

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

February 12, 1996

Docket File,

50-410

Mr. B. Ralph Sylvia Executive Vice President, Nuclear Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station P.O. Box 63 Lycoming, NY 13093

SUBJECT: HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY (HPCS) NOZZLE SAFE-END EXTENSION (KC-32) WELD INSPECTION FREQUENCY, NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2 (TAC NOS. M93744 AND M94350)

Dear Mr. Sylvia:

By letter dated September 22, 1995, you requested NRC staff approval to recategorize the weld (KC-32) joining the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) nozzle safe end to the safe end extension. During the first refueling outