U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V

Report No. 50-275/80-19
50-323/80-10

License No. 50/275, 50/323 Priority CPPR 39, CPPR-69 Category

Licensee: Pacific Gas and Electric Company
77 Beale Street
San Francisco, California 94106

Facility Name: Diablo Canyon Units 1 & 2

Inspection at: Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, California

Inspection conducted: September 1-30, 1980

Inspectors: Tolbert Young Jr. 10/2/80
Tolbert Young Jr., Senior Resident Reactor Inspector Date Signed

Mario Sagaggio Jr. 10/2/80
Mario Sagaggio Jr., Resident Reactor Inspector Date Signed

Approved by: D M Sternberg 10/7/80
D. M. Sternberg, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 1, Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Date Signed

Summary:

Inspection of September 1-30, 1980 (Report Nos. 50-275/80-19 and 50-323/80-10)

Areas Inspected: Routine inspection of preoperational testing, plant tour, preoperation test program controls, IE circulars and bulletins, operator training, fuel storage, QA for preoperation testing and witnessing of testing in progress. This inspection involved 167 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC resident inspectors.

Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

IE:V Form 219(1)

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

*R. Patterson, Acting Plant Manager
R. D. Etzler, Project Superintendent
*M. N. Norem, Resident Startup Engineer
*J. S. Diamonon, QC Supervisor
*J. M. Gisclon, Power Plant Engineer
*D. A. Backens, Supervisor of Maintenance
*W. B. Kaefer, Technical Assistant to Plant Superintendent
*J. A. Sexton, Supervisor of Operations
*R. T. Twiddy, QA Supervisor

The inspectors also talked with and interviewed a number of other licensee employees including members of general construction, the operations staff and QA personnel.

*Denotes those attending the exit interview.

2. IE Bulletin/Circular Followup

Circular No. 78-05 (Closed)
Operating Procedure No. L-5 (Plant cooldown from minimum load to cold shutdown) was revised and a precaution was added: If the S/G reliefs are used for cooldown, caution must be observed to avoid SIS on steamline differential pressure.

Circular No. 78-16 (Closed)
Operating Order No. O-1 (Operation of limitorque valve actuators) was issued in June 1980. This procedure identified all SMB-0, 1, 2 and 3 actuators equipped with a 3600 RPM motor drive and describes the method to be used to verify that valve operations will function in the motor drive mode of operation after the operator has been used in the manual mode of operation.

Circular No. 80-01 (Closed)
Suspect induction disc relays at Diablo Canyon are the type IAC overcurrent, IAV undervoltage, and the IJCV directional overcurrent protective relays. A survey of all installed relays of such types in Unit 1 by plant quality control and in Unit 2 by general construction's station test group showed the relays were manufactured prior to the date code of concern and therefore, not subject to this circular.

The warehouse stock, however, did fall within the date codes of concern and 7 of the 8 disassembled relays were found to have the petroleum jelly lubricant in their time dials. All have since been cleaned in accordance with the GE service advice 721-162.2 and returned to stock.

Circular No. 80-02 (Closed)
The licensee has committed to change Administrative Procedure No. A-8 (overtime and emergency relief restrictions) to reflect the new requirements. The proposed technical specifications have been changed to reflect the new requirements.

Circular No. 80-03 (Closed)
The review by Quality Control revealed only one instance where the plant protection against the toxic gas hazards was not met. The NRC Standard Review Plan requires a minimum of five Self Contained Breathing Appliances (SCBA) in the control room. There are currently only four SCBAs. Emergency Procedure General Appendix 6, "Portable Emergency Equipment," is to be revised to increase the number of SCBA's in the control room to 8.

Information Notice No. 80-01 (Closed)
Review by the Engineering Department and plant quality control confirmed both the Diablo Canyon fuel handling tool design and design of the spent fuel storage racks (as well as the proposed high density storage rack design), coupled by existing administrative controls, would preclude the occurrence of the events described by the Circular.

Information Notice No. 80-05 (Closed)
Notice 80-05, "Chloride Contamination of Safety-Related Piping and Components". A check by Quality Control with Materials Facility personnel confirmed that there is no "Duraspray" fireproofing material in warehouse stock. The Albi "Duraspray" contains magnesium oxychloride which is hazardous to stainless steel, aluminum and copper.

The Plant Staff Review Committee feels that administratively the concern is already dealt with, as the subject is covered under Administrative Procedure D-6, "Cleanliness Controls for Corrosion-Resistant Alloys."

