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MOLDEN,J.E. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
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Rev 7/14/97

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Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Diablo Canyon Power Plant
P.O. Box 56
Avila Beach, CA 93424
805/545-6000

April 4, 1997

PG&E Letter DCL-97-051

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80
Docket No. 50-323, OL-DPR-82
Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2
Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Update

Dear Commissioners and Staff:

In accordance with Section V, "Implementing Procedures," of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, enclosed is an update to the emergency plan implementing procedures for the Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2.

The changes to Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure EP G-1, Revision 25, were already transmitted via PG&E Letter DCL-97-001, dated January 6, 1997. The previous submission was from an expedited revision with handwritten changes. The copy of the procedure enclosed with this submittal incorporates the changes electronically.

This update does not contain any privacy/proprietary information.

If there are any questions regarding this update, please contact Martin T. Hug of my staff at (805) 545-4016.

Sincerely,

James E. Molden

James E. Molden
Manager - Operations Services

A045/,

Enclosures

cc: Steven D. Bloom
Ellis W. Merschoff - w/a (2)
Kenneth E. Perkins
Michael D. Tschiltz

GRC/1345

UPDATE TO THE EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES FOR DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2

Procedure Number	Privacy/ Proprietary Information	Title
EP G-1, Revision 25	None	"Emergency Classification and Emergency Plan Activation"

DCPP EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

Table of Contents - Volume 3B

***Procedure included in this submittal**

TITLE: EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND EMERGENCY PLAN ACTIVATION

APPROVED: [signature] 12/6/96 ~~10/09/95~~ MA DATE | 12/6/96 ~~10/09/95~~ MA EFFECTIVE DATE

PROCEDURE CLASSIFICATION: QUALITY RELATED

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.0 SCOPE

1.1 This procedure describes accident classification guidelines and Emergency Plan activation responsibilities.

2.0 DISCUSSION

2.1 This procedure provides guidance for activating the Emergency Plan as well as classifying an accident. The steps required by this procedure are in addition to the steps required to maintain the plant in, or restore the plant to, a safe condition.

2.2 Initial notification of the San Luis Obispo County Sheriff's Watch Commander and the State Office of Emergency Services should be as soon as possible and shall be within 15 minutes.

2.2.1 The 15 minute time frame begins when the Shift Supervisor or Shift Foreman recognizes the emergency event(s) have occurred.

a. Recognition is when the Shift Supervisor or Shift Foreman has analyzed the event or condition and determined classification criteria are met.

2.2.2 Follow-up notifications shall be made every 30 minutes or within 15 minutes of changing event classifications.

2.3 Events not meeting the minimum classification criteria contained in this procedure should be reviewed for reportability in XI1.ID2, "Regulatory Reporting Requirements and Reporting Process."

3.0 <u>DEFINITIONS</u>

3.1 Emergency Classes

3.1.1 Notification of Unusual Event (NUE) - characterized by off-normal conditions in progress <u>or</u> having occurred which:

a. Indicate a potential degradation of plant safety if proper action is not taken

<u>OR</u>

b. Cause circumstances beyond the control of operating staff making the situation more serious from a safety standpoint.

c. No releases of radioactive material requiring off-site response or monitoring are expected.

3.1.2 Alert - events in progress <u>or</u> having occurred, involving an actual or potential substantial degradation of the plant safety level.

a. Any releases of radioactive material are expected to be limited to small fraction of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides (PAGs).

b. The lowest classification level where off-site emergency response is anticipated.

3.1.3 Site Area Emergency (SAE) - event(s) in progress <u>or</u> having occurred involving actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for public protection.

a. Radioactive releases or their potential may exceed EPA PAGs, but only near the site boundary.

b. A core meltdown situation is not indicated.

3.1.4 General Emergency - event(s) in progress or having occurred which indicate:

a. Imminent substantial core damage.

b. Potential for containment loss.

c. Radioactive releases can be expected to exceed EPA PAGs off-site.

4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES

4.1 <u>Interim Site Emergency Coordinator</u> (Interim SEC) - Control Room Shift Supervisor is responsible for Emergency Plan activation and implementation, event closeout (NUE ONLY) and overall emergency management UNTIL the Site Emergency Coordinator officially assumes the responsibilities following Technical Support Center activation.

4.2 <u>Site Emergency Coordinator</u> (SEC) - The SEC in the Technical Support Center shall be responsible for changes in emergency classification after relieving the ISEC and until relieved by the EOF Recovery Manager of overall command and control of the emergency effort.

4.3 <u>Recovery Manager (RM)</u> - The RM shall be responsible for changes in emergency classification after arriving at the EOF and relieving the SEC of overall command and control of the emergency response effort.

5.0 INSTRUCTIONS

5.1 Classify and declare the event according to Attachment 7.1 of this procedure ONLY.

<u>NOTE</u>: Simultaneous EALs that increase the probability of release require escalation of the classification to one level above the higher EAL.

5.2 Formally announce all emergency classification declarations to the Control Room, TSC, or EOF, respectively.

5.3 Perform the actions required for the declared event in accordance with EP G-2 (Control Room), EP EF-1 (TSC), or EP EF-3B (EOF), respectively.

6.0 RECORDS

6.1 Retain all notification records and other event documentation to prepare a written event summary.

6.2 NUE: Written summary required within 24 hours. RMS summary as "Plant Lifetime Document" with copies to DCPP Emergency Planning.

6.3 Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency: Written summary within 8 hours of closeout or class reduction. RMS summary as "Plant Lifetime Document" with copies to DCPP Emergency Planning.

