

02A-27A  
**COPY**

Mr. G. A. Maneatis, Senior Vice President  
 Facilities Development  
 Pacific Gas and Electric Company  
 77 Beale Street  
 San Francisco, CA 94106

November 22, 1982  
 J. O. No. 14296  
 DCS-168

Mr. H. R. Denton, Director  
 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
 7920 Norfolk Avenue  
 Bethesda, MD 20114

Mr. R. H. Engelken, Regional Administrator  
 Region V  
 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210  
 Walnut Creek, CA 94956

Docket No. 50-275  
 Diablo Canyon Unit 1  
 License No. DPR-76

SWEC NOTES OF CONFERENCE

Attached is a Notes of Conference for a working meeting held at SWEC's office on November 4, 1982 between DCP and IDVP. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the EOI's generated by SWEC in the Electrical and Instrument/Controls area. If you have any questions concerning these notes, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Very truly yours,

*John E. Schierling*  
 J. E. Krechting

Project Engineer, Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant

Enclosure

CC: RRFrays (enc)	HBrown (enc)
BNorton (enc)	DSGeorgiou (enc)
TES Document Control (enc)	RBHubbard (enc)
(c/o WECOoper)	JRPhillips (enc)
WECOoper (enc)	JRRenolds (enc)
EDenison (enc)	DSFleischaker (enc)
RFReedy (enc)	
JSchierling (2) (enc)	

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 PDR ADDCK 05000275  
 R PDR



11/23/2011  
11/23/2011

NOTES OF CONFERENCE  
INDEPENDENT DESIGN VERIFICATION PROGRAM  
PHASE II  
DIABLO CANYON - UNIT 1

J.O.No. 14296

Held in the Headquarters of  
Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation  
Boston, MA

November 4, 1982

Present for:

Diablo Canyon Project (DCP)

R. Fray (PG&E)  
J. E. Herbst (PG&E)  
B. D. Smith (PG&E)  
W. Vahlstrom (PG&E)

G. Bhatt (Bechtel)

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

J. Knox  
H. Schierling (Licensing)

Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Hill,  
Christopher, and Phillips

G. Fine


Teledyne Engineering Systems (TES)

R. R. Boentgen  
B. Doherty  
S. Peeran  
D. Stratouly  
J. W. Wheaton

Stone & Webster Engineering  
Corporation (SWEC)

G. Gerth\*  
E. F. Heneberry  
R. Hurford  
J. Jacques  
J. E. Krechting  
R. Reed  
F. Rezendes  
F. Sestak, Jr.  
C. Zanzie  
D. Visco\*  
S. Stricker

\*Part time



PURPOSE

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the following SWEC generated EOIs so that the DCP in preparing its responses could understand the bases, the assumptions, and the particular problems associated with each EOI. These EOIs are primarily related to the electrical and the instrumentation and control effort.

EOI - 8011	EOI - 8024	EOI - 8043
EOI - 8013	EOI - 8025	EOI - 8045
EOI - 8017	EOI - 8026	EOI - 8046
EOI - 8022	EOI - 8041	EOI - 8054
EOI - 8023	EOI - 8042	EOI - 8057

DISCUSSION

Mr. F. Sestak, Jr. (SWEC) began the meeting with a brief introduction. This was followed by an opening statement of the meeting format by TES (Attachment 1). All in attendance introduced themselves and identified the organizations they represented. The following represents the important aspects of the discussion.

EOI-8011


This EOI concerns environmental qualification of Rockbestos cables exposed to temperature excursions due to postulated pipe cracks.

SWEC has not yet reviewed the documentation supplied by DCP (DCP letter No. 226, dated October 27, 1982) which DCP considers will show the cable to be environmentally qualified. DCP requested that the resolution of EOI-8011 not be dependent on the resolution of EOI Nos. 8002, 8003, and 8004, which addresses the fact that temperature profiles, under some plant conditions, may be greater than previously calculated.

