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SUBJECT: Forwards request for relief for non-welded repair using ASME Code Case N-523 of facility main SG instrumentation piping connection.

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
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Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Diablo Canyon Power Plant
P.O. Box 56
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805/545-6000

Warren H. Fujimoto
Vice President—Diablo Canyon
Operations and Plant Manager

September 20, 1995



PG&E Letter DCL-95-201

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Docket No. 50-323, OL-DPR-82
Diablo Canyon Unit 2
Request for Relief for a Temporary Repair of the Unit 2 Main Steam Generator
Instrumentation Piping Connection Utilizing ASME Code Case N-523

Gentlemen:

Attached for NRC review and approval is a request for relief for a non-welded repair using ASME Code Case N-523 of the main Unit 2 steam generator instrumentation piping connection. A leak was discovered in this line on September 7, 1995. This leak cannot be isolated and Code weld repaired during plant operation, and would necessitate a plant shutdown and cooldown to Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown). Based on the guidance provided by Generic Letter 90-05, a Code weld repair during power operation is impractical. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i), it is requested that the NRC grant relief for a temporary repair using an engineered mechanical clamp designed to meet the guidance of ASME Code Case N-523. The clamp will be used until the next entry into Mode 5 of sufficient duration; but not later than the next refueling outage, scheduled to begin March 16, 1996, at which time a Code weld repair will be performed.

This request was discussed with the NRC staff during a telephone conversation on September 8, 1995.

This Code Case relief request was approved by the PG&E Plant Staff Review Committee. If there are any questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. W. G. Crockett at (805) 545-4346.


Sincerely,

W. H. Fujimoto for WHF
Warren H. Fujimoto

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


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September 19, 1995
Page 2

cc: L. J. Callan
Kenneth E. Perkins
James C. Stone
Michael D. Tschiltz
Diablo Distribution

Enclosure

1355S/DDM/_____



**REQUEST FOR RELIEF FOR A TEMPORARY REPAIR OF UNIT 2 MAIN
STEAM GENERATOR INSTRUMENTATION PIPING CONNECTION UTILIZING
ASME CODE CASE N-523**

On September 7, 1995, with Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Unit 2 in Mode 1 (Power Operation), a visual examination discovered a pinhole leak in the steam generator (SG) number 2-3 instrumentation sensing line connection. The discovery was made by a plant operator performing a confirmatory inspection for possible leakage sources inside the main containment structure, due to an increasing trend of containment sump inventory and discharge required by Technical Specification (TS) 4.4.6.2.1.b, "Reactor Coolant System - Operational Leakage."

The pinhole leak is located at the socket weld for a SG narrow range level sensing line in Code Class 2 high-energy piping. This leak cannot be isolated and Code weld repaired during power operation. A Code weld repair requires a plant shutdown to Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown), which would subject the unit to an unnecessary plant shutdown. Based on the above and the guidance provided by Generic Letter 90-05, "Guidance for Performing Temporary Non-Code Repair of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 Piping," a Code weld repair during power operation is impractical. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i), it is requested that the NRC grant relief for a temporary repair in accordance with Code Case N-523, "Mechanical Clamping Devices for Class 2 and 3 Piping, Section XI, Division 1," to avoid a unit shutdown and to limit the leakage from the through-wall flaw. The engineered mechanical clamp will be used until the next scheduled Mode 5 entry of sufficient duration; but not later than the next refueling outage, scheduled to begin March 16, 1996, at which time, a Code weld repair will be performed.

Description of System Function

SG 2-3 narrow range level sensing line tap has developed a pinhole leak at the base of the socket weld of the 3/4 inch, ASTM A-106 Grade B, schedule 80 piping attached to the SA-508, Class I, SG nozzle number 9. This line provides the lower pressure sensing necessary for instrumentation channels LT-536 and LT-537. Channel LT-537 is one of three redundant level instrumentation channels for SG 2-3 that provides a safety related (instrument Class IA) reactor trip signal (low-low SG level) and turbine trip (high-high level, when above P-14). The safety-related functions include reactor trip system and engineered

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

safeguards features actuation system protection as required by TSs 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, respectively. LT-537 also provides a control input to the digital feedwater control system, and indication for the emergency response facility data system, plant computer and control room. Channel LT-536 is a non-safety related device (instrument Class IC) which provides SG 2-3 indication (instrument Class II) at the dedicated shutdown panel as required by Equipment Control Guideline 4.2, "Steam Generator Level and Pressure Instruments (Appendix R)," for use in the unlikely event of a postulated fire in the cable spreading room.

The normal operating pressure and temperature range of this line is approximately 805 psig and 519 degrees F to 1005 psig and 545 degrees F. The maximum design condition for this line is 1415 psig at 600 degrees F, which envelops all modes of operation. To date, this line has experienced less than one hundred thermal cycles. A cycle is defined as a heatup from Mode 5 to Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown) and subsequent return to Mode 5.

Evaluation of Flaw

The flaw is at the toe of the socket weld of the 3/4 inch pipe to the SG 2-3 nozzle. It appears to be a pinhole type leak based upon a visual inspection. There is no evidence of any linearity to the leak opening. The flaw is believed to have originated in the inner diameter of the pipe.

Wall thickness of the upstream and downstream piping were determined volumetrically (see Attachment 1). Comprehensive ultrasonic testing (UT) examination and other nondestructive examination (NDE) methods were not feasible due to the temperature of the pipe, presence of a steam leak, configuration of the socket weld, and proximity to the main SG.

Due to the lack of NDE results available to characterize the flaw, an evaluation of susceptible failure mechanisms was performed to provide assurance that the structural integrity of the line is maintained. This review considered fatigue from vibration and thermal cycling, sustained over-stress, erosion/corrosion, and steam flashing with the following results:

- o Fatigue

A walkdown of the Units 1 and 2 narrow range SG level instrument sensing lower tap piping for the similar (redundant sensing line) locations (24 total), was performed to determine if there are any other leaks and assess the potential for piping fatigue due to vibration. No pressure boundary leakage or vibration was found.



The potential for thermal cycling was assessed. The socket welded connection is within close proximity of the main SG such that the connection is at the same temperature as the main SG shell. The SG 2-3 insulating material surrounds the integral SG nozzle. The 3/4 inch piping extension is self supporting and uninsulated. However, due to the stable bulk SG temperature and the stable free air cooling provided to this location, the temperature transition area of this location is considered stable. Therefore, thermal cycling of this area is limited to a heatup from Mode 5 to Mode 4 (or above) and subsequent return to Mode 5.

A typical fatigue crack would exhibit readily visible linearity in a generally circumferential direction. These cracks typically initiate at the root of the weld and propagate to the outside emerging on the weld face. There are cases where a fatigue crack initiates on the outside surface of a pipe. These later cracks will be located at the toe of the weld since it is the stress riser. In this case, the crack is quite long on the outside surface before the leak occurs. The SG 2-3 leak does not exhibit any linearity that would be indicative of the existence of a crack.

Based on the leak characteristics, lack of vibration, and limited NDE examination of the flaw; fatigue at this location due to vibration or thermal cycling is not considered to be significant.

- o Sustained Over-Stress

The stress calculation of record was reviewed to determine the state of stress in the line. The various design parameters including deadweight, pressure, thermal and seismic were reviewed. The line meets design requirements which are within ASME Code allowable values.

- o Erosion/Corrosion

The instrumentation sensing line does not require any significant flow to perform its function. A limited UT inspection showed no wall thinning in the areas of piping upstream or downstream of the leaking weld location. The secondary water chemistry of the SG is maintained in accordance with the recommendations of the NSSS vendor and industry experience. The maintenance of water chemistry within these guidelines prevents the potential accumulation of corrosion agents at this location. Therefore, erosion/corrosion is not considered to be the failure mechanism.



- o Flashing

This location is continuously maintained at the main SG pressure. Therefore, significant phase change/flashing will not normally occur.

The review of the above mechanisms provides reasonable assurance that the structural integrity of the SG level sensing line is maintained; and when combined with the results of the limited UT inspections, it has been concluded that the leak is a result of a localized weld defect.

Code Case N-523 Repair

- o Description

An engineered mechanical clamp, designed to meet the load requirements of the piping, will be installed consistent with the requirements of Code Case N-523. The clamp design with its associated strongback is shown in Attachment 2.

The clamp is designed for the line design condition of 1415 psig at 600 degrees F and sealant injection pressure of 2122 psig, which is 1.5 times the design pressure (1415 psig).

The clamp is designed to meet the load requirements assuming a complete through-wall 360 degree flaw. The highest stresses in the clamp assembly are below Code allowables and below yield stress for the design temperature. The maximum stress in the clamp is less than 2/3 of yield.

Due to the erosion effects of steam cutting, it is desired to minimize the leak as much as possible. In order to accomplish this, the engineered mechanical clamp will be injected with thermal-setting sealant which will fill the small space between the clamp and the piping. No credit is given to this sealant for structural integrity, and its only function is to eliminate leakage.

Temporary additional support of the clamp, and/or attached lines, is not necessary due to adequate structural support and bearing area available for the clamp attachment.

- o Stress Evaluation

A stress evaluation of the piping configuration, with the additional mass of the engineered mechanical clamp and associated strongback was



performed. The evaluation considered all design basis loading conditions including deadweight, pressure, thermal and seismic. The results of the evaluation were acceptable. Attachment 3 provides the piping stress analysis results. In all cases, the piping stresses are below Code allowables and below yield stress for the design temperature.

o Design/Installation

The engineered mechanical clamp is designed and analyzed by TEAM Environmental Services, Inc., who is qualified and experienced in designing engineered mechanical clamps. TEAM Inc. is on the PG&E Approved Qualified Suppliers List. The engineered mechanical clamp will be fabricated using safety-related qualified material as required by Code Case N-523. The clamps will have no fabrication welds. A system leakage test will be performed upon installation of the clamp.

o Personnel Safety

Appropriate protective clothing will be worn by personnel during the installation of the clamp assembly. The installation of the engineered mechanical clamp will be performed by qualified contract personnel, supplied by TEAM Environmental Services, who have previously performed this type of repair.

Safety Evaluation

The following safety evaluation addresses the effects of a through-wall 360 degree flaw. The radiological and environmental qualification effects of this condition were reviewed for impact on the following design basis accidents as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).

- UFSAR Section 15.2.11, "Excessive Load Increase Incident"
- UFSAR Section 15.2.13, "Accidental Depressurization of the Main Steam System"
- UFSAR Section 15.3.2, "Minor Secondary System Pipe Breaks"
- UFSAR Section 15.4.2, "Major Secondary System Pipe Rupture"

The safety evaluation concluded the following: 1) installation of the engineered mechanical clamp does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR, 2) no new possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the UFSAR, and 3) no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS.



System Interaction and Hazards Review

A system interactions and hazards review was performed, which included a walkdown of the area to identify any safety related components that could be affected. This review postulated a complete 360 degree circumferential break at the leak location and the failure of the leak repair clamp. The effects of pipe whip, jet impingement/fluid spray, flooding and environmental qualification were reviewed with the following results:

- o Pipe Whip

The location of the socket weld prevents creation of a pipe whip because there is no lever arm between the SG and the break. The jet would add a force of about 500 pounds to the SG at the break location, which is not significant. The leak repair clamp attached to the pipe could become a missile. This clamp and piping assembly would be propelled towards the SG cubicle wall while remaining connected to the stainless steel instrument tubing line. The assembly could hit the generator cubicle wall and fall inside the cubicle, or be ejected over the shield wall. While the fall inside the cubicle could damage instrumentation associated with SG 2-3, and could cause a reactor trip; this is bounded by the previously analyzed inadvertent reactor trip. If the missile is ejected over the shield wall, it could not disable any components, which would prevent the safe shutdown of the unit.

- o Jet Impingement/Fluid Spray

The nominal size of the nozzle is 3/4 inch. This is less than the 1 inch minimum diameter criteria used in the DCPD high energy and moderate energy line break analyses. As a result, a new evaluation was performed limiting the scope to the welded joint currently leaking. A walkdown of the area identified no targets within the jet's zone of influence. The jet dissipates quickly and would have no significant energy by the time it reaches any targets.

- o Flooding

The flooding, which could occur as a result of the break, is enveloped by other previously analyzed steam and feedline breaks in the area. Therefore, it is concluded that flooding would not disable any safety related equipment necessary for safe shutdown following the break.



- o Environmental Qualification

The general area ambient temperature is not being noticeably affected by the existing steam leak. If the leak was to increase as a result of the socket weld separating, the conditions would become worse; but would be bounded by the conditions of the MSLB and LOCA for which the devices are already qualified.