7.0 ATTACHMENTS

7.1 "Emergency Action Level Classification Chart," 06/14/94

8.0 REFERENCES

8.1 EP EF-1, "Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center."

8.2 EP EF-3B, "Long-Term EOF Activation and Operation."

8.3 EP G-2, "Activation and Operation of the Interim Site Emergency Organization (Control Room)."

8.4 EP R-2, "Release of Airborne Radioactive Materials."

8.5 EP RB-9, "Calculation of Release Rate."

8.6 EP RB-10, "Protective Action Recommendation."

8.7 EP RB-11, "Emergency Off-Site Dose Calculations."

8.8 EP RB-14, "Core Damage Assessment Procedure."

8.9 EP EF-6, "Operating Procedures for EARS Stations."

8.10 CP M-9A, "Hazardous Materials Incident - Initial Emergency Response/Mitigation Procedure."

8.11 CY2.ID1, "Radiological Monitoring and Controls Program."

8.12 XI1.ID2, "Regulatory Reporting Requirements and Reporting Process."

8.13 DCPP Technical Specifications.

8.14 DCPP Emergency Plan, Table 4.1-1.

8.15 EOP E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture."

8.16 EOP FR-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink."

8.17 EOP FR-P.1, "Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition."

8.18 OP AP-8A, "Control Room Inaccessibility - Establishing Hot Standby."

9.0 SPONSOR

R.M. Bliss

TITLE: EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION CHART

	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
I. FIRE (All Modes)	1. Fire not under control within 15 minutes of initiating fire fighting efforts AND affecting plant equipment or power supplies in or near the Protected Area(s).	1. Fire not under control within 15 minutes of initiating fire-fighting efforts AND threatening the loss of function of any of the following Safety related systems required for safe shutdown: - Vital Power Supplies: D/Gs, DFOT, Vital 4kV, 480V, 120VAC, or 125VDC - Primary Systems and Auxiliaries: RCS, CCW, RHR, or Charging and Boration - Heat Sinks: AFW, ASW, 10% Dumps, S/G Safeties, or MSIVs - Control Room, Cable Spreading Rooms, or HSDP.	1. Fire causing the complete loss of function of any one of the following safety related systems required for safe shutdown: - Vital Power Supplies: D/Gs, DFOT, Vital 4kV, 480V, 120VAC or 125VDC - Primary Systems and Auxiliaries: RCS, CCW, RHR, or Charging and Boration - Heat Sinks: AFW, ASW, 10% Dumps, S/G Safeties, or MSIVs - Control Room. Cable Spreading Rooms, or HSDP.	1. Site Emergency Coordinator judges that a fire could cause common damage to plant systems which is determined to have the potential to release radioactive material in quantities sufficient to cause exposures comparable to General Emergency #4.
II. FUEL DAMAGE OR VESSEL DAMAGE (Modes 1-4)	2. Indication of Fuel Damage as shown by: Confirmed RCS sample shows >100/E µCi/gm specific activity (Tech Spec 3.4.8) OR Confirmed RCS sample shows dose equivalent I-131 activity > Tech Spec limit for Iodine Spike (Tech Spec Fig. 3.4-1). Category II Continued on next page.	2. Indication of Fuel Damage as shown by: Confirmed RCS sample >300 µCi/cc of equivalent I-131 specific activity OR equivalent fuel failure is measured by exposure rate from systems carrying reactor coolant per EP RB-14 OR Confirmed RCS sample indicates >1% fuel failure within 30 minutes or 5% total fuel failure. Category II Continued on next page.	See SAE #17 for Steam Line Break	2. Degraded core with possible loss of coolable geometry as indicated by: 5 or more thermocouple readings > 1200 deg. F. OR LOCA with no indication of ECCS flow AND indication of fuel damage (See Alert #2) OR LOCA with containment rad levels > values for 100% gap release in EP RB-14. Category II Continued on next page.

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

TITLE: EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION CHART

	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
II. FUEL DAMAGE OR VESSEL DAMAGE (Modes 1-4) (Continued)	3. Pressurized Thermal Shock is verified by entry into EOP FR-P.1 AND Left of Limit A curve (EOP FR-P.1).			3. Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers: A) Indication of fuel damage (See Alert #2) AND Determination of a Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) which requires entry into EOP E-3 AND Steam release from ruptured S/G, either used for plant cooldown purposes or due to a steamline brea[illegible] B) Indication of Fuel Damage (See Alert #2) AND Determination of a SGTR requiring entry into EOP E-3 AND Indication of a steam line break inside containment AND High potential for loss of containment integrity (e.g., loss of function of both Containment Spray trains OR loss of function of one Containment Spray train and four CFCUs). C) Indication of Fuel Damage (See Alert #2) AND Determination of a SGTR which requires entry into EOP E-3 AND Indication of a steam line break outside containment with inability to isolate the break. D) Potential fuel damage indicated by incore thermocouples >700 deg. F or RVLIS <39% AND LOCA as indicated by RCS leakage and SI AND Loss of containment integrity.

