

OGT 15 1985

Docket Nos.: 50-275
and 50-323

MEMORANDUM FOR: George W. Knighton, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 3
Division of Licensing

FROM: Hans Schierling, Project Manager
Licensing Branch No. 3
Division of Licensing

SUBJECT: DIABLO CANYON - CRDR MEETING WITH PG&E

DATE & TIME: November 6 and 7, 1985
9:00 am - 5:00 pm

LOCATION: Room 5033
Air Rights Building
4550 Montgomery Avenue
Bethesda, Maryland

PURPOSE: Discuss status of Licensee's Detailed Control Room Design
Review.

PARTICIPANTS: NRC
H. Schierling
N. Thompson
L. Beltrachi
NRC Consultants (SAI)

PG&E
B. Lew, et al.

Original signed by:
Hans Schierling

Hans Schierling, Project Manager
Licensing Branch No. 3
Division of Licensing

cc: See next page

DL:LB#3
HSchierling/es
10/10/85

DL:LB#3
GWKnighton
10/11/85

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ENCLOSURE 2

DIABLO CANYON DCRDR MEETING
November 6, 1985

Attendance List

<u>Name</u>	<u>Affiliation</u>
Hans Schierling	NRC Diablo Canyon Project Manager
Peter Beckham	PG&E CRDR Phase II Project Manager
Joseph Cucco, Jr.	PG&E CRDR Phase II Review Team Leader
Bryant Giffin	PG&E
Joe Seminara	PG&E - Consultant
John J. Vranicar	PG&E
Joseph Lisboa	Bechtel
Rob Fisher	PG&E
W. Neil Thompson	NRC-DHFS-HFEB Team Leader
Dom Tondi	NRC-DHFS-HFEB
Dick Eckenrode	NRC-DHFS-HFEB
Saba N. Saba	NRC-DHFS-HFEB
John Stokley	SAIC - Consultant to NRC
Joel Kramer	NRC-DHFS-HFEB
Carol Kain	SAIC - Consultant to NRC
Sig Auer	PG&E
Tom Libs	PG&E



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MINUTES OF MEETING BETWEEN
NRC AND PG&E
ON THE DCRDR FOR THE
DIABLO CANYON GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2


The following are minutes of a meeting held on November 6, 1985, between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E). Also in attendance were a PG&E human factors consultant and NRC consultants from Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). Specific attendees and the organizations they represent are shown in Attachment 1.

The purpose of the meeting was to address concerns that resulted from an in-progress audit conducted on February 11-15, 1985, at the plant site. Results of that audit were documented in a report and forwarded to PG&E on September 16, 1985 (Reference 1). In response to the in-progress audit report PG&E requested a meeting with NRC staff to address the in-progress audit findings and to attempt to overcome any problems found with the DCRDR being conducted. The following are highlights of the meeting. Attachment 2 provides the NRC meeting agenda that had been suggested in the audit report. Attachment 3 consists of handouts provided by PG&E during the meeting.

Establishment of a Qualified Multidisciplinary Review Team

During PG&E's in-progress audit, several concerns surfaced regarding the core review team composition and the management review team's participation in the DCRDR.

PG&E addressed concerns in the audit report in describing the team composition by discipline and the types of disciplines that are assigned to each DCRDR task. A handout to illustrate DCRDR task assignments was also provided. At the time of the audit, the human factors specialist was not engaged with some important parts of the DCRDR; however, PG&E indicates that this expertise is now available and will take a stronger role in DCRDR tasks. PG&E also discussed the management team participation in review of Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs) and approval of proposed design changes. A DCRDR procedure has been established for management sign-off in the assessment and resolution process to increase their involvement.



Also mentioned during the meeting was the assignment of a new manager to Phase 2 of the DCRDR; this individual is also charged with managing the implementation of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). PG&E recognizes that an overlap of personnel between the different control room improvement programs will help to coordinate efforts. Complete documentation of personnel by name, DCRDR tasks assigned, level of involvement, and participation in other improvement programs should be included in PG&E's documentation of this requirement.

Function and Task Analysis; Comparison of Display and Control Requirements With a Control Room Inventory

The methodology and the composition of the DCRDR Team which were employed in the effort to meet this requirement were judged by NRC to be inadequate. This message was conveyed to PG&E at the time of the in-progress audit and again in the NRC in-progress audit report (Reference 1). Since the time of the audit, Diablo Canyon has completed writing all the EOPs associated with Revision 1 of the Westinghouse Owners Group Emergency Response Guidelines. As of the date of the current meeting, PG&E had not yet turned its attention to satisfying the task analysis concerns resulting from the NRC in-progress audit. However, at the meeting, PG&E agreed to comply with this requirement of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1.

Specifically, PG&E agreed to:

1. Include a human factors specialist to assist it in the completion of both the analysis itself and the comparison of the display and control needs (product of the task analysis) with the control room inventory. Confirm methodology to be used for completing the task analysis.
2. Identify, independent of the control room, the needed human factors characteristics of the information and control requirements needed to perform the task.
3. Create documentation of these required characteristics for use in comparison against the control room inventory.



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4. Complete the comparison and identify HEDs.
5. Document process for audit purposes.


As an integral part of completing the above steps, PG&E should respond to elements 2 and 3 of the in-progress audit report (Reference 1) in its letter to the NRC Diablo Canyon Project Manager, as well as in its Supplement to the Summary Report. Additional guidance to PG&E may be found in an NRC memorandum from H.B. Clayton to D.C. Ziemann, dated April 5, 1985 (Reference 2). Items 2 and 4 of this memo are still open items. PG&E should note that completion of the task analysis was intended to be done to assist in developing effective EOPs. Consequently, the results of the new task analysis effort may result in modifications to those EOPs already written by PG&E (e.g., instances may be found where the control room does not adequately support the EOPs). NRC concluded this item by requesting that PG&E describe their methodology to the NRC before beginning the task analysis. That description should be documented in their response to the NRC Project Manager. They should feel free to phone NRC for any guidance to develop their methodology.

Control Room Survey

During the in-progress audit, PG&E had not completed some of the studies that are part of the survey; namely lighting survey, control environment for heating, ventilation and air, the auditory environment, emergency equipment, annunciator system and communications. Review of the remote shutdown panels was also in progress. Display formats and features on the plant computer and the SPDS are also to be part of the control room survey effort. The audit team had also found the survey identified several generic or control room-wide HEDs for which the survey team were to resurvey on a panel-by-panel basis. PG&E addressed this concern by indicating that plans for survey completion were under way and were expected to be finished by February 1986.

Assessment of HEDs

In response to the in-progress audit, PG&E developed a methodology to reassess HEDs in order to identify the safety significant HEDs. That





methodology was discussed during the meeting, and PG&E provided handouts to illustrate the assessment process and the manner by which it will maintain records. The major item left unresolved during the audit was the specific process to screen safety-significant HEDs. The assessment of HEDs has been revised and improved from that originally performed; HEDs that impact plant safety will be identified and placed in Priority Groups 1 or 2. The major delineation between Group 1 and 2 HEDs is defined as the potential for error. NRC staff are concerned that the potential for error be assessed by the human factors specialist and that HEDs be grouped by either high, medium or low categories. HEDs with no high error potential and no significant safety consequences may be placed in lower priority categories. Group 1 HEDs will be scheduled for the first refueling outage which is planned for July 15, 1986; and Group 2 HEDs will be corrected during either the first or the second refueling outage. PG&E was reminded to assess HEDs that have neither high safety consequences nor high potential error for their cumulative effects which could raise their significance and priority. Because the Supplement to the Summary Report describing corrections is tentatively scheduled for July 1987 - after the correction phase begins - a conflict exists between implementation of corrections (July 1986) prior to NRC review of those corrections.

In conclusion, the meeting resulted in clarification of PG&E's methodology to satisfy this requirement. With exception of a scheduling conflict, NRC found PG&E has adequately improved its process to identify and schedule corrections for safety-related HEDs. The conflict in scheduling may be resolved by an NRC staff visit prior to the Supplement to the Summary Report to review proposed corrections for safety-significant HEDs. HEDs and other findings documented during the in-progress audit mini-survey should be addressed in the assessment process and documented in the Supplement to the Summary Report. Results of the HED assessment process should also be reported to the NRC in their Supplement to the Summary Report.

