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ACCESSION NBR: 8708240443 DOC. DATE: 87/08/21 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
FACIL: 50-275 Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Pacific Ga 05000275
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LUCKETT, R. M. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
SHIFFER, J. D. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 87-011-00: on 870724, two deactivated automatic containment isolation valves reactivated for testing after maint, in noncompliance w/Tech Spec 3.6.3.b. Caused by personnel error. Policy re error will be issued. W/870821 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 5
TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

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	TRAMMELL, C	1	1			
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	AEOD/DOA	1	1	AEOD/DSP/NAS	1	1
	AEOD/DSP/ROAB	2	2	AEOD/DSP/TPAB	1	1
	DEDRO	1	1	NRR/DEST/ADS	1	0
	NRR/DEST/CEB	1	1	NRR/DEST/ELB	1	1
	NRR/DEST/ICSB	1	1	NRR/DEST/MEB	1	1
	NRR/DEST/MTB	1	1	NRR/DEST/PSB	1	1
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	NRR/DLPQ/HFB	1	1	NRR/DLPQ/QAB	1	1
	NRR/DOEA/EAB	1	1	NRR/DREP/RAB	1	1
	NRR/DREP/RPB	2	2	NRR/PMAS/ILRB	1	1
	REG FILE 02	1	1	RES DEPY GI	1	1
	RES TELFORD, J	1	1	RES/DE/EIB	1	1
	RGN5 FILE 01	1	1			
EXTERNAL:	EG&G GROH, M	5	5	H ST LOBBY WARD	1	1
	LPDR	2	2	NRC PDR	1	1
	NSIC HARRIS, J	1	1	NSIC MAYS, G	1	1

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 44 ENCL 43

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1): DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2): 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5 | PAGE (3): 1 OF 0 4

TITLE (4): FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH T. S. 3.6.3 ACTION b. WHEN TWO DEACTIVATED AUTOMATIC CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES WERE REACTIVATED FOR TESTING FOLLOWING MAINTENANCE

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 7	2 4	8 7	8 7	0 1 1	0 0	0 8	2 1	8 7		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9): 1

POWER LEVEL (10): 1 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (11)

[X] 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

[ ] OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE
RICHARD M. LUCKETT, REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ENGINEER	8 0 5 5 9 5 - 7 3 5 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

[ ] YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

[X] NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15): MONTH | DAY | YEAR

ABSTRACT (16)

On July 24, at 1420 PDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 (Power Operation), two deactivated automatic containment isolation valves (nuclear steam supply sampling valves 9355B and 9357B) were reactivated for testing following maintenance, in noncompliance with action statement b. of Technical Specification 3.6.3. Action statement b. requires that when a containment isolation valve is inoperable each affected penetration be isolated by at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position. Contrary to this requirement, licensed operators restored power to the solenoid valves that control air to these air-operated containment isolation valves to allow postinstallation testing. The testing was postponed and the valves remained in service for a period of 28 hours and 20 minutes until discovered by operations personnel. Immediately upon discovery, the penetrations were isolated in accordance with Technical Specification requirements. Subsequent testing verified that the valves were operable during the event and capable of performing their safety function in providing containment isolation.

The cause of this event was personnel error (cognitive), in that licensed operators restored power to the solenoid valves, for containment isolation valves 9355B and 9357B without ensuring that the requirements of action statement b. of Technical Specification 3.6.3 were met. Another cause was the lack of specific policies or procedures addressing Technical Specification compliance with inoperable containment isolation valves.

An Operations Department Policy will be issued to provide guidance to operations personnel regarding Technical Specification compliance with inoperable containment isolation valves.

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5	8 7	— 0 1 1	— 0 0	0 2 OF 0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

I. Initial Conditions

Unit 1 was in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 100 percent power.

II. Description of Event

A. Event:

At 0430 PDT, July 23, 1987, two containment isolation valves (nuclear steam supply sampling valves 9355B and 9357B) were removed from service to allow replacement of the solenoid valves used to supply air to open them. In compliance with the requirements of action statement b. of Technical Specification 3.6.3, these containment isolation valves were deactivated by closing the valves and removing power from the solenoid valves.

