

CATEGORY 1

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9802120318 DOC.DATE: 98/02/04 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
FACIL:50-410 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Niagara Moha 05000410
AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
ROWE, K. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.
DAHLBERG, K.A. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 98-001-00:on 980107,entry into TS 3.0.3 occurred due to
containment atmosphere gaseous/particulate radiation
monitors operable.Caused by random failure of flow control
transducer board.Failed transducer was replaced.W/980204 ltr

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TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

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NIAGARA MOHAWK
GENERATION
BUSINESS GROUP

NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION/LAKE ROAD, P.O. BOX 63, LYCOMING, NEW YORK 13093

February 4, 1998
NMP2L 1755

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

RE: Docket No. 50-410
LER 98-01

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B), we are submitting LER 98-01, "Entry Into Technical Specification 3.0.3 due to Containment Atmosphere Gaseous/Particulate Radiation Monitors Inoperable."

Very truly yours,

Kim A. Dahlberg
Plant Manager - NMP2

KAD/TWP/lmc
Attachment

xc: Mr. H. J. Miller, Regional Administrator, Region I
Mr. B. S. Norris, Senior Resident Inspector
Records Management

9802120318 980204
PDR ADOCK 05000410
S PDR



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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503

FACILITY NAME (1) Nine Mile Point Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000410	PAGE (3) 1 OF 4
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TITLE (4)
Entry Into Technical Specification 3.0.3 due to Containment Atmosphere Gaseous/Particulate Radiation Monitors Inoperable

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
01	07	98	98	001	00	02	04	98	N/A	05000
									N/A	05000

OPERATING MODE (9) 1 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

POWER LEVEL (10) 095	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(e) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b) <input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c) <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER <i>(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)</i>
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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME K. Rowe, Acting Radiation Protection Manager NMP2	TELEPHONE NUMBER (315) 349-7555
---	------------------------------------

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NFRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NFRDS
X	IJ	TD		Y					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO			

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On January 7, 1998 at 0441 hours, while operating at approximately 95 percent reactor power, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 when both divisions of the Containment Atmosphere Gaseous/Particulate Radiation Monitors were declared inoperable. A plant shutdown was commenced at 0535 hours.

In addition, the Division I Emergency Diesel Generator was out of service for pre-planned maintenance. This condition, in conjunction with the Division II Containment Atmosphere Gaseous/Particulate Radiation Monitor being inoperable, caused entry into an additional shutdown action per TS 3.8.1.1 Action e. Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) was verbally granted enforcement discretion on January 7, 1998 at 1123 hours, to permit restoration of the necessary equipment and avoid an unnecessary plant shutdown.

The cause of this event, entry into TS 3.0.3, has been determined to be the random failure of the flow control transducer board on the Division II Containment Atmosphere Gaseous/Particulate Radiation Monitor (2CMS*CAB10B).

The failed flow control transducer board was replaced, the flow control circuit was re-calibrated and the monitor was returned to service.



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Nine Mile Point Unit 2	05000410	98	01	00	02 OF 04

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 566A's) (17)

I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On January 7, 1998 at 0441 hours, while operating at approximately 95 percent reactor power, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 when both divisions of the Containment Atmosphere Gaseous/Particulate Radiation Monitors were declared inoperable. A plant shutdown was commenced at 0535 hours.

In addition, the Division I Emergency Diesel Generator was out of service for pre-planned maintenance. This condition, in conjunction with the Division II Containment Atmosphere Gaseous/Particulate Radiation Monitor being inoperable, caused entry into an additional shutdown action per TS 3.8.1.1 Action e. Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) was verbally granted enforcement discretion on January 7, 1998 at 1123 hours, to permit restoration of the necessary equipment and avoid an unnecessary plant shutdown. NMPC submitted a written request for enforcement discretion on January 8, 1998 (NMPC letter NMP2L 1745), which was subsequently approved in writing by the NRC on January 9, 1998.

