

Regulatory

File Cy.

Commonwealth Edison Company

ONE FIRST NATIONAL PLAZA ★ CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Address Reply to:

POST OFFICE BOX 767 ★ CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60690

January 26, 1973



Mr. D. J. Skovholt
Assistant Director for
Operating Reactors
Directorate of Licensing
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D.C. 20545

Subject: Request for Additional Information on the
Oxygen Sampling Systems for Dresden Units
2 and 3 and Quad-Cities Units 1 and 2,
Dkt Nos. 50-237, 50-249, 50-254 and 50-265

Dear Mr. Skovholt:


Your letter of November 15, 1972, requested additional information on the oxygen analyzer systems for Dresden Units 2 and 3 and Quad-Cities Units 1 and 2. Below are the questions and responses.

1. Your program for lubricating oxygen sampling system isolation valves.

These valves and valves of this type will be lubricated during every refueling outage.

2. Your analysis of the cause of two automatic isolation valves in series failure to close and your evaluation of the possibility of similar valve failures in the oxygen analyzer or other systems.

The problem was caused by a lack of lubrication of the valve stem. The problem was solved by lubricating the valve shaft and adjusting the valve packing. Repetition of this procedure during every refueling outage for all valves of this type



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
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will preclude a similar failure in the valves in question or valves of the same type.

3. It is our understanding that containment integrity could be lost by the rupture of a tube in the oxygen analyzer system if the particulate sampling lines are open when the containment is pressurized. If this is correct, we request that you either:
 - a. modify the sampling system and test its capability to withstand full accident pressure, or
 - b. provide means for automatic isolation of the particulate sample lines or oxygen analyzer or provide remote manual isolation with a procedure specifying when the valves are to be closed, or
 - c. verify by calculation that the maximum leakage through the oxygen analyzer would not add significantly to accident doses.

The system design and criteria are presently under review by our Engineering Department. A response to the question will be submitted to you about March 1, 1973.

Very truly yours,



L.D. Butterfield, Jr.
Nuclear Licensing Administrator

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