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

TITLE: EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION CHART

	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
III. FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT (All Modes)		3. Fuel Handling Accident causing a release in Containment or the Fuel Handling Building WITH The potential to exceed the criteria listed in Alert #4 or #5.	2. Fuel Handling Accident causing a release in Containment or the Fuel Handling Building WITH The potential to exceed the criteria listed in SAEs #3, #4 or #5.	
IV. LOSS OF CONTROL OR RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL (All Modes)	4. Radiological Effluent Process Monitor High Radiation Alarm with valid reading in excess of alarm setpoint on any of the following monitors: RE-14/14R RE-24/24R RE-28/28R.	4. Radiological Effluent Process Monitor Alarm or other indication of a release which exceeds the following when calculated at the Site Boundary with EP R-2: TEDE Rate > 0.57 mr/hr OR Thyroid CDE Rate > 1.70 mr/hr	3. An actual or projected release which is calculated in accordance with EP R-2, or EP RB-9 and RB-11, to exceed the following criteria at the Site Boundary (800 meters): TEDE Rate > 50 mr/hr for 30 min. OR Thyroid CDE Rate > 250 mr/hr for 30 min.	4. TEDE Rate ≥ 1000 mr/hr OR Thyroid CDE Rate ≥ 5000 mr/hr is calculated at the Site Boundary (per EP R-2, EP RB-11 or with EARS) under actual meteorological conditions AND actual effluent monitor level OR is calculated and confirmed by near-site monitors, vent monitors or in-plant radiation levels.
	5. A valid reading in excess of the isolation setpoint, which fails to isolate the release on any of the Radiological Process Effluent Monitors: RE-18 OR RE-23 During discharge only.	5. Valid alarm on plant vent high range noble gas monitor RE-29. NOTE: ALARMS AT STATE OES SACRAMENTO.	4. Peak puff release rate exceeding 2 minute duration which exceeds the following criteria at the Site Boundary when calculated with EP R-2: TEDE Rate > 500 mr/hr for 2 min. OR TEDE > 17 mrem OR Thyroid CDE Rate > 2500 mr/hr for 2 min. OR Thyroid CDE > 85 mrem.	
	6. Unplanned or uncontrolled release to the environment exceeding alarm setpoints on RE-3. Category IV Continued on next page.	6. An actual liquid release which exceeds 10x the limits of 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table 2, Col. 2 per CY2.ID1. Category IV Continued on next page.	5. The dose rates from above (SAE #3 or #4) are projected based on other plant parameters. Category IV Continued on next page.	

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

TITLE: EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION CHART

	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
IV. LOSS OF CONTROL OR RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL (All Modes) (Continued)	7. An actual or projected airborne release which exceeds the following at the Site Boundary when calculated with EP R-2: TEDE Rate > 0.057 mr/hr __OR__ Thyroid CDE Rate > 0.170 mr/hr.	7. Unplanned or unanticipated increase of 1 R/hr or greater in any of the following areas: Passageways, __OR__ Normally occupied areas, __OR__ Accessible areas normally < 100 mR/hr, __OR__ Outside boundaries of Radiologically Controlled Areas __AND__, for any area above, a potential exists for __EITHER__ an uncontrolled release to the environment __OR__ a loss of ability to maintain plant safety functions.	6. EPA PAGs are projected to be exceeded at or near the Site Boundary: TEDE ≥ 1000 mrem __OR__ Thyroid CDE ≥ 5000 mrem as calculated by EARS, EP R-2, or EP RB-11 __OR__ as determined by Field Monitoring data analysis.	
	8. An actual liquid release which exceeds the limits of 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table 2, Col. 2 per CY2.ID1.	8. Unexplained increase of 50 X DAC in airborne radioactivity outside the boundary of the Radiologically Controlled Areas, but within the Plant Protected Area.		
V. LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM (All Modes)		9. Entry into OP AP-8A, "Control Room Accessibility," __AND__ controls established within 15 minutes.	7. Entry into OP AP-8A, "Control Room Accessibility," __AND__ controls __not__ established within 15 minutes.	

__NOTE:__ SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

TITLE: EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION CHART

	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
VI. LOSS OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE	9. Plant is <u>not</u> brought to required operating Mode within any applicable Tech Spec Action Statement time limit (Modes 1-4).		8. Complete loss for greater than 15 minutes of any of the following functions needed to reach or maintain Hot Shutdown (while in Modes 1-4): AFW capability Steam Dump System and S/G Safety Valves Loss of the capability to maintain RCS inventory as evidenced by a loss of all charging pumps coincident with the inability to depressurize and inject with the Safety Injection pumps Loss of capability to increase the Boric Acid concentration sufficient to maintain Keff less than .99 in Mode 4 with a loss of capability to trip control rods ASW or CCW Systems Loss of electrical power or I&C for any of the above listed systems, causing a complete loss of function.	5. Loss of Heat Sink indicated by: Entry into EOP FR H.1 <u>AND</u> Loss of water inventory in 3 S/Gs (<23% [34%] Wide Range).
	10. Loss of function of both RHR trains for greater than 15 minutes while in Mode 5 or 6.	10. Loss of function of both RHR trains for greater than 15 minutes in Modes 1-4.		
	11. A loss of function of <u>all</u> charging pumps for greater than 15 minutes when normally used for RCS inventory control (Modes 1-4).	11. An unplanned shutdown of the RHR System (while in Mode 5 or 6) for > 1 hour with no other normal means of decay heat removal available (e.g., flooded reactor cavity or steam generators with loops filled).		
		12. An unplanned loss of function of the RHR System (Mode 5 or 6) for greater than 15 minutes <u>AND</u> RCS thermocouple temperature is projected to exceed 200 deg.F within 1 hour of RHR loss (see Appendix B of OP AP SD series) <u>OR</u> RCS thermocouple temperature exceeds 200 deg. F.		