EOI Nos. 8023, 8024, 8025, and 8026

These EOIs concern the Station Service System Calculations performed by SWEC on the 4160 V Safety-Related Distribution System. The general problem is bus voltages which, under certain operating modes, are lower than adequate to ensure operation of motors. The specific problems are listed as follows:

- EOI-8023 - Operating Mode is a LOCA with subsequent transfer to the 230 kV start-up source. The calculated voltages at the Engineered Safeguards 460 V motors are 0.90 per unit of 460 V, not including the voltage drop in motor leads.
- EOI-8024 - Operating Mode is normal operation with station service supplied by the 230 kV start-up source. Starting large 4 kV or 12 kV motors will result in a calculated transient voltage drop on the 480 V bus between .68 to .70 per unit of 480 V.



EOI-8025 - Operating Mode is a LOCA with subsequent transfer to the 230 kV start-up source. Starting the 4 kV motors simultaneously will result in a calculated voltage at the Engineered Safeguards motors of 0.70 per unit of 4 kV motors and 0.67 per unit of 460 V motors.

EOI-8026 - Operating Mode is normal operation with station service supplied by the 230 kV start-up source. The calculated voltage on the Engineered Safeguards motors is 0.847 per unit of 480 V at the 480 V bus and 0.86 per unit of 460 V for the 460 V motors terminals.

During the discussion of these EOIs, DCP stated it has recently performed bus voltage calculations which indicated more favorable voltages than those shown by SWEC's calculations. The discussion then centered on the differences in the transformer tap positions, demand load, and loading sequence used as input data to each program.

In addition, DCP stated that the operation modes listed in EOIs 8024 and 8026, i.e., normal operation from the 230 kV start-up source, was not credible because the auxiliary load would be transferred to the preferred (unit generator) auxiliary source when the unit reached 20 percent of its rating. SWEC noted that there is no Technical Specification restriction for transfer to the preferred auxiliary power source at different unit outputs and that the auxiliary power requirements at 20 percent of the unit output would be much greater than 20 percent of the total auxiliary requirements.

In its response to each of these EOIs, DCP will provide its calculation results and input data for SWEC's review. In addition, for EOI's 8024 and 8026, DCP will furnish approved operating restrictions or procedures which preclude supply of the auxiliaries from the standby source under different unit power levels.


#### EOI-8022

This EOI concerns the capability of the breakers on the 4 kV Engineered Safeguards switchgear to interrupt the available short circuit current.

SWEC calculated that the 4 kV breakers with an interrupting capability of 33.1 kA would be subject to a short circuit duty of 42.6 kA. DCP had recently performed this calculation which showed that the short circuit duty would be less than 33.1 kA.

The discussion of this EOI centered on loading assumptions used as input data to this calculation, particularly which motors would be running.

In its response to this EOI, DCP will provide its calculation results and input data for SWEC's review. This will include documentation showing which motors will be operating under normal conditions.





EOIs-8041, 8042, 8043, 8045, and 8057

These EOIs concern separation of redundant electrical systems. The EOIs cite specific situations where redundant cables are brought together and therefore violate physical separation per IEEE 308 and FSAR Section 8.3.3.

DCP stated that the separation commitment for Unit 1 is that no mutually redundant equipment or circuit is susceptible to a single failure. The redundant cable, listed in each EOI, although tied together, is not mutually redundant and, therefore, separation criterion, as defined in the FSAR Chapter 8.3.3, was not violated. In order to affect mutually redundant equipment for the situations described in these EOIs, there would have to occur multiple failures. For example, in EOI-8045, there would have to be more than one failure (a short circuit, a fuse failure, and two breaker failures) in order to affect more than one diesel generator control power bus. SWEC raised the concern that not all mutually redundant circuits were physically separated because redundant circuits were allowed to come together.