The Division I Containment Atmosphere Gaseous/Particulate Radiation Monitor (2CMS*CAB10A) was inoperable for pre-planned maintenance activities, specifically the replacement of the heat trace circuit and insulation. An adverse trend had been previously identified on Division I regarding water in the particulate filter/detector assembly, which led personnel to suspect a heat trace circuit problem. The Division II Containment Atmosphere Gaseous/Particulate Radiation Monitor (2CMS*CAB10B) became inoperable on January 7, 1998 at 0441 hours. Initially, the cause of the failure of both divisions of Containment Atmosphere Gaseous/Particulate Radiation Monitors appeared to be moisture intrusion. Subsequent troubleshooting activities determined that the Division II flow control transducer board had failed, allowing the introduction of AC noise on the DC flow control circuit, resulting in erratic operation. The flow control device was replaced, re-calibrated and returned to service on January 7, 1998 at 1820 hours. Restoration of the Division II Containment Atmosphere Gaseous/Particulate Radiation Monitor allowed the shutdown action to be exited and thus eliminated the continued need for NRC enforcement discretion. Due to the extent of the pre-planned maintenance activities on the Division I Containment Atmosphere Gaseous/Particulate Radiation Monitor (2CMS*CAB10A), Division I was not restored to operable status until January 9, 1998 at 1420 hours. The Division I Emergency Diesel Generator was restored to operable status on January 9, 1998 at 1145 hours.

II. CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of this event, entry into TS 3.0.3, has been determined to be the random failure of the flow control transducer board on the Division II Containment Atmosphere Gaseous/Particulate Radiation Monitor (2CMS*CAB10B).



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATIONESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION
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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
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Nine Mile Point Unit 2	05000410	98	01	00	03 OF 04

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

III. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) "any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications." Specifically, entry into TS 3.0.3 was required when no action statement was provided in TS 3.4.3.1 for both divisions of Containment Atmosphere Gaseous/Particulate Radiation Monitors being inoperable. This event was initially reported under 10CFR50.72 (b)(1)(i)(A) due to the initiation of a plant shutdown. This plant shutdown was not completed due to the approval of the enforcement discretion described above and restoration of the Division II Containment Atmosphere Gaseous/Particulate Radiation Monitor.

The function of the reactor coolant system leakage detection systems specified in TS 3.4.3.1 is to monitor and detect leakage from the reactor coolant pressure boundary so that appropriate actions can be taken before the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary is impaired. In the plant accident analysis, no credit for mitigation of an accident is taken for the reactor coolant system leakage detection systems. Per TS 3.4.3.1, leakage can be detected inside the drywell via: drywell floor and equipment drain tank fill rate changes, gaseous radioactivity levels, and particulate radioactivity levels. The drywell floor and equipment drain tank fill rate monitoring systems were operable and capable of quantifying leakage during this entire period.

There were no safety significant consequences as a result of this event, since the drywell floor and equipment drain tank fill rate monitoring systems remained in service and provided positive indication that containment system leakage was not indicating an increasing trend. Other safety systems which indirectly monitor primary containment leakage, such as containment temperature and pressure, were operable and would have provided positive indication of primary coolant pressure boundary leakage. Grab samples of the drywell atmosphere were taken and analyzed every 12 hours during the period of the enforcement discretion. In addition, the monitoring frequency of the drywell floor and equipment drain tank fill rates was increased from every 8 hours to every 4 hours during the period of the enforcement discretion.

In the NMP2 Individual Plant Examination (IPE) and Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE), the risks of core damage and radionuclide release events were evaluated using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methods. The PRA implicitly credits leak detection within the LOCA initiator frequency. However, since the drywell floor and equipment drain tank fill rate monitors remained available and grab samples were being taken, the impact of short-term operation without the other radiation monitors was minimal.

The condition of both Containment Atmosphere Gaseous/Particulate Radiation Monitors being inoperable has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable in the Improved Standard Technical Specifications (ITS). The ITS allows continued operation for up to 30 days with no required drywell atmospheric monitoring system operable, provided grab samples are taken every 12 hours. NMPC is currently in the process of converting to the ITS and has determined that this flexibility is appropriate for NMP2.



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FACILITY NAME (1) Nine Mile Point Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000410	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3) 04 OF 04
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		98	01	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

III. ANALYSIS OF EVENT (cont'd)

Based on the preceding, the condition of both Containment Atmosphere Gaseous/Particulate Radiation Monitors being out of service had no adverse consequences on the health and safety of the general public or site personnel. This condition did not degrade the ability to safely operate or shutdown the plant.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

- The Division II Containment Atmosphere Gaseous/Particulate Radiation Monitor (2CMS*CAB10B) flow control system was repaired by replacing the faulty transducer board, and the flow control circuit was re-calibrated and returned to operable status.

V. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION**A. Failed components:**

Component description: Flow control transducer board
 Manufacturer: Kurz
 Model number: PC194C

B. Previous similar events: none.**C. Identification of components referred to in this LER:**

COMPONENT	IEEE 803 FUNCTION	IEEE 805 SYSTEM ID
Leak Monitoring System	NA	IJ
Monitor	MON	IJ
Transducer	TD	IJ
Heater (heat trace)	EHTR	IJ
Insulation	ISL	IJ
Generator, Diesel	DG	EK



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