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Waste Control Specialists LLC's Consolidated Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facility Project

Comment On: NRC-2016-0231-0005

Environmental Reviews: Waste Control Specialists, LLC; Consolidated Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facility Project

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Submitter Information

Name: Dr. Gwen DuBois

Address:

Chesapeake Physicians for Social Responsibility
32
Baltimore, MD, 21218

Email: twhitehouse@psr.org

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RULES

General Comment

Please see attached comments

Attachments

CPSR wsscscop4 March 5 17

SUNSI Review Complete

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E-RIDS= ADM-03

Add= J. Park (JRP)

CHESAPEAKE PSR PHYSICIANS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY



March 2, 2017

Cindy Bladey
Office of Administration
Mail Stop: OWFN-12-HO8
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001;

RE: Docket No. 72-1050; NRC-2016-0231

Waste Control Specialists LLC's Consolidated Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facility
Project

Dear Cindy Bladey:

Waste Control Specialists' (WCS) has applied to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to store up to 40,000 metric tons of spent fuel, high-level radioactive waste (5000 MTU first permit), from our nation's nuclear reactors and store it in Andrews County for up to 40 years. Not only the storage but the transfer of this waste on our highways, railways and by barge poses the possibility of huge environmental and health risks to the people in Andrews as well as to the population all along the route of transfer of this highly dangerous waste. Is this a terrible disaster waiting to happen? What are the risks of a major untoward event occurring? Because of the seriousness, even the low probability events should be considered.

Chesapeake Physicians for Social Responsibility, an organization of 300 dues paying members and 1000 activists, opposes nuclear power because of risks of proliferation. Nuclear power requires enriched uranium 235, which can be further enriched to make nuclear weapons, and plutonium, a very fissile bomb-making element used over Nagasaki, which is found in nuclear waste. Over time, the amount of bomb grade plutonium in nuclear waste becomes more accessible as the shorter-lived isotopes disappear. The world is awash in plutonium. In addition to proliferative risks, uranium mining creates environmental contamination especially in Navajo Nation communities. Mine workers have a higher risk of developing lung cancer and silicosis. We do not believe that the United States has found a long-term safe way to store nuclear waste, which will have to last for centuries beyond the time that governments and nations as we know now are likely to still exist. How do we communicate to civilizations so far in advance to "stay away" and "danger." As wind and solar prices of electricity per kilowatt hour drop while nuclear costs rise, especially if the cost of waste is included, nuclear cannot compete without public subsidies thereby reducing limited financial resources for truly renewable energy. In addition, nuclear power comes in years behind schedule

as well as over budget. Simply stated, it is not a practical solution to the impending crisis of climate change. We believe that nuclear waste should be stored in hardened on-site storage casks until the time that a permanent reasonable safe deep repository can be found for perpetuity. In the meantime, we should stop producing this waste that we do not have a place to store safely.

That being said, this Environmental Impact Statement still should be as comprehensive as possible and should include transportation-related safety and environmental issues. Nuclear waste canisters are 1/2 inch thick unlike the > than 10 inch canisters/cask system in use in Europe. How thoroughly have the thin canisters been tested for transport? How does the 1/2 inch thickness increase the vulnerability for cracks in canisters within casks that can't be seen in transport nor storage? There is no way presently to detect early cracks in these canisters. What about transport of high burn-up fuel and safety? What about the possibility that cladding has been made more brittle and will shatter? What about the problems using aluminum baskets not allowed in Japan after lessons learned from Fukushima? What is the risk of criticality being reached if assemblies crash into each other during transport due to faulty aluminum baskets?

Since accidents happen on the highways an average of 2.5-4.5 per million vehicle miles¹ (for the railways, 2.28 accidents would be expected per 1,000,000 miles of travel²³) how many trips and miles are going to be required and what would be the expected number of accidents? Accidents involving fires? Will these estimates take into consideration travel through urban areas? Bad weather conditions? Increased traffic in the future? How about for trips over 20 years? More than 20 years? For example, what about the high level waste which is removed from Calvert Cliffs nuclear power plant over 20-40 years.. With multiple transports on barges over the years what are the chances that one of these casks ends up in the water? If that happened, how long before corrosion would cause a crack and compromise the integrity of the canister within? Could there be contamination of the Bay waters? What effect would that have on humans? Marine life? The seafood industry? Once on the rails, the possibility of an accident on the rails need to be multiplied by the many trips that will occur over 20 or 40 years. Plans were submitted to the NRC for 120 casks at Calvert Cliffs. ⁴ If the canisters in half of these casks are involved in trips on the rails the 1700 + miles to Andrews would the chance of an accident be about < 1 in 10 over that period for just our two Maryland nuclear power plant reactors and this temporary waste storage facility in Texas. We know about fires in CSX tunnels in Baltimore where an accident 2001 led to temperatures in excess of 1400 degrees Fahrenheit. Though never tested, through modeling these containers are estimated to withstand 1400 degrees Fahrenheit for not more than 30 minutes. How long would containers remain intact with those temperatures? How many people would be exposed? How many people would need to be evacuated and for how long? Have the risk of an accident involving nuclear waste on the waterways, railways and highways been estimated and summed up from all of the trips with nuclear power plants' waste? What about the consequences with high burn up fuel, transported over all of the years

