, I  
18 think it will be helpful for your staff to see how  
19 those standards are applied in other locations.

20 We will be looking for a revised Recovery  
21 Plan from you that will address the findings that Don  
22 has laid out here. As Don indicated, from that we  
23 will issue a confirmatory action letter. I would like  
24 to get that out by the end of the spring, so we will  
25 look for your revised Recovery Plan in a time frame to

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1 support that.

2 In the meantime, our enhanced oversight  
3 will include, as Art indicated, maintaining a third  
4 resident at the site for the foreseeable future. We  
5 will be doing some enhanced oversight during the  
6 upcoming outage focused on the maintenance activities  
7 and the work management practices to make sure that  
8 the work that is needed to be done to continue to  
9 maintain safe operation of this station will be done.

10 With that, let me turn it to you to  
11 provide your response and remarks.

12 MR. DENT: Thank you, Mr. Dorman. First  
13 of all, thank you very much for the opportunity to  
14 present this evening. We do appreciate it. And as  
15 far as the inspection is concerned, on behalf of this  
16 station I'll tell you we're completely aligned with  
17 the outcome of the inspection and we take full  
18 ownership of the results of the inspection.

19 And I think, Mr. Jackson, what we're going  
20 to talk about, we're not going to -- I wasn't planning  
21 on going necessarily point by point of the comments  
22 that you made, but the perspective of the team is  
23 very, very valued and we've taken a lot of action  
24 already based on the team's input. And I think you're  
25 going to hear a lot of the points you brought up

1 touched on as we go through this.

2 So with that said, what we'd like to  
3 cover, with your concurrence of course, is a review of  
4 three of our site focus areas and the relationship  
5 between the fundamental problems that you talked about  
6 and the problem areas. And these are the fundamental  
7 problems and problem areas that we determined as a  
8 result of our diagnostic assessment of our performance  
9 early in 2016.

10 Before getting into the focus areas  
11 though, I just wanted to state that first of all we  
12 appreciate and very much agree with the NRC's  
13 conclusion that Pilgrim is safe to operate. And  
14 frankly, if I felt we weren't safe to operate, we  
15 wouldn't be operating. And that sentiment is aligned  
16 all the way through the Entergy organization. And I  
17 think that's been demonstrated in the not too distant  
18 past here within the Entergy fleet.

19 So that conclusion, frankly, is a result  
20 of the 600-plus women and men that make up the Pilgrim  
21 team that dedicate themselves day in, day out to the  
22 protection of the health and safety of the public. So  
23 all of us from me through the whole organization have  
24 very much a vested interest in the safe operation of  
25 the plant for a variety of reasons.

1           So that said, the three areas we'd like to  
2 discuss, again with your concurrence, are around safe  
3 operations, nuclear safety culture and finally  
4 equipment reliability. So if there are no objections?

5           (No audible response.)

6           MR. DENT: Okay. Turn it over to John  
7 McDonald.

8           MR. McDONALD: Thank you, John. An  
9 important facet of our improving safety culture is the  
10 incorporation of risk management into all aspects of  
11 daily operation. Our decision making is based upon  
12 consequence and not probability. Therefore,  
13 regardless of the probability of occurrence, if the  
14 outcome or consequence is unacceptable to our plant or  
15 our team, then we will not tolerate the risk.

16           Our primary focus is risk elimination.  
17 This team has consistently demonstrated a conservative  
18 bias to maneuver or shut down the plant in response to  
19 equipment performance or in order to eliminate the  
20 potential risk of a severe winter storm.

21           Additionally, our extended condition in  
22 corrective maintenance during our maneuvers and plant  
23 shutdown has improved our plant equipment performance  
24 as well as safety.

25           Our operating crews have consistently



1 maneuvered the plant with precision during plant power  
2 maneuvers. And additionally, as stated, the crews  
3 have responded with precision as well as proficiency  
4 in response to plant transients. Notwithstanding we  
5 concur that increased operations leadership is  
6 essential to our improvement and the shift manager key  
7 -- is key to driving peer behaviors as well as plant  
8 performance.

9 We've developed an Operational Excellence  
10 Plan with a significant focus on developing shift  
11 managers and station leaders. This plan includes  
12 recognized industry mentors for each shift manager as  
13 well as an aggressive benchmark plan such that each  
14 shift manager will visit an industry top performer to  
15 see personally best practices and to internalize a  
16 vision of excellence or what good looks like.

17 Any questions?

18 (No audible response.)

19 MR. DENT: No? Okay. Thank you.

20 MR. McDONALD: I'd like to turn the  
21 presentation over to Dave Noyes, the recovery manager,  
22 to discuss nuclear safety culture.

23 MR. NOYES: Diagnostic analysis recognized  
24 nuclear safety culture as a key driver of the plant  
25 decline beginning in 2011. We made a significant

1 leadership changes in the 2013 and early 2014 time  
2 frame. Those have been supported by more recent  
3 training for all personnel and the positive influence  
4 of industry expertise within the last year.

5 We do see some progress in our cultural  
6 improvement through improved leadership, but we  
7 understand that sustained culture change takes time  
8 and continued enforcement.

9 Current workforce at Pilgrim has  
10 demonstrated ownership and aligned around the concept  
11 of finishing strong in the last two-and-a-half years  
12 of operation. We are as a team using communication  
13 effectively to explain the basis for our decisions and  
14 promote alignment.

15 Through the 95003 process we've learned  
16 the need to individualize those Performance  
17 Improvement Plans and also to extend them to a  
18 duration that will ensure sustainability, and we've  
19 begun to make those changes already.

20 PARTICIPANT: Is that -- how are you  
21 extending that beyond the leadership? I think the  
22 leadership is a critical part of it, but is that then  
23 expected to trickle down into the organization, or how  
24 are you engaging the organization to penetrate those  
25 culture improvements deeper into the organization?

1           MR. NOYES: Well, they're done through the  
2 leadership, through the one on one, through trickle-  
3 down methodology, but then in specific areas like risk  
4 and decision making and Corrective Action Program  
5 implementation we're using mentors to physically  
6 target and provide feedback in the field, in our work  
7 control meetings, in places where those decisions get  
8 made.

9           MR. LORSON: Mr. Dent, you mentioned that  
10 you were aligned with the team's findings. We  
11 understand that Entergy went through quite a  
12 significant effort to do the apparent cause  
13 evaluations to determine your fundamental problem  
14 areas and to take corrective actions. Were you  
15 surprised by the number and the types of findings that  
16 the team identified?

17          MR. DENT: Well, I'll tell you, Mr.  
18 Lorson; I was going to mention this in my closing  
19 remarks, the team that came in was a very, very high-  
20 powered team. The NRC team I'm talking about. Very,  
21 very experienced, very wide breadth of experience.  
22 And I don't know if "surprise" is the right word, but  
23 value-added across the board in terms of the insights  
24 and perspective that they found.

25           So I was disappointed. I thought that --

1 and I still think to this day we were very  
2 comprehensive in our assessment and obviously we could  
3 have done better.

4 MR. LORSON: Given that you were  
5 disappointed with the team findings, I think just a  
6 minute ago Mr. Noyes indicated that you were going to  
7 go back and further review and revise your corrective  
8 action documents to address the team findings. Why  
9 would we be confident that your second effort to  
10 address the team findings and to prevent recurrence of  
11 some of the problems we've seen in the past will be  
12 successful?

13 PARTICIPANT: Well, first of all, the  
14 NRC's going to have a review of the document before it  
15 goes into the confirmatory action letter, so I  
16 wouldn't be the least bit surprised if we get some  
17 significant feedback one way or another on that. And  
18 I think the key piece of this is really having robust  
19 effectiveness reviews in place.

20 In the viewpoint of us -- from our  
21 perspective with the effectiveness review is it isn't  
22 an effectiveness review to say that this is done,  
23 we've completed it and check the box. It's about  
24 checking and adjusting as we go forward.

25 MR. LORSON: Is there anything you plan to

1 do differently going forward as you revise your  
2 Corrective Action Program?

3 PARTICIPANT: So what we'll do is use more  
4 diverse teams as part of the analysis, but I think  
5 maybe a contributor to the gaps that we saw in the  
6 causal analysis was the non-traditional approach to  
7 subject matter experts, which was different than  
8 analysts were used to in their evaluation of this type  
9 of issue at other stations. So I think the key is  
10 going to be able to get additional diversity, both  
11 plant knowledge and independent cause evaluator  
12 expertise engaged in that revised analysis.

13 MR. LORSON: Okay. Thank you.

14 MR. NOYES: Okay. For the last two  
15 bullets there, training to improve performance and  
16 shaping leader behaviors, I'd like to start by saying  
17 the site strategically uses training to improve  
18 performance.

19 We take learnings from many different  
20 sources and utilize a rigorous process to analyze,  
21 design and deliver effective training. The  
22 opportunities we get are given to us via many  
23 different avenues. One, the NRC inspection that we  
24 just went through, senior resident and resident  
25 inspector question, external and internal experts,

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1 focused observations, day to day work activities that  
2 discover gaps or better ways of doing business.

3 We take those, we enter them into a  
4 rigorous process that they get evaluated and drive  
5 future performance, some of which we were just talking  
6 about and how it was our causal evaluations going to  
7 be different. We've taken information from the team  
8 and we're starting to work through corrections to the  
9 analysts to make sure that they do it correctly and we  
10 review it and approve it with the right rigor.

11 We've taken several of those findings or  
12 some of those issues that were brought to us to  
13 completion already and started dealing with the SME  
14 feedback and mentoring that you discussed. And we've  
15 taken and started to drive the way we utilize those in  
16 different areas differently.

17 Actions that we took early in the 95003  
18 process strengthened our condition report screening  
19 and prioritization and that's been recognized by us in  
20 our performance improvement measures.

21 We've recognized our benchmarking external  
22 to Entergy could have been better. We had a lot of  
23 experts come into the site, and based on the findings  
24 and the information that you've provided to us, we've  
25 already started taking actions to increase our

1 benchmarking. I've currently just went to the Salem  
2 Power Plant in New Jersey to benchmark safety culture  
3 and safety culture monitoring last week -- two weeks  
4 ago and found some things that the communication  
5 specialist and I went to at that site to watch how  
6 they did business and taking some of those back,  
7 putting it in a formal report, putting actions in  
8 place that will change our behaviors at our site.  
9 So we've taken your insights and started running with  
10 those.

11           There's many more planned. We are going  
12 to benchmark ourselves against the industry in shaping  
13 leader behaviors. And we have our shift managers that  
14 you described earlier on a benchmarking process where  
15 we're going to have two done before the outage and  
16 more coming right after our upcoming outage.

17           And I believe the security SME support and  
18 the operator SME support is another example of our  
19 learning from the things that we've been given over  
20 this past journey, I guess. And that's all I had for  
21 those two. I'll turn it over to Bruce Chenard.

22           PARTICIPANT: Yes, just really quick, do  
23 you -- while we were on site for the three weeks, we  
24 did not see a corporate presence there. And some of  
25 our team that were involved in the Arkansas Nuclear

1 One 95003 saw that as a bit strange because they saw  
2 a lot of corporate Entergy fleet people there involved  
3 with the inspection. Do you get what you think is  
4 your right amount of support from your fleet as far as  
5 -- because again, that's another source of  
6 benchmarking. You're not alone. You're part of a  
7 fleet.

8 PARTICIPANT: Yes, I do. The Corrective  
9 Action Program corporate functional area manager has  
10 been at our site. I can't say continuously, but a  
11 very high rate of return. We've had communication  
12 with licensing and other groups. I know operations  
13 has gone down to Grand Gulf and other places. And the  
14 CFAMs (phonetic) have come back to us to evaluate how  
15 we compared to those. So I believe the corporation  
16 and the corporate functional area managers are engaged  
17 in providing information and what good looks like from  
18 their perspective to us also.

19 PARTICIPANT: Yes, one of the things I  
20 know was a bit of a head scratcher to us is we did  
21 notice that you had -- I can't remember the acronym,  
22 but it's NIOS. Is it the nuclear oversight --

23 PARTICIPANT: Independent Oversight.

24 PARTICIPANT: Right. I know they had some  
25 observations in your work management area that were



1       risen to one level and then I guess not enough  
2       occurred to fix it and it got risen to another level.  
3       And I know I'm familiar from my past, but the team was  
4       struck by that, that they're not used to seeing your  
5       own internal QA organization have to go through  
6       several iterations to tell you that you need to  
7       improve in a certain area. And I guess it -- that's  
8       another avenue of even internal benchmarking that  
9       appeared to not be effective in the area of work  
10      management. Is there any response to that?

11               PARTICIPANT: Yes, I agree. Actually work  
12      management is an entire across-the-site team, however,  
13      it falls under my purview. We have been working very  
14      hard at developing consistent work management  
15      performance. Work management, equipment reliability  
16      and safety go hand in hand.

17               PARTICIPANT: Yes, I'm not as concerned  
18      about the what you did --

19               PARTICIPANT: So with --

20               PARTICIPANT: -- but listening to an  
21      internal organization --

22               (Simultaneous speaking.)

23               PARTICIPANT: With respect to NIOS, we had  
24      a lowest level of awareness, which is an elevation.  
25      The actions were not adequate to sustain performance.

1 So the next step is escalation. I don't want to  
2 answer on behalf of our independent oversight, but  
3 we're very close to resolving those issues at this  
4 time and would be within the end of this month or next  
5 month for resolution.

6 PARTICIPANT: Thank you.

7 PARTICIPANT: Maybe just to follow on to  
8 Don's question, is there some learning that you take  
9 from this experience where maybe you weren't as  
10 attuned to the NIOS findings as maybe you should have  
11 been? Is there something you can do differently going  
12 forward so that for future findings you're taking the  
13 right actions?

14 PARTICIPANT: Yes, there are always  
15 learnings, absolutely. Our response initially was  
16 driven by developing measurements to ensure we were  
17 improving as opposed to really ensuring our behaviors  
18 improved. That's critical. It's a complex process of  
19 coming from an activity and planning to predictable  
20 and timely completion. And everyone needs to be  
21 involved. And we need to ensure our behaviors from  
22 cradle to grave are consistent week after week after  
23 week. And that's where we needed to change most  
24 significantly.

25 PARTICIPANT: Okay.

1 PARTICIPANT: That answer your question?

2 PARTICIPANT: Yes, it did. Thank you.

3 PARTICIPANT: Yes, thanks.

4 MR. CHENARD: All right. For equipment  
5 reliability key drivers in equipment reliability are  
6 risk recognition and decision making, which we just  
7 previously talked about, John did, the corrective  
8 action process which Dave just talked about. And then  
9 we have the refueling outage which is coming up,  
10 making sure we have the right scope in there and we  
11 fix the right equipment. We have our work management  
12 process and we have engineering programs. Okay? We  
13 at Pilgrim are dedicated to make sure that we achieve  
14 excellence in equipment reliability going forward.

15 As far as the refueling outage we worked  
16 with the fleet, Entergy fleet, we worked with industry  
17 experts when we identified the scope for the refueling  
18 outage to make sure that we had the right scope so  
19 that we can ensure that we'd run safely for the  
20 remainder of plant life.

21 That scope was challenged, like I said,  
22 not only from our fleet, but industry people and -- to  
23 get that alignment. We also have the resources  
24 necessary from the Entergy fleet to ensure that we can  
25 accomplish that refueling outage.

1           For work management our focus has been and  
2 always is fixing the right equipment at the right  
3 time. So we're working on being proficient in our  
4 implementation of our work management process. Our  
5 process is sound. We have struggled with our  
6 implementation of that process and we're working again  
7 to increase our proficiency and to make sure that  
8 we're more predictable at the execution week to do  
9 work. We have struggled in our implementation in the  
10 past as identified by the NIOS finding in the  
11 escalation, and we're continuing to develop and work  
12 at improving that process.

13           Lastly is the engineering programs. We  
14 did significant deep dives in each one of our  
15 engineering programs to ensure that we -- each of our  
16 programs was sound. And from that we identified  
17 improvement areas. And we developed action plans, and  
18 we're in the process of completing those action plans.  
19 Some are done and others are still in progress. And  
20 we have schedules to complete all of them.

21           It's important to understand that Entergy  
22 has provided us the resources necessary for Pilgrim  
23 Station to run reliably through the end of plant life  
24 with safety first.

25           Any questions? Yes?

1 PARTICIPANT: It would be fair to say that  
2 equipment performance at Pilgrim has been challenging  
3 if you look at the recent history --

4 MR. CHENARD: Yes.

5 PARTICIPANT: -- and number of events,  
6 plant shutdowns and so on and --

7 MR. CHENARD: Absolutely.

8 PARTICIPANT: -- so forth. You discussed  
9 some changes to engineering programs that you're  
10 looking at.

11 MR. CHENARD: Yes, sir.

12 MR. KLUKAN: You talked about schedules  
13 for completion. Can you be a little bit more specific  
14 and talk about some specific example of a program  
15 improvement that you've identified that's going to  
16 allow you to do things differently to give us better  
17 confidence that equipment performance will improve in  
18 the future?