As its response to these EOIs, DCP will document why the separation and single failure criteria were not violated. In addition, DCP's response will provide its criteria for cable separation and how separation of mutually redundant circuits was controlled. DCP requested SWEC to revise EOI-8057 to show which specific violations applied to each panel listed; SWEC agreed.

EOI-8054

This EOI concerns cable originating from the vital gray bus, that takes on a different vital color with subsequent routing in a non-gray raceway.


DCP stated that this circuit, was a non-Class IE circuit, and therefore there was no violation. SWEC stated that this EOI also represented the generic concern of how cables were assigned colors and routed, and of how this was controlled.

As its response to this EOI, DCP will provide documentation to address the particular example in EOI-8054 and information on how colors and routing of cables were assigned and controlled.

EOI-8046

This EOI concerns the requirement of having certain Unit 2 batteries and diesel generators available for certain fans in the CRVP system.

DCP stated that the CRVP system was a common system to Units 1 and 2. To provide additional reliability for this system, there are transfer schemes for electrical power supply between the two units. From the discussion it appeared that the Unit 2 batteries and diesel generators were required to provide redundancy for these fans.



As its response to this EOI, DCP will provide documentation showing that the Unit 2 batteries and diesel generators are available for Unit 1 regardless of the status of Unit 2.

EOI-8013


Before discussing this EOI, TES presented the statement shown in Attachment 2.

This EOI concerns the test data for the diesel generators not being adequate to verify the capability of the generators to meet the loading requirements.

DCP presented a revised loading sequence for the diesel generators. The revision involved changing the starting sequence for the containment spray pump. By changing the load sequence, the DCP will show the existing test data used in conjunction with additional calculations will be sufficient to verify the capability of the generators to supply the loading requirements. In its response to this EOI, DCP will provide documentation showing the revised loading schedule and calculations as required.


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Attachments




ATTACHMENT I

"This meeting between the IDVP and DCP was called by DCP for the purpose of discussing Files 8011, 8017, 8022, 8023, 8024, 8025, 8026, 8041, 8042, 8043, 8045, 8046, 8054, and 8057. The participants are the IDVP and DCP. In accordance with the guidelines of Mr. Denton's letter to TES of September 29, 1982, the NRC staff and the non-PG&E recipients of that letter were informed of this meeting, and may be present as observers. We also recognize that any NRC staff members present have regulatory functions which they may wish to exercise during the meeting. With the specific exceptions identified above, this is an IDVP-DCP working meeting, not a public meeting, called, conducted, and documented in accordance with NRC procedures. As physical host for this meeting, SWEC has the right to include, as an observer, or exclude any non-participant or non-invited observer."



ATTACHMENT 2

"Having completed all agenda items as specified above, and since time is remaining with all cognizant personnel present, discussion of additional EOI - 8013 can now be included--provided no participants object. Hearing no objections, discussion of EOI - 8013 can begin."





DATE	November 4, 1982
J. O. NO.	14296
P. O. NO.	
LTR. NO.	DCS-141
REF.	

VIA

TO  
 Dr. W. E. Cooper  
 TES Document Control  
 Project 5511  
 Teledyne Engineering Services  
 130 Second Avenue  
 Waltham, MA 02254

DEAR SIRs:

THE FOLLOWING ARE  ATTACHED:  SENT SEPARATELY:

<u>1</u>	COPIES	PRINTS	REPRODUCIBLES	MICROFILM APERTURE CARDS
	EACH OF			
<input type="checkbox"/>	DRAWINGS	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPECIFICATIONS	
<input type="checkbox"/>	DOCUMENTS	<input type="checkbox"/>	NOTES OF CONFERENCE	

STATUS		PLEASE NOTE	SENT FOR YOUR	
<input type="checkbox"/> FINAL	<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVED	<input type="checkbox"/> REVISIONS	<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT
<input type="checkbox"/> PRELIMINARY	<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVED AS REVISED <small>AS DEFINED IN SPECIFICATION</small>	<input type="checkbox"/> ADDITIONS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> USE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION
<input type="checkbox"/> NO COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> UNACCEPTABLE	<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENTS	<input type="checkbox"/> FILES	<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE
<input type="checkbox"/> SUGGESTIONS AS NOTED			<input type="checkbox"/>	