<u>NOTE</u>: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

TITLE: EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION CHART

	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
VII. LOSS OF POWER OR ALARMS OR ASSESSMENT OR COMMUNICATIONS	12. Loss of all off-site power for greater than 15 minutes AND at least 2 D/Gs are supplying their vital busses (Modes 1-4).	13. Loss of all off-site power for greater than 15 minutes AND only 1 D/G is supplying its vital bus (Modes 1-4).	9. Loss of all on-site AND off-site AC power for > 15 minutes (Modes 1-4).	See General Emergency Condition #5 under LOSS OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE.
	13. Loss of all off-site power for greater than 15 minutes AND at least 1 D/G is supplying its vital bus (Modes 5 and 6).	14. Loss of all off-site and on-site AC power for greater than 15 minutes in Modes 5 and 6.		
	14. Loss of all vital DC power as indicated by DC Bus 11(21), 12(22), and 13(23) undervoltage for > 15 minutes (Modes 5 and 6).	15. Loss of all vital DC power as indicated by DC Bus 11(21), 12(22) and 13(23) undervoltage for < 15 minutes (Modes 1-4).	10. Loss of all vital DC power as indicated by DC Bus 11(21), 12(22) and 13(23) undervoltage for > 15 minutes (Modes 1-4).	
	15. Loss of assessment capabilities as indicated by a total loss of SPDS in the Control Room AND simultaneous loss of all displays for any "Accident Monitoring" variable in Tech Spec Table 3.3-10 for > 1 hour while in Modes 1, 2 or 3. *			
	16. Main Control Room Annunciators PKs 1 through 5 AND CRT AND typewriter all do not respond to an alarm condition in Modes 1-4 for over 15 minutes.	16. Main Control Room Annunciators PKs 1 through 5 AND CRT AND typewriter all do not respond to an alarm condition in Modes 1-4 for over 15 minutes AND the plant is in a significant transient (plant trip, SI, or generator runback >25 MW/min), nonannunciating systems available.	11. Main Control Room Annunciators PKs 1 through 5 AND CRT AND typewriter all do not respond to an alarm condition in Modes 1-4 for over 15 minutes AND the plant is in a significant transient AND backup, nonannunciating systems are not available (PPC, SPDS).	
	17. Total loss of communication capability with off-site agencies (all Modes) as indicated by the inability to communicate with SLO County (by telephone and radio) OR the NRC Operations Center.			

XPR 12-4-96

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

* NOTE: IF THE AFFECTED VARIABLE IN TABLE 3.3-10 IS THE PLANT VENT RADIATION MONITOR - HIGH RANGE, REFER TO THE COMPENSATORY MEASURES IN STP G-16.

XPR 12-4-96

TITLE: EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION CHART

	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
VIII. NATURAL PHENOMENA (All Modes)	18. Ground motion felt and recognized as an earthquake by a consensus of Control Room operators on duty AND measuring greater than 0.01g on the Earthquake Force Monitor.	17. Earthquake > 0.2 g verified by Seismic Monitors.	12. Earthquake > 0.4 g verified by Seismic Monitors.	6. Site Emergency Coordinator's judgement that major internal or external events (e.g., earthquakes, wind damage, explosions, etc.) which could cause massive common damage to plant systems which is determined to have the potential to release radioactive material in quantities sufficient to cause exposures comparable to General Emergency #4.
	19. Flooding of any plant structure that causes initiation of entry to Mode 3 due to a Tech Spec action statement.	18. High water exceeding Intake Structure main deck elevation or low water causing cavitation and shutdown of both ASW pumps for < 15 minutes.	13. High water causing flooding of ASW pump compartments or low water causing the shutdown of both ASW pumps for > 15 minutes.	
	20. Tsunami or Hurricane Warning from the State, NOAA, NWS, Coast Guard or System Dispatcher OR Observation of low or high water levels at the Intake Structure indicative of a Tsunami or Hurricane.	19. Sustained wind of 85 mph (38 m/sec) at any elevation on the Met. Tower.	14. Sustained wind speed > 100 mph (45 m/sec).	
	21. A tornado sighted within Site Boundary.	20. Tornado strikes the plant protected area.		
IX. OTHER HAZARDS (All Modes)	22. Report of airplane crash within the Site Boundary or unusual airplane activity threatening the plant.	21. Confirmed missile, airplane crash or explosion involving a plant structure in the protected area.	15. Missile, airplane crash or explosion causing complete loss of a safety system function that causes entry into a Tech Spec Action Statement.	See General Emergency #6 above.
	23. Confirmed explosion on-site.			
	24. Turbine failure causing casing penetration OR damage to turbine or generator seals.	22. Turbine failure generating missiles that cause visual damage to other safety related structures, equipment, controls, OR power supplies.		
	25. Significant release of flammable OR toxic gas OR liquid that prevents, even with SCBAs, operations inside the power block OR intake structure (ref. CP M-9A).	23. Release of flammable OR toxic gas OR liquid that jeopardizes operation of safety related systems by either preventing required access OR by threatening imminent damage.		

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TITLE: EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION CHART

	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
X. PRIMARY OR PRI/SEC OR SECONDARY LEAK (Modes 1-4)	26. RCS unidentified OR pressure boundary leakage that exceeds 10 gpm OR identified leakage that exceeds 25 gpm.	24. Primary leak rate >50 gpm.	16. Known primary system LOCA during which RCS subcooling cannot be maintained >20°F OR PZR level cannot be maintained >4% (20% with adverse containment).	See General Emergency #3 under Fuel or Vessel Damage.
	27. SI Actuation with ECCS injection into the RCS resulting from a valid signal based on actual plant conditions. NOTE: SI ACTUATION ALSO ALARMS AT OES IN SACRAMENTO.	25. Determination of a SGTR which results in entry into EOP E-3.	17. Determination of a SGTR coincident with steam release from ruptured S/G, either used for plant cooldown purposes or due to a steamline break.	
	28. Steam line break which results in SI actuation.	26. Determination of a steam line break with >10 gpm Primary to Secondary leakage.		
	29. Failure of a PZR PORV AND Block Valve OR Safety Valve fails to reseat, excluding allowable leakage, following a pressure reduction below the reset point.			
XI. REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM FAILURE (Modes 1-4)		27. Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) as indicated by: Failure of an automatic reactor trip to trip the reactor.	18. An ATWS condition with no fuel damage evident AND An additional failure of a system required for Hot Shutdown (See SAE #8) to actuate.	7. ATWS with Fuel Damage indications (see Alert Condition #2 under FUEL DAMAGE) OR ATWS with potential Core Melt indicated by incore thermocouples > 700 deg. F AND RVLIS < 39%.
XII. SECURITY THREAT (All Modes)	30. Report by Security that a forcible entry or sabotage attempt has occurred or a credible bomb threat has been received against the areas within the protected area boundary.	28. Security reports ongoing security threat involving physical attack on the facility or a sabotage device has been detected that threatens the operability of safety related equipment (see Alert #1).	19. Security reports ongoing physical attack on the facility or a sabotage device causing a confirmed loss of a safety system function that causes an entry into a Tech Spec Action Statement (see SAE #1).	8. Security reports ongoing security threat which causes loss of control of the operations of the plant to hostile forces.
XIII. SITE EMERGENCY COORDINATOR'S JUDGEMENT (All Modes)	31. Site Emergency Coordinator determines conditions warrant increased awareness on the part of off-site authorities of initiation of a plant shutdown per Tech Spec LCOs or involve other than normal controlled shutdown.	29. Site Emergency Coordinator judges plant conditions exist that warrant precautionary activation of the TSC and placing the EOF and other key emergency personnel on stand-by.	20. Site Emergency Coordinator judges that conditions exist that warrant activation of the emergency centers and monitoring teams or a precautionary notification to the public near the site.	9. Site Emergency Coordinator judges conditions exist which have a potential to release radioactive material in quantities sufficient to cause exposures comparable to General Emergency #4.