Selection of Design Improvements

This item, which was addressed during the meeting involved the specific procedure PG&E would institute to guide HED correction from design improvements through to implementation, including the participation of a human factors specialist.



During the meeting, PG&E discussed its correction process, provided a flow chart to illustrate the process, and described the role the human factors specialist would provide. Preliminary HED corrections are formed during core team assessment of HEDs and more formal selection of design changes are to be determined by using a half-scale mock-up. The process will be done by the core review team with the full participation of a human factors specialist. Documentation of HEDs and proposed corrections are submitted for management team review who then either concur or ask for other alternatives. Interim compensatory action may also be proposed to reduce the safety significance of potential for error of the HED until a time when full or optimal correction can be made. Justification for no correction may also result during the correction phase.

PG&E also discussed the approach that is taken for modifying procedures when correcting those types of HEDs. The process is largely identical to the one for design corrections; however, the PG&E operations group plays a stronger role in the process to verify that the HED is corrected. All design changes or procedure changes are fully documented and reviewed by management in a formal plant design change procedure. The procedure also calls for human factors involvement throughout the process.

It was concluded that this item from the audit has been addressed with a process that should guide HEDs through design correction proposal to implementation.

Verification That Selected Improvements Will Provide the Necessary Correction, and Verification That Improvements Will Not Create New HEDs

During the in-progress audit, PG&E had not formalized a procedure for this stage of the DCRDR, and had not identified the role the human factors specialist would take. As described above, a more formalized procedure to document HED corrections and to include human factors was established. That process includes review of the corrections on a mock-up and/or in the simulator. Procedural changes are also to be verified by an operations review group who have the following checklists at their disposal to help in verifying the correction:




1. Westinghouse Owners Group Writer's Guide
2. 2005-EOP Checklist
3. Human factors review of format consistency with other procedures

Coordination of the DCRDR With Other Control Room Improvement Programs


The process to accomplish this requirement was briefly described by PG&E. Specifically it indicated that overlap of team members on the different programs would afford a mechanism to meet this requirement; however, it did not provide documentation or examples of how this mechanism would function, i.e., sign-off sheets, procedures, etc. PG&E also stated that the EOPs are complete as of March 1985, Regulatory Guide 1.97 instrumentation is largely installed, and the SPDS has been declared operational. Training of operators to all changes is not complete, at least for the DCRDR; however, a mechanism exists for the training department to sign-off on all design changes. PG&E should fully respond to this item during future submittals. One way to illustrate this item may be to expand the HED Correction Flow Chart to indicate the relationship and integration of DCRDR corrections with other control room improvement programs.

Conclusions

The meeting resulted in clarification of most items found during the NRC in-progress audit at Diablo Canyon, Units 1 and 2. PG&E concurrence with this meeting summary should be provided along with a specific response to all nine items that were found during the audit, with specific detail describing the process to conduct the function and task analysis. The NRC staff believe that PG&E has performed a great deal of work to accomplish the DCRDR, but has yet to document the specific procedures (particularly for items 2 and 3) and communicate them via submittals to the NRC. Only through such submittals can the licensee be assured of receiving credit for its efforts. At a minimum, information to address all audit items, including the SPDS audit findings, should be submitted in PG&E's Supplement to the Summary Report. An organization chart identifying personnel, task assignments, and levels of effort for each of the nine items should be developed and provided, in addition to any quality control aspects for completion of




items. PG&E should also inform the NRC of intentions to implement safety-related corrections during the first refueling outage. A response to all nine items from PG&E should be received by NRC in early January.



REFERENCES

1. "In-Progress Audit of the Detailed Control Room Design Review Evaluations for Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2." Division of Human Factors Safety, NRR, NRC, September 1985.
2. NRC Memorandum from H.B. Clayton to D.L. Ziemann, "Meeting Summary - Task Analysis Requirements of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737," April 5, 1985.