**YOUR ATTENTION IS DIRECTED TO THE FOLLOWING:**

RELEASED FOR:  FABRICATION  PURCHASE OF NECESSARY MATERIALS

PLEASE REVISE AND SUBMIT \_\_\_\_\_ PRINTS \_\_\_\_\_ REPRODUCIBLES \_\_\_\_\_ MICROFILM APERTURE CARDS.

PLEASE SUBMIT \_\_\_\_\_ PRINTS \_\_\_\_\_ REPRODUCIBLES \_\_\_\_\_ MICROFILM APERTURE CARDS OF  DOCUMENTS  DRAWINGS  SHOP DETAIL

PLEASE RETURN ONE COPY EACH OF THIS MATERIAL BEARING YOUR APPROVAL OR COMMENTS.

PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS MATERIAL BY SIGNING AND RETURNING THE ENCLOSED COPY OF THIS FORM.

WE TRUST THAT THESE NOTES ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR UNDERSTANDING: IF NOT, PLEASE ADVISE US.

**IMPORTANT** SHOULD ANY REVISION TO DOCUMENTS OR DRAWINGS RETURNED HEREWITH INVOLVE A PRICE INCREASE, THE SUPPLIER MUST NOTIFY STONE & WEBSTER PURCHASING DEPARTMENT WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS EVEN THOUGH A DEFINITE ESTIMATE CANNOT BE GIVEN AT THE TIME, OTHERWISE, THE PURCHASER WILL CONSIDER THE REVISIONS MADE WITHOUT COST.

NOTES OF CONFERENCE  
 INDEPENDENT DESIGN VERIFICATION PROGRAM  
 PHASE II  
 TELEDYNE ENGINEERING SERVICES  
DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - UNIT 1

The attached Notes of Conference document the important aspects of the Scheduled Meeting held in SWEC's office on 10/21/82.

Very truly yours,


*F. Sestak, Jr.*

F. Sestak, Jr.  
 Project Manager, Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant

Copies to:  
 GAManeatis (enc)

*TO: J. Pulsipher*

*dot3*



NOTES OF CONFERENCE  
DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1  
INDEPENDENT DESIGN VERIFICATION PROGRAM  
PHASE II (IDVP)

---

J.O. No. 14296

Held at the offices of Stone & Webster  
Engineering Corporation  
Boston, MA  
October 21, 1982

Present for:

Bechtel

R. Chang

Diablo Canyon Project (DCP)

E. Connell, III

R. Fray

Quadrex Corporation

G. M. Leonard

R. Naymark

D. Munson

R. A. Uffer

State of California

G. Fine

Stone & Webster Engineering  
Corporation (SWEC)

D. Graves

J. E. Krechting

E. F. Heneberry

J. M. Oddo

D. L. Post

C. O. Richardson

F. Sestak, Jr.

F. J. Rezendes

S. P. Sekerak

Teledyne Engineering Service (TES)

L. C. Noriega

L. Semprucci

M. Revett

D. Stratouly

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory  
Commission (USNRC)

J. Pulsipher

H. Walker



4

## REFERENCES

1. DCP letter DCVP-SWEC-199 dated September 27, 1982
2. TES document, describing meeting format (attached)

## PURPOSE

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the basis of the NSC analyses and the DCP response to the SWEC generated EOIs 8001 through 8006 (Reference 1).

## DISCUSSION

Mr. F. Sestak, Jr. (SWEC) began the meeting with a brief introduction. This was followed by an opening statement of the meeting format by TES (Reference 2). All in attendance introduced themselves and identified the organization they represent.