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

TITLE: EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND EMERGENCY PLAN ACTIVATION

APPROVED: D. Millush 10/9/95 DATE 10/9/95 EFFECTIVE DATE

PROCEDURE CLASSIFICATION: QUALITY RELATED

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.0 SCOPE

1.1 This procedure describes accident classification guidelines and Emergency Plan activation responsibilities.

2.0 DISCUSSION

2.1 This procedure provides guidance for activating the Emergency Plan as well as classifying an accident. The steps required by this procedure are <u>in addition to</u> the steps required to maintain the plant in, or restore the plant to, a safe condition.

2.2 Initial notification of the San Luis Obispo County Sheriff's Watch Commander and the State Office of Emergency Services should be as soon as possible and shall be within 15 minutes.

2.2.1 The 15 minute time frame begins when the Shift Supervisor or Shift Foreman recognizes the emergency event(s) have occurred.

a. Recognition is when the Shift Supervisor or Shift Foreman has analyzed the event or condition and determined classification criteria are met.

2.2.2 Follow-up notifications shall be made every 30 minutes or within 15 minutes of changing event classifications.

2.3 Events not meeting the minimum classification criteria contained in this procedure should be reviewed for reportability in XI1.ID2, "Regulatory Reporting Requirements and Reporting Process."

3.0 DEFINITIONS

3.1 Emergency Classes

3.1.1 Notification of Unusual Event (NUE) - characterized by off-normal conditions in progress or having occurred which:

a. Indicate a potential degradation of plant safety if proper action is not taken

OR

b. Cause circumstances beyond the control of operating staff making the situation more serious from a safety standpoint.

c. No releases of radioactive material requiring off-site response or monitoring are expected.

3.1.2 Alert - events in progress or having occurred, involving an actual or potential substantial degradation of the plant safety level.

a. Any releases of radioactive material are expected to be limited to small fraction of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides (PAGs).

b. The lowest classification level where off-site emergency response is anticipated.

3.1.3 Site Area Emergency (SAE) - event(s) in progress or having occurred involving actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for public protection.

a. Radioactive releases or their potential may exceed EPA PAGs, but only near the site boundary.

b. A core meltdown situation is not indicated.

3.1.4 General Emergency - event(s) in progress or having occurred which indicate:

a. Imminent substantial core damage.

b. Potential for containment loss.

c. Radioactive releases can be expected to exceed EPA PAGs off-site.

4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES

4.1 Interim Site Emergency Coordinator (Interim SEC) - Control Room Shift Supervisor is responsible for Emergency Plan activation and implementation, event closeout (NUE ONLY) and overall emergency management UNTIL the Site Emergency Coordinator officially assumes the responsibilities following Technical Support Center activation.

4.2 Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) - The SEC in the Technical Support Center shall be responsible for changes in emergency classification after relieving the ISEC and until relieved by the EOF Recovery Manager of overall command and control of the emergency effort.

4.3 Recovery Manager (RM) - The RM shall be responsible for changes in emergency classification after arriving at the EOF and relieving the SEC of overall command and control of the emergency response effort.

5.0 INSTRUCTIONS

5.1 Classify and declare the event according to Attachment 7.1 of this procedure ONLY.

NOTE: Simultaneous EALs that increase the probability of release require escalation of the classification to one level above the higher EAL.

5.2 Formally announce all emergency classification declarations to the Control Room, TSC, or EOF, respectively.

5.3 Perform the actions required for the declared event in accordance with EP G-2 (Control Room), EP EF-1 (TSC), or EP EF-3B (EOF), respectively.

6.0 RECORDS

6.1 Retain all notification records and other event documentation to prepare a written event summary.

6.2 NUE: Written summary required within 24 hours. RMS summary as "Plant Lifetime Document" with copies to DCPP Emergency Planning.

6.3 Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency: Written summary within 8 hours of closeout or class reduction. RMS summary as "Plant Lifetime Document" with copies to DCPP Emergency Planning.

