

CATEGORY 1

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 9712230212 DOC. DATE: 97/12/15 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
FACIL: 50-410 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Niagara Moha 05000410
AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
DEAN, R. J. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.
DAHLBERG, K. A. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.
RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 97-015-00: on 971114, discovered an opening in wall between NMP2 secondary containment & North Auxiliary Bay. Caused by improper construction when plant was constructed. Preliminary walkdown in SAB has been completed. W/971215 ltr.

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NIAGARA MOHAWK

GENERATION
BUSINESS GROUP

NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION/LAKE ROAD, P.O. BOX 63, LYCOMING, NEW YORK 13093

December 15, 1997
NMP2L 1738

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

RE: Docket No. 50-410
LER 97-15

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii), we are submitting LER 97-15, "Opening Between Secondary Containment and Reactor Building Auxiliary Bay."

Very truly yours,

Kim A. Dahlberg
Plant Manager - NMP2

KAD/GJG/lmc
Attachment

xc: Mr. H. J. Miller, Regional Administrator, Region I
Mr. B. S. Norris, Senior Resident Inspector
Records Management

50224



JE 22/1

9712230212 971215
PDR ADUCK 05000410
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503

FACILITY NAME (1)

Nine Mile Point Unit 2

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000410

PAGE (3)

1 OF 3

TITLE (4)

Opening Between Secondary Containment and Reactor Building Auxiliary Bay

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)	
11	14	97	97	015	00	12	15	97	N/A	05000	
									N/A	05000	

OPERATING MODE (9)

1

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

POWER LEVEL (10) 95	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	<i>(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)</i>
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

R. J. Dean - Engineering Manager Unit 2

TELEPHONE NUMBER

(315) 349-4240

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH

07

DAY

02

YEAR

98

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On November 14, 1997, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) discovered an opening in the wall between the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) secondary containment and the North Auxiliary Bay (NAB). This opening allowed the secondary containment atmosphere to communicate with the NAB and therefore, safety-related equipment located in the NAB could have been exposed to High Energy Line Break (HELB) and Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) environment. Since the wall design was to prevent migration between the secondary containment and the NAB atmosphere, this condition placed the plant outside of the design basis.

The cause of this opening has been determined to be improper construction when the plant was constructed.

The appropriate Technical Specification was entered for the affected electrical distribution equipment. Corrective actions were to repair the opening, and perform a preliminary inspection of similar walls to verify that there were no other openings.



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-330), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Nine Mile Point Unit 2	05000410	97	- 15	- 00	02 OF 03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On November 14, 1997, while installing emergency lights at Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2), plant personnel identified an opening in the wall between the reactor building (secondary containment) and the North Auxiliary Bay (NAB) elevation 240 feet. This wall forms the boundary between the Equipment Qualification Design Basis harsh environment (secondary containment) and the mild environment (auxiliary equipment bays). Therefore, this opening would have provided a path for the harsh environment in the secondary containment to communicate with the mild environment in the NAB, and thus could have negatively impacted equipment in the NAB.

The NMP2 reactor building forms the secondary containment, and required equipment to mitigate the consequences of an accident is qualified to withstand the environment following a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and a High Energy Line Break (HELB). Attached to the reactor building are the NAB and South Auxiliary Bay (SAB). The NAB contains Division I equipment and the SAB contains Division II equipment. The walls between the secondary containment and auxiliary bays are designed to prevent migration of secondary containment atmosphere into the auxiliary bays which could possibly result in a harsh environment. Therefore, the opening at elevation 240 feet would have permitted migration which could have impacted the operability of the equipment in the NAB elevation 240 feet. The opening was located in the upper portion of the wall adjacent to a floor beam. Therefore, it was not observable from the floor, and could only be observed from a scaffold or ladder such as the one being used to install the emergency lights.

Upon discovery of this opening, operators entered Technical Specification 3.8.3.1 Action a.1, since the Division I AC electrical distribution equipment was considered inoperable. The wall was sealed to conform to the design and the Technical Specification Action was exited.

II. CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of this opening has been determined to be improper construction when the wall was formed during plant construction. A contributing cause was inadequate quality inspection during construction.

III. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(ii), "any event or condition that resulted in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded; or that resulted in the nuclear power plant being (B) in a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant."



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATIONESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION
REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE
RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT
(3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Nine Mile Point Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000410	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3) 03 OF 03
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
		97	- 15	- 00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

III. ANALYSIS OF EVENT (cont'd)

Due to the potential of migration of harsh environmental conditions into the NAB elevation 240 feet, it is conservatively assumed that some or all of the equipment in the NAB elevation 240 feet would have failed at some point following a LOCA or HELB. This assumption is made since the migration rate and resultant impact on equipment has not been quantified. However, as noted below in Section IV, NMPC is performing analysis on the components to determine the impact.

Since preliminary inspections have not identified other openings, the SAB was not affected. Therefore, Division II equipment would have been available to mitigate the consequences of a HELB or LOCA. In addition, the impact on Division I equipment would not have been instantaneous, so that Division I systems would have initiated, as required, to provide initial mitigation.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. Technical Specification 3.8.3.1 Action a.1 was entered, the wall was repaired and the Technical Specification Action was exited on November 15, 1997.
2. A preliminary walkdown which included similar walls in the SAB has been completed to verify that there are no other openings.
3. A comprehensive inspection of HELB barriers will be completed by February 14, 1998.
4. An analysis will be completed to determine the impact of migration through this opening on equipment by June 30, 1998.

V. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

- A. Failed components: none.
- B. Previous similar events: none.
- C. Identification of components referred to in this LER:

COMPONENT	IEEE 803 FUNCTION	IEEE 805 SYSTEM ID
Wall (bulkhead)	BHD	NG