ATTACHMENT 1

DIABLO-CANYON DCRDR MEETING
November 6, 1985

Attendance List

<u>Name</u>	<u>Affiliation</u>
Hans Schierling	NRC/DL/LB-3
Peter Beckham	PG&E CRDR Phase II Project Manager
F. Joseph Cucco, Jr.	PG&E CRDR Phase II Review Team Leader
Bryant Giffin	PG&E
Joe Seminara	PG&E - NF consultant
John J. Vranicar	PG&E
Joseph Lisboa	Bechtel I&C
Rob Fisher	PG&E - Ops Sr. Engr.
W. Neil Thompson	NRC DHFS HFEB Team Leader
Dom Tondi	NRC DHFS HFEB
Dick Eckenrode	NRC DHFS HFEB
Saba N. Saba	NRC DHFS HFEB
John Stokley	SAIC/consultant to NRC
Joel Kramer	NRC DHFS HFEB
Carol Kain	SAIC/NRC
Sig Auer	PG&E Co. Eng.
Tom Libs	PG&E



ATTACHMENT 2

SUGGESTED AGENDA FOR


DIABLO CANYON DCRDR MEETING

1. Structure and Participation of the DCRDR team
 - A. Increased participation of human factors consultants
 - B. Provision for documenting levels of effort or task assignments
 - C. Increased involvement of PG&E management in HED review and approval process.

2. Function and Task Analysis
 - A. Changes to methodology in order to provide a listing of needed instrument and control characteristics associated with operator tasks.
 - B. Change in process to include human factors specialists in task optimization of EOPs.
 - C. Completion of all tasks associated with Revision 1 or the EPGs.

3. Comparison of Display and Control Requirements with a Control Room Inventory
 - A. Change in methodology to use identified inventory and product from SFTA
 - B. Method for documentation.

4. Control Room Survey
 - A. Discuss current status and plans for completion of studies/surveys
 - B. Discuss methods for documenting specific HEDs which are part of a larger generic group.



5. Assessment of HEDs

Change of process to screen safety significant HEDs

6. Selection of Design Improvements


Development of a procedure to guide HED correction from design improvement through to implementation, including the participation of the human factors specialists in all phases.

7. and 8. Verification

Discuss a formalized procedure for this activity, and include the participation of the human factors specialists.

9. Coordination of DCRDR with other programs

- A. Discuss a formalized process
- B. Provide a procedure with a milestone chart to illustrate product completion, integrator, and iteration with other programs.



ATTACHMENT 3

DCRDR TASK ASSIGNMENTS

REASSESSMENT OF HED'S

Develop Methodology:	Review Team Leader Human Factors Specialist Core Review Team members Plant Operations Personnel
Reassess HED's:	Human Factors Specialist Review Team Leader Core Review Team members Operators Additional technical support as required
Perform Invest/Surveys:	Core Review Team members Human Factors Specialist Additional technical support as required Results reviewed by other review team members including Human Factors Specialist
HED Assessment Concurrence:	Management Team Plant Representative for Priority I HED's Any MT member for non-priority I HED's

FORMALIZE ENHANCEMENT METHODOLOGIES

Draft Guidelines:	Human Factors Specialist Core Review Team members Plant personnel
Convert to Technical Format:	Core Review Team members
Review Guidelines:	Human Factors Specialist Review Team Leader
Formalize Guidelines:	Core Review Team members Design Drafting personnel Management Team

HED RESOLUTIONS

Develop Resolution Options:	Human Factors Specialist Core Review Team Review Team Leader Plant Operations Personnel
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Implement Changes to Mock-up: Core Review Team members
 Design Drafting personnel
 Review Team Leader

Verify HED's Corrected: Core Review Team members
 Human Factors Specialist
 Plant Operations personnel
 Review Team Leader

Validate Corrections: Human Factors Specialist
 Plant Operations personnel
 Core Review Team members
 Review Team Leader

General Review of Changes: Plant Operations personnel

Review Operator Comments: Human Factors Specialist
 Review Team Leader
 Core Review Team members
 Others (DCPP, NOS, DCP) as required

SUBMIT MODIFICATION RECOMMENDATIONS

Design Change Requests: Core Review Team members
 Design Drafting
 Review Team Leader
 Project Manager

Other Requests/Recommend: Core Review Team members
 Review Team Leader
 Project Manager


DEVELOP RESOLUTION IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

Establish Milestones: Review Team Leader
 Core Review Team members
 Management Team members (via HED assessment
 concurrence)

Implementation Schedule: Project Management Group personnel
 Diablo Canyon Project scheduling personnel
 Review Team Leader