Mr. J. Oddo read EOI's 8001 through 8006 and opened the meeting for discussion of 8001. In response to EOI 8001, Mr. Uffer (Quadrex) and Mr. Connell (DCP) generally agreed that the CONTEMPT program produced an incorrect temperature. They believe that this was an isolated case resulting from improper input and numerical instabilities with the code (CONTEMPT). Quadrex stated that proper results could have been obtained by altering either the input parameters (e.g. vent area and friction factors) or by reducing the time step size.

SWEC reiterated its written position. SWEC further stated that a time step sensitivity study has been performed with CONTEMPT and the results showed that air inflow occurs independent of the time step chosen. SWEC also stated that the vent area is a fixed physical parameter and should not be changed.


The discussion proceeded to input parameters to CONTEMPT described in EOI's 8002, 8003, and 8004. Quadrex reiterated the validity of applying a moisture entrainment model in the SG blowdown. SWEC made several clarifying and supporting statements for the necessity of performing additional break size investigations if the entrainment model is used.

SWEC noted that the turbine building analysis, performed by SWEC, did not necessarily identify the worst case or highest temperature which could be postulated to occur but resulted in a temperature higher than was previously calculated as the worst case by NSC.

Quadrex stated that their analyses met all of the requirements in force at the time of their performance and that there was no requirement at that time to comply with NUREG-0588 (and IE Bulletin 79-01B). SWEC pointed out that, subsequently, the NRC required PG&E to evaluate compliance with these documents, and PG&E had stated that the NSC analyses previously supplied by PG&E to the NRC were in compliance with NUREG-0588.

The discussion proceeded to EOI 8005, flooding analysis. Mr. D. Munson (Quadrex) stated that the NSC analysis is so conservative as to completely bound all of the errors stated in the EOI. SWEC stated that, although this may be true, the errors discussed in the EOI must be explicitly addressed in a revision to the analysis.

The discussion of EOI 8006 resulted in a clarification. SWEC pointed out that the 4000 ft<sup>2</sup> vent area from the turbine building to atmosphere used by NSC could not be verified since no documentation was submitted by the DCP. SWEC has calculated a vent area of approximately 1700 ft<sup>2</sup>, which was supported by the inspection of the plant.



It was decided by TES to allow discussion of EOI's 8033 and 8034. Regarding entrainment, Quadrex discussed swelling and bubble collapse in the SG. SWEC discussed the methods utilized by Westinghouse to model the steam generator. SWEC also stated that the steam separator should have been included in the steam generator model developed by NSC. SWEC defined entrainment as occurring when the enthalpy of the effluent is less than that of dry steam, considering the appropriate conditions. In the discussion of EOI 8034, SWEC stated that the NSC analysis did not account for the effect of adjacent compartments.

A general comment by Mr. Connell (DCP) was made concerning the IDVP classification of the errors found in analyses. Mr. Connell believed that some of the errors should have been classified by SWEC as "C" or "D" type errors, rather than "A" or "B" errors. SWEC reiterated its written position regarding error classification.

ACTION REQUIRED

TES. to provide SWEC written direction for addressing the DCP responses.

JModdo:RL

Attachment



2.2.3



"This meeting between the IDVP and DCP was called by DCP for the purpose of discussion and clarification of  
EQI <sup>files</sup> Pool Tech. Book

The participants are the IDVP and DPO. In accordance with the guidelines of Mr. Denton's letter to TES of Sept. 29, 1982, the NRC staff and the non-PG&E recipients of that letter were informed of this meeting, and may be present as observers. We also recognize that any NRC staff members present have regulatory functions which they may wish to exercise during the meeting. With the specific exceptions identified above, this is an IDVP-DCP working meeting, not a public meeting called, conducted and documented in accordance with NRC procedures. As physical host for this meeting, SMFC has the right to include, as an observer, or exclude any non-participant or non-invited observer."