19 MR. CHENARD: Yes, so in the area of  
20 maintenance rule, which is a regulation that we go  
21 follow, we identified as part of our assessment there  
22 that for some of our non-critical equipment that we  
23 weren't always coming to cause when we had failures.  
24 In our action plans we're fixing the conditions and  
25 then restoring it back into service.

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1           When we have critical equipment fail, our  
2           process drives us to a causal analysis. So we found  
3           a gap in the way we were implementing the maintenance  
4           rule. And we've subsequently closed that gap so that  
5           when we have a maintenance rule functional failure, we  
6           always determine cause. And then from there we create  
7           actions of event recurrence. So just that one little  
8           thing allows us to prevent future failures in some of  
9           the areas that we've had repeat failures in the past.

10           PARTICIPANT: Okay. Thank you.

11           PARTICIPANT: I'm done.

12           PARTICIPANT: Okay.

13           PARTICIPANT: Hey, yes, just to backtrack  
14           a little bit, I was a little slow on the draw with the  
15           nuclear independent oversight perspective. John's  
16           response notwithstanding; I'll be very blunt and  
17           direct, we -- when we -- when the issue was elevated,  
18           we were too narrowly focused on correcting the issue.  
19           What we should have done is you get -- you receive an  
20           elevation from nuclear independent oversight. That's  
21           not the end of the world. That's what nuclear  
22           independent oversight is there for. You enter the  
23           issue into the Corrective Action Program. You develop  
24           an action plan and you implement the plan.

25           What we failed to do, two things: One is

1 the actions were too narrowly focused. And two, back  
2 to your point earlier, Mr. Jackson, as far as the  
3 fleet is concerned, it's a two-way street with the  
4 fleet. We had the opportunity to leverage the fleet  
5 into the review of our plan to help us make sure that  
6 the plan was wide enough and broad enough to correct  
7 the performance problems we were having.

8 So once it was escalated -- unfortunately  
9 it had to be escalated. Issues should never be  
10 escalated. Once it was, that is what we did. So just  
11 to give you my perspective of your question. Does  
12 that make sense?

13 PARTICIPANT: Yes, it does.

14 PARTICIPANT: Okay.

15 PARTICIPANT: Okay. If I could just to  
16 wrap up here, just to reiterate what we just covered,  
17 what we attempted to cover was our site focus areas  
18 and that relationship between the site focus areas and  
19 the fundamental problems and problem areas that were  
20 identified during our comprehensive assessment and  
21 diagnostic of our performance. That's important  
22 because those site focus areas are what we focused the  
23 whole site on from an alignment perspective. That's  
24 why I bring that up.

25 And we did feel; and I mentioned this

1 earlier, we were very comprehensive. We did a lot of  
2 work to get to the core and to the root of the  
3 problems. Clearly with the NRC team coming in here,  
4 the NRC team; I'll put it in a positive, provided some  
5 really, really good insight and perspective. And you  
6 mentioned earlier the -- a couple times the  
7 adjustments to the Recovery Plan. That's in progress.  
8 We're talking that insight, we're taking the feedback,  
9 we're taking the results of the findings and  
10 violations and reforming the Recovery Plan based on  
11 that input.

12 In fact, we have taken a number of  
13 actions. Right now one of the bigger ones you  
14 mentioned, Mr. Jackson, around ops performance.  
15 Clearly, you tie ops performance and ops leadership of  
16 the station. And to answer your question, no, we  
17 didn't paint the picture with the shift managers that  
18 you're what got us to column 4 and you're what's going  
19 to get us out of column 4. So it's that -- having  
20 that picture of excellence with the shift manager.

21 So you kind of couple that with the  
22 benchmarking. And it all goes hand in hand. It  
23 really does. So we're taking aggressive actions.  
24 We've already seen a significant step change in  
25 performance. The shift managers are grabbing hold of



1 it and really taking ownership of the feedback.

2 So now to be clear, from our perspective  
3 we were not satisfied with our performance. We don't  
4 feel like we're -- we need to be. We have no  
5 illusions that we've arrived or -- but I will tell you  
6 that we've been working aggressively on improvement  
7 for performance for some time now. If you go back to  
8 mid-2013 time frame, objectively, subjectively there's  
9 substantial evidence that the performance improvement  
10 is steady and sustainable.

11 And I think with the NRC team's  
12 perspective when we leverage the Operations  
13 Department, we'll take the angle and trajectory of  
14 improvement and greatly increase it. I feel very  
15 confident that that's what we're on the eve of in  
16 addition to the other feedback.

17 We intend; and I know we've kind of  
18 alluded to this, but we intend -- and our viewpoint  
19 is, as Victor McCree mentioned to me when he was on  
20 site visiting, the viewpoint of the station is to run  
21 through the tape on June 1st, 2019 from a performance  
22 perspective. So we intend to continue to drive to --  
23 we're not looking for regulatory compliance. What  
24 we're looking for is industry excellence. And that's  
25 our target and that's what we've been driving to.

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1           And I'll tell you, we've been getting from  
2           the onset, from 2013, tremendous support from the  
3           fleet, tremendous support from the Entergy Corporation  
4           all the way up to the CEO of the business. And I  
5           think our outage -- if you look at our outage budget,  
6           the capital budget and the improvements we're making  
7           this outage, it doesn't -- it's not indicative of a  
8           plant that's shutting down in two years.

9           So I do feel strongly and our actions do  
10          demonstrate our commitment and recognizing that we do  
11          have work to do.

12          So with that said, any other questions  
13          we'll be glad to try to answer.

14                 PARTICIPANT: Any other questions?

15                 PARTICIPANT: John, one of the key aspects  
16          that cuts across all these different areas you  
17          discussed is accountability at the site. And the site  
18          has frankly struggled to make the staff and management  
19          team accountable to make sure that the -- your staff  
20          does what they say they're going to do at a real basic  
21          level. How do you guys plan to address that?

22                 PARTICIPANT: Yes, I think -- thank you  
23          for that question. I think that the centerpiece of  
24          where we're going with this; we hadn't talked about it  
25          in the actions in terms of work management, is really

1 making work management the centerpiece of driving  
2 accountability, because that's an all-in, as we  
3 mentioned a, quote, "team sport," as well as CAP.

4 If you look at CAP, we've been driving  
5 accountability in the Corrective Action Program and  
6 we're seeing performance improvement. But that  
7 broader work management process where the entire  
8 station plays into that is really the centerpiece of  
9 where we're looking to -- we got that feedback  
10 resoundingly from the team. We implemented an  
11 accountability model several years ago. We've been  
12 leveraging that. I think we took that to a certain  
13 point and it's kind of levelized out here. So we need  
14 to refresh things to continue to drive accountability.

15 Does that answer your question?

16 PARTICIPANT: It does. Thank you.

17 PARTICIPANT: Okay. Thank you.

18 MR. KLUKAN: Okay, thank you, everyone.  
19 Welcome back. Just a few comments before we begin  
20 with the second half of the meeting. First of all, I  
21 apologize regarding the snacks. I should have said to  
22 the best of my knowledge and belief there were snacks  
23 for sale, but apparently there weren't when I said  
24 there were. So sorry about that.

25 As I noted, as part of my introductory

1 remarks, the speaking order will be determined by the  
2 numbers I pull from this container. The intent of  
3 which is that the speaker order be at random. When  
4 your number is called, please queue up to the aisle  
5 microphone you will see in the middle between the two  
6 sections of chairs. If you cannot, for whatever  
7 reason, come to the aisle microphone. A microphone  
8 will be brought to you.

9 As we are recording this meeting for the  
10 purposes of creating a transcript, I would ask you,  
11 politely ask you that you please state and potentially  
12 spell your name if you so desire, before you begin  
13 with your remarks, just so it makes it easier for the  
14 transcriptionist later on.

15 As I mentioned earlier, again, I just want  
16 to remind you there's no prohibition against trading  
17 or donating tickets. However, both individuals, the  
18 person donating the ticket and the person receiving it  
19 must be present at the time when the number is called.  
20 You can't leave your ticket with someone else and then  
21 leave the meeting.

22 In an effort to give as many people as  
23 possible an opportunity to speak this evening, please  
24 limit yourself to three minutes when speaking.  
25 Positioned at the edge of the stage you see here is a

1 clock that will count down the three minutes for each  
2 speaker. At the three minute mark I will politely ask  
3 you to conclude. You will also hear a buzzing a noise  
4 or beep, whatever you want to call it.

5 We have over 60 people signed up to speak  
6 this evening. What that means is this. It's unlikely  
7 that we will be able to get to all of them by the  
8 established meeting end time at 9:15. Know that,  
9 however, the NRC staff will remain after the meeting  
10 and have individual discussions out in the hallway by  
11 the entrance.

12 Before we begin with public speakers, I  
13 would like to give elected officials an opportunity to  
14 give prepared remarks. Note that I not hold elected  
15 officials to the three minute time limit.

16 So I would like to begin first with Mr.  
17 D'Angelo who is a representative of United States  
18 Senator Elizabeth Warren's office. So if you would,  
19 please queue to the microphone. Thank you.

20 MR. D'ANGELO: Hi. Jon D'Angelo, Senator  
21 Elizabeth Warren's Southeastern Mass. Regional  
22 Director. And I'm just going to read a prepared  
23 statement on behalf of the Senator.

24 Senator Warren remains deeply concerned by  
25 Entergy's public safety record at the Pilgrim Nuclear

1 Power Station. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission must  
2 listen to the voices of the residents of Southeastern  
3 Massachusetts, hear their concerns, and hold Entergy  
4 accountable by insisting they fully comply with  
5 critical safety standards. Entergy's repeated failure  
6 to adequately address equipment problems has placed  
7 Pilgrim in a Category 4, one step away from an ordered  
8 shut down. It's clear the company is focusing on  
9 their efforts on profit over safety and Pilgrim must  
10 not be allowed to stagger and stumble towards a 2019  
11 shut down.

12 (Applause.)

13 The risks are far too high. And the NRC  
14 must demand that Entergy ensure the safe operation of  
15 Pilgrim or step in to shut the plant down. Thank you.

16 (Applause.)

17 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you very much. Next we  
18 have Ms. Rory Clark, who is the representative for  
19 Senator Ed Markey.

20 MS. CLARK: Hi, there. My name is Rory  
21 Clark. I am Regional Director for Senator Ed Markey  
22 for the 4th and 9th Congressional Districts. And I've  
23 brought along with me a statement that the Senator  
24 wanted me to read this evening.

25 When the NRC unintentionally released its

1 preliminary inspection report for Pilgrim Nuclear  
2 Plant, the public finally learned that there was a  
3 safety culture problem that "a bunch of talking  
4 probably won't fix." Yet, Entergy has continued with  
5 its empty promises.

6 When violations of safety rules were  
7 discovered, Entergy would put employees on a 90-day  
8 improvement plan consisting of three 30-minute minutes  
9 with their bosses.

10 Now as the NRC prepares its final report,  
11 it wants to reassure the public that these robust  
12 conversations which will now occur for longer than 90  
13 days will be enough to fix pervasive safety problems  
14 at Pilgrim. Those include safety culture problems  
15 such as supervisors on targeted improvement plans, not  
16 knowing that they were on those plans, as well as  
17 technical issues such as leaks in reactors, steam  
18 isolation valves which prevent radioactive release  
19 into the environment. But even as the NRC  
20 acknowledges that Entergy does not yet have an  
21 appropriate plan of action to ensure that identified  
22 safety issues will not happen again.

23 Massachusetts residents, especially those  
24 residing near Pilgrim, deserve to know that Entergy  
25 and the NRC have plans in place that will ensure

1 public safety and reverse course for one of the most  
2 troubled nuclear power plants in the country.

3           Until Entergy shows it has a detailed plan  
4 of action, the public will lack that assurance. I  
5 urge Entergy to support its hard-working staff with  
6 the resources necessary to run this plant safely.  
7 Entergy's initial steps towards safety are still  
8 overwhelmingly insufficient to guarantee the safety of  
9 our residents. Thank you.

10           (Applause.)

11           MR. KLUKAN: Thank you very much. Next we  
12 have Mr. Michael Jackman of Congressman Bill Keating's  
13 office.

14           MR. JACKMAN: Thank you. I have a  
15 statement from the Congressman. Thank you for the  
16 opportunity to address you at tonight's annual  
17 assessment meeting. Once again, it is encouraging to  
18 see the community represented here tonight to  
19 demonstrate their concerns regarding the safe  
20 management and oversight of Pilgrim Nuclear Power  
21 Station.

22           Unfortunately, the House voting schedule  
23 prevents me from being here in person, but I wanted to  
24 restate my opinion that the NRC must place the station  
25 under the most rigorous scrutiny in order to improve



1 the safety culture at the plant. In addition, Entergy  
2 must be required to operationalize adequate corrective  
3 action programs to maximize the safety of residents of  
4 Plymouth and surrounding communities.

5 At yesterday's government-to-government  
6 presentation, NRC staff rightly called into question  
7 Entergy's commitment to safety culture. As a licensed  
8 operator, Entergy must prove itself worthy of the  
9 trust of the Federal Government and the people it  
10 serves and it needs to do this every day, 24 hours a  
11 day, 7 days a week. It can only do this by having in  
12 place a safety conscious work environment where every  
13 employee is invested in the safe operation of the  
14 plant and feels like his or her work has the ultimate  
15 goal of preserving the safety of the public, not the  
16 bottom line of Entergy's shareholders.

17 The finding of this annual assessment  
18 letter which keeps Pilgrim in Column 4 due to long-  
19 standing issues of low to moderate safety significance  
20 indicate that the commitment to safety has not been  
21 met by Entergy management.

22 I call upon the NRC to maintain its level  
23 of oversight at PNPS and target its assessments of the  
24 plant to improved safety procedures and protocols.  
25 Entergy must be held accountable for the deficiencies

1 identified in this assessment and the other on-going  
2 inspections and corrective action must be taken. The  
3 safety of the people of Massachusetts depends on it.  
4 Thank you.

5 (Applause.)

6 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you. Now we will hear  
7 from State Senator Vinnie Demacedo.

8 MR. DEMACEDO: Thank you and thank you for  
9 the opportunity to say a few words. I didn't know  
10 what to expect in regards to when Entergy was put in  
11 this 95003 column. It was certainly my hope at the  
12 time when this happened that the NRC was as you  
13 shared, was going to spend 12,000 hours and we knew  
14 that Entergy was obviously in a position to take this  
15 very seriously and we heard some estimates of \$40  
16 million in expense to meet the standards. And I had  
17 certainly had hoped that at this particular juncture,  
18 what we would have found was you know what, you were  
19 in Category 4, great job. You put everything together  
20 and now you've moved out of Category 4. Or you would  
21 have come back and said, you know with all due  
22 respect, we are in Category 5 and we're closing down.

23 (Applause.)

24 However, what we're hearing today and what  
25 I've heard today and I was trying to listen very

1 carefully, adequate. We've heard adequate, your  
2 concerns about a safety culture. And that certainly  
3 doesn't give one an incredible amount of confidence in  
4 that this adequate moving forward. And so maybe I had  
5 a misunderstanding of what this category again -- as  
6 we all know, I'm not a nuclear engineer and I don't do  
7 what you do. And we have to rely on you, the experts.  
8 And I appreciate the 12,000 hours of time that you  
9 spent looking at this.

10 With that being said, I have been spending  
11 a great deal of time on this whole concept of  
12 decommissioning and what's going to happen when this  
13 plant closes. We have a significant amount of spent  
14 fuel rods that are going to have to be moved to dry  
15 cask storage.

16 (Applause.)

17 And it's always been my desire that that  
18 would happen very quickly. At one meeting we were at  
19 and it wasn't the last one, but I think it was the one  
20 before, you had shared with us that Entergy was in a  
21 position with the decommissioning fund to do what they  
22 call prompt decommissioning. And because we also know  
23 that because of the NRC rules, they could have gone  
24 into safe store for 60 years. That is, just to make  
25 it clear, the community does not want that.

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1 (Applause.)

2 And we know that there is now some  
3 interest in the company AREVA and NorthStar with this  
4 joint venture. What kind of confidence can we have  
5 that this company, obviously it's going to be a  
6 transfer of license, what type of confidence can we  
7 have that the money is adequate to do what we hope to  
8 do and I hope you're going to say that if this venture  
9 is successful and it moves forward that they will, in  
10 fact, do prompt decommissioning and so that plant  
11 won't stay in safe store and just moth balled. But  
12 that it will be done in a way that is just not  
13 adequate, but industry excellence I think is what I'm  
14 hoping for.

15 (Applause.)

16 So to that extent I really -- and we've  
17 had this conversation, but I really would like to hear  
18 from you and to the public a confidence. Because as  
19 you know, the legislature just created the  
20 Decommissioning Commission. I know that sounds crazy,  
21 but -- and the Governor just put \$120,000, 21  
22 stakeholders from every aspect of government in  
23 different areas and we want to make sure that this is  
24 done to the highest level of competence and moves  
25 forward in a safe and efficient and hopefully a speedy

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1 manner to get what I've -- and I've shared this  
2 before, to get that property back to virgin soil and  
3 hopefully back on the tax rolls for the Town of  
4 Plymouth and the surrounding region.

5 So I hope that you can at least respond to  
6 -- you shared my concern and also respond to the fact  
7 in regards to this decommissioning and how quickly can  
8 this happen and are you supportive and do you foresee  
9 prompt decommissioning as opposed to safe store if  
10 this new venture is successful?

11 (Applause.)

12 PARTICIPANT: Thank you, Senator. Let me  
13 start with the adequate piece. It was mentioned in  
14 the conversation earlier, the resident inspectors from  
15 one out of five other plants in the country, Don  
16 canvassed his team before they left the site on the  
17 question of safe operation going forward. And the  
18 team had the view and I value the experience that they  
19 brought to that in assessing that. Our management  
20 team in the region looked at this. We looked at the  
21 -- if you look at -- I think Art mentioned in his  
22 presentation the performance indicators for the  
23 station were all green with margin throughout 2016.  
24 What some of those indicators are measuring is the  
25 reliability and availability of things like the

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1 emergency A/C power supplies, the heat removal  
2 systems, the residual heat removal systems. So those  
3 -- reliability of those systems throughout 2016  
4 support that conclusion of safety.

5 So adequate is a term that's in our  
6 authorizing legislation. The Commission defines what  
7 adequate is by its regulations and by its oversight  
8 process. Adequate for nuclear is a high standard.  
9 It's not what the word commonly means to us. So I  
10 would offer that the station has demonstrated  
11 reliability. Don's licensing experts have observed  
12 the ability of those operators to put the plant in a  
13 safe condition when something happens that warrants  
14 it. Those all contribute to that conclusion.

15 Let me go briefly to the decommissioning  
16 aspect. And I would emphasize that the conversation  
17 that we've just had about improving the culture at the  
18 station matters whether they operate or they're  
19 decommissioning. The Commission's Safety Policy  
20 statement is addressed to not just operating reactors,  
21 but to everything that we license, so that improvement  
22 needs to happen regardless of whether the station  
23 continues to operate or not.

24 As to the question of the prompt  
25 decommissioning, I think that's going to be and we'll

1 follow what happens with Entergy's conversations with  
2 NorthStar. They're a little bit further advanced on  
3 that with Vermont Yankee. They actually have a  
4 license transfer proposal. We have a say in that.  
5 We'll look at the technical qualifications of the  
6 company to do the work and we'll look at the financial  
7 qualifications of the company under the terms of the  
8 deal to accomplish that work and bring the  
9 decommissioning through to license termination is the  
10 end of that process for us. And license termination,  
11 we'll be doing independent oversight of their site  
12 surveys that verify that they have cleaned up all the  
13 radioactive material on the site.

14 So the question of the prompt piece, I  
15 think the business model for AREVA NorthStar is to do  
16 it promptly. Their business model is that they can do  
17 it within the available decommissioning trust funds.  
18 They can do it in a way that meets the requirements,  
19 and they want to get it done and move on. So that's  
20 a -- so I think that there's a likelihood that if that  
21 process is followed, you will have a license holder at  
22 that point who will be motivated to do a prompt  
23 decommissioning. But ultimately, when that happens,  
24 they will provide post-shut down decommissioning  
25 activities report to the Commission and that will lay

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1 out what their plan is.

2 MR. DEMACEDO: And again, forgive me for  
3 my ignorance, but again, prompt -- so this company  
4 couldn't come here and then decide to do safe store.  
5 So if this does happen, the goal would definitely be  
6 the prompt decommissioning.

7 Again, just transferring the license,  
8 there are people that are concerned that you just  
9 transfer the license, Entergy goes and has their other  
10 fleet that they're concerned about. That's just  
11 something that just we would like some assurance in  
12 regards to the NRC that if you are allowed for this to  
13 happen, one would hope that the goal would be that  
14 prompt decommissioning.

15 And again, for those who don't know prompt  
16 decommissioning, it would start the process right  
17 away. Obviously, spent fuel rods, they've got a five-  
18 year life cycle, the ones that have just been taken  
19 out to cool down before they're moved to dry cask  
20 storage. But in fact, that would be the process and  
21 it would happen in an expedited manner.

22 Please forgive me for going past the three  
23 minutes, my apologies. But I just think this is such  
24 an important issue because it's something that we've  
25 heard and I've heard from my community that when this



1 plant closes, we don't want to be in a situation that  
2 -- we understand it happens and we know the NRC allows  
3 this as a function, but I want to make it as clear as  
4 possible, everything that you can do, we do not want  
5 to see that happen in this community for safe store  
6 for 60 years. We really do want to see this concept  
7 of prompt decommissioning and move forward.

8 (Applause.)

9 So to that extent I thank you for your  
10 time and I'm hopeful that that is, in fact, what  
11 happens provided that you and your expertise feel  
12 confident that this entity and again, I don't know  
13 much about this entity, that they are at that  
14 excellent standard that you feel confident they will  
15 do this in a safe and effective manner and hopefully  
16 get us back on track to deal with this. So thank you  
17 so much and I appreciate your time. Thank you very  
18 much.

19 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you, Senator.

20 (Applause.)

21 MR. KLUKAN: And again, there is no time  
22 limit on elected officials. That is not an  
23 encouragement to test that, but next up we have a  
24 joint statement by State Representative Peake and  
25 Hunt. I'm not sure which of you would like to give

1 this statement or both of you, whatever you would  
2 like, really.

3 MS. PEAKE: Hello, good evening. I'm  
4 Representative Sarah Peake. I'm joined up here by  
5 Representative Dylan Fernandez, Representative Randy  
6 Hunt, and Senator Julian Cyr. And this statement was  
7 also jointly crafted with Representatives Crocker,  
8 Vieira, and Whelan as well, so the entire Cape  
9 delegation.

10 I want to begin by thanking you very much  
11 for the presentation you gave us yesterday at the  
12 government-to-government meeting that you had the  
13 courtesy of extending to us. We wish that we could  
14 say that based on your presentation we feel comforted  
15 and confident that the ongoing operation of the  
16 Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station will be flawless and  
17 uninterrupted. Unfortunately, we came away from that  
18 meeting with as many or more concerns than we had  
19 prior to the meeting.

20 Most alarming were the NRC findings around  
21 safety culture. To quote from your PowerPoint  
22 presentation "Pilgrim leaders have not held themselves  
23 and their subordinates accountable to high standards  
24 of performance." It is no wonder that Pilgrim Nuclear  
25 Power Station remains at a Category 4 level.

1 As you described it, management's response  
2 to improving the safety culture was underwhelming. At  
3 best, they displayed incompetence, having no idea how  
4 to change their corporate culture for the better. At  
5 worst, they were just extending, and I use the  
6 metaphor here, their middle finger to you, the NRC, to  
7 the surrounding Plymouth community, and to all who are  
8 potentially affected by their poor operating  
9 standards.

10 (Applause.)

11 That includes our constituents and most  
12 residents of Massachusetts. Let's remember, this is  
13 a critique of safety culture at a nuclear power plant.  
14 Their attitude and response would be alarming in any  
15 factory or manufacturing setting, but here the  
16 consequences of this culture continuing are far more  
17 dire.

18 Because of our concerns based on past  
19 performance and our on-going concerns stemming from  
20 your report, we ask that the Pilgrim nuclear power  
21 plant not be refueled this spring.

22 (Applause.)

23 Let me finish. And that the orderly shut  
24 down of this plant begin immediately. As part of that  
25 shut down process, we ask that the Town of Plymouth be

1 made whole and that Entergy's agreement with them for  
2 pilot payments be honored. The town's finances should  
3 not be further jeopardized because Entergy's seemingly  
4 inability to correct safety and the safety culture at  
5 the plant.

6 Also, of critical importance is the  
7 establishment or continuation of a robust program  
8 benefitting the non-management workers who will be  
9 displaced during and after the shut down.

10 (Applause.)

11 We understand that ISO New England has  
12 contracted with Entergy to supply power into 2019 and  
13 that there is a penalty clause in that contract. We  
14 pledge and we will work with the Baker administration,  
15 ISO New England, and Entergy to lift the yoke of any  
16 proposed penalty.

17 (Applause.)

18  
19 We further ask that the NRC continue to  
20 have inspectors present at the plant both while it's  
21 operational and after it ceases produces energy. The  
22 lax safety culture has a half life just as the spent  
23 fuel does. It will continue to be critically  
24 important that plant operations are monitored and all  
25 involved in the operation and shut own are held to

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1 the highest safety standards.

2 I want to thank you for your time and now  
3 I want to give my colleagues who are standing here  
4 with me their opportunity at the microphone as well.  
5 Thank you.

6 (Applause.)

7 MR. HUNT: I'm Representative Randy Hunt  
8 from the 5th Barnstable District which includes  
9 constituents in the Town of Plymouth.

10 My take on our statement is simply this.  
11 It is a vote of no confidence in the leadership team  
12 at Pilgrim Nuclear Station and by extension to the  
13 corporation of Entergy.

14 (Applause.)

15 Like Senator Demacedo, I'm not a nuclear  
16 engineer, but I was an auditor for many years. And I  
17 have a very sensitive BS meter. And tonight, it went  
18 off several times. So this has been a recurring issue  
19 for years that the correction plans that have been put  
20 in place as stated by Mr. Jackson did not actually fix  
21 the problem and that the fix to the fix to the problem  
22 did not fix the fix to the problem. That, I believe,  
23 is an accurate portrayal of what was said here which  
24 means that it's struggling.

25 So I will leave you with this one

1 question. I hope that the leadership of the plant and  
2 Entergy would be able to answer this. What motivation  
3 is there for continuous improvement with a looming  
4 shutdown in 2019?

5 (Applause.)

6 MR. FERNANDEZ: I want to thank you for  
7 being here tonight. I want to thank everyone for  
8 coming out on this really critical issue. And I'll  
9 make my remarks brief. But I'm just deeply concerned  
10 about the safety issues with this plant. It's  
11 operating at a level 4, one step away from shutdown at  
12 a level 5. And it has spent more time operating at a  
13 level 4 in the past 5 years than at any other level.

14 And Entergy, who owns this plant, also has  
15 two other plants also operating as I'm aware at a  
16 level 4. And those are the three plants in the U.S.  
17 operating at the least safe level before being shut  
18 down.

19 (Applause.)

20 And I just think there's a pattern here  
21 that needs to be looked at. And at some point  
22 persistently operating at level 4 should lead to  
23 operating at a level 5.

24 (Applause.)

25 And so I just want -- I just think we

1 should take a look at the broader picture here and not  
2 just on Pilgrim, but at Entergy as a whole when it  
3 comes to closing this plant in a timely, early, and  
4 safe manner. Thank you.

5 (Applause.)

6 MR. CYR: Thank you. I'm State Senator  
7 Julian Cyr. I represent the Cape and Islands  
8 District. This is Provincetown to Mashpee, Nantucket,  
9 Martha's Vineyard and the Elizabeth Islands, otherwise  
10 known as the folks who don't have an evacuation plan.  
11 And I thank you folks for your time this evening. And  
12 I really thank and appreciate the really strong  
13 statement you're hearing from the delegation that  
14 represents so many people about in the unified front  
15 about our concerns, significant concerns and demand  
16 that this plant be shut down, not refueled, and be  
17 shut down immediately.

18 I also want to thank so many of you who  
19 have come here tonight in large numbers to make your  
20 voices heard. Your tireless dedication to safety and  
21 the health of our coastal community remains vital and  
22 unfortunately necessary. As a state senator for the  
23 Cape, Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket, I represent and  
24 physically live in communities that have no evacuation  
25 in the event of an incident at Pilgrim.

1 Pilgrim is a corroding facility, operated  
2 by a utility who was found by you, the NRC, to not  
3 have held themselves accountable to high standards of  
4 performance when it comes to operating the plant  
5 safely. Your words, not ours. To say that I'm deeply  
6 troubled is an understatement.

7 Now I want to be clear that the root cause  
8 of the problem with Pilgrim lies with the leadership  
9 team and with the corporation itself and not with the  
10 hard-working employees of the plant.

11 (Applause.)

12 It is the leadership in this corporation  
13 that has put their jobs in jeopardy. It is the  
14 corporation and their leadership that has also put the  
15 lives of their employees and the lives of more than  
16 half the Commonwealth of three million people at risk  
17 and in jeopardy.

18 Therefore, it is in the best interest of  
19 public safety that I and we unequivocally call for  
20 Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station to be shut down  
21 immediately. That means now. That means today. That  
22 means no refueling.

23 (Applause.)

24 Unfortunately, the Commonwealth of  
25 Massachusetts has limited powers over this facility.



1 And the vast majority of that regulatory authority and  
2 that responsibility lies with you, the NRC.

3 However, I will do everything in my power  
4 to incentivize Entergy to close this plant immediately  
5 before 2019. Entergy is motivated solely by their  
6 financial bottom line.

7 Therefore, I have filed legislation to add  
8 oversight costs to Entergy during the decommissioning  
9 process and have filed a bill that will assess Entergy  
10 costs of maintaining spent fuel rods in wet storage  
11 until they are moved in dry storage. Unlike Entergy,  
12 my motivation and our motivation is to protect public  
13 safety, to prevent immense harm to the people, to our  
14 environment, to our Commonwealth.

15 Growing up on Cape Cod, I've often looked  
16 up to the late Senator Edward M. Kennedy as a hero and  
17 I'm sure that many of us here did growing up and  
18 living in coastal Massachusetts. And I really wonder  
19 what Senator Kennedy would say tonight? I do feel  
20 quite certain that he would have a lot to say about  
21 Pilgrim and the regulatory role and responsibility of  
22 the NRC.

23 And I recall at a hearing before the  
24 Senate Armed Services Committee in 2005, former  
25 Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was testifying and

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1 all he was doing was essentially all he could to avoid  
2 blame and responsibility for his failures in managing  
3 the Iraq War. And at one point in that testimony,  
4 Senator Kennedy asked him, "Sir, in baseball it's  
5 three strikes and you're out. What is it for the  
6 Secretary of Defense?"

7 So I ask all of you here before the NRC,  
8 in baseball it's three strikes out. What is it for  
9 Entergy and Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station?

10 Thank you for your time and please, we  
11 need this plant closed immediately, not refueled.  
12 Thank you.

13 (Applause.)

14 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you very much. I don't  
15 know if we caught, just for the sake of the  
16 transcript, the third representative to speak was Mr.  
17 Fernandez.

18 I wasn't sure, sir, if you said your name.  
19 I just wanted to make sure your remarks were credited  
20 to you on the transcript.

21 Last, we have Mr. Ken Tavares, who is the  
22 chair of the Board of Selectmen for Plymouth.

23 MR. TAVARES: Good evening. To start off  
24 with, I am actually facing the wrong way. I would  
25 rather be turned around and speaking to the folks that

1 are in the back, but I do want to say a couple of  
2 things to you first. Thank you for being here and  
3 thank you for keeping a commitment that you made to my  
4 community back at the beginning of the year that you  
5 would meet with us every other month -- I mean every  
6 other week, and take on any questions that we have.  
7 You've kept that promise and I am most appreciative of  
8 that connection with the NRC.

9 Along with being here as the chairman of  
10 the board, Selectman Joyce, Selectman Mahoney is here  
11 and yesterday in Boston for that over two hour meeting  
12 at the State House, Selectman Provenzano and myself  
13 had the opportunity to listen to your briefing ahead  
14 of time. And it was enlightening. I do not want to  
15 repeat the remarks that I made to you yesterday  
16 regarding leadership. I think the position of my  
17 board was very, very clear that we think there is a  
18 deficiency and that that absolutely needs very, very  
19 special attention.

20 But now if I could turn around with this  
21 microphone which I can't, I want to speak to the  
22 representatives of Entergy that are here this evening.  
23 Take a look at me. Take a look at Representative  
24 Muratore who served on the board and the other  
25 Selectmen that at here, not just looking into our

1 eyes, but the eyes of our community. We represent  
2 over 60,000 people and we have been trying for a long  
3 time to sit down with the corporate leadership of this  
4 country -- I mean of this company. I'm not sure we'd  
5 get the country leaders right now.

6 But it is extremely important that the  
7 Entergy representatives here take back a message the  
8 Town of Plymouth wants to meet you at the table, no  
9 matter whether this plant closes in 2019 or earlier,  
10 we are going to be left here. And we have been asking  
11 important questions that will help determine our  
12 economic and social life. And so far we don't get any  
13 answers.