PROVIDE MECHANISM FOR HUMAN FACTORS REVIEW OF FUTURE CHANGES

Provide HF Training: Human Factors Specialist
 (to Eng'g, Operations, etc.) Review Team Leader
 Core Review Team members



Perform HF review of DCN's: Review Team Leader
(duration of DCRDR) Core Review Team members
 Human Factors Specialist

Perform HF review of DCN's: Human Factors Group (to be established)
(post-DCRDR)

INTEGRATE WITH OTHER NUREG-0737 ACTIVITIES

Reg. Guide 1.97 Review: Core Review Team members
 I&C Engineering
 Human Factors Specialist
 Review Team Leader

SPDS Review: CRDR Project Manager
 Human Factors Specialist
 Core Review Team members
 Review Team Leader

EOP's Review: Plant procedures group
 Operating Procedures Review Group
 Human Factors Specialist
 Core Review Team members
 Review Team Leader


ISSUE FINAL REPORT

Draft Report: Review Team Leader
 Human Factors Specialist
 Core Review Team members


Review report: Project Manager
 Management Team members
 DCP, NOS, and DCP Managers
 Licensing
 DCRDR contributors


Note 1: The order of listing reflects the relative level of involvement.


Note 2: The core Review Team consists of personnel from I&C Engineering, Electrical Engineering, and Operations Engineering.




GENERIC TO PLANT SPECIFIC (DCPP 1 & 2) TASK ANALYSIS
CONVERSION PROCESS







SAMPLE OF DCP 1 & 2 TASK ANALYSIS REACTOR TRIP SAFETY INJECTION



REASSESSMENT OF HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES (HED'S)

SCOPE

This procedure provides guidance for assessing the safety significance and operability concerns of Human Engineering Discrepancies (HED's).

PROCEDURE

Each HED will be assessed in accordance with the flow chart shown on Attachment 1. This assessment will place each HED in one of five categories which relate to the priority of the HED. The categories are:

- I - High priority; HED shall be corrected or mitigated by the 1st refueling, or justification must be made for continuing operation.
- II - Medium priority; the HED should be corrected within a reasonable time period (1st or 2nd refueling).
- III - Operability concern; HED will be corrected as the schedule permits.
- IV - Low priority; cost/benefit analysis will be performed to determine fix (if any). No established schedule.
- N/A - HED need not be considered for correction.


The assessment process will consider the safety significance of the equipment associated with the HED, the potential for error of the HED, and the consequences should an error occur.

PLANT FUNCTION

The first step in assessing the HED's as shown on Attachment 1 is determining the function of the equipment involved. HED's affecting equipment which is safety-related, or equipment which is not safety-related but is used in an emergency operating procedure, will be assessed for safety significance. HED's affecting the balance of plant equipment or which do not directly affect plant equipment will be assessed for plant operability.

POTENTIAL FOR ERROR

The HED is next reviewed for potential for error. Attachment 2 includes a series of questions (derived from NUREG-0800, Exhibit 2-2) which will be used as guidance during this part of the assessment. The human factors specialist will be relied on heavily to determine the actual potential for error occurrence.



CONSEQUENCE OF ERROR

The HED's following the safety significance path will next be reviewed for safety consequences of an error resulting from not correcting the HED. The following are examples of errors with significant safety consequences:

An error that would likely result in unsafe operation or the violation of a technical specification, safety limit, or a limiting condition for operation.

An error that would likely result in the unavailability of a safety-related system needed to mitigate transients or systems needed to safely shut down the plant.

An error that would likely result in a challenge to the safety-related systems in shutting down the plant (e.g., a Reactor Trip or a Safety Injection).

HED's judged to not lead to errors of significant safety consequences will also be reviewed for operability concerns. Operability concerns include factors affecting plant availability, plant efficiency, plant reliability, etc.

The HED's following the plant operability path will be reviewed for plant operability concerns only.


PRIORITIZATION AND RATIONALE

By following the flow chart, each HED will fall into one of the five priorities previously mentioned. If the priority is not apparent or if there is no clear cut "yes" or "no" answers to some of the assessment factors, the HED will be further analyzed with a view toward improving operator performance and plant safety, and a priority will be selected by the Review Team. The rationale used will be documented on the assessment form. Any significant dissent from the final priority selected will also be documented.