7.0 ATTACHMENTS

7.1 "Emergency Action Level Classification Chart," 06/14/94

8.0 REFERENCES

8.1 EP EF-1, "Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center."

8.2 EP EF-3B, "Long-Term EOF Activation and Operation."

8.3 EP G-2, "Activation and Operation of the Interim Site Emergency Organization (Control Room)."

8.4 EP R-2, "Release of Airborne Radioactive Materials."

8.5 EP RB-9, "Calculation of Release Rate."

8.6 EP RB-10, "Protective Action Recommendation."

8.7 EP RB-11, "Emergency Off-Site Dose Calculations."

8.8 EP RB-14, "Core Damage Assessment Procedure."

8.9 EP EF-6, "Operating Procedures for EARS Stations."

8.10 CP M-9A, "Hazardous Materials Incident - Initial Emergency Response/Mitigation Procedure."

8.11 CY2.ID1, "Radiological Monitoring and Controls Program."

8.12 XI1.ID2, "Regulatory Reporting Requirements and Reporting Process."

8.13 DCPP Technical Specifications.

8.14 DCPP Emergency Plan, Table 4.1-1.

8.15 EOP E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture."

8.16 EOP FR-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink."

8.17 EOP FR-P.1, "Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition."

8.18 OP AP-8A, "Control Room Inaccessibility - Establishing Hot Standby."

9.0 SPONSOR

R.M. Bliss

TITLE: EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION CHART

	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
I. FIRE (All Modes)	1. Fire not under control within 15 minutes of initiating fire fighting efforts AND affecting plant equipment or power supplies in or near the Protected Area(s).	1. Fire not under control within 15 minutes of initiating fire-fighting efforts AND threatening the loss of function of any of the following Safety related systems required for safe shutdown: - Vital Power Supplies: D/Gs, DFOT, Vital 4kV, 480V, 120VAC, or 125VDC - Primary Systems and Auxiliaries: RCS, CCW, RHR, or Charging and Boration - Heat Sinks: AFW, ASW, 10% Dumps, S/G Safeties, or MSIVs - Control Room, Cable Spreading Rooms, or HSDP.	1. Fire causing the complete loss of function of any one of the following safety related systems required for safe shutdown: - Vital Power Supplies: D/Gs, DFOT, Vital 4kV, 480V, 120VAC or 125VDC - Primary Systems and Auxiliaries: RCS, CCW, RHR, or Charging and Boration - Heat Sinks: AFW, ASW, 10% Dumps, S/G Safeties, or MSIVs - Control Room. Cable Spreading Rooms, or HSDP.	1. Site Emergency Coordinator judges that a fire could cause common damage to plant systems which is determined to have the potential to release radioactive material in quantities sufficient to cause exposures comparable to General Emergency #4.
II. FUEL DAMAGE OR VESSEL DAMAGE (Modes 1-4)	2. Indication of Fuel Damage as shown by: Confirmed RCS sample shows >100/E µCi/gm specific activity (Tech Spec 3.4.8) OR Confirmed RCS sample shows dose equivalent I-131 activity > Tech Spec limit for Iodine Spike (Tech Spec Fig. 3.4-1). Category II Continued on next page.	2. Indication of Fuel Damage as shown by: Confirmed RCS sample >300 µCi/cc of equivalent I-131 specific activity OR equivalent fuel failure is measured by exposure rate from systems carrying reactor coolant per EP RB-14 OR Confirmed RCS sample indicates >1% fuel failure within 30 minutes or 5% total fuel failure. Category II Continued on next page.	See SAE #17 for Steam Line Break	2. Degraded core with possible loss of coolable geometry as indicated by: 5 or more thermocouple readings > 1200 deg. F. OR LOCA with no indication of ECCS flow AND indication of fuel damage (See Alert #2) OR LOCA with containment rad levels > values for 100% gap release in EP RB-14. Category II Continued on next page.

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

EP G-1 (UNITS 1 AND 2)
ATTACHMENT 7.1

TITLE: EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION CHART

	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
II. FUEL DAMAGE OR VESSEL DAMAGE (Modes 1-4) (Continued)	3. Pressurized Thermal Shock is verified by entry into EOP FR-P.1 AND Left of Limit A curve (EOP FR-P.1).			3. Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers: A) Indication of fuel damage (See Alert #2) AND Determination of a Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) which requires entry into EOP E-3 AND Steam release from ruptured S/G, either used for plant cooldown purposes or due to a steamline break B) Indication of Fuel Damage (See Alert #2) AND Determination of a SGTR requiring entry into EOP E-3 AND Indication of a steam line break inside containment AND High potential for loss of containment integrity (e.g., loss of function of both Containment Spray trains OR loss of function of one Containment Spray train and four CFCUs). C) Indication of Fuel Damage (See Alert #2) AND Determination of a SGTR which requires entry into EOP E-3 AND Indication of a steam line break outside containment with inability to isolate the break. D) Potential fuel damage indicated by incore thermocouples >700 deg. F or RVLIS <39% AND LOCA as indicated by RCS leakage and SI AND Loss of containment integrity.

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

TITLE: EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION CHART

	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
III. FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT (All Modes)		3. Fuel Handling Accident causing a release in Containment or the Fuel Handling Building <u>WITH</u> The potential to exceed the criteria listed in Alert #4 or #5.	2. Fuel Handling Accident causing a release in Containment or the Fuel Handling Building <u>WITH</u> The potential to exceed the criteria listed in SAEs #3, #4 or #5.	
IV. LOSS OF CONTROL OR RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL (All Modes)	4. Radiological Effluent Process Monitor High Radiation Alarm with valid reading in excess of alarm setpoint on any of the following monitors: RE-14/14R RE-24/24R RE-28/28R.	4. Radiological Effluent Process Monitor Alarm or other indication of a release which exceeds the following when calculated at the Site Boundary with EP R-2: TEDE Rate > 0.57 mr/hr <u>OR</u> Thyroid CDE Rate > 1.70 mr/hr	3. An actual or projected release which is calculated in accordance with EP R-2, or EP RB-9 and RB-11, to exceed the following criteria at the Site Boundary (800 meters): TEDE Rate > 50 mr/hr for 30 min. <u>OR</u> Thyroid CDE Rate > 250 mr/hr for 30 min.	4. TEDE Rate ≥ 1000 mr/hr <u>OR</u> Thyroid CDE Rate ≥ 5000 mr/hr is calculated at the Site Boundary (per EP R-2, EP RB-11 or with EARS) under actual meteorological conditions <u>AND</u> actual effluent monitor level <u>OR</u> is calculated and confirmed by near-site monitors, vent monitors or in-plant radiation levels.
	5. A valid reading in excess of the isolation setpoint, which fails to isolate the release on any of the Radiological Process Effluent Monitors: RE-18 OR RE-23 During discharge <u>only</u>.	5. Valid alarm on plant vent high range noble gas monitor RE-29. <u>NOTE</u>: ALARMS AT STATE OES SACRAMENTO.	4. Peak puff release rate exceeding 2 minute duration which exceeds the following criteria at the Site Boundary when calculated with EP R-2: TEDE Rate > 500 mr/hr for 2 min. <u>OR</u> TEDE > 17 mrem <u>OR</u> Thyroid CDE Rate > 2500 mr/hr for 2 min. <u>OR</u> Thyroid CDE > 85 mrem.	
	6. Unplanned or uncontrolled release to the environment exceeding alarm setpoints on RE-3. Category IV Continued on next page.	6. An actual liquid release which exceeds 10x the limits of 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table 2, Col. 2 per CY2.ID1. Category IV Continued on next page.	5. The dose rates from above (SAE #3 or #4) are projected based on other plant parameters. Category IV Continued on next page.	