14 It's time to stop. It's time to look at  
15 us. It's time to invite us into your board room and  
16 into your offices and talk. I know we have a State  
17 Commission coming that will take care of a great deal  
18 of the other matters concerning safety and the  
19 disposal of fuel, but there are other issues that are  
20 impacting this region and I am not comfortable this  
21 evening that anyone from the corporate headquarters is  
22 listening to us.

23 So I have the microphone right now. Call  
24 us. I'll be happy to give you my number, Entergy,  
25 because we do want to open up those lines of

1 communication. Thank you.

2 (Applause.)

3 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you very much. So that  
4 exhausts the list of individuals who are elected  
5 officials or representatives of elected who I know  
6 wished to give prepared remarks.

7 I just wanted to check before we move on  
8 to the public portion if there were any others,  
9 elected officials or representatives thereof, in the  
10 audience who would like to give a prepared statement  
11 at this time. Going once, twice, all right.

12 We'll now open it up to the public portion  
13 of the meeting. I'm going to write a series of  
14 numbers on the board. First up is number 28 who is  
15 Susan Carpenter. Susan Carpenter. Is Susan Carpenter  
16 here? Okay.

17 So after her will be followed by number  
18 48, which is Henrietta Cosentino and then number 6 --  
19 this is where I end up failing all of you. Jameal  
20 (phonetic) Graham. So again, I'm going to write these  
21 on the board so you see them. But I just wanted to  
22 get the first three going. So whenever you are ready,  
23 Ms. Carpenter, feel free to begin.

24 MS. CARPENTER: I wrote this two years ago  
25 and nothing has changed since then. So I want to

1 submit this s my written testimony.

2 Pilgrim, An Allegory. Poised on the shore  
3 of Cape Cod Bay a sleeping dragon, it bides its time  
4 while people turn their heads away, denying its  
5 presence. But it is old, this dragon, old and  
6 vulnerable.

7 It will be safe they said in 1972. It  
8 will rest for 40 years. After 40 years they said it  
9 will rest still for 20 years more.

10 Fukushima, its twin, slept for 40 years.  
11 In February of 2011, they said it will sleep for 20  
12 years more. But the dragon was awakened within the  
13 first month of his 10 year slumber, awakened by the  
14 thrust of the earth and the salty waters of the sea.  
15 Its fiery breath blew forth devastation.

16 The people had said this dragon is good.  
17 It gives us money, builds our libraries, brings us  
18 jobs and prosperity we would not otherwise have.

19 Now the libraries stand empty. The fields  
20 lie fallow. The houses empty. Livestock perished in  
21 the barns built for safe refuge.

22 We sold our souls, the people said. What  
23 was once our prosperity has become our ruin.

24 Homeless they crouch in towns and villages  
25 not their own, waiting to return to a life now lost to

1       them.

2                   Our dragon slumbers but for how long, we  
3       ask.   We saw him stir when the snows came.   Then  
4       resume his sleep for now.   This body slowly decaying,  
5       scorched by his own fires within.   Unaware of the  
6       sea's slow rising, the increasingly violent storms  
7       unaware of his vulnerability from above or from his  
8       own digested waste lying in a spent fuel pool  
9       overstuffed with lethal leavings, capable of erupting  
10      any time.

11                   As they told the people of Fukushima, days  
12      before their dragon awoke, he will sleep, they tell  
13      us.   He will sleep.

14                   Thank you.

15                   (Applause.)

16                   MR. KLUKAN:   Thank you.   Again, next up is  
17      Ms. Henrietta Cosentino.   Is she with us this evening?  
18      Okay, great.

19                   MS. COSENTINO:   I'm Henrietta Cosentino.  
20      I'm a resident of Plymouth and this is my second time  
21      in the last two months of being in front of the NRC.  
22      This is the first time I've heard Entergy.

23                   I want to say that I am appalled.   I am  
24      simply appalled.   For an hour we heard basically -- I  
25      have another word, but I'll use the word gobbledygook.

1       Bureaucratic gobbledygook.

2               It is very clear to most of the people in  
3       the room, those who do not depend on Entergy for  
4       their living, that the NRC and Entergy together care  
5       more about the welfare of the nuclear industry and  
6       Entergy than they care about the safety and welfare of  
7       all of us and of our land, our lives, and our land.

8               (Applause.)

9               And this is not just a matter of Plymouth  
10       or even a matter of just Plymouth and the Cape and  
11       Islands, but for the entire eastern seaboard. The  
12       risk of a meltdown, the risk of anything even half as  
13       bad as Fukushima or Chernobyl is unacceptable. It's  
14       appalling.

15              If I were a student and I got grade D for  
16       two or three years in a row, do you think I'd advance  
17       anywhere? I'd flunk out. Well, Category 4 is  
18       essentially a grade D. It does not justify keeping  
19       this plant open.

20              I think there's something gravely wrong  
21       with the criteria by which you measure risk. Let's  
22       see on the one hand, there's \$3.5 million that Entergy  
23       -- that poor Entergy had to spend \$3.5 million to get  
24       the NRC to come and do its inspection. On the other  
25       hand you have what, 50 -- I don't know how many



1 millions of people live up and down the eastern  
2 seaboard. It's a lot. This is not an acceptable  
3 risk. It's outrageous.

4 (Applause.)

5 Nothing we heard tonight gave us anything  
6 but less confidence. You should be ashamed, frankly.

7 (Applause.)

8 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you very much. So next  
9 up is number 6, Jameal Graham

10 MS. GRAHAM: Hello again. This is Jameal  
11 Graham, thank you. I would like to again thank you  
12 and thank everybody for coming and it's clear that the  
13 Commonwealth is doing our very best to educate  
14 ourselves to be responsibly socially and addressing an  
15 issue that affects not just the health and well-being  
16 of people here in Plymouth, but of the entirety of the  
17 eastern seaboard.

18 As we all know, radioactivity is an equal  
19 opportunity killer. It kills everything, right? So  
20 the radioactivity of nuclear proliferation from the  
21 mining of uranium to the dropping of the bombs is  
22 radioactive contamination on Planet Earth.

23 And we deal with that on a very high level  
24 in a commercial radioactive nuclear fissioning  
25 reactor, nuclear fissioning. That is what nuclear

1 commercial power plants are. A commercial nuclear  
2 power plant is nuclear fissioning, correct? Okay.

3 So this is not Mrs. Smith's baking. We're  
4 not concerned about too many chocolate chips or not  
5 enough butter. We are talking about nuclear  
6 fissioning. That in and of itself on a good day is  
7 extremely hazardous to the health and well-being of  
8 every person that works in that plant every day. And  
9 if we bothered to do any studies, we could surely show  
10 the effect of health and well-being on the people in  
11 that plant, but we don't do those studies.

12 So I want to take this to the next step  
13 which is the importance of addressing the refueling  
14 because of all this bureaucratic song and dance and  
15 Entergy disappearing from the stage, right, yeah, Mr.  
16 Entergy, okay.

17 So refueling has been granted and you give  
18 us 45 days which is in May and we are all aware that  
19 you have decided that it's safe to refuel this nuclear  
20 hazard on our eastern seaboard in April. I would like  
21 to ask you plainly what kind of nuclear fuel rods  
22 exist now of the 2800 in the Pilgrim nuclear power  
23 plant?

24 There are over 1,000 nuclear fuel rods  
25 already in Pilgrim nuclear power plant over the

1 capacity of its original site tank. Correct. That is  
2 true. Over 1,000. There are 2800 and tell me people  
3 over here, there were -- the plant was designed for  
4 800, correct? Eight hundred eight. There are 2800  
5 now. So can you please tell us what kind of fuel rods  
6 you're intending to put into nuclear power plant  
7 Pilgrim in April before the next song and dance of  
8 bureaucracy's schedule to take place?

9 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you very much.

10 (Applause.)

11 MS. GRAHAM: I would like an answer.

12 PARTICIPANT: So it's correct to say that  
13 there are more fuel assemblies in the pool than what  
14 the pool was originally designed for. The pool design  
15 was modified several decades ago to accommodate  
16 additional fuel assemblies by putting borated panels  
17 in the pool that absorbs the neutron flux and ensures  
18 that it will stay sub-critical and that the heat will  
19 be effectively removed. So it's not accurate to say  
20 that it currently holds more fuel assemblies than it  
21 is currently designed for.

22 As far as -- I'm not sure what the point  
23 of your question of what kind of fuel. In the normal  
24 refueling, a fuel assembly in the reactor operates for  
25 three operating cycles in the reactor. So on a

1 refueling outage, the company will remove one third of  
2 the fuel that was operating during the past year and  
3 a half, two years, and that fuel will be removed to  
4 the spent fuel pool. And those number of assemblies  
5 will be replaced with new fuel assemblies to support  
6 the upcoming operation. I think that's what will  
7 happen in the outage, but I'm not sure exactly what  
8 you meant by what kind of fuel.

9 Brett?

10 MR. KLUKAN: All right, next up we have  
11 number 4, Mr. Keith Maxwell. He will then be followed  
12 by number 9 which is Ms. Marie Meyer-Barton.

13 MR. MAXWELL: Hey, good evening, everyone.  
14 My name is Keith Maxwell. I'd like to speak and  
15 address tonight the bond and stockholders of the  
16 Entergy Corporation, the taxpayers, and general  
17 population. The bottom theme of my comment here  
18 tonight is something that everybody can agree that  
19 they are concerned with and that's money. The old  
20 George Washington's dollar.

21 And what I just passed out to the NRC  
22 members and the vice president, John Dent of Entergy  
23 is that a recent New York Times article has stated  
24 that the Japanese Government and utility are now found  
25 negligent in the nuclear disaster. Courts in Japan

1 have now financially placed the liability at some  
2 estimates a trillion dollars on both the Government of  
3 Japan and the utility, wiping out all shareholder and  
4 bondholder equity due to negligence regardless of any  
5 liability protections.

6 So in the ultimate nuclear disaster, if  
7 there's negligence involved, the Price-Anderson Act is  
8 void. Any legal shields between Entergy Louisiana,  
9 Entergy Jackson, Entergy Plymouth are removed and all  
10 the stock and bondholder equity of Entergy in any  
11 nuclear accident would be eliminated.

12 In addition, it is my opinion that  
13 potentially a trillion dollar taxpayer liability would  
14 be incurred. That would impact all the residents of  
15 Plymouth, Southeastern Massachusetts to Washington,  
16 D.C.

17 Now as of March 15th this year, the U.S.  
18 Federal Government's borrowing authority holiday has  
19 run out. Under the Trump administration, it is  
20 doubtful or debatable as to what kind of debt ceiling  
21 extension there will be. So it's very plausible that  
22 the borrowing authority to cover such a trillion  
23 dollar liability may not exist.

24 If they do decide to extend the debt  
25 ceiling liability, the trillion dollars they need for

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1 that nuclear weapons program in DoD may be impacted,  
2 and our national security and defense will be  
3 impacted.

4 Now Entergy's corporate quality control  
5 program is at Jackson, Mississippi. It's a corporate  
6 program. Quality control and assurance is corporate.  
7 It applies to Pilgrim. The 95003 inspection and team  
8 is limited to the Pilgrim license LSC and Plymouth.  
9 It has not adequately gone and addressed the corporate  
10 root causes, driving the failures of Pilgrim Station.

11 The delegation from the Massachusetts  
12 Legislature and Senate hit the nail right on the head.  
13 Entergy Corporation is a business. I'm speaking to  
14 the executives of Entergy Corporation. Your  
15 responsibility is to protect the stock and bondholders  
16 of the corporation, the corporation's equity. Your  
17 responsibility is to negotiate with the State of  
18 Massachusetts, secure the financial guarantees and  
19 money that makes it equitable for you to make a  
20 profit, make some money, and apply conservative  
21 decision making to limit the outstanding risk on the  
22 corporation.

23 The liability of the Price-Anderson Act  
24 has not been adjusted for risk or inflation in 20 or  
25 30 years. The premiums paid by the corporation do not

1 cover the risk. So from a business, financial,  
2 corporate point of view, Entergy and the State of  
3 Massachusetts has every opportunity and from the  
4 corporate stockholder and bondholder should be  
5 compensated to shut Pilgrim down early, eliminate the  
6 corporate and bondholder risk to stockholders and they  
7 should be compensated equitably. Entergy shareholders  
8 and bondholders should be paid for coming in  
9 Massachusetts and supplying power all these years and  
10 now where they're losing money. They are a  
11 corporation. The bottom line is to make money. If  
12 you pay them, they'll do whatever you want. Thank you  
13 very much.

14 (Applause.)

15 MR. KLUKAN: Okay, next up we have number  
16 9 who is again Ms. Marie Meyer-Barton.

17 MS. TURCO: Hi, Marie gave me her number.  
18 I'm Diane Turco with Cape Downwinders.

19 MR. KLUKAN: Hi, is Marie here?

20 MS. TURCO: Yes. She is here.

21 MR. KLUKAN: Okay, great. This is a new  
22 role. We want to make sure we're doing it right.

23 MS. TURCO: How would you know it's her  
24 anyway?

25 MR. KLUKAN: I appreciate that.

1 MS. TURCO: Repetitive, degrading,  
2 adequate are not words that should be paired with  
3 nuclear reactor. Correct? What do you think?

4 (Applause.)

5 What do you think? What do you think?  
6 What do you think?

7 (Applause.)

8 Adequate is not something that we should  
9 be hearing and it is not acceptable. In fact, Mr.  
10 Dent said, if unacceptable, we will not tolerate the  
11 risk. And he's not satisfied with the performance.  
12 Well, the same with us. We don't accept this risk and  
13 we won't tolerate it. Why do they have more power  
14 than the public? They're the ones that are putting us  
15 at risk. And you're letting them do that.

16 Your goal was to arrest declining  
17 performance, but in 2013 Pilgrim was identified as one  
18 of the nine worst operating reactors, correct? In  
19 2014, you come in, violations of federal safety  
20 regulations and Pilgrim is now one of the five worst  
21 operating reactors. Correct?

22 2015, you come in again, more federal  
23 safety violations and Pilgrim is now rated one of the  
24 three worst rated reactors in the country. Is that  
25 correct?



1 PARTICIPANT: Yes.

2 MS. TURCO: And they're all owned by?

3 PARTICIPANT: Entergy.

4 MS. TURCO: Entergy. Okay? You come in  
5 to arrest declining performance and we're standing  
6 here two years later, going on the third year that  
7 Pilgrim is going to be still one step from federally-  
8 mandated shutdown.

9 What we're seeing is ongoing federal  
10 violations of safety. There were 18 failures. We  
11 didn't mention that today. But there were 18 failures  
12 of problems at Entergy just this past year.

13 April 11th NRC report, violations of NRC  
14 federal safety regulations. May 20th NRC report,  
15 violations of federal safety regulations. November  
16 14th NRC report, federal safety violations. Ongoing  
17 and ongoing. What is it going to take for the NRC to  
18 shut down Pilgrim, an accident?

19 Now we come up to the email and thank you,  
20 Mr. Jackson for the email. That was really good. And  
21 we are going to trust this email and in here you  
22 talked about how poor the safety culture was at  
23 Pilgrim. All right?

24 The second thing is thank you for the next  
25 report. Our Valentine's Day report, I just want to

1 finish one up. This is what they said. Okay, this is  
2 just February 14, 2017. "Entergy did not adequately  
3 implement the process of planning, controlling, and  
4 executing work activities such that nuclear safety is  
5 the overriding priority."

6 Your job is to shut Pilgrim because you  
7 have identified that nuclear safety is not a priority  
8 at Entergy.

9 (Applause.)

10 It seems like you have a symbiotic  
11 relationship with Entergy. You charge them \$3.2  
12 million for the assessment and they're saving tens of  
13 millions of dollars of not doing the fixes that they  
14 should be doing because you're giving them the  
15 oversight. You're saving them money, so shut it down.  
16 Will you shut it down?

17 (Applause.)

18 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you very much. Okay,  
19 next up will be --

20 MS. TURCO: Will you answer my question,  
21 please? If nuclear safety is not a priority, will you  
22 shut down Pilgrim? You've identified that.

23 PARTICIPANT: We have laid out the  
24 analysis that we did, the conclusion that we reached  
25 that we have not have sufficient significant issues

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1 that result in the shutdown.

2 All of the issues that you just waved at  
3 me, all of the issues that you just pointed out from  
4 our inspection reports in 2016 are all issues that  
5 were designated as green or very low safety  
6 significance. All of those issues added up have no  
7 safety significance to the overall performance of the  
8 station.

9 The issues that arose in 2013 that started  
10 us down this path were a set of unplanned scrams of  
11 the plant that were frankly in and of themselves of  
12 relatively low safety significance, but were a  
13 statistical significant deviation from industry norms  
14 that caused us to increase our oversight.

15 The safety relief valve issue in January  
16 of 2015 was the issue that then put them into column  
17 4. And it's that -- you talked about repetitive  
18 degraded cornerstone is not something you want to hear  
19 about in a nuclear power plant and neither do I.

