

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503

FACILITY NAME (1)

Nine Mile Point Unit 2

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000410

PAGE (3)

1 OF 3

TITLE (4)

Opening Between Reactor Building and Reactor Building Auxiliary Bay

| EVENT DATE (5) | | | LER NUMBER (6) | | | | REPORT DATE (7) | | | OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) | |
|----------------|-----|------|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|-------|-----------------|------|----------------|-------------------------------|--|
| MONTH | DAY | YEAR | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | MONTH | DAY | YEAR | FACILITY NAMES | DOCKET NUMBER(S) | |
| 11 | 14 | 97 | 97 | 015 | 01 | 03 | 04 | 98 | N/A | 05000 | |
| | | | | | | | | | N/A | 05000 | |

OPERATING MODE (9)

1

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

| | | | | |
|------------------------|--|---|---|---|
| POWER LEVEL (10) 95 | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b) | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv) | <input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b) |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(e)(1) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v) | <input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c) |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(e)(2) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii) | <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | <i>(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)</i> |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x) | |

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

R. J. Dean - Engineering Manager Unit 2

TELEPHONE NUMBER

(315) 349-4240

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

| CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFACTURER | REPORTABLE TO NPRDS | CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFACTURER | REPORTABLE TO NPRDS |
|-------|--------|-----------|--------------|---------------------|-------|--------|-----------|--------------|---------------------|
| | | | | | | | | | |

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH

07

DAY

02

YEAR

98


ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On November 14, 1997, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) discovered an opening in the wall between the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) Reactor Building stair tower and the North Auxiliary Bay (NAB). The Reactor Building and Auxiliary Bays form the Secondary Containment. This opening allowed the Reactor Building atmosphere to communicate with the NAB and therefore, safety-related equipment located in the NAB could have been exposed to High Energy Line Break (HELB) and Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) environment. Since the wall design was to prevent migration between the Reactor Building and the NAB atmosphere, this condition placed the plant outside of the design basis.

The cause of this opening has been determined to be improper construction when the plant was constructed.

The appropriate Technical Specification was entered for the affected electrical distribution equipment. Corrective actions were to repair the opening, and perform a preliminary inspection of similar walls to verify that there were no other openings.

9803190012 980304
PDR ADOCK 05000410
S PDR



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 30.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

| FACILITY NAME (1) | DOCKET NUMBER (2) | LER NUMBER (6) | | | PAGE (3) |
|------------------------|-------------------|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|----------|
| | | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | |
| Nine Mile Point Unit 2 | 05000410 | 97 | 15 | 01 | 02 OF 03 |

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On November 14, 1997, while installing emergency lights at Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2), plant personnel identified an opening in the wall between the Reactor Building stair tower and the North Auxiliary Bay (NAB) elevation 240 feet. The NMP2 Reactor Building contains required equipment to mitigate the consequences of an accident and is qualified to withstand the environment following a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and a High Energy Line Break (HELB). The Reactor Building and the NAB and South Auxiliary Bay (SAB) form the Secondary Containment. The NAB contains Division I equipment and the SAB contains Division II equipment. The walls between the Reactor Building and Auxiliary Bays are designed to prevent migration of Reactor Building atmosphere into the Auxiliary Bays which could possibly result in a harsh environment. Therefore, the opening at elevation 240 feet would have permitted migration which could have impacted the operability of the equipment in the NAB elevation 240 feet. The opening was located in the upper portion of the wall adjacent to a floor beam. Therefore, it was not observable from the floor, and could only be observed from a scaffold or ladder such as the one being used to install the emergency lights.

Upon discovery of this opening, operators entered Technical Specification 3.8.3.1 Action a.1, since the Division I AC electrical distribution equipment was considered inoperable. The wall was sealed to conform to the design and the Technical Specification Action was exited.

II. CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of this opening has been determined to be improper construction when the wall was formed during plant construction. A contributing cause was inadequate quality inspection during construction.

III. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(ii), "any event or condition that resulted in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded; or that resulted in the nuclear power plant being (B) in a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant."



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATIONESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION
REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE
RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT
(3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

| FACILITY NAME (1) | DOCKET NUMBER (2) | LER NUMBER (6) | | | PAGE (3) |
|------------------------|-------------------|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|----------|
| | | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | |
| Nine Mile Point Unit 2 | 05000410 | 97 | - 15 | - 01 | 03 OF 03 |

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

III. ANALYSIS OF EVENT (cont'd)

Due to the potential of migration of harsh environmental conditions into the NAB elevation 240 feet, it is conservatively assumed that some or all of the equipment in the NAB elevation 240 feet would have failed at some point following a LOCA or HELB. This assumption is made since the migration rate and resultant impact on equipment has not been quantified. However, as noted below in Section IV, NMPC is performing analysis on the components to determine the impact.

Since preliminary inspections have not identified other openings, the SAB was not affected. Therefore, Division II equipment would have been available to mitigate the consequences of a HELB or LOCA. In addition, the impact on Division I equipment would not have been instantaneous, so that Division I systems would have initiated, as required, to provide initial mitigation.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. Technical Specification 3.8.3.1 Action a.1 was entered, the wall was repaired and the Technical Specification Action was exited on November 15, 1997.
2. A preliminary walkdown which included similar walls in the SAB has been completed to verify that there are no other openings.
3. A comprehensive inspection of HELB barriers was completed on February 10, 1998. There were no additional deficiencies observed.
4. An analysis will be completed to determine the impact of migration through this opening on equipment by June 30, 1998.

V. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

- A. Failed components: none.
- B. Previous similar events: none.
- C. Identification of components referred to in this LER:

| COMPONENT | IEEE 803 FUNCTION | IEEE 805 SYSTEM ID |
|-----------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Wall (bulkhead) | BHD | NG |