- o Loss of Fluid

The break would result in a system transient less severe than the previously analyzed UFSAR Section 15.2.11, "Excessive Load Increase Incident," and has; therefore, been determined to be acceptable. Loss of the instrument would result in tripping one channel of a 2 out of 3 reactor trip logic. This instrument is not required to achieve safe shutdown following the break. Additionally, a fire is not postulated in conjunction with this break. As such, indication at the dedicated shutdown panel is not required following the break.


Visual Inspections

Visual VT-2 leakage examinations were performed at the similar locations of the SG narrow range level instrumentation lower sensing line connections (three per SG for the four SGs, i.e., 12 locations). No evidence of pressure boundary leakage or piping degradation was found. Leakage monitoring will continue to be provided by containment leakage collection monitoring required by TS 4.4.6.2.1.b at least once per 12 hours. A remote camera will be used to visually monitor the repair clamp for continued structural integrity of the clamp and leakage on a daily basis.

Conclusion

The structural integrity of the Unit 2 SG 2-3 narrow range level sensing line tap will be maintained with the installation and continued monitoring of the engineered mechanical clamp. This clamp was designed to meet the load requirements of the piping as provided by Code Case N-523. Therefore, it is requested that the NRC grant relief for a temporary repair until the piping can be Code weld repaired during the next Mode 5 entry of sufficient duration; but not later than the next refueling outage, scheduled to begin March 16, 1996.





DCPP 2 STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL INDICATOR
"STEAM LEAK 9-8-95

AR# A0377877



Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Diablo Canyon Power Plant
P.O. Box 56
Avila Beach, CA 93424
805/545-6000

Warren H. Fujimoto
Vice President-Diablo Canyon
Operations and Plant Manager

October 12, 1995

PG&E Letter DCL-95-225



U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80
Docket No. 50-323, OL-DPR-82
Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2
Temporary Repair of the Unit 2 Main Steam Generator Instrumentation Piping
Connection Utilizing ASME Code Case N-523 (Proprietary Data)

Gentlemen:

On September 8, 1995, the NRC staff requested information regarding PG&E's request for relief for a temporary repair of the Unit 2 main steam generator instrumentation piping connection utilizing ASME Code Case N-523. The response to the request, PG&E Letter DCL-95-201, dated September 20, 1995, contains proprietary drawings, calculation methods, and calculation results in Attachment 2. The nonproprietary information was provided in PG&E Letter DCL-95-216, dated September 29, 1995. PG&E requests that DCL-95-201 be handled in accordance with NRC procedures for proprietary material.

Attached is Team Environmental Services, Inc.'s (TEAM), Application for Withholding Proprietary Information From Public Disclosure in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations. The Application sets forth the bases on which the information may be withheld from public disclosure by the Commission, and addresses with specificity the considerations listed in 10 CFR 2.790(b)(4). It is respectfully requested that PG&E Letter DCL-95-201, Attachment 2, that is proprietary to TEAM, be withheld from public disclosure.

Correspondence with respect to the proprietary aspects of the Application for Withholding or the supporting TEAM Affidavit should be addressed to Mr. John P. Kearns, Engineering, P.O. Box 123, Alvin, Texas, 77512.

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October 11, 1995
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Kindly acknowledge receipt of this material on the enclosed copy of this letter and return it in the enclosed addressed envelope.

Sincerely,


Warren H. Fujimoto

cc w/enc.: L. J. Callan
Kenneth E. Perkins
James C. Stone
Michael D. Tschiltz

cc wo/enc.: Diablo Distribution

Attachment (All cc's w/enc.)

1355s/DDM/2246



**TEAM ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES APPLICATION FOR WITHHOLDING
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE**



U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Attention: James C. Stone

**APPLICATION FOR WITHHOLDING PROPRIETARY
INFORMATION FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE**


Subject: PG&E Letter DCL-95-201 dated September 20, 1995

Dear Mr. Stone:

The proprietary information for which withholding from public disclosure is being requested is further identified in the enclosed Affidavit signed by the owner of the proprietary information, Team Environmental Services, Inc. (TEAM). The Affidavit sets forth the basis on which the information may be withheld from public disclosure by the Commission, and addresses with specificity the considerations listed in 10 CFR 2.790(b)(4) of the Commission's regulations.