<u>NOTE</u>: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

TITLE: EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION CHART

	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
IV. LOSS OF CONTROL OR RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL (All Modes) (Continued)	7. An actual or projected airborne release which exceeds the following at the Site Boundary when calculated with EP R-2: TEDE Rate > 0.057 mr/hr OR Thyroid CDE Rate > 0.170 mr/hr.	7. Unplanned or unanticipated increase of 1 R/hr or greater in any of the following areas: Passageways, OR Normally occupied areas, OR Accessible areas normally < 100 mR/hr, OR Outside boundaries of Radiologically Controlled Areas AND, for any area above, a potential exists for EITHER an uncontrolled release to the environment OR a loss of ability to maintain plant safety functions.	6. EPA PAGs are projected to be exceeded at or near the Site Boundary: TEDE ≥ 1000 mrem OR Thyroid CDE ≥ 5000 mrem as calculated by EARS, EP R-2, or EP RB-11 OR as determined by Field Monitoring data analysis.	
	8. An actual liquid release which exceeds the limits of 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table 2, Col. 2 per CY2.ID1.	8. Unexplained increase of 50 X DAC in airborne radioactivity outside the boundary of the Radiologically Controlled Areas, but within the Plant Protected Area.		
V. LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM (All Modes)		9. Entry into OP AP-8A, "Control Room Accessibility," AND controls established within 15 minutes.	7. Entry into OP AP-8A, "Control Room Accessibility," AND controls not established within 15 minutes.	

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

TITLE: EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION CHART

	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
VI. LOSS OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE	9. Plant is not brought to required operating Mode within any applicable Tech Spec Action Statement time limit (Modes 1-4).		8. Complete loss for greater than 15 minutes of any of the following functions needed to reach or maintain Hot Shutdown (while in Modes 1-4): AFW capability Steam Dump System and S/G Safety Valves Loss of the capability to maintain RCS inventory as evidenced by a loss of all charging pumps coincident with the inability to depressurize and inject with the Safety Injection pumps Loss of capability to increase the Boric Acid concentration sufficient to maintain Keff less than .99 in Mode 4 with a loss of capability to trip control rods ASW or CCW Systems Loss of electrical power or I&C for any of the above listed systems, causing a complete loss of function.	5. Loss of Heat Sink indicated by: Entry into EOP FR H.1 AND Loss of water inventory in 3 S/Gs (<23% [34%] Wide Range).
	10. Loss of function of both RHR trains for greater than 15 minutes while in Mode 5 or 6.	10. Loss of function of both RHR trains for greater than 15 minutes in Modes 1-4.		
	11. A loss of function of all charging pumps for greater than 15 minutes when normally used for RCS inventory control (Modes 1-4).	11. An unplanned shutdown of the RHR System (while in Mode 5 or 6) for > 1 hour with no other normal means of decay heat removal available (e.g., flooded reactor cavity or steam generators with loops filled).		
		12. An unplanned loss of function of the RHR System (Mode 5 or 6) for greater than 15 minutes AND RCS thermocouple temperature is projected to exceed 200 deg.F within 1 hour of RHR loss (see Appendix B of OP AP SD series) OR RCS thermocouple temperature exceeds 200 deg. F.		

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

TITLE: EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION CHART

	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
VII. LOSS OF POWER OR ALARMS OR ASSESSMENT OR COMMUNICATIONS	12. Loss of all off-site power for greater than 15 minutes AND at least 2 D/Gs are supplying their vital busses (Modes 1-4).	13. Loss of all off-site power for greater than 15 minutes AND only 1 D/G is supplying its vital bus (Modes 1-4).	9. Loss of all on-site AND off-site AC power for > 15 minutes (Modes 1-4).	See General Emergency Condition #5 under LOSS OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE.
	13. Loss of all off-site power for greater than 15 minutes AND at least 1 D/G is supplying its vital bus (Modes 5 and 6).	14. Loss of all off-site and on-site AC power for greater than 15 minutes in Modes 5 and 6.		
	14. Loss of all vital DC power as indicated by DC Bus 11(21), 12(22), and 13(23) undervoltage for > 15 minutes (Modes 5 and 6).	15. Loss of all vital DC power as indicated by DC Bus 11(21), 12(22) and 13(23) undervoltage for < 15 minutes (Modes 1-4).	10. Loss of all vital DC power as indicated by DC Bus 11(21), 12(22) and 13(23) undervoltage for > 15 minutes (Modes 1-4).	
	15. Loss of assessment capabilities as indicated by a total loss of SPDS in the Control Room AND simultaneous loss of all displays for any "Accident Monitoring" variable in Tech Spec Table 3.3-10 for > 1 hour while in Modes 1, 2 or 3.			
	16. Main Control Room Annunciators PKs 1 through 5 AND CRT AND typewriter all do not respond to an alarm condition in Modes 1-4 for over 15 minutes.	16. Main Control Room Annunciators PKs 1 through 5 AND CRT AND typewriter all do not respond to an alarm condition in Modes 1-4 for over 15 minutes AND the plant is in a significant transient (plant trip, SI, or generator runback >25 MW/min), nonannunciating systems available.	11. Main Control Room Annunciators PKs 1 through 5 AND CRT AND typewriter all do not respond to an alarm condition in Modes 1-4 for over 15 minutes AND the plant is in a significant transient AND backup, nonannunciating systems are not available (PPC, SPDS).	
	17. Total loss of communication capability with off-site agencies (all Modes) as indicated by the inability to communicate with SLO County (by telephone and radio) OR the NRC Operations Center.			