At 1430 PDT, July 24, 1987, upon completion of the solenoid valve replacement, licensed operators restored power to the solenoid valves to allow testing, per the request of Construction Instrumentation and Control (I&C) personnel. At this time the containment isolation valves were still considered inoperable because postmaintenance testing to verify operability (stroke time testing) had not yet been performed. The restoration of power to the solenoid valves resulted in the requirements of action statement b. of Technical Specification 3.6.3 not being met. Subsequently, it was decided to postpone completion of the test through the weekend.

During the time when the valves were returned to service and not yet verified operable, a control room operator opened valves 9355A and B to allow chemistry personnel to take a sample. To perform this evolution, the operator had to operate through a control board caution tag on the inside containment isolation valve (nuclear steam supply sampling valve 9355A).

At 1840 PDT, July 25, 1987, plant operating personnel identified that power had been restored to the solenoid valves and that the Technical Specification action statement requirements were not being met. They immediately removed power from the solenoid valves and verified compliance with the Technical Specifications. Subsequent testing verified that the isolation valves were operable and capable of performing their intended safety function in providing containment isolation.

B. Inoperable structures, components or systems that contributed to the event:

None

C. Dates and approximate times for major occurrences:

1. July 23, 1987, at 0430 PDT: Containment isolation valves closed and deactivated.

2. July 24, 1987, at 1420 PDT: Event date - Containment isolation valves reactivated without verification of operability in violation of Technical Specification 3.6.3.

3. July 25, 1987, at 1840 PDT: Discovery date - Containment isolation valves were isolated and deactivated in accordance with Technical Specifications.

4. July 27, 1987, at 1230 PDT: Testing complete, containment isolation valves declared operable and returned to service.

D. Other systems or secondary functions affected:

None

E. Method of discovery:

Routine control board observation by operating personnel.

F. Operator actions:

Upon discovery, the Shift Foreman directed that the penetrations be immediately isolated in accordance with Technical Specification requirements.

G. Safety system responses:

None

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
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DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5	8 7	— 0 1 1	— 0 0	0 4 OF 0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

III. Cause of Event

A. Immediate cause:

Personnel error (cognitive), in that licensed operators restored power to the solenoid valves, for containment isolation valves 9355B and 9357B without ensuring that the requirements of action statement b. of Technical Specification 3.6.3 were met.

B. Root cause:

Lack of specific policies or procedures addressing Technical Specification compliance with inoperable containment isolation valves.

IV. Analysis of Event

The inside containment isolation valves 9355A and 9357A were operable and capable of performing their intended safety function in providing containment isolation of the penetrations throughout this event. Subsequent testing of the outside containment isolation valves 9355B and 9357B verified that these valves were operable and capable of closing as required during the time that they were administratively inoperable and returned to service. These containment isolation valves are required to close on a phase A isolation signal and ensure that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment.

V. Corrective Actions

A. An Operations Department Policy will be issued to provide guidance to operations personnel regarding Technical Specification compliance with inoperable containment isolation valves.

B. Administrative Procedures C-7 and C-7S1, "Plant Tagging Requirements," and procedure C-6S1, "Clearance Request/Job Assignment," will be reviewed and revised as necessary to incorporate lessons learned from this event.

C. Guidance will be provided to operating crews reinforcing the requirements related to caution tags.

VI. Additional Information

A. Failed components:

None

B. Previous LERs on similar events:

None

1609S/0051K

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

PG&E

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JAMES D. SHIFFER
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

August 21, 1987

PGandE Letter No.: DCL-87-209

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80
Diablo Canyon Unit 1
Licensee Event Report 1-87-011-00
Failure to Comply With Technical Specification 3.6.3
Action b. When Two Deactivated Automatic Containment
Isolation Valves Were Reactivated For Testing
Following Maintenance

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), PGandE is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report 1-87-011-00 concerning a failure to comply with Technical Specification 3.6.3, action b. when two deactivated automatic containment isolation valves were reactivated for testing following maintenance.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Kindly acknowledge receipt of this material on the enclosed copy of this letter and return it in the enclosed addressed envelope.

Sincerely,

J. D. Shiffer

Enclosure

cc: L. J. Chandler
J. B. Martin
M. M. Mendonca
P. P. Narbut
B. Norton
CPUC
Diablo Distribution
INPO

1609S/0051K/DY/1749

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