This letter authorizes Pacific Gas and Electric Company to use the enclosed Affidavit. Correspondence with respect to the proprietary aspects of the Application for Withholding or the Affidavit should reference this letter and be addressed to the undersigned.

Very truly yours,


Mr. John P. Kearns
Vice President
Team Environmental Services Inc.

500.



Enclosure
PG&E Letter DCL-95-225

AFFIDAVIT ON BEHALF OF TEAM ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES



Enclosure

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF TEXAS)
)
 CITY OF ALVIN)
 AND COUNTY OF BRAZORIA)
)

I, Mr. John P. Kearns, being duly sworn, depose and say that I am authorized to execute this Affidavit on behalf of Team Environmental Services, Incorporated (TEAM), and that the averments of fact set forth in this Affidavit are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

1. I am an Officer of TEAM and, as such, I am authorized to apply for withholding proprietary information from public disclosure on behalf of TEAM.
2. I am making this Affidavit in conformance with the provisions of 10 CFR 2.790 and in conjunction with the TEAM Application for Withholding transmitting this Affidavit.
3. I have personal knowledge of the criteria and procedures utilized by TEAM in designating information as proprietary, privileged, or as confidential commercial or financial information.
4. Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.790(b)(4), the following is furnished for consideration by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) in determining whether the information sought to be withheld from public disclosure should be withheld.
 - a. The information is being transmitted to the NRC in confidence and, under the provisions of 10 CFR 2.790, it is to be received in confidence by the Commission.
 - b. The information sought to be withheld from public disclosure is owned and has been held in confidence by TEAM and its consultants.
 - c. The information is of a type customarily held in confidence by TEAM, and not customarily disclosed to the public. Information is



held in confidence if it falls in one or more of several types, the release of which might result into the loss of an existing or potential competitive advantage, as follows:

- (1) It consists of supporting data relative to a process (or component, structure, tool, method, etc.), the application of which data secures competitive economic advantage, e.g., by optimization or improved marketability.
- (2) Its use by a competitor would reduce his expenditure of resources or improve his competitive position in the design, manufacture, shipment, installation, assure of quality, or licensing of a similar product.

d. There are sound policy reasons behind the TEAM decision to hold this information in confidence, including the following:

- (1) The use of such information gives TEAM a competitive advantage over its competitors. It is, therefore, withheld from disclosure to protect the TEAM competitive position.
- (2) It is information which is marketable. The extent to which such information is available to competitors diminishes the TEAM ability to sell products and services involving the use of the information.
- (3) Use of the information by a competitor would put TEAM at a competitive disadvantage by reducing competitor's expenditure of resources at our expense.
- (4) The TEAM capacity to invest corporate assets in research and development depends upon its success in obtaining and maintaining a competitive advantage.
- (5) The information sought to be protected is not available in public sources, or available information has not been previously employed in the same original manner or method to the best of our knowledge and belief.

e. Further, this information has substantial commercial value as follows:

- (1) TEAM plans to sell the technology to its customers for purposes of meeting NRC requirements for licensing documentation.



(2) TEAM can sell support and defense of the technology in the licensing process to its customers.

- f. Public disclosure of this proprietary information is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of TEAM because it would enhance the ability of competitors to provide similar analytical documentation and licensing support services for commercial power reactors or industrial facilities without commensurate expenses. Also, public disclosure of the information would enable others to use the information to meet requirements for licensing documentation without purchasing the right to use the information.
- g. The development of the technology described in part by the information is the result of applying the results of many years of experience in an intensive TEAM effort and the expenditure of a considerable sum of money.
- h. In order for competitors of TEAM to develop this technology, similar technical programs would have to be performed, and significant manpower with the requisite talent and experience would be required to develop and benchmark the analytical methods.

5. The proprietary information sought to be withheld has been designated as Attachment 2 in the Pacific Gas and Electric Company letter, DCL-95-201 dated September 20, 1995. The response included TEAM drawings, calculation methods and calculation results.

Subscribed and sworn to in Arvin, Texas, this day of October 1995.

Respectfully submitted,

Team Environmental Services, Incorporated.

John P. Keams

John P. Keams
Vice President

Subscribed and sworn to before me
this 5th day of October 1995:

Notary: *Linda L. Nugent*
My commission expires
1-31-97