20 MS. TURCO: Right, right.

21 PARTICIPANT: But it is in the  
22 Commission's oversight process, it is that step in the  
23 process where we embark on the process that Don has  
24 been doing to have an independent diagnosis of what  
25 are the degradations in the programs at the station

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1 that have allowed them to come to this point. And a  
2 piece of that, a piece of the charter of Don's team  
3 was to ask the question should they be in column 5.

4 Don's team was an exceptional team of  
5 people with a lot of experience who spent a lot of  
6 time in other nuclear power plants and they saw that  
7 there is still work to do at Pilgrim to have sustained  
8 performance improvement which is that's what we have  
9 to see before they would move out of column 4 to the  
10 left. But they also concluded that based on all of  
11 their experience and everything they've seen at other  
12 nuclear power plants, including a lot of those folks  
13 have a lot of Navy experience, too, that the  
14 reliability of the equipment, the proficiency of the  
15 operators, and the lack of a pattern of significant  
16 issues and that's the key in that column 5, could they  
17 conclude that they have confidence that this plant  
18 will be operated safely.

19 MS. TURCO: Systemic mismanagement and on-  
20 going violations more than -- what's that word you  
21 use? More than minor in this latest, right, Erin?  
22 More than minor in this latest report in 2017. We're  
23 still hearing it. It needs to be stopped.

24 So my question is what is it going to take  
25 for you to close Pilgrim, an accident?

1 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you.

2 (Applause.)

3 Okay, next up we have number 33 who is Mr.  
4 James Garb, G-A-R-B. All right, great. He will be  
5 followed by Ms. Judy Barclay, number 37. And then Ms.  
6 Diane Turco, which is number 22. So you can trade  
7 with someone else. So Mr. Garb, please feel free to  
8 go ahead.

9 MR. GARB: Good evening. My name is James  
10 Garb. I live in Yarmouth across the bay. I'm a  
11 physician and I specialize in occupational and  
12 environmental health. I spent most of my career  
13 working with healthcare organizations on their safety  
14 problems and I know a good safety culture when I see  
15 it. And I know a bad safety culture when I see it.  
16 And what we have at Pilgrim is a bad safety culture.

17 Mr. Jackson identified that in his email.  
18 We heard it tonight. And anyone who's been following  
19 what's been going on at Pilgrim knows that. And what  
20 we heard tonight from the people from Pilgrim gave me  
21 no confidence in their ability to turn that around.  
22 And Mr. Jackson told us it takes three to five years  
23 to turn a safety program, a safety culture around.  
24 Pilgrim is only going to be operating for two years  
25 and so it's physically impossible that they're going

1 to make things better in that time.

2 I think it's disingenuous of the Pilgrim  
3 managers to blame the shift managers for this problem.  
4 It's not a shift manager problem. It's the CEO of  
5 Entergy problem. It's the senior management of  
6 Entergy problem.

7 (Applause.)

8 Entergy only operates ten nuclear plants  
9 in the country and 30 percent of them are in column 4.  
10 No other operator has a plant in column 4. The  
11 chances of that happening just by chance are one in a  
12 million. It's a corporate culture problem at Entergy.

13 I'll tell you in the healthcare industry  
14 if the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of  
15 Healthcare Organizations came into a hospital and  
16 found a fraction of what your team found at Pilgrim,  
17 they would pull that hospital's license in a  
18 heartbeat.

19 (Applause.)

20 Let me just share with you all what a good  
21 corporate safety culture looks like. A few years ago,  
22 I had the opportunity to hear the CEO of Georgia  
23 Pacific speak at a safety conference. Briefly,  
24 Georgia Pacific is a big, multi-national corporation  
25 that does a lot of hazardous work, lumber industry,

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1 logging, making chemicals, making fertilizers, a lot  
2 of room for things to go wrong.

3 They have an accident rate that's as close  
4 to zero as you can get. And the CEO got up there and  
5 he said this and I'll never forget it. He said, "At  
6 Georgia Pacific, safety is our most important value.  
7 It's more important than quality. It's more than  
8 important than profit." And that's what the  
9 population of Southeast Massachusetts deserves from  
10 the nuclear power plant here in town and we should  
11 accept nothing less. And the NRC should accept  
12 nothing less.

13 (Applause.)

14 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you. Next up we have  
15 number 37 which is Ms. Judy Barclay. Ms. Judy  
16 Barclay.

17 MS. BARCLAY: Good evening. I'm in the  
18 minority here tonight because I don't want to see the  
19 plant shut down until 2019. I'm a Plymouth resident  
20 for 35 years. I've also been an employee at Entergy  
21 for 27 years. I'm not part of management. I'm part  
22 of the working class people that take our job  
23 seriously. We look at safety as our number one  
24 priority. Every meeting we go to, the first thing we  
25 talk about is safety. Every job we approach, the

1 first thing we do is talk about what issues could  
2 cause an unsafe act.

3 I understand as a nuclear employee that my  
4 job is to do my job safely so that I leave my job  
5 every day the same way I came in on that morning. The  
6 Nuclear Regulatory Commission came in and under a  
7 microscope looked at all of our flaws. How many of us  
8 could take that kind of scrutiny and still not come up  
9 with a little flaw that we didn't self-identify? I  
10 don't think there's any of us that could.

11 I do know that the leadership of our plant  
12 is dedicated every day to making sure that it's run  
13 safely, that it trains its people to run everything  
14 that they do on a daily basis as safely as they can,  
15 efficiently, effectively, and proficiently.

16 We take pride in what we do. We don't go  
17 to work every day trying to make an accident happen.  
18 I live in Plymouth. I don't want that. I understand  
19 the concerns of everybody here. I hear you. But that  
20 doesn't mean that your viewpoint is the only viewpoint  
21 of people who live in Plymouth.

22 Regardless of the fact that I work there,  
23 I live here, and I've been here for 35 years. I don't  
24 want any of us to have to be part of a Chernobyl or a  
25 Fukushima. And I don't believe that anybody that I



1 work with would ever want that either.

2 We take great pride in our plant and what  
3 we do every day, and we hope that the Nuclear  
4 Regulatory Commission will continue to help us make  
5 sure that we continue our improvement to be the best  
6 plant that we can be until the end of 2019.

7 I thank you for the opportunity to speak  
8 in a positive manner. Good evening.

9 (Applause.)

10 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you. All right, next  
11 up is ticket 22 which is Ms. Diane Turco.

12 MS. TURCO: Thank you. Did somebody else  
13 want to go first? Okay. I just wanted to ask a  
14 question because I have a letter from Governor Baker  
15 and it was written in 2015. And it said that he's  
16 expecting that Entergy be in compliance with all the  
17 rules and regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory  
18 Commission.

19 Can you say that Entergy, given all these  
20 violations of federal safety standards is in  
21 compliance with NRC regulations?

22 PARTICIPANT: Not completely. The  
23 findings indicate that.

24 MS. TURCO: Right, right.

25 PARTICIPANT: And that's why we do

1 inspection. There are a huge amount of regulations,  
2 requirements, some of them get into the fundamental  
3 design of the equipment. Others are reporting  
4 requirements, administrative programs and processes.  
5 And so when we look at any particular finding, we look  
6 at the significance of it, whether we need to take any  
7 additional regulatory action other than identifying it  
8 in an inspection report to the licensee and verifying  
9 that they go back and fix it.

10 MS. TURCO: Okay, so you have not been  
11 able to comply with our Governor's request for  
12 compliance with all the rules and regulations of the  
13 NRC.

14 Another thing I did ask -- I was wondering  
15 because of all that's going on is what is the criteria  
16 for the NRC to close a poor-performing reactor? And  
17 this is the response I got. "If it were an immediate  
18 safety concern, the NRC would require shutdown."  
19 Well, that's pretty obvious that would happen. But  
20 this continues "But because every situation is  
21 different, it's not possible to give a one size fits  
22 all answer."

23 By reporting on on-going safety violations  
24 and allowing Entergy to operate Pilgrim as a  
25 repetitively degrading reactor, for the third

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1 consecutive year, the failings of the NRC is also  
2 being exposed. You haven't closed a nuclear reactor  
3 in a poor-performing category in 30 years as I  
4 understand. What gives us confidence that you would  
5 really ever close Pilgrim?

6 PARTICIPANT: Actually, Fort Calhoun in  
7 Nebraska was closed from 2011 to 2015 because of a  
8 pattern, or one of the criteria that Art talked about  
9 before was a pattern of a loss of confidence in the  
10 ability of the facility to operate within its design  
11 basis.

12 MS. TURCO: I'm saying closed for good.  
13 So that's 1 in 30 years that you closed short term.  
14 But we know Pilgrim can't be fixed. They're closing  
15 in two years. They're not going to put any money into  
16 that reactor, so that puts us all at increased risk.  
17 So what kind of confidence will we have that you would  
18 really consider and close Pilgrim?

19 PARTICIPANT: Over my career, 26 years  
20 now at the NRC, I've been involved with a number of  
21 reactors. Maine Yankee was one. Yankee Rowe was  
22 another one where the reactor ended up in a long-term  
23 shutdown because of performance conditions. The  
24 Agency typically at that point doesn't revoke a  
25 license. We go in and we examine the plant closely

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1 and we identify the issues and the equipment that have  
2 to be fixed before we would allow a restart of that  
3 facility.

4 MS. TURCO: Right, right.

5 PARTICIPANT: And in those cases, that  
6 list got to a point where the board of directors of  
7 those companies said we're not going to make that  
8 investment in the station.

9 MS. TURCO: Okay, but that was after it  
10 was shut down. And that happened to Pilgrim in the  
11 '80s when I was working on this, too.

12 What you're saying is there's really no  
13 criteria for you to shut Pilgrim as a poor-performing  
14 reactor. It's not going to happen. It hasn't  
15 happened in 30 years. That's what I'm asking for,  
16 give us some confidence that you really would do that.  
17 I'm not hearing it.

18 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you. Next up, we have  
19 number 5 who is Paul Jean. I think I got that name  
20 right. Paul Jean. And that will be followed by  
21 ticket number 23 who is Joanne Corrigan. So whenever  
22 you're ready.

23 MR. JEAN: I'm Paul Jean. I'm the vice  
24 chairman of the Board of the Plymouth Philharmonic, so  
25 I'm not here to speak to safety issues. As a

1 representative of an orchestra, I'm just here to speak  
2 to the fact that Entergy has been a good community  
3 partner for the Plymouth Phil. for the past three or  
4 four years. Over that period of time, Entergy has  
5 contributed approximately \$75,000 in funding to the  
6 Phil. That's allowed us to put on our musical  
7 performances and it's also allowed us to continue our  
8 programming in the Plymouth Public Schools. So from  
9 our perspective, they've been just a good community  
10 partner, but again, we don't take any position on the  
11 safety issues. Thank you.

12 (Applause.)

13 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you. Next up is number  
14 23, Ms. Joanne Corrigan. She will be followed by  
15 ticket number 11 which is Layton Price.

16 MS. CORRIGAN: Yes, I'm just disturbed by  
17 the amount of time that the NRC has given Pilgrim for  
18 the CAP, the corrective action plan, and it just seems  
19 to me, this is a 44-year-old plant. There must be a  
20 safety procedure protocol somewhere in place at the  
21 other places that everybody has to follow to a certain  
22 extent per that particular plant.

23 How has it taken these years to get a  
24 safety protocol that's acceptable and correct and  
25 taken us out of 4?

1           Now you said we're going to get out of 4,  
2           the people that put us into 4 are going to get us out  
3           of 4. Hopefully, they don't put us into 5 with the  
4           reaction blowing up over there. Hopefully, they can  
5           get us into 3, but I don't think they can and nothing  
6           you have said instills any confidence in any of you to  
7           the people that really thing there's a severe problem  
8           at the plant. And you just aren't going to close it  
9           down. It's all about the money and we understand  
10          that.

11                    (Appause.)

12                   MR. KLUKAN: Thank you. So again next up  
13           is number 11, Layton Price.

14                   MR. PRICE: Good evening. My name is  
15           Layton Price and I'm a resident of Plymouth. My wife  
16           and I were married in Plymouth in 1959. For decades  
17           we came to Plymouth for vacations. In 2001, we  
18           retired to a family home on one of the beautiful ponds  
19           in Plymouth.

20                   Each year we receive a calendar that  
21           Entergy sponsors. It contains some wonderful  
22           historical photographs, as well as evacuation  
23           instructions to follow in the event that the Pilgrim  
24           plant has a significant failure or accident. What  
25           other business or industry is potentially so dangerous

1 to the public that it requires evacuation plans for  
2 all of Plymouth plus much of the surrounding area?

3 The highways and roads people are supposed  
4 to use for evacuating various sub-areas are much the  
5 same as they were 50 years ago. But today, tens of  
6 thousands more people live in Plymouth and the  
7 surrounding areas and the traffic on these highways is  
8 many times greater. In other words, this alone makes  
9 the danger to the public greater.

10 In the event of a nuclear emergency,  
11 people will hurry to get onto the main highways and  
12 roads. Traffic will become congested. People will  
13 get anxious and some will panic. Cars will run out of  
14 gas. Accidents will occur. Traffic will get backed  
15 up for miles and evacuation will soon become a virtual  
16 impossibility.

17 Now that the NRC itself ranks Plymouth as  
18 one of the least safe nuclear plants in the country,  
19 it should be perfectly obvious to anyone here and  
20 especially to our state and local legislators that the  
21 risks to the public safety are enormous.

22 The NRC is gambling that the aged and  
23 deteriorating Pilgrim plant won't have a significant  
24 failure or accident. Likewise, state officials are  
25 charged with protecting the public safety are gambling

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1 that Pilgrim won't have a serious problem. In other  
2 words, both the NRC and the public officials are  
3 gambling with everything we own, with our health, and  
4 with our ability to even live in Plymouth. Pilgrim  
5 plant safety is an NRC responsibility, but public  
6 safety is largely a state and local government  
7 responsibility.

8           Given the dismal equipment safety and  
9 maintenance record of Pilgrim, our public officials  
10 have a moral obligation to protect everyone put at  
11 risk by this failing nuclear plant. Neither the NRC  
12 nor the state and local officials seems to fully  
13 appreciate the gravity of this responsibility.  
14 Instead, they appear to be passing responsibility  
15 around like a hot potato, hoping that nothing will  
16 happen.

17           It should be clear to everyone that the  
18 public safety of many tens of thousands of people is  
19 at risk. It is not sufficient to keep patching up  
20 Pilgrim and hoping for the best.

21           MR. KLUKAN: After Number 14, we have  
22 Number 13, which is Pine Dubois (phonetic), and then  
23 Number 7, which is Charlie McDonald (phonetic), and  
24 then Number 12, which is Dorothy Price (phonetic).  
25 Did we get that, everyone?



1           So again, Lucy Mitchell (phonetic) will be  
2 followed by Pine Dubois, followed by Charlie McDonald,  
3 followed by Dorothy Price. Okay. Whenever you're  
4 ready.

5           MS. DICKENSON: Okay. Thank you, Lucy,  
6 for giving me your ticket. My name is Elaine  
7 Dickinson. I'm with Cape Downwinders, and all I have  
8 heard here tonight gives me the impression that  
9 Entergy is running a nuclear kindergarten at Pilgrim.

10          Learn as you go. Failure doesn't mean  
11 that the student will flunk out. It's kindergarten,  
12 after all.

13          We, the people, pay your salaries with our  
14 tax dollars, yet you do not work for us. You work for  
15 the nuclear industry.

16          Your mandate, which is on your website,  
17 and was on the corner of every slide up there tonight,  
18 uphold public safety by protecting the public and the  
19 environment. This mandate seems to mean nothing to  
20 you.

21          You protect the profits of the  
22 corporation, not public safety. It is a crime. I  
23 think others here tonight would like to join me in  
24 firing you all.

25          MS. DUBOIS: Good evening. She just

1 really means do your job. You know? That's the theme  
2 of our country these days, I think.

3 I wrote, I made up a nice little poster  
4 for the NRC tonight. It's called failing to plan is  
5 planning to fail.

6 And I guess the, and I'm going to give you  
7 each one of these for your office. I, my message  
8 tonight really is that I think that what's going on is  
9 a violation of the public trust. You know?

10 The public entered the nuclear age with a  
11 really different idea of it. You know? And in the  
12 '70s and in the early '80s, we were guaranteed that  
13 all that waste fuel, whatever that was, would be  
14 addressed by the Department of Energy and, you know,  
15 buried in some safe place for the next million years.

16 And in 1998, we realized we were wrong.  
17 And DOE realized they were wrong. In 1999, 2000,  
18 Pilgrim was sold to Entergy.

19 Didn't have a great time starting up. By  
20 2011, it was failing. In 2012, you re-licensed them  
21 without evaluating the environmental consequences,  
22 without assuring that the EPA had a current NPDES  
23 permit that would protect the water resources of Cape  
24 Cod Bay.

