

CATEGORY 1

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 9807270320 DOC. DATE: 98/07/17 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL: 50-410 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Niagara Moha 05000410
 AUTH. NAME: AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 DEAN, R. J. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.
 CONWAY, J. T. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 98-019-00: on 980617, determined that fire proofing was missing from beam. Caused by failure of contractor personnel. Breach permit initiated & compensatory fire patrols were established. W/980717 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 5
 TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

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Niagara Mohawk

John T. Conway
Vice President
Nuclear Generation

Office: (315) 349-4213
Fax: (315) 349-2605

July 17, 1998
NMP2L 1808


United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

RE: Docket No. 50-410
LER 98-19

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii), we are submitting LER 98-19, "Fire Proofing Missing from Beam."

Very truly yours,


John T. Conway
Vice President - Nuclear Generation


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JTC/GJG/kap
Attachment

Je22

xc: Mr. H. J. Miller, Regional Administrator, Region I
Mr. B. S. Norris, Senior Resident Inspector
Records Management

20051
9807270320 980717
PDR ADOCK 05000410
S PDR



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503

FACILITY NAME (1)

Nine Mile Point Unit 2

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000410

PAGE (3)

1 OF 4

TITLE (4)

Fire Proofing Missing from Beam

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)	
06	17	98	98	019	00				N/A	05000	
									N/A	05000	

OPERATING MODE (9)

5

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

POWER LEVEL (10) 000	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(e)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<i>(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)</i>
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(e)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

R. J. Dean, Engineering Manager - NMP2

TELEPHONE NUMBER

(315) 349-4240

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH

DAY

YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On June 17, 1998, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) personnel determined that a structural beam in the Division II Emergency Switchgear Room was not properly coated with fire proofing. Heightened awareness as a result of structural fire proofing deficiencies identified at Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) prompted the identification of the deficiency discussed in this report. A historical review determined that the fire proofing was removed to attach conduits to the beam during the original construction of NMP2.

The cause of the missing fire proofing is the failure of the contractor personnel to assure that the beam was re-fire proofed after the conduits were installed during construction. The cause of not discovering the missing fire proofing during subsequent inspections is inadequate managerial methods due to weaknesses in the fire proofing inspection program.

A breach permit was initiated and compensatory fire patrols were established. The beam was re-fire proofed and additional inspections have been performed. No additional significant missing/damaged fire proofing was identified. Fire department personnel have been made aware of the importance of detecting missing fire proofing coatings. Drawings and procedures will be revised to assure that future routine inspections would detect similar deficiencies.



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 30.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Nine Mile Point Unit 2	05000410	98	- 19	- 00	02 OF 04

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On June 17, 1998, NMP2 personnel determined that a beam in the Division II Emergency Switchgear Room was not properly coated with fire proofing. Heightened awareness as a result of structural fire proofing deficiencies identified at Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) prompted the identification of the deficiency discussed in this report. These deficiencies at NMP1 were previously reported in NMP1 LER 98-09, "Missing Fire Proofing Material from Structural Steel."

A historical review was performed to determine when and how the fire proofing was removed. From this review, engineers determined that it is likely that the fire proofing was removed in the 1985 to 1987 timeframe when conduits were being installed during the original construction of NMP2. At that time, fire proofing was installed on the beam and was likely removed to support conduit attachment. However, the contractor installing the conduits failed to reinstall the fire proofing.

Since 1990, fire department procedures have required inspection of structural steel fire proofing for Appendix R fire barriers. That procedure has sketches from design drawings as attachments which are annotated as to which walls, ceilings and floors are safe shutdown barriers. The procedure contains direction on inspection of fire proofing and acceptance criteria. However, the primary focus of the procedure is on penetration inspections and barrier integrity. Prior to 1990, on-the-job training was provided for penetration inspections and barrier integrity inspections. However, in July 1990, inspection of structural steel with fire proof coating for Appendix R barriers was added to the procedure but training was not provided.

II. CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of the missing fire proofing is the failure of the contractor personnel to assure that the beam was re-fire proofed after conduits were attached to the beam. The contractual documents indicate that the construction company was to re-fire proof the beam after the conduits were installed. The construction company personnel failed to verify that the as left condition of the beam met the design requirements.

The cause of not discovering the deviation during subsequent inspections was inadequate management methods due to weaknesses in the fire proofing inspection program. The procedure used to inspect penetrations seals and barrier integrity was revised to include fire proofing on structural steel in 1990. The procedure is weak with regard to specific direction as to what to inspect and certain figures attached to the procedure were based upon engineering drawings which were inadequate in that certain safe shutdown barriers were not identified. In addition, the inspectors were not adequately trained on the procedure revision.



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2	05000410	98	- 19	- 00	03 OF 04

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

III. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii), "Any event or condition that resulted in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded, or that resulted in the nuclear power plant being: (B) In a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant."

The affected structural steel beam is located in the ceiling of the Division II Emergency Switchgear Room. This beam supports the floor of the Relay Room located above it. The fire hazards in this room consist of cables and cable trays, insulation and a motor-control center. The fire load of this room translates to a Fire Severity of one hour and forty seven minutes resulting in room temperatures of approximately 1800°F.

This room is protected with a total flooding CO₂ fire suppression system, full smoke detection coverage and portable fire extinguishers. Additionally, CO₂ hose reels and water fire hose reels are located directly outside the room entrances in the north and south corridors of the control building. This equipment provides adequate coverage for manual fire fighting.

With the fire suppression and detection in the Division II Emergency Switchgear Room, a fire in this area would not likely result in a failure of this beam. The fire effects would be mitigated by automatic and manual suppression capabilities. This room is subjected to routine daily fire door checks and operator rounds along with security checks of the exterior doors. If a fire were to originate in the room, it is likely that the fire would be detected in a short period of time. In the unlikely event these automatic and manual defense-in-depth fire protection features were not available and the fire brigade did not respond to a fire in this area, the structural integrity of the affected steel beam could have been compromised. Given these conditions, it could have resulted in a condition outside the Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis and impacted the safe shutdown capability of the plant from the control room. However, the Division I Remote Shutdown Panel would have been available to assist in safely shutting down the plant.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. A breach permit was initiated and compensatory fire patrols established until the fire proofing was repaired.
2. The fire proofing was restored to original design requirements.
3. All safe shutdown barriers at NMP2 have been inspected and no additional significant missing/damaged fire proofing has been detected.



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATIONESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION
REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE
RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT
(3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Nine Mile Point Unit 2	05000410	98	19	00	04 OF 04

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (Cont'd)

4. The remaining drawings which define safe shutdown barriers have been reviewed. Some discrepancies in the drawings were identified. Followup plant inspections were performed and no additional fire proofing discrepancies were found.
5. The NMP2 drawings which were found to be deficient, and the NMP2 inspection procedure, will be revised and training provided to fire department personnel prior to the next inspection of fire barriers at NMP2.
6. Fire department personnel will be trained on the NMP1 procedure and associated engineering documents (e.g., drawings) prior to the next inspection of fire barriers at NMP1.
7. Since 1987, the administrative procedures and programs for modifications and maintenance have been significantly improved to incorporate appropriate controls and should preclude recurrence. Enhanced controls are in place to provide oversight of contractor personnel to ensure that requirements are met.

V. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

- A. Failed components: none
- B. Previous similar events: none
- C. Identification of components referred to in this LER:

COMPONENT	IEEE 803 FUNCTION	IEEE 805 SYSTEM ID
Emergency Switchgear Room	N/A	NA
Relay Room	N/A	NA
Remote Shutdown Panels	PL	JD

