

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8709220289 DOC. DATE: 87/09/16 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL: 50-323 Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, Pacific Ga 05000323
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 NELSON, T. A. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
 SHIFFER, J. D. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 87-020-00: on 870818 & 870901 both trains of auxiliary
 bld ventilation sys inoperable violating Tech Spec 3.7.6.1.
 Caused by problem w/flow path from discharge plenum to
 intake room. Investigation of event continuing. W/870916 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 5
 TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

| | RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME | COPIES LTTR ENCL | RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME | COPIES LTTR ENCL |
|-----------|---------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|
| | PD5 LA | 1 1 | PD5 PD | 1 1 |
| | TRAMMELL, C | 1 1 | | |
| INTERNAL: | ACRS MICHELSON | 1 1 | ACRS MOELLER | 2 2 |
| | AEOD/DOA | 1 1 | AEOD/DSP/NAS | 1 1 |
| | AEOD/DSP/ROAB | 2 2 | AEOD/DSP/TPAB | 1 1 |
| | DEDRO | 1 1 | NRR/DEST/ADS | 1 0 |
| | NRR/DEST/CEB | 1 1 | NRR/DEST/ELB | 1 1 |
| | NRR/DEST/ICSB | 1 1 | NRR/DEST/MEB | 1 1 |
| | NRR/DEST/MTB | 1 1 | NRR/DEST/PSB | 1 1 |
| | NRR/DEST/RSB | 1 1 | NRR/DEST/SGB | 1 1 |
| | NRR/DLPQ/HFB | 1 1 | NRR/DLPQ/QAB | 1 1 |
| | NRR/DOEA/EAB | 1 1 | NRR/DREP/RAB | 1 1 |
| | NRR/DREP/RPB | 2 2 | NRR/PMAS/ILRB | 1 1 |
| | REG FILE 02 | 1 1 | RES DEPY GI | 1 1 |
| | RES TELFORD, J | 1 1 | RES/DE/EIB | 1 1 |
| | RGN5 FILE 01 | 1 1 | | |
| EXTERNAL: | EG&G GROH, M | 5 5 | H ST LOBBY WARD | 1 1 |
| | LPDR | 2 2 | NRC PDR | 1 1 |
| | NSIC HARRIS, J | 1 1 | NSIC MAYS, G | 1 1 |



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

| | | |
|--|--|----------------------------|
| FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON UNIT 2 | DOCKET NUMBER (2) 015010131213 | PAGE (3) 1 OF 04 |
|--|--|----------------------------|

TITLE (4) **ENTRY INTO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3 DUE TO BOTH TRAINS OF AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION BEING INOPERABLE**

| EVENT DATE (5) | | | LER NUMBER (6) | | | REPORT DATE (7) | | | OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) | | | | | |
|----------------|-----|------|----------------|------------------|--------------|-----------------|-----|------|-------------------------------|--|--|----------------|--|--|
| MONTH | DAY | YEAR | YEAR | SEQUENTIA NUMBER | SUBOR NUMBER | MONTH | DAY | YEAR | FACILITY NAMES | | | DOCKET NUMBERS | | |
| 08 | 18 | 87 | 87 | 0210 | 010 | 09 | 16 | 87 | | | | 050000 | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | 050000 | | |

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (11)

OPERATING MODE (9) **1**

POWER LEVEL (10) **100**

10 CFR **50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)**

OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

THOMAS A. NELSON, REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ENGINEER

TELEPHONE NUMBER
AREA CODE **8105** NUMBER **5951-7351**

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

| CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFACTURER | REPORTABLE TO NRC | CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFACTURER | REPORTABLE TO NRC |
|-------|--------|-----------|--------------|-------------------|-------|--------|-----------|--------------|-------------------|
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If you complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)
MONTH **11** DAY **13** YEAR **87**

ABSTRACT (16)

On August 18, 1987, at 1320 PDT, and again on September 1, 1987, at 1910 PDT, with the unit in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 100 percent power, both trains of the auxiliary building ventilation system were inoperable, resulting in violation of Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.6.1 and entry into TS 3.0.3. In both cases, supply fan S-34 had been manually secured, and the flow sensor for the operating fan S-33 sensed a "no-flow" condition, tripping fan S-33. The most probable cause is that a flow path from the discharge plenum to the intake room allowed pressure to equalize enough to give an apparent "no-flow" condition. The flow path for the August 18 event involved backflow through the parallel fan S-34's dampers, and the September 1 event involved backflow through the door between the discharge plenum and the intake room.

On August 18, 1987, at 1355 PDT, TS 3.0.3 was exited when both supply fans were placed in operation. On September 1, 1987, at 1930 PDT, TS 3.0.3 was exited when one train of auxiliary building ventilation was placed in operation.

PGandE is continuing the investigation into these events to determine the root cause and appropriate corrective actions. A supplemental report will be submitted when this investigation is complete.

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PDR ADDCK 05000323
S PDR

1674S/0051K

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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|---|--|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|----------|----|-------|
| FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON UNIT 2 | DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 3 | LER NUMBER (6) | | | PAGE (3) | | |
| | | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | | | |
| | | 8 7 | - 0 2 0 | - 0 0 | 0 2 | OF | 0 4 |

TEXT If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's (17)

I. Initial Conditions

Unit 2 was in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 100 percent power.

