


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Regulatory

File Cy.

Commonwealth Edison Company

ONE FIRST NATIONAL PLAZA ★ CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Address Reply to:

POST OFFICE BOX 767 ★ CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60690

Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450

7-17-70

Dr. Peter A. Morris, Director
Division of Reactor Licensing
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington D.C. 20545

Dear Dr. Morris:

This is to report a condition relating to the operation of the station in which the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) System was found to have been inoperable during a time in which it was required to be operable. The plant was shutdown for a maintenance and fuel inspection outage at this time.

Problem and Initial Action

This situation was discovered at 4:00 p.m. on July 8, 1970 during checkout of the LPCI System for a special test. The control switches for the LPCI pumps were found in the pull-to-lock position; this would have prevented the pumps from starting on an initiation signal. The control switches were immediately returned to the normal position and the Operating Engineer notified. All other required emergency core cooling system were operable at the time. The LPCI System was required to be operable at this time as specified in section 3.5.A.4 of the Technical Specifications.



Investigation

Investigation of the conditions leading to this situation was immediately begun and revealed the following:

The system was last known to be in the proper condition on June 27, 1970 when monthly surveillance was conducted on the LPCI pumps.

On the 4 p.m.-12 p.m. shift of July 6, 1970, the 2C LPCI pump was run to circulate the torus for a water sample. At this time the LPCI control switches were found in pull-to-lock; and the control switch for 2C was returned to pull-to-lock following its run. The operator states that this was the "as-found" condition and did not question it.

Between June 27 and July 8, the reactor mode switch was in REFUEL and core alterations were made during most of the shifts. These alterations consisted



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U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Health Research Division
Washington, D.C. 20545

Dear Mr. [Name]

This is to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of July 16, 1970, regarding the [Topic]. The information provided is being reviewed and a response will be provided to you as soon as possible.

Sincerely,
[Signature]

The enclosed report, dated July 16, 1970, contains the results of the study conducted by the [Department/Division]. It is hoped that this information will be helpful to you in your ongoing research. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions or need further clarification.

Very truly yours,
[Signature]

Enclosed for your information are two copies of the report mentioned above. One copy is being retained in the [Department/Division] files.

Very truly yours,
[Signature]

I am sure that the information provided in the report will be of great value to you. Please let me know if you need any further assistance or if you have any suggestions for future studies.

Very truly yours,
[Signature]

July 17, 1970


of irradiated fuel removal and replacement, loading of new fuel, LPRM string removal and replacement, and control rod blade withdrawal and insertion for control rod drive replacement.

Review of the operating order, procedures, and logs and survey of the shift personnel reveals no order to place the control switches in pull-to-lock and no information as to when they were placed in that condition.

Corrective Action

The following has been or will be done to preclude the possibility of this situation, or similar situations, occurring again:

1. The operating shifts have been instructed to review the sections of the Technical Specifications relating to the emergency core cooling systems.
2. An operating order will be written requiring the operating shift to review the operability of systems with technical specification requirements as soon as practicable upon assuming the shift.
3. The checkoff lists and procedures for Tech Spec related systems will be reviewed and revised as necessary to include the proper position of the control switches for system operability.


H.K. Hoyt
Superintendent

HKH:glw

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
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1. The Commission has received information from the Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, that the Bureau is currently reviewing the proposed development of the proposed project. The Bureau is currently reviewing the proposed development of the proposed project. The Bureau is currently reviewing the proposed development of the proposed project.

1. The first group of people who are interested in the study of the history of the United States are the people who are interested in the history of the United States.

1. The first of these is the fact that the system is not a closed system. It is a system which is open to the environment. This means that the system is not self-contained and it is not self-sufficient. It is a system which is dependent on the environment for its survival. This is a major weakness of the system and it is one which must be addressed if the system is to be successful.

...and
...and



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Commonwealth Edison Company


ONE FIRST NATIONAL PLAZA ★ CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Address-Reply to:

POST OFFICE BOX 767 ★ CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60690.

July 6, 1970

Dr. Peter A. Morris, Director
Division of Reactor Licensing
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D.C. 20545



Subject: Additional Information Relative to
Provisional Operating License DPR-19 for
Dresden Unit 2

Dear Dr. Morris:

The purpose of this letter is to provide you with information concerning recent operational difficulties on Dresden Unit 2 and our proposed corrective actions. This information has been requested in your letter dated June 18, 1970 which responded to our proposed Change No. 2 to Appendix A of DPR-19.

Attached hereto is Exhibit I containing our evaluation of the following operational difficulties:

1. The rapid depressurization incident on June 5, 1970;
2. Main steam line isolation valves; and
3. Excessive hydraulic forces in the high pressure coolant injection system steam line.

An investigative program on unexplained fuel failures and excessive control rod scram times is in progress. The results of this program will be submitted when it is completed.

In addition to three signed originals, 19 copies of this information are also submitted.

Very truly yours,

Byron Lee, Jr.

Assistant to the President

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to
before me this 14th day
of July, 1970.

Notary Public

1970

In another folder
as 108.61