¹ https://www.dot.ny.gov/divisions/operating/osss/highway-repository/Average_Accident_Rates_14_15.pdf

² www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1108/ML110880284.pdf

³ <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-energy-texas-dump-idUSBRE83Q11W20120427>

⁴ <https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1409/ML14090A122.pdf>

destined for WCS plant? Add in terrorist risks, highways more crowded, population centers exposed. WE know Fukushima has created over 100,000 long-term refugees.⁵ The EIS should look closely into the risk of groundwater contamination and to concerns that this site sits and the southern end of the Ogallala Aquifer. What is the risk of radioactive contamination of drinking water and to how many people? Suppose the waste sits at that location not for 20-40 years but , as some fear, for several hundred years given that finding a permanent repository site acceptable to the whole nation is so problematic. Is the site permeable to water over what time period? What long-term barriers to water seepage have been required?

The EIS should look closely at Environmental Justice issues as a marker of vulnerability of the population of Andrews to additional adverse events.⁶ Compared with rest of U.S., this is a population that exceeds the 75th percentile for being linguistically isolated, and has a large minority population (Hispanic). Regarding pollution exposure, it is at or exceeds the 75th percentile for lead paint indicator, for traffic proximity, and for being exposed to high ozone levels compared with the rest of the U.S. This community already is overexposed to risk with the present low-level radioactive waste storage facility and is less able to cope with the health and financial implications of living near radioactive dumps if there is a leak of radioactive waste. The WIPP fire in New Mexico just over the border where a little mistake, using the wrong kitty litter led to fires, radioactive releases, personnel exposure to radioactivity and closed the facility ⁷ for nearly 3 years⁸. This illustrates that when humans are involved, things can go very wrong. What would it mean for property values if an accident were to occur. What would it mean for radiation exposure if an accident occurred? Should these people have this risk when they are already disadvantaged in their ability to cope with adversity?

What are the increased risks of leaks in Andrews with storage of high-level nuclear waste as the years pass and the storage system ages? If the waste stays at this site for forty years before a final repository is found, what happens if a storage canister develops cracks and/or is leaking? How will it be discovered before radiation contaminates the environment? How is the canister to be monitored and how often? Does the technology exist to detect small cracks and leaks before temperatures rise or radiation is detected in the environment? How will the waste be safely transferred to another container if found to be leaking? We have seen the problems with retrieving and removing nuclear waste in Fukushima, but at least at Fukushima there are spent fuel pools into which to put waste from which it can then be transferred. How will that transfer of a failing canister be safely accomplished at WCS facility? Should the NRC require the thicker, more durable canister/cask system used in Europe that are in use at only a few npp in the U.S? Should higher standards requiring the more durable thicker canister/cask system be instituted and would this be safer as well as more cost effective, less likely to fail?. What are storage risks with high burn up fuel and brittle oxidized zirconium cladding? What are risks of storage when and if aluminum baskets fail and fuel assemblies crash into each

⁵ <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/03/11/national/nuclear-refugees-tell-distrust-pressure-return-fukushima/#.WKS7-dlrLcs>

⁶ <https://ejscreen.epa.gov/mapper/>

⁷ <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/mar/27/cat-litter-blamed-for-240m-radiation-leak-at-new-mexico-nuclear-waste-dump>

⁸ <http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/WR-First-waste-emplaced-as-WIPP-reopens-1301177.html>

other risking criticality? Would higher standards requiring thicker more durable canister/cask systems be safer and more cost effective for high burnup fuel? Interim storage means we will have to transfer and move nuclear waste twice. Why should we be exposing the nation to the risks of moving radioactive waste on rails and highways in the future in aged canisters? The scoping must consider the risks of transferring and transporting waste two times if this is truly an interim plan. On the other hand, what will be the risks of this waste being stored at Andrews for more than forty years if no permanent repository is found in that time? What are the risks of waste being stolen to make plutonium bombs when the waste becomes more steal-able as shorter lived hotter isotopes disappear ? How long can the public be kept from exposure? How long can sources of drinking water be kept safe from these dangerous radioisotopes? How would storms and flooding and earthquakes effect that projection? Is there an alternative that poses less risk like leaving casks in hardened on site storage until a "final" one trip resting place has been found?

Are we cutting corners with inferior canisters that will not be able to hold up for the prolonged consolidated interim storage proposed here.

In short, what may appear superficially to be a good solution to the nuclear waste storage problem may simply replace one set of problems with other possibly worse problems. This EIS must be carried out in a scientific, thorough, and evidenced based fashion so that public health, and environmental sustainability don't become casualties of political expedience. To make sure that it is thoroughly vetted with the public, in addition to the comments above, the comment period should be extended to 90 days.

Sincerely,

Gwen L. DuBois MD, MPH
President
Chesapeake Physicians For Social Responsibility