CORRECTION

After the HED has been assessed and prioritized, proposed resolutions can be discussed and documented. This step is included here because the subject is clear and it allows input from both Operations and the Human Factors Specialist in determining design requirements. The manner in which HED's are assessed (by function, error potential, and consequence) prevents discussion of resolutions at this time to affect the prioritization of an HED.

For Priority I HED's, an Interim Compensatory Action or summary Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) is included on the Assessment form. The Interim Compensatory Action serves to reduce the safety significance or potential for error of the HED until time permits implementation of a final or optimal correction. A JCO is documented when it is impractical to implement an interim physical modification or when no correction is planned.




The Backfit Feasability is added for information only. It will not be a factor in whether or not a Priority I or II HED will be corrected or mitigated. It may be a factor in the extent of the correction and/or the schedule for implementing the final (optimal) resolution.


The Schedule for Implementation is a goal for resolving an HED. Milestone dates such as "first refueling," "second refueling," "completed," will be used here. Specific dates will be generated later as the extent of the number of changes and Engineering and Construction involvement become known.

CONCURRENCE

During the assessment, the Review Team members performing the assessment will initial the form in the available space. Any dissents shall also be initialed.

After the assessment form is completely filled out, it shall be sent to a Management Team member for concurrence. Priority I HED's should be signed by the DCPM Management Team member. The non-Priority I HED's may be reviewed by any Management Team member.





ATTACHMENT 1: HED ASSESSMENT FLOW DIAGRAM



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POTENTIAL FOR ERROR

DISCREPANCY HAS CAUSED AN ERROR IN THE PAST

(If this can be answered yes, no further review is required).

OPERATORS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO CORRECT THE DISCREPANCY THEMSELVES

FACTORS AFFECTING OPERATOR ATTENTIVENESS

Discrepancy will cause undue operator fatigue.

Discrepancy will cause operator confusion.

Discrepancy will cause operator discomfort.

Discrepancy presents a risk to control room personnel.

Discrepancy will distract control room personnel from their duties.

FACTORS AFFECTING OPERATOR PHYSICAL ABILITIES

Discrepancy will affect the operator's ability to see and read accurately.

Discrepancy will affect the operator's ability hear correctly.

Discrepancy will affect the operator's ability to communicate with others.

FACTORS AFFECTING OPERATOR ACTIONS

Discrepancy will cause a delay of necessary feedback to the operator.

Because of the discrepancy, operator will not be provided with positive feedback about control tasks.

Discrepancy will lead to inadvertent activation or deactivation of controls.

Discrepancy will otherwise degrade the operator's ability to manipulate controls correctly.

FACTORS AFFECTING OPERATOR MENTAL OR PHYSICAL WORKLOAD

Tasks in which the discrepancy is involved may be highly stressful.

Discrepancy is involved in a task which is usually performed concurrently with another task.

Discrepancy requires operator to calculate or interpolate data.

Discrepancy violates normal control room or nuclear industry conventions or population stereotypes.



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CHRON # _____

CATEGORY _____

HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY ASSESSMENT

TITLE/SUBJECT _____
(Complete description is on attached HED)

<u>ASSESSMENT:</u>	SAFETY RELATED:	YES	NO
Reviewers	HIGH ERROR POTENTIAL:	YES	NO
_____	SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONSEQUENCE:	YES	NO N/A
_____	OPERABILITY CONCERN:	YES	NO N/A

_____ Date PRIORITY: _____

RATIONALE:

DISSENT:

CORRECTION PLAN:

- A. Immediate Compensatory Actions/Justification for Continued Operation:

- B. Optimal Correction:

SCHEDULE FOR IMPLEMENTATION _____


CONCURRENCE: _____
Management Team Representative Date



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HED CORRECTION PROCESS





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MEETING SUMMARY DISTRIBUTION
OPERATING REACTORS BRANCH NO. 1

Docket or Central file

~~NRC PDR~~

Local PDR

PAD#3 RDG

J. Partlow (Emergency Preparedness only)

Steve Varga

Hans Schierling

OELD

E. Jordan

B. Grimes

ACRS (10)

Plant Service List

C. Parrish

NRC Participants

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