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

TITLE: EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION CHART

	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
VIII. NATURAL PHENOMENA (All Modes)	18. Ground motion felt and recognized as an earthquake by a consensus of Control Room operators on duty AND measuring greater than 0.01g on the Earthquake Force Monitor.	17. Earthquake > 0.2 g verified by Seismic Monitors.	12. Earthquake > 0.4 g verified by Seismic Monitors.	6. Site Emergency Coordinator's judgement that major internal or external events (e.g., earthquakes, wind damage, explosions, etc.) which could cause massive common damage to plant systems which is determined to have the potential to release radioactive material in quantities sufficient to cause exposures comparable to General Emergency #4.
	19. Flooding of any plant structure that causes initiation of entry to Mode 3 due to a Tech Spec action statement.	18. High water exceeding Intake Structure main deck elevation or low water causing cavitation and shutdown of both ASW pumps for < 15 minutes.	13. High water causing flooding of ASW pump compartments or low water causing the shutdown of both ASW pumps for > 15 minutes.	
	20. Tsunami or Hurricane Warning from the State, NOAA, NWS, Coast Guard or System Dispatcher OR Observation of low or high water levels at the Intake Structure indicative of a Tsunami or Hurricane.	19. Sustained wind of 85 mph (38 m/sec) at any elevation on the Met. Tower.	14. Sustained wind speed > 100 mph (45 m/sec).	
	21. A tornado sighted within Site Boundary.	20. Tornado strikes the plant protected area.		
IX. OTHER HAZARDS (All Modes)	22. Report of airplane crash within the Site Boundary or unusual airplane activity threatening the plant.	21. Confirmed missile, airplane crash or explosion involving a plant structure in the protected area.	15. Missile, airplane crash or explosion causing complete loss of a safety system function that causes entry into a Tech Spec Action Statement.	See General Emergency #6 above.
	23. Confirmed explosion on-site.			
	24. Turbine failure causing casing penetration OR damage to turbine or generator seals.	22. Turbine failure generating missiles that cause visual damage to other safety related structures, equipment, controls, OR power supplies.		
	25. Significant release of flammable OR toxic gas OR liquid that prevents, even with SCBAs, operations inside the power block OR intake structure (ref. CP M-9A).	23. Release of flammable OR toxic gas OR liquid that jeopardizes operation of safety related systems by either preventing required access OR by threatening imminent damage.		

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

TITLE: EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION CHART

	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
X. PRIMARY OR PRI/SEC OR SECONDARY LEAK (Modes 1-4)	26. RCS unidentified OR pressure boundary leakage that exceeds 10 gpm OR identified leakage that exceeds 25 gpm.	24. Primary leak rate >50 gpm.	16. Known primary system LOCA during which RCS subcooling cannot be maintained >20°F OR PZR level cannot be maintained >4% (20% with adverse containment).	See General Emergency #3 under Fuel or Vessel Damage.
	27. SI Actuation with ECCS injection into the RCS resulting from a valid signal based on actual plant conditions. NOTE: SI ACTUATION ALSO ALARMS AT UES IN SACRAMENTO.	25. Determination of a SGTR which results in entry into EOP E-3.	17. Determination of a SGTR coincident with steam release from ruptured S/G, either used for plant cooldown purposes or due to a steamline break.	
	28. Steam line break which results in SI actuation.	26. Determination of a steam line break with >10 gpm Primary to Secondary leakage.		
	29. Failure of a PZR PORV AND Block Valve OR Safety Valve fails to reseat, excluding allowable leakage, following a pressure reduction below the reset point.			
XI. REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM FAILURE (Modes 1-4)		27. Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) as indicated by: Failure of an automatic reactor trip to trip the reactor.	18. An ATWS condition with no fuel damage evident AND An additional failure of a system required for Hot Shutdown (See SAE #8) to actuate.	7. ATWS with Fuel Damage indications (see Alert Condition #2 under FUEL DAMAGE) OR ATWS with potential Core Melt indicated by incore thermocouples > 700 deg. F AND RVLIS < 39%.
XII. SECURITY THREAT (All Modes)	30. Report by Security that a forcible entry or sabotage attempt has occurred or a credible bomb threat has been received against the areas within the protected area boundary.	28. Security reports ongoing security threat involving physical attack on the facility or a sabotage device has been detected that threatens the operability of safety related equipment (see Alert #1).	19. Security reports ongoing physical attack on the facility or a sabotage device causing a confirmed loss of a safety system function that causes an entry into a Tech Spec Action Statement (see SAE #1).	8. Security reports ongoing security threat which causes loss of control of the operations of the plant to hostile forces.
XIII. SITE EMERGENCY COORDINATOR'S JUDGEMENT (All Modes)	31. Site Emergency Coordinator determines conditions warrant increased awareness on the part of off-site authorities of initiation of a plant shutdown per Tech Spec LCOs or involve other than normal controlled shutdown.	29. Site Emergency Coordinator judges plant conditions exist that warrant precautionary activation of the TSC and placing the EOF and other key emergency personnel on stand-by.	20. Site Emergency Coordinator judges that conditions exist that warrant activation of the emergency centers and monitoring teams or a precautionary notification to the public near the site.	9. Site Emergency Coordinator judges conditions exist which have a potential to release radioactive material in quantities sufficient to cause exposures comparable to General Emergency #4.

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.