II. Description of Event

A. Event:

On August 18, 1987, at 1320 PDT, and again on September 1, 1987, at 1910 PDT, with the unit in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 100 percent power, both trains of the auxiliary building ventilation system (VF) were inoperable, resulting in violation of Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.6.1 and entry into TS 3.0.3. In both cases, supply fan (VF)(FAN) S-34 had been manually secured for maintenance, and the flow sensor (VF)(FI) for the operating fan S-33 sensed a "no-flow" condition, tripping fan S-33. The most probable cause is that a flow path from the discharge plenum to the intake room allowed pressure to equalize enough to give an apparent "no-flow" condition. The flow path for the August 18 event involved backflow through the parallel fan S-34's dampers, and the September 1 event involved backflow through the door between the discharge plenum and the intake room (the door was left ajar).

On August 18, 1987, at 1355 PDT, TS 3.0.3 was exited when both supply fans were placed in operation.

On September 1, 1987, at 1930 PDT, TS 3.0.3 was exited when one train of auxiliary building ventilation was placed in operation.

B. Inoperable structures, components or systems that contributed to the event:

None

C. Dates and approximate times for major occurrences:

1. August 18, 1987, 1320 PDT: TS 3.0.3 was entered when both trains of auxiliary building exhaust ventilation were inoperable.
2. August 18, 1987, 1355 PDT: TS 3.0.3 was exited when both supply fans were placed in operation.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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| | | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | | |
| | | 8 7 | - 0 2 0 | - 0 1 0 | 0 3 | OF 0 4 |

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

- 3. September 1, 1987, 1910 PDT: TS 3.0.3 was entered when both trains of auxiliary building exhaust ventilation were inoperable.
- 4. September 1, 1987, 1930 PDT: TS 3.0.3 was exited when one train of auxiliary building exhaust ventilation was restored.

D. Other systems or secondary functions affected:

None

E. Method of discovery:

The event was immediately apparent to the control room operators due to alarms and indications.

F. Operator actions:

August 18, 1987: The backdraft damper for fan S-34 was manually closed and fan S-33 was successfully started. Fan S-34 was then started placing both trains of auxiliary building ventilation in service.

September 1, 1987: The door between the intake room and the discharge plenum was closed and fan S-34 was restarted placing one train of auxiliary building ventilation in service.

G. Safety system responses:

None

III. Cause of Event

A. Immediate cause:

In both cases, auxiliary building supply fan S-33 tripped on a "no-flow" signal after fan S-34 was secured, resulting in both fans being inoperable, resulting in violation of TS 3.7.6.1 and entry into TS 3.0.3.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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|---|--|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|----------|----------|
| FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON UNIT 2 | DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 3 | LER NUMBER (6) | | | PAGE (3) | |
| | | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | | |
| | | 8 7 | - 0 2 0 | - 0 0 | 0 4 | OF 0 4 |

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

B. Root cause:

The exact reasons for the indicated loss of air flow are indeterminate at this time and are under investigation. The most probable root cause for the "no-flow" signal was indicated loss of air flow as measured by the flow sensing instrument. PGandE will submit a supplemental report when the exact cause has been determined.

IV. Analysis of Event

The auxiliary building ventilation system's primary function is to maintain the temperature of engineered safety feature (ESF) motors within acceptable limits (FSAR Section 9.4.2). The equipment was unavailable for 35 minutes and 20 minutes on August 18 and September 1, respectively. However, the associated exhaust fans were in constant operation, providing air circulation. Therefore, there were no significant adverse safety consequences or implications resulting from this event.

V. Corrective Actions

PGandE is investigating these events to determine the root cause and corrective actions. A supplemental report will be submitted upon conclusion of the investigation.

VI. Additional Information

A. Failed components:

None

B. Previous LERs on similar events:

LER 2-87-018-00: Entry into TS 3.0.3 due to both trains of auxiliary building ventilation being unavailable to start on an autostart signal

In this event one exhaust fan tripped on thermal overload while it attempted to start on an autostart signal when the other exhaust fan was secured. The corrective actions included a precaution in the test procedure to wait 15 minutes before starting a recently secured fan to allow the thermal overloads time to cool off. The corrective actions of this event would not have prevented the current event from happening.

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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

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JAMES D. SHIFFER
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

September 16, 1987

PGandE Letter No.: DCL-87-228

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555


Re: Docket No. 50-323, OL-DPR-82
Diablo Canyon Unit 2
Licensee Event Report 2-87-020-00
Entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 Due to Both Trains of
Auxiliary Building Ventilation Being Inoperable

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), PGandE is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report concerning the entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3. This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Kindly acknowledge receipt of this material on the enclosed copy of this letter and return it in the enclosed addressed envelope.

Sincerely,


for J. D. Shiffer

Enclosure

cc: L. J. Chandler
J. B. Martin
M. M. Mendonca
P. P. Narbut
B. Norton
CPUC
Diablo Distribution
INPO

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