25 You said, oh, no, we'll get around to

1 that. And you haven't. It's still 22 years expired.  
2 One of the oldest expired licenses in the country. It  
3 should not be operating.

4 And then what do you do? You modify the,  
5 how you deal with the spent fuel. You just said, we,  
6 oh, we modified the pool by using these Boraflex  
7 panels.

8 Well, what did we learn last year? We  
9 learned that the Boraflex was slipping off the panels  
10 and you had to make it wider. So you had to modify  
11 that again.

12 And then you modified everything else and  
13 went, oh, dry cask storage. But you put it next to  
14 the ocean. You put it next to the ocean.

15 Why? Because you think water cools it  
16 really great. Well, guess what? Our fish and  
17 livelihoods and environment and everything we love is  
18 in the ocean, except for our kids and the houses that  
19 we live in and what not. But you know, those are at  
20 risk.

21 The tritium, that wasn't supposed to be in  
22 the ground, but it's in the ground where? Going into  
23 the ocean.

24 That's another modification of everything  
25 that you told us you were taking care of. You're not

1 taking care of it.

2 And although I have to say, I have the  
3 utmost respect for how many boxes you have figured out  
4 how to, you know, fill up. You haven't gotten out of  
5 the box.

6 The box is the environment. It's the  
7 context that we all live in. And you need to jump in  
8 our box and then figure out if you're doing the right  
9 thing.

10 Shut it down, do not refuel it, pay Holtec  
11 to send it to Arkansas. They need it down there. We  
12 don't.

13 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you very much. Okay.  
14 Next up, we'll have Mr. Charlie McDonald. Okay. He  
15 will be followed by Ms. Dorothy Price, who will then  
16 be followed by Ms. Mary Conathan (phonetic), which is  
17 Number 24. Ms. Mary Conathan. Okay. All right.  
18 Whenever you are ready.

19 MR. McDONALD: I am ready. Good evening,  
20 and thanks for the opportunity to speak. I'm Charlie  
21 McDonald. Can you hear me?

22 I'm a resident of Plymouth, and an  
23 employee of Pilgrim. I'm the training manager at the  
24 station for the last three years.

25 And I don't know if I can do much better

1 than my coworker, Judy, on talking about the pride  
2 that the workforce has and our commitment to safety,  
3 but I'm going to try.

4 I just want to go over, I've been in this  
5 business since 1978, and each and every one of the  
6 power plants I've been at, I've seen a progressive  
7 focus on safety in all those years.

8 I started out before, Three Mile Island,  
9 and all the lessons learned, and I can tell you when  
10 I came here three years ago, I had choices.

11 And when I was interviewed, I also was  
12 interviewing the management team that interviewed me  
13 to get a sense of their level of commitment to safety,  
14 because at that point, the station had been in decline  
15 and there was a recovery plan in place.

16 So I made a conscious decision to come  
17 here based on what I saw from the leadership team, and  
18 I can tell each and every one of you that there is a  
19 strong commitment on a daily basis to safety at the  
20 Pilgrim station.

21 And I can also assure you that for the  
22 next two and a half years, until the plant shuts down  
23 in 2019, that we have a continued focus on safety.

24 We talk about the outage a lot here  
25 tonight, and I can tell you, one example of that is

1 the millions of dollars that we're investing in the  
2 station to ensure that we can safely operate for the  
3 next two and a half years until June of 2019 when the  
4 plant shuts down.

5 So from a safety perspective, I'm  
6 confident, everyone at the station is fully committed  
7 to nuclear safety at the highest standards.

8 We're a learning organization. We're  
9 taking the feedback from the, Don's team, and acting  
10 on that. And making our improvement plans that much  
11 more robust and better.

12 I want to, and again, acknowledge the team  
13 on the, the team, the work they did. As Judy said,  
14 there was a fine microscope that the team used to  
15 review our performance in accordance with their  
16 inspection procedures.

17 It was thorough. It was robust. And it  
18 came to the conclusions that we agree with, and we're  
19 focused on responding to the team and their comments.

20 And again, focused on safety, safety,  
21 safety. So the other thing I want to comment on,  
22 because I've heard a lot of politicians and everyone  
23 roll up here, that was a, the impression was that  
24 everyone in this room was really to shut down the  
25 station.

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1 But I just want to, I don't know many of  
2 you are left, but just kind of raise your hand to the  
3 folks that are in this community and work at the  
4 station that have a different point of view.

5 And I'm one of those. As a citizen and a  
6 resident here in the Plymouth area, and also as a  
7 worker at the station. So, I appreciate the  
8 opportunity to speak, and you all have a good night.

9 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you very much. Okay.  
10 Next up is Number 12, Dorothy Price.

11 FEMALE 1: We're trading.

12 MR. KLUKAN: Okay. Thank you very much  
13 for letting me know. And then Number 24, Mary  
14 Conathan. Just, I just need to, I just wanted to make  
15 sure you're in the room, just so I, all right. Okay.

16 And then, just to let you know you're up,  
17 and then that, she will be followed by Number 25,  
18 Jolene Dolabani (phonetic). Okay?

19 MS. DOLABANI: Well, that's me.

20 MR. KLUKAN: Oh.

21 MS. DOLABANI: So I will trade that with  
22 someone if someone else would like to speak.

23 MR. KLUKAN: Well, we'll figure it out at  
24 the time.

25 MS. DOLABANI: We'll figure it out.

1 MR. KLUKAN: But, all right. As long as  
2 there are two people, all right.

3 MS. DOLABANI: All right.

4 MR. KLUKAN: But please, go.

5 MS. DOLABANI: Okay.

6 MR. KLUKAN: Sorry.

7 MS. DOLABANI: Thank you. My name is  
8 Jolene Dolabani, and I'm a relatively new resident to  
9 Plymouth, and I love being here.

10 It was my intention just to come to this  
11 meeting and listen with great interest about what was  
12 being said, but after I sat here for a while, I kind  
13 of felt compelled to speak.

14 I appreciate how the NRC can take pretty  
15 complicated information, and especially Mr. Jackson,  
16 who I thought was extremely plain spoken in his  
17 evaluation of some of the problems at Pilgrim, but  
18 because he was so plain spoken and it was so easy to  
19 understand, it just struck me that the six problem  
20 areas that you described, describe problems that were  
21 so pervasive and systemic that whatever confidence I  
22 might've had in the beginning of this meeting has  
23 severely eroded.

24 I feel that, I mean, I didn't know that  
25 600 people worked at Pilgrim. That's a lot of people.



1 And I'm sure, you know, in their heart of hearts, it  
2 is your very, very best intention to rise up and make  
3 the improvements that have been indicated.

4 But even with the best of intentions, I  
5 don't know if that much distance can be covered in the  
6 two years that you have left.

7 And I will also say, as a small business  
8 owner, if I had that many strikes against me, nobody  
9 would bring in mentors to kind of help me out. I  
10 would basically, in the business world, be kicked to  
11 the curb and I would be shut down.

12 So I just think, you know, some of these  
13 standards should be applied all the way across the  
14 board. Thank you very much.

15 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you very much. Okay,  
16 next up we have got Number 24. I heard we had a trade  
17 happening. Okay.

18 MS. WILLIAMSON: Hi, my name is Arlene  
19 Williamson (phonetic). I live in Mashpee. And I  
20 just, the one thing that blows my mind the most here  
21 is this plant has been in Category 4, in Column 4, and  
22 you know, pretty close to shut down, has a really bad  
23 track record.

24 It's continued to go down, down, down.  
25 And the NRC, I mean, you just allow someone to refuel

1 a plant when they're in bad shape like that?

2 I mean, don't you have any standards like  
3 you'd have to get a better grade to get a reward? I  
4 mean, how in God's name can you allow a plant that we  
5 have no confidence in, Entergy's not going to put any  
6 money into this plant. Come on.

7 They're hoping on a, you know, a wish and  
8 a prayer that this place is going to chug along for  
9 two more years and they're going to get this money's  
10 worth out of it.

11 I mean, and you just say, go ahead,  
12 refuel. You're still in shit shape, but go ahead and  
13 refuel. You know?

14 I mean, it's, to me, I don't allow, I  
15 mean, you don't have any like rules or regulations  
16 like you have to, you have to improve before we'll let  
17 you do this?

18 And when I heard that you guys were  
19 allowing them to refuel and they weren't coming out of  
20 Category 4, Column 4, and they weren't into 3 to get  
21 that reward to do that, I just blew my mind. And I  
22 mean, how can you do that?

23 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you.

24 MALE 1: Because I think it's important to  
25 understand the process. Column 4, when a plant gets

1 into Column 4, that happens over a period of time.

2 They don't just fall off a cliff and end  
3 up in Column 4. It's going to take time for them to  
4 recover from that.

5 Typical period of time for a plant that  
6 gets into Column 4, we've had, we've had I think 10 of  
7 these over the 17 years of the program, typical time  
8 that it takes for a plant to recover from Column 4 is  
9 three to four years.

10 Pilgrim has been, Pilgrim has been in  
11 Column 4 for about a year and a half. And as I said  
12 earlier, whether they shut down now or shut down two  
13 years from now, I want them to improve.

14 Because whether they're operating or in  
15 the decommissioning process, I need to see those  
16 improvements.

17 So that is, you know, that doesn't, so the  
18 need to improve is regardless of whether they shut  
19 down now or two years from now.

20 As far as, as far as allowing refueling.  
21 Their license allows them to refuel. I don't give  
22 them permission every two years to refuel. Their  
23 license allows them to refuel.

24 The criteria to prevent refueling would be  
25 the same criteria that I would apply to the Column 5

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1 decision.

2 So it, so it is, so it is entirely  
3 consistent with the program that, they're not the  
4 first plant in Column 4 to refuel.

5 That is, the overarching conclusion of the  
6 his team and of the agency is that the plant is safe  
7 to operate, and that's what allows them to refuel. So  
8 let me just --

9 (Off microphone comments)

10 MALE 1: The NRC does have the option to  
11 suspend, modify, or revoke the license. That would be  
12 that Column 5 decision, so --

13 MS. WILLIAMSON: So when you say it takes  
14 a long time for them to slip into that Category 4,  
15 it's going to take a long time to, you know --

16 MALE 1: Yes.

17 (Off microphone comments)

18 MALE 1: So I think one of Don's slides  
19 talked, some signs of improvement that the team saw.  
20 I would also note that what got them here was the  
21 frequency, initially, was the frequency of the scrams  
22 that were occurring back in 2013.

23 In the last two years, they have had one  
24 scram, and that is very consistent with industry  
25 performance.

1           The industry, over the past year with 100  
2 reactors, roughly, had 53 scrams. So that's roughly  
3 one every two years per reactor.

4           That's, Pilgrim is at industry norm over  
5 the last two years, relative to that. We talked about  
6 the performance indicators for the mitigating systems.

7           The most important safety systems, the  
8 reliability and the availability of those systems has  
9 been consistently good over the past year.

10          So we have these findings, we have these  
11 violations of procedural issues and so on. But there  
12 are signs of improvement.

13          I don't want to leave you with the sense  
14 that Pilgrim has not improved at all. What I want to  
15 tell you is they still got work to do to get back to  
16 being a normal level of oversight.

17               (Off microphone comments)

18          MR. KLUKAN: She, all right. She had  
19 about half of her time left. So technically she's  
20 still within her time.

21          So I'm going to let her like ask that last  
22 question, and then we're going to go on. The next  
23 number I think is Number 25.

24          MALE 1: Let me, let me just clarify the  
25 question, if I could. So the question was if they

1 refuel and then shortly after they start up from  
2 refueling, they scram, then what was the question?

3 (Off microphone comments)

4 MALE 1: Yes. Yes. So let me clarify a  
5 little bit about, a scram is bad. Actually a scram is  
6 the plant, generally, is the plant responding as  
7 designed to go into a safe condition based on  
8 something that happened.

9 So really what we would look at is, what's  
10 that something that happened, and what's the  
11 significance of that and how does that feed into our  
12 Column 5 criteria? So that's how we would look at  
13 that. Thank you.

14 MR. KLUKAN: All right, thank you. So  
15 next up is Number 25, Ms. Dolabani, who --

16 MS. DOLABANI: That was me, and I will  
17 offer my time to whoever.

18 MR. KLUKAN: Okay. All right. Thank you  
19 very much. Okay. She, or he, excuse me, I apologize,  
20 will be followed by Number 36, which is Bob Rio  
21 (phonetic), and then Number 27, Elaine Dickinson, and  
22 then Number 19, John D'Archangelo (phonetic).

23 So again, Number 36, Bob Rio, 27, Elaine  
24 Dickenson, and then Number 19, John D'Archangelo. And  
25 I apologize if I'm mispronouncing any of your names.

1 So, please.

2 MR. BARTON: Yes. My name's Don Barton  
3 (phonetic), and I'm from Mashpee.

4 (Off microphone comments)

5 MR. BARTON: Yes. My name's Don Barton.  
6 I'm from Mashpee. I just have a few words I want to  
7 express today.

8 Obviously, the last few years, Pilgrim has  
9 descended into a litany of failure. And the fact that  
10 you express today that there's been some improvement,  
11 you would expect that with the onslaught of your  
12 assets onsite, watching every move.

13 You would expect to see some measure of  
14 improvement. If, in fact, you were providing much of  
15 the oversight and leadership while you were there with  
16 this intensive review.

17 But aside from the issues of consistent,  
18 irredeemable failure, there's another aspect I wanted  
19 to share with you tonight, and that concerns on  
20 another whole dimension, the cyber security issues at  
21 Pilgrim.

22 Nuclear plants have become targets for  
23 cyber warfare around the globe. The Deputy General,  
24 Secretary General of the UN warned in December that  
25 the nightmare scenario of radioactive material being

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1 released from nuclear power stations using a cyber  
2 attack is being attempted by terrorist groups.

3 This is just another consideration in the  
4 whole scheme of things. Russia is accused of hacking  
5 a nuclear plant in Ukraine.

6 The Korea hydro nuclear plant in South  
7 Korea was attacked and computer systems breached. The  
8 government blamed North Korea, and Kim Jong-Un for the  
9 attack.

10 Recently ISIS terrorists killed at the  
11 Belgium airport were plotting an attack on a nearby  
12 nuclear plant.

13 But can we be assured that Pilgrim, which  
14 has the radioactive equivalent of dozens of atomic  
15 bombs onsite, not be a victim of cyber hacking that  
16 could release all of this destructive power?

17 The answer is definitively, no, as Pilgrim  
18 is not in compliance with cyber security requirements.  
19 This is some history.

20 In 2009, Pilgrim submitted a schedule for  
21 meeting a required, eight required milestones related  
22 to bolstering cyber security.

23 Here we are eight years later and still  
24 they are not in compliance. Pilgrim did not complete,  
25 did complete seven of eight milestones in December

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1 2012, five years ago.

2 The first seven milestones were generic,  
3 preparatory steps that were supposed to lead to step  
4 8, which is the actual implementation. Never  
5 happened. Step 8, full implementation of the cyber  
6 security plan, missed its original deadline December  
7 2014.

8 For ISMIS, Entergy stated that the scope  
9 of implementation required more resources. Then a new  
10 deadline was established and extended to June 30,  
11 2016. Missed again.

12 NRC stated that the second miss was  
13 reasonable, given the complexity of the remaining  
14 work.

15 Now, a new deadline has been given by the  
16 NRC for December 15, 2017. Pilgrim spokesman, Patrick  
17 O'Brien said on behalf of Entergy that this third  
18 delay will ensure compliance.

19 I am sure Entergy will redouble their  
20 efforts with closure looming in 2019. In the future,  
21 I submit that the NRC should not set any compliance  
22 deadlines for only another miss.

23 Instead, let's depict reality and use  
24 language like, when you are ready or whenever, to  
25 salvage your remaining credibility.

1           So I want to know, if they miss again on  
2           December 15, 2017, are you, what happens? Is there  
3           any penalty or does it just go away into the abyss and  
4           it's just extended again?

5           This is what is so frustrating to the  
6           people here tonight. Nothing gets done. Thank you.

7           MALE 2: My particular division in Region  
8           I, we supervise the inspectors that do go out and  
9           verify compliance with our cyber requirements.

10          The milestones, 1 through 7, that you  
11          described, first of all, let me say that we do take  
12          cyber security very important, and we believe that the  
13          site is safe from a cyber-type attack.

14          And when you look at the milestones 1  
15          through 7, those were controls that were designed to  
16          ensure protection of the most critical systems at the  
17          station.

18          The milestone 8 full implementation  
19          schedule that you discussed are for protection of  
20          systems that weren't covered by the milestones 1  
21          through 7 implementation process.

22          So we believe that there are adequate  
23          controls in this point in time to ensure that the  
24          station is safe from a cyber attack. We are --

25          MR. BARTON: You didn't implement the

1 plan.