11

**RFR**

**R.F. REEDY, INCORPORATED**

236 N. Santa Cruz Avenue  
Los Gatos, California 95030 • (408) 354-9110

November 15, 1982

Dr. W. E. Cooper  
TELEDYNE ENGINEERING SERVICES  
130 Second Avenue  
Waltham, MA 02254


Subject: RFR, Inc. October 3rd Friday Look Ahead Report

Dear Dr. Cooper:

Regarding the RFR, Inc. audit of the DCP's implementation of their QA Program, it is planned that an audit exit meeting will be held with the DCP personnel on or about December 10, 1982.

The Diablo Canyon site portion of the corrective action audit is planned to start November 29, 1982.

Very truly yours,

  
Roger F. Reedy, P.E.  
R. F. REEDY, INC.

RFR:na

cc: F. Sestak  
E. T. Denison



November 15, 1982  
Third Friday Report  
Disbursement List

cc: H. Schierling (2)  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
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Diablo Canyon Verification Program Manager  
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Chief Power Engineer  
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E. Denison  
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
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Phoenix, AZ 85012

A. C. Gehr



SNELL & WILMER  
3100 Valley Bank Center  
Phoenix, AZ 95073







**R.F. REEDY, INCORPORATED**

236 N. Santa Cruz Avenue  
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November 15, 1982

Dr. W. E. Cooper  
TELEDYNE ENGINEERING SERVICES  
130 Second Avenue  
Waltham, MA 02254


RFR, Inc., November Program Manager's Report -  
3rd Friday Report

Dear Dr. Cooper:

Enclosed please find the RFR, Inc., November Program Manager's Report.

As required by DCNPP-IDVPP-PP-05 and RFR-002, individuals assigned by this organization to the IDVP have completed an acceptable Statement Regarding Potential or Apparent Conflicts of Interest.

Very truly yours,

  
Roger F. Reedy, P.E.  
R. F. REEDY, INC.

RFR:na

cc: F. Sestak  
E. T. Denison



RFR, Inc.  
Program Manager's Report  
October  
3rd Friday Report

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- 3.0 STATUS OF SCHEDULE
- 4.0 CORRECTION TO PREVIOUS PROGRAM MANAGER'S REPORT
- 5.0 MEETINGS
- 6.0 CONCLUSIONS



11

1.0 WORK ACCOMPLISHED

1.1 Design Chain

ITR completed.

Design chain interface diagrams submitted to TES.

1.2 Reviews

Completed

1.3 Completed.

RFR audit of DCP corrective action commenced November 11, 1982 following completion of audit checklists and TES review of checklists.

1.4 Reports

65% completed.

2.0 SCHEDULED WORK FOR NEXT REPORT PERIOD

2.1 Design Chain

Completed

2.2 Reviews

All reviews have been completed.

2.3 Audits

Audit of DCP QA Program implementation for corrective action will continue. Completion date is planned for December 3, 1982.

2.4 Reports

First draft of RFR, Inc. Review and Audit Report to be completed.

3.0 STATUS OF SCHEDULE

RFR, Inc. Reviews and Audits are progressing as planned and no schedule delays are known or anticipated.

4.0 CORRECTION TO PREVIOUS PROGRAM MANAGER'S REPORT

None.



## 5.0 MEETINGS

A TES QA audit of RFR, Inc. IDVP Phase II activities was performed on October 18, 1982. On October 27, 1982, RFR, Inc. had a planning meeting with the DCP at San Francisco to obtain information needed for the RFR, Inc. audit of the DCP corrective action.

## 6.0 CONCLUSIONS

RFR, Inc. has completed their part of the design chain and reviews and audits. An audit of DCP QA program implementation is being conducted by RFR, Inc.



2.



November 15, 1982  
Third Friday Report  
Disbursement List

cc: H. Schierling (2)  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
7920 Norfolk Avenue  
Bethesda, Maryland 20114

R. Fray  
Diablo Canyon Verification Program Manager  
PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY  
215 Market Street  
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Chief Power Engineer  
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Handwritten marks and symbols in the top right corner, including a small cluster of dots and a few faint lines.

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