Information Notice No. 80-06 (Closed)
The requirements of the new 10 CFR 50.72 were addressed in a new procedure called "Emergency Procedure - General Appendix 1, 'Emergency Classification System'."

Information Notice No. 80-08 (Closed)
The only known use of this type block is in the process control and protection racks (Hagan racks) which is confined to only two panels. Inspection by Quality Control revealed no sign of cracks or defects on either unit. To preclude this problem, I & C personnel were instructed at a meeting on the precautions to be taken when working on the State blocks and also emphasized the new block link torque requirement as recommended by the manufacturer.

Information Notice No. 80-09 (Closed)
The Plant Staff Review Committee believes that the concern of the Circular does not apply to Diablo Canyon because the plant has a once-through cooling system and that the routine chlorination of the circulating water for slime and algae control would make the presence of the disease-causing amoeba very unlikely.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

3. Followup on Previously Identified Items

Volume Control Tank (VCT)
(79-06-01, Closed) Because of the problems revealed during the inspection of the Unit 2's VCT, Unit 1's VCT was re-inspected and the same indications were noted. Both VCT's were repaired and hydrostatic tests were performed. The test results were examined with the same procedures and results as reported in Inspection Report No. 50-323/79-06.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

4. Plant Tour

The inspectors walked through various areas of the plant on a weekly basis to observe activities in progress; to inspect the general state of cleanliness, housekeeping and adherence to fire protection rules; to check the proper approval of "man on the line, caution and clearance" tags on equipment, and to review with operation personnel the status of various systems in the plant.

The inspectors noted that the status of the systems and the housekeeping appeared consistent with construction activities. The reactor cavity is still being maintained as a clean area and extra personnel are still assigned to cleanup crews. Cleanliness and housekeeping of the plant is still improving.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

5. Operator Training

The operations division is continuing their intensive retraining program for the operators and technical advisors to include two weeks at the Westinghouse simulator. The inspectors have monitored some of these classes and will monitor more classes throughout the training program.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6. Preoperation Test Program Controls Units 1 & 2

The inspector verified by record review and/or observation that (a) jurisdiction controls were being observed for system turnover, (b) tagging was being accomplished consistent with jurisdictional controls of the administrative procedures and (c) controls were being observed prior to and subsequent to testing. A schedule is being maintained for preoperational testing and updated when necessary.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7. QA Preoperational Testing Units 1 & 2

An inspector examined QA audit reports of preoperational testing audits conducted within the last three months. The inspector verified that the audits were conducted in accordance with approved procedures and that corrective actions for identified discrepancies had been prescribed. System turnover from construction to the startup test group and to the operations division was conducted in accordance with established procedures and administrative controls.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

8. Operating, Administrative, and Surveillance Test Procedures

An inspector reviewed new and revised licensee operating, administrative, and surveillance test procedures. Procedures reviewed included:

NPAP A-5	Organizational Control of Emergencies
EPOP 25	Tank Ruptures
STP M-54	Measurement of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Injection Flow
STP P-5B	Routine Surveillance Test of Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps

Based upon review, the following comment is pertinent:

STP P-5B directs use of the permanently installed pump suction gages to record surveillance data. The presently installed gages have too great a range of operation with respect to recorded data to meet ASME code requirements. Accordingly, the licensee has committed to either replace the existing pump suction gages or install test gages with an acceptable range of operation. Pending replacement or installation of new gages, this comment will remain an open item for followup (80-19-01).

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

9. Preoperational Testing

a. Portions of the following tests were witnessed by an inspector:

18-4A	Hydrostatic Testing of Piping Systems in the Auxiliary Building; Fire Station Cross Tie to Containment
10.1 Addm. 3	Residual Heat Removal Flush

b. While witnessing the above testing, the inspector verified that the procedures were technically adequate, the proper test instrumentation was being used, and the procedure was being followed.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

10. New Fuel Storage Units 1 & 2

The new fuel storage and security was inspected. The inspector verified that the integrity of the security controls were being maintained and adequate procedures were available and enforced. Environmental protection to control dust and debris, and to prevent fuel damage was being maintained. The inspection ascertained that the requirements of both special nuclear materials licensee were being met.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

11. Exit Interview

The inspectors met with a senior licensee representative on a weekly basis and with the representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 on September 26, 1980. The scope and findings of the inspection were summarized by the inspectors.