2 MALE 2: That's not true. The milestones  
3 1 through 7 have been completed, and best information  
4 I have is that Pilgrim's on track to complete full  
5 implementation through milestone 8 by December of the  
6 end of this year, and we will conduct a follow-up  
7 inspection following the completion of their milestone  
8 8 completion status to confirm that the activities  
9 they've undertaken have been done to a high level on  
10 integrity. So, thank you.

11 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you. Next up is Number  
12 36, Mr. Bob Rio. He will be followed by Number 27,  
13 Elaine Dickenson, and then Number 19, John  
14 D'Archangelo.

15 MR. RIO: Okay. Thank you very much. My  
16 name is Bob Rio. I am senior vice president at  
17 Associated Industries of Massachusetts, which is a  
18 trade association.

19 It's been around 100 years. Certainly  
20 nuclear safety is not my expertise, so I'm going to  
21 leave that to your experts and all the discussions  
22 that have gone along.

23 What I want to really talk about is the  
24 nuclear plant's contribution to really the energy, the  
25 energy role in Massachusetts.

1           You know, we have the highest electricity  
2 rates in the country right now, Massachusetts does.  
3 And certainly that is hurting a lot people in the  
4 western part of the state, particularly in the  
5 southeastern part of the state where electric rates  
6 really are driving businesses out.

7           There is an over-reliance now on natural  
8 gas. Over 60 percent of our power now is coming from  
9 natural gas, and I think everybody knows it's  
10 incredibly difficult to site natural gas lines and  
11 other storage to service those power plants.

12           All the new plants, and certainly the  
13 plant that will pick up the slack when Pilgrim  
14 retires, ultimately, will be natural gas.

15           Pilgrim is a base load power plant, which  
16 really serves us daily and reliably. In fact,  
17 intermittent resources like solar and wind would not  
18 exist except for plants like nuclear power plants that  
19 really serve as the backup, as we saw a couple days  
20 ago when we had that, all that snow.

21           Certainly solar was not working without  
22 the natural gas and the nuclear. We would've been in  
23 a lot of trouble that day.

24           Clean, no carbon. It will be replaced by  
25 natural gas. In fact, we're so starved for natural

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1 gas right now that many of the power plants are  
2 actually operating dual fuel and oil, and our carbon  
3 emissions last year have actually gone up because  
4 we're actually using more oil in Massachusetts than we  
5 ever have because of the lack of natural gas.

6 And certainly without building a natural  
7 gas infrastructure, which is very difficult to build,  
8 we're going to be burning more oil, and if carbon or  
9 global warming is really a concern, then non-carbon  
10 sources like nuclear, like wind, like solar, like  
11 hydro, really need to be continued here for the, for  
12 the near future.

13 So in the end, you know, you've heard  
14 about the people, 600 paying jobs and all that, and  
15 I'll leave that to the employees of that plant to  
16 really explain that, but we would support that the NRC  
17 continue monitoring the plant, but at the same time,  
18 if it's safe, we urge this plant to be, remain open  
19 until, what's the final, June 1, 2019. Thank you.

20 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you. Next up is Number  
21 27, Elaine Dickenson.

22 MS. DICKENSON: I gave my ticket to Sheila  
23 Parks.

24 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you very much. She  
25 will be followed by Number 19, John D'Archangelo, and

1 then Number 15, Mr. Steven Seymour (phonetic).

2 MS. PARKS: My name is Dr. Sheila Parks  
3 and I'm not a medical doctor. I talked with you a  
4 month ago and I said that I was a former college  
5 professor. I taught teachers and people wanting to be  
6 teachers. And I like the other man who  
7 talked. I want everybody to see the sign that I have.  
8 And I also want to thank you for extending the time.

9 I drove down from Boston to speak to you  
10 because we're at ground zero too. You don't have to  
11 be at the Cape to be at ground zero.

12 Diane (phonetic) and Elaine, Diane and  
13 Susan (phonetic) came to Boston several years ago to  
14 tell us that we were there too. So we're here in this  
15 fight too.

16 So I'm going to try, I know about  
17 preemption. I've been reading about it for several  
18 years now since my friend and colleague, Mary Lambert  
19 (phonetic), mentioned it to me.

20 But I am going to exercise my first  
21 amendment rights tonight and talk about cancer and  
22 leukemia.

23 Last month when I was here, I asked you,  
24 what were you going to tell our children. Tonight,  
25 I'm going to ask you the same thing.

1           What is everybody in this room going to  
2           tell our children? That children die of cancer 20  
3           times more and are more susceptible to leukemia and  
4           other cancers than adults, 20 times more?

5           That women are more susceptible to  
6           carcinogenic effects of nuclear plants, two times more  
7           than men?

8           And that little girls are more susceptible  
9           to the carcinogenic effects than little boys, two  
10          times more? Who is going to tell that to our  
11          children?

12          You need to go home tonight and tell that  
13          to every child in the world, that they're going to die  
14          and you all know because you all live here that there  
15          are clusters of cancer here in, on the Cape that are  
16          the highest rate of Massachusetts.

17          Well, they don't come from anything except  
18          Pilgrim. And I'm sure if anybody ever did a study of  
19          the workers in the plant, they would have the highest  
20          cancer rate too.

21          So in 2014, Dr. Ian Fairlie from United  
22          Kingdom put out a research study, which you didn't  
23          know about, Jackson, Mr. Jackson, when I asked you  
24          about it last week, but I'm in my, the process of  
25          sending all of you, Entergy and the NRC, all the

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1 research that's been done on this stuff.

2 So anyhow, kids who live near nuclear  
3 power plants have more leukemias than kids who don't  
4 live near them. That's statistically significant.

5 Children ask the world of us. We're  
6 giving them leukemia and cancer. Pine talked about  
7 the ocean. It's filled with all the stuff that gives  
8 you cancer.

9 So I wanted to say, I can't keep quiet.  
10 Remember that meeting for the women's day? I can't  
11 keep quiet about nuclear power. I can't keep quiet  
12 about nuclear power. And none of the other people in  
13 this room can either. Thank God, there are all of us  
14 saying, we can't keep quiet about nuclear power.

15 Helen Caldicott, who is the most  
16 preeminent physician in the world, who has worked  
17 about nuclear power and nuclear weapons for at least  
18 43 years, in July 7, 2013, I read you already her  
19 statistics of what she said.

20 We've got to stop it. We're giving, I  
21 want to know who is, that's my question to you, who is  
22 going to tell our children?

23 The children of everybody in this room.  
24 The children of this country. The children everywhere  
25 there are nuclear power plants, that they are dying of



1 cancer from the nuclear power plants, from the minute  
2 they were built.

3 Doesn't matter if they're old and  
4 crotchety. From the day they were built. There is no  
5 safe dose of radiation ever, ever, ever, and that has  
6 been put out by one of the most, I have the paper  
7 here, so I'm going to tell you, by one of the most  
8 scientific journals in the country. Thank you.

9 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you.

10 (Off microphone comments)

11 MR. KLUKAN: I was, I was worried there  
12 for a minute. Okay. Thank you. All right. Next up  
13 is Number 19, Mr. John D'Archangelo.

14 He will be followed by Number 15, Steven  
15 Seymour, and then Number 41, Margaret Ryce-Moir  
16 (phonetic). I apologize. But Number, again, Number  
17 41, Margaret Ryce, M-O-I-R. Anyway, so please, Mr.  
18 D'Archangelo.

19 MR. D'ARCHANGELO: Hi, I'm John  
20 Dearchangelo. I am a, I don't live around here on the  
21 Cape. I'm actually from Reading, closer to Boston.

22 And I just wanted to say that I am  
23 disgusted, and I'm disgusted with the NRC and I'm  
24 disgusted in Entergy Corporation, and I think you're  
25 all a bunch of pigs. And we need to shut Pilgrim

1 Nuclear Power Plant as soon as possible.

2 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you very much. Next  
3 up, we have Number 15, Steven Seymour. He will be  
4 followed by, again, Ms. Ryce, and then Number 2, Mr.  
5 John Nicholls (phonetic). Okay. So again, Mr.  
6 Seymour, please.

7 MR. SEYMOUR: Yes. I haven't come to one  
8 of the hearings for the NRC before. I'm a civil  
9 engineer from Cape Cod out in Barnstable.

10 And it's, I'm glad I came tonight. I was,  
11 it actually raised my level of concern about the  
12 issue. I thought I might hear something a little bit  
13 more upbeat.

14 I know in the field that I worked in with  
15 sewage treatment plants, we had projections of what  
16 the useful life of the plant was, and what the useful  
17 life of the concrete was, and what the useful life of  
18 the mechanical was, and that's how we did present  
19 worse, the figure if you were going to build the  
20 thing.

21 I don't know if the industry or the, all  
22 governmental oversight has looked in, at that level of  
23 what is the useful life of some of these plants.

24 It sounds like some of the equipment that,  
25 tonight, a couple pieces of equipment, they couldn't

1 replace them with the part that was made originally,  
2 and then they had to put something else in.

3 And it seemed like they didn't look at how  
4 that would impact the whole system, and that was one  
5 of the, couple of the things that they were looked at.  
6 And I could see where that could happen.

7 And I, on Cape Cod, we have evacuation  
8 signs by Route 6 when you, if you actually get to  
9 Route 6, which you know where to go that it's going to  
10 say evacuation ways from Route 6, my understanding is  
11 that in the event of a nuclear, if there was a nuclear  
12 problem, that they would actually close the bridge  
13 down.

14 You just stay there, you know, and see  
15 what happens. And then my question, the other  
16 question I had, and the gentleman brought it up about  
17 financially, is if there was a nuclear accident like  
18 that, who would be financially responsible to make  
19 people haul?

20 And if there were injuries to that, would  
21 there be criminal responsibility of people that,  
22 people such as in your position or positions of  
23 authority as to whether they let something go or not?  
24 And that's my questions. Thanks.

25 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you very much.

1 MR. SEYMOUR: Actually, is this working?

2 There we go.

3 MR. KLUKAN: No, no.

4 MR. SEYMOUR: Now I'm on.

5 MR. KLUKAN: Maybe the counsel does or  
6 something.

7 MR. SEYMOUR: What, I'm sorry, what was  
8 that?

9 MR. KLUKAN: You want me to answer  
10 questions?

11 MR. SEYMOUR: Yes. I don't know.

12 MR. KLUKAN: So, normally during these  
13 meetings, I don't, I don't do that.

14 MR. SEYMOUR: Okay.

15 MR. KLUKAN: I'd be happy to take your  
16 questions back to the Office of General Counsel. The  
17 reason why is I don't like mixing my two roles.

18 It's not because I don't want to answer  
19 your questions, and I'll be happy to talk to you after  
20 the meeting, but during the meeting, I try to stick in  
21 a facilitator role.

22 It makes life easier. Just stick with  
23 only one hat for the meeting. But again, if you stick  
24 around afterwards, I'll be happy to talk to you about

25 --

1 MR. SEYMOUR: Okay.

2 MR. KLUKAN: -- what I'm allowed to as  
3 regional counsel.

4 MR. SEYMOUR: Okay.

5 MR. KLUKAN: I don't make the policies.  
6 Anyway --

7 MR. SEYMOUR: That's okay. And the other  
8 question about, is there a thought of what's the  
9 useful life of the plants are?

10 MALE 1: Yes, so I'm actually going to go  
11 against my counsel's advice and touch the first one  
12 briefly. Maybe it's the third rail. I don't know.

13 There, somebody else referred to it  
14 earlier, there's a Price-Anderson Act that provides  
15 insurance coverage that the utility pays into.

16 That, frankly, is at a level that, when  
17 you look at the cost impacts of the Fukushima  
18 accident, the Price-Anderson coverage would not be  
19 sufficient, and then there's a point where the federal  
20 government steps in, to the broader question of  
21 culpability after the fact.

22 Yes, I think, ultimately, I'm not going to  
23 speculate on that. Ultimately, the courts would  
24 decide that.

25 We have had a case in Ohio, about 15 years

1       ago, where there was corrosion in the head of a  
2       reactor vessel, and there was found to be a, through  
3       the courts, some criminal culpability of negligence by  
4       engineer there.

5               That's one that didn't even get to an  
6       accident. So I think it's plausible to consider that  
7       there, that the courts would look dimly on that.

8               And as the other gentleman gave us the New  
9       York Times article that's recently been the finding in  
10      Japan.

11              As far as the useful life, that is,  
12      obviously, a consideration that goes into the design  
13      of the plant from the, from the structures that house  
14      the plant to the structures that, the piping systems  
15      that the fluid systems go through, there's  
16      consideration.

17              If it's fatigue cycles through the life,  
18      all of the those things factor into the design. When  
19      the plant come to the 40 year point, the license  
20      renewal is focused on the aging management.

21              So it's focused on identification and  
22      replacement of things that are coming to the end of  
23      their useful life.

24              So yes, it's included in the original  
25      consideration of the design, and it specifically is

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1 the focus of the effort when we look at renewing a  
2 license beyond the original 40 years.

3 MR. SEYMOUR: Thank you.

4 MALE 1: Thanks.

5 MR. KLUKAN: All right. So I feel, I feel  
6 like I can add something to that, just very quickly.  
7 So just, I don't, I don't think everyone, this may not  
8 be common knowledge, but as you know, we have  
9 deliberate misconduct rules under each part of our  
10 regulations.

11 Part 50.5 is the one that applies to  
12 reactors. That is the most commonly cited. I  
13 shouldn't say most commonly cited, but in terms of  
14 reactors, that's the one you're going to see.

15 Every time our Office of Investigation  
16 makes a deliberate finding, that case file is  
17 forwarded to the US Attorney's office, or the  
18 Department of Justice, to see whether they want to  
19 pursue it criminally.

20 And then if they, if they decline, then  
21 we'll pursue it civilly. So we do work hand-in-hand  
22 with the Department of Justice for all our deliberate,  
23 our willful misconduct findings.

24 Those are turned over to the Department of  
25 Justice for review and consideration before we move

1 forward with our own enforcement actions.

2 MALE 1: You were asking about NRC staff

3 --

4 MR. KLUKAN: Oh.

5 MALE 1: Brett's referring to the Office  
6 of Investigations. We also have an Office of  
7 Inspector General that is also, they're charged with  
8 investigating potential wrongdoing by us. So they  
9 have a similar coordination function when they have an  
10 investigation finding.

11 MR. KLUKAN: Yes, that's a whole different  
12 can of worms. But we do, every time you make an  
13 allegation, and this, I can personally say this.

14 Every time you make an allegation of  
15 abuse, fraud abuse, misconduct, wrongdoing by an NRC  
16 staff member, I forward it onto the Office of  
17 Inspector General.

18 MR. SEYMOUR: Okay.

19 MR. KLUKAN: So, anyway --

20 MR. SEYMOUR: Thank you. And I just  
21 wanted to say that I am more concerned tonight than I  
22 was before.

23 MALE 1: Okay.

24 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you.

25 MALE 1: Thanks.



1 MR. KLUKAN: Okay. So next up, we have  
2 Number 41. Oh, you're already here.

3 MS. RYCE-MOIR: Hello.

4 MR. KLUKAN: All right. And then you will  
5 be followed by Number 2, John Nicholls. John Nicholls  
6 still in the audience?

7 All right, great. And then Number 1,  
8 Sheila Parks. Okay, so please. Whenever you're  
9 ready.

10 MS. RYCE-MOIR: So the Pilgrim Nuclear  
11 Power Station is safe. Like cigarette smoking is good  
12 for your health, like thalidomide was good for  
13 pregnant women, like syphilis injections inserted into  
14 healthy black men were good for them, like the toxic  
15 debris ingested into their lungs by first responders  
16 at the World Trade Center wasn't a health risk.

17 Sure, we citizens of the Commonwealth  
18 believe you when you reassure us about the safety of  
19 the ailing toxic waste dump called Pilgrim.

20 Why should we not believe you? Look, I'm  
21 sure you're pleasant people. You have pleasant  
22 families. You donate to Toys For Tots.

23 You even set up open meetings for the  
24 people to be able to speak when you're forced to by  
25 errant emails.

1           So here's the problem. You really haven't  
2           listened. It's all a sham. A carefully orchestrated  
3           manipulation of the truth. It happens a lot these  
4           days.

5           Despite the magnitude of profound and  
6           brilliantly articulated objections about the safety of  
7           Pilgrim by all Massachusetts legislators, thousands of  
8           residents, top-notch scientists, and even former NRC  
9           regulators, you continue to tell us it's safe.

10          It's safe like driving your car into  
11          oncoming traffic is safe. We'd have to be crazy to  
12          listen to your excuses.

13          You are cowards, and the gentlemen from  
14          the corporation, cowards. Nothing but cowards.  
15          Worse, you're cowards who are playing Russian Roulette  
16          with our lives and the lives of our children and our  
17          grandchildren.

18          NRC's magical thinking may kill us. It  
19          may do so slowly as the multiple problems that plague  
20          the plant remain unresolved.

21          Or it may do so in an instant, should the  
22          water rise and the wind blow in any particular weather  
23          event, like we saw in Fukushima.

24          Maintaining the Pilgrim Nuclear Power  
25          Plant is nothing short of complete and total

1 abdication of federal responsibility for our health  
2 and safety.

3 And it is shameful. It is shameful. And  
4 I think that your charade is equally as shameful. Let  
5 me conclude by suggesting that the relationship  
6 between the Entergy Corporation and the NRC is far  
7 more intimate and cozy than that of both entities with  
8 us, the public. Accident?

9 Why bother with the travesty of increased  
10 supervision, the confirmatory letter you've talked  
11 about is already in the mail.

12 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you. Okay. Next up we  
13 have Number 2, John Nicholls.

14 MR. NICHOLLS: John Nicholls. The word  
15 safe is being used as a public relations device in  
16 order to calm the public.

17 There's no content behind it. Since, even  
18 if people sincerely believe it's safe, it's only a  
19 forecast, and forecasts are inaccurate, and there is  
20 some chance of a nuclear accident there.

21 There were 99 nuclear accidents worldwide,  
22 1955 to 2013, 47 of them were in the US, 33 meltdowns  
23 in the US, according to Wikipedia, which has a long  
24 list of nuclear disasters.

25 And you did not convince the Cape

1 delegation of legislators, all of whom call for  
2 immediate shut down and call for transfer of fuel rods  
3 into dry casks, nor did you, nor did you convince  
4 Elizabeth Warren, who called for a shut down unless  
5 Pilgrim can be renovated.

6 And my question to you is if a whole lot  
7 of legislators, not only Cape legislators, but some  
8 Boston legislators too, and the Cape, and the Attorney  
9 General of Massachusetts, and the Governor, and the  
10 federal legislative congressional delegation  
11 consisting of nine representatives and two senators,  
12 would sign a letter to the NRC demanding immediate  
13 shutdown, would you, or would the NRC respond to all  
14 the points made in that letter and make those points  
15 public? Thank you.

16 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you.

17 MALE 1: So if the commission received  
18 such a letter, I am confident that they would respond  
19 in public to any points addressed in such a letter.

20 MR. KLUKAN: Okay. Next up we have Sheila  
21 Parks.

22 (Off microphone comments)

23 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you. Before you begin,  
24 so this, the numbers on the board were at that point  
25 in the evening where we have to start wrapping things

1 up. So we are going to end --

2 (Off microphone comments)

3 MR. GARLEY: Hello, I'm John Garley  
4 (phonetic). I'm from Hingham. I'd like to ask how  
5 many people feel safer as a result of the talk?  
6 Seriously. Is that true? Then you work for Entergy.

7 (Off microphone comments)

8 MR. GARLEY: All right. I just want to  
9 read something in case any of you people have  
10 forgotten this.

11 We hold these truths to be self-evident  
12 that all men are created equal, and that all, they are  
13 endowed with their creator with certain unalienable  
14 rights that among these are life, liberty, and the  
15 pursuit of happiness.

16 That to secure these rights, governments  
17 are instituted among men and women, deriving their  
18 just powers from the consent of the governed that  
19 whenever any form of government becomes destructive to  
20 these ends, that it is the right of the people to  
21 alter and to abolish it, and to institute a new  
22 government weighing its foundations on such principles  
23 and organizing its powers in such form as to them to  
24 shall be seem likely to affect their safety and  
25 happiness.

1 Prudence, indeed, will dictate that  
2 governments long established should not be changed for  
3 light and transient causes.

4 In according to all experience has shown  
5 that mankind are more disposed to suffer while evils  
6 are sufferable and will right themselves by abolishing  
7 the forms of which we are, they're accustomed.

8 But when train, long train of abuses and  
9 usurpations pursuing invariably the same object  
10 evinces a design to reduce them under absolute  
11 despotism.

12 It is their right and their duty to throw  
13 off such government and to provide the guards for new  
14 future security.

15 I throw you off. You really suck. I  
16 can't believe there's, what, 55 million people in  
17 immediate threat, and you're saying, oh, just refuel.

18 That is like, insane. And that you sit  
19 there and look at that, you have to be sociopathic.  
20 I honestly believe that.

21 I, it's just insanity, what's going on  
22 here. And just, and you go and your security culture,  
23 you know, this is a whole new millennium.

24 Someone talk about cyber stuff, and I'm  
25 still stuck with 9/11 with flying a plane into it.

1 Answer my question.

2 Is it safer to fly a plane into a spent  
3 fuel pool or into a dry cask? Which is the safest?  
4 All right?

5 It's not that funny. You know, I think  
6 you should sit there like that, you know, making the  
7 money and dismissing, I mean, it's just, I just, I  
8 don't have words.

9 That's why I had to read this. But I  
10 thought you made a Freudian slip here in your header.  
11 It's the Pilgrim Annual Assessment Meeting and IP,  
12 whatever.

13 The public exit meeting? What does,  
14 right? Can you see your header? The public exit, is  
15 we like to leave.

16 I encourage every American in here, you  
17 guys are working for us, right? Come on, you're here  
18 for the safety of the people.

19 It's our country. Are we going to throw  
20 this shit off? I mean, really name some truth. There  
21 are good American citizens working, they're not  
22 getting paid for it, coming up with real stuff, and  
23 nothing's happening.

24 We've heard it repeatedly, repeatedly,  
25 repeatedly. Nothing is happening. You're protecting

1 the corporations, you're protecting the money, and  
2 you're not protecting the health and wealth and safety  
3 of the commons, which is us. You fucking get that?  
4 Thank you.

5 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you. All right. Next  
6 up is Number 51, Heidi Mayo (phonetic).

7 MS. MAYO: I'm Heidi Mayo. I live in  
8 Plymouth. I used to live in Duxbury. I used to be  
9 able to see the plant from my living room.

10 I've been living underneath of them,  
11 literally the shadow of the plant since it was built.  
12 I don't have a thyroid anymore because in the late  
13 '70s or early '80s, I believe there was Iodine 131  
14 that the plant let go of and I ate a hot mussel.

15 And so I don't have a thyroid anymore, so  
16 I just thought I'd bring up the cancer thing. One  
17 thing I would really like to do is to thank the  
18 workers at this plant, this failing plant.

19 This plant that is decrepit, that is, the  
20 cement can't even last that long, and I have to thank  
21 these workers for being the thing that stands between  
22 us and a Fukushima-type accident.

23 And you guys should be ashamed of  
24 yourselves. Just close it. Close it before you ruin  
25 everybody's lives. Thank you.



1 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you. Thank you. Okay.  
2 Next up is Jim Parameter (phonetic), Number 17. Is  
3 Jim --

4 MALE 3: He left.

5 MR. KLUKAN: All right, Jim has left.  
6 Okay. So next up we will have Number 43, Joanne Coil  
7 (phonetic). Joanne Coil, Number 43?

8 Okay. All right. Let me pull two new  
9 names. And then these will be the final, if they're  
10 in the room. So Number 40.

11 FEMALE 2: No, Joanne's given me her --

12 MR. KLUKAN: Oh, Joanne was here?

13 FEMALE 2: Yes. Is it, yes. She is here.  
14 Yes, she's right there. Does anybody who hasn't  
15 spoken want to --

16 MR. KLUKAN: Okay. So --

17 FEMALE 2: Okay.

18 MR. KLUKAN: So Joanne, or, please.

19 FEMALE 2: Okay. I just want to go back  
20 to that email, which was really the unvarnished truth,  
21 and we really felt that you understood the situation  
22 that was going on at Pilgrim because of what you said  
23 in that email.

24 I just want to ask, you did say earlier  
25 that a safety culture would take three to five years

1 to really turn around? Is that true?

2 MALE 1: That's the standard --

3 FEMALE 2: Okay.

4 MALE 1: -- if you read books, yes.

5 FEMALE 2: Okay. So if I can go to your  
6 email, it said that on the site vice president tried  
7 to backtrack on a statement, but that you believed  
8 what the senior managers said was genuine thought.

9 So I'm going to take this email as your  
10 genuine thought, because you did that to somebody who  
11 was backtracking, and we're going to believe this  
12 email.

13 In the email you said, there was failure  
14 that would not prevent reoccurrence. That there's a  
15 lot of positive energy, but on one seems to know what  
16 to do with it to improve performance leading to  
17 procedural noncompliances, poor performance, poor  
18 engineering practices, and equipment reliability  
19 problems.

20 You also said too that overall we are  
21 beginning to see a picture where the people seem to be  
22 willing and happy and excited about change, so that's  
23 to the workers.

24 But actions seem to be marginalized during  
25 implementation. Some of this marginalization seems to

1 be due to not understanding what the end state should  
2 look like.

3 And frankly, some of it seems to be due to  
4 lack of resources across many groups. We've talked  
5 about that.

6 Entergy's not putting money into the dying  
7 reactor. You also ended saying we are observing  
8 current indications of a safety culture problem that  
9 a bunch of talking probably won't fix.

10 We take that as your genuine thought. You  
11 have already said that the safety culture can't be  
12 fixed.

13 MALE 1: No, I didn't say, no, I didn't  
14 say that.

15 FEMALE 2: You also, probably won't be  
16 fixed. Probably won't --

17 MALE 1: By something. Right?

18 FEMALE 2: Probably won't be fixed.

19 MALE 1: Read that whole, read that whole  
20 sentence. Please.

21 FEMALE 2: We are observing current  
22 indications of a safety culture problem that a bunch  
23 of talking probably won't fix.

24 MALE 1: Exactly.

25 FEMALE 2: Period.

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1           MALE 1:   So you mentioned that is the  
2           unvarnished truth.   I certainly would stand behind  
3           that that point in time, one week into the inspection,  
4           that was the unvarnished truth.

5           I can also tell you when, the results that  
6           I presented tonight are the truth.   When the report  
7           comes out within 45 days of this meeting, that will be  
8           the truth to the best, if I put my name on it and I  
9           sign it, it's the truth.   Okay?

10          I am an honest individual.   It is to the  
11          best of my ability, it will be the truth that the team  
12          knew at that, when we completed the inspection.   Now  
13          --

14          FEMALE 2:   Okay.   So, what I'm, yes, what  
15          I'm, yes --

16          MALE 1:   That piece you talked, the piece  
17          you talked about, the safety culture --

18          FEMALE 2:   Yes.

19          MALE 1:   -- I still stand behind that.  
20          The licensee has, we wrote a finding against, or a  
21          finding against that.

22          They have to go back and take further  
23          corrective actions to fix what the team found, and  
24          we're going to get a chance to take a look at what  
25          corrective actions they come up with.

1 FEMALE 2: Okay. So they close it in two  
2 years, but you've already indicated that improving the  
3 safety culture would take three to five years. So the  
4 math doesn't seem to match.

5 MALE 1: Getting to a place where safety  
6 culture would be considered the norm in the industry  
7 takes that long. They are currently improving it.

8 FEMALE 2: Okay. But you said it takes  
9 three to five years, so the math doesn't really match.  
10 And so that's the big concern is we, as citizens in  
11 the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and actually  
12 everywhere, have a right to safety. It's Article 1 in  
13 our --

14 MALE 1: Yes.

15 FEMALE 2: -- state constitution. And we  
16 demand that safety. And you aren't providing it.  
17 From what we're reading in the reports, the ongoing  
18 systemic mis-management, the ongoing reoccurring  
19 violations of federal safety standards are still  
20 happening today. And it needs to stop and Pilgrim  
21 needs to be shut down.

22 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you. Okay. It is now  
23 9:45. As always, I would like to thank you for the  
24 respect you've shown at each other.

25 I realize that you, many of you have

1 divergent views on the issues we've discussed tonight,  
2 but for the most part, you were very civil to each  
3 other and for that you have my utmost thanks.

4 There are feedback forms out on the  
5 registration table. I personally value your input  
6 into how we can make these better in terms of  
7 logistics.

8 So please, please fill out those forms if  
9 you have thoughts or ideas for how to make this  
10 better. And with that, I'll turn it over to Dan to  
11 close out the evening.

12 MS. LOGAN: I'm sorry. I am sorry, but if  
13 you would run this meeting properly and not let people  
14 go over their time and had people on deck sooner, more  
15 of us could've spoken.

16 You didn't do a good job with the meeting.  
17 So now you want to cut those of us that have been here  
18 all night to go home. It's wrong.

19 (Off microphone comments)

20 MR. KLUKAN: Okay.

21 MS. LOGAN: Okay.

22 MR. KLUKAN: You know what? The meeting's  
23 officially over, but if you want to, we'll stay here  
24 and speak.

25 I will just say this, and I'm not trying

1 to defend myself. I spend a lot of time trying to  
2 figure this out and working with my other facilitators  
3 at Headquarters to figure out how to run these  
4 meetings.

5 And I apologize that I wasn't as efficient  
6 as I could've been, but I want you to know that I do  
7 my best to be fair to you.

8 (Off microphone comments)

9 MS. LOGAN: Sorry, it just wasn't good  
10 enough.

11 MR. KLUKAN: You know what? If you, if  
12 you don't believe I was good enough or you think there  
13 are ways I could improve this, then please fill out  
14 the feedback form so that we can document that and  
15 take it back to Headquarters.

16 MS. LOGAN: Okay.

17 MR. KLUKAN: But please --

18 MS. LOGAN: My name is Jane Logan  
19 (phonetic). I'm an insurance broker and I live on  
20 Cape Cod. I'm one mile from the Sagamore Bridge.

21 And before I start, let me, let me speak  
22 to the rabid capitalist that was in the audience  
23 waving the dollar bill.

24 They didn't share their profits with the  
25 people, and we shouldn't cover their losses. That's

1 socialized, you know, privatize the profit and  
2 socialize the loss.

3 But in addition to that comment, if you  
4 listen to the insurance companies that cover Cape Cod  
5 with the national flood insurance plan, you would  
6 think at any given moment, Plymouth, Cape Cod and the  
7 island is going to be wiped off the face of the  
8 planet.

9 We live in this big scary place where  
10 they're charging everyone higher rates for insurance  
11 and where they have, everyone has high wind  
12 deductibles, but it's okay to have this old, decrepit  
13 power plant on the coast who, not only doesn't have a  
14 good risk management plan, they falsified records.

15 Tell me exactly what you have to do in the  
16 nuclear community to qualify to be shut down.  
17 Falsifying records doesn't cut it? Because it cuts it  
18 with me.

19 So in addition to everyone in this area  
20 that lives near the power plant and no one's house  
21 insurance or property insurance covers nuclear  
22 holocaust.

23 So everyone's property is going to be  
24 destroyed. Donald Trump's not going to bail us out  
25 because Massachusetts didn't vote for him. Okay?



1           So we're all left with our property  
2 destroyed, no insurance coverage. Right? Right?  
3 That's what's going to happen. Okay.

4           So you take it from there, and then all of  
5 a sudden, you know, the stockholders leave and they're  
6 just fine, and we're all left behind with, you know,  
7 the Cape in a wreck.

8           Everything's in a wreck. And they want us  
9 to bail them out? I mean, really? And not only is it  
10 the poor people around the plant, we have PAVE PAWS  
11 here. We have Otis Air Force Base here.

12           You know what's going to happen to the  
13 security of the east coast if those two facilities  
14 can't operate?

15           Does anyone think outside the little box  
16 of their own little world and connect the dots? No.  
17 I mean, I went to a sub shop in downtown Plymouth one  
18 day and there was three security guards from the  
19 nuclear power plant there in their uniforms.

20           And I'm thinking, oh, maybe someone should  
21 just kidnap them and cause a problem with the power  
22 plant. Okay?

23           Things happen. People underestimate how  
24 often bad things happen. And when you combine the  
25 nuclear power plant with the absolute lack of concern

1 for security of this, that this power plant has shown  
2 for years and years and years, it's absolutely  
3 unacceptable.

4 So I'm hoping that the federal regulators,  
5 keeping, if they don't even care about us or, you  
6 know, we're just collateral damage.

7 Oh, well. Maybe they'll do the right  
8 thing for the wrong reason, and that's to protect PAVE  
9 PAWS and Otis Air Force Base and Boston.

10 MR. KLUKAN: Okay.

11 MALE 1: We're done.

12 MR. KLUKAN: Thank you. We are now  
13 closing down the meeting. I would ask if you believe  
14 that this is a, have comments about how this meeting  
15 should be conducted, especially in terms of the number  
16 of people who get to speak, I would ask you, write to  
17 our commissioners.

18 Their addresses, their email addresses,  
19 write to them. I don't have the authority to do that.  
20 If you want to make it go that long or to stay until  
21 we, until everyone gets to speak, write and tell our  
22 commissioners that. Let them hear.

23 (Off microphone comments)

24 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went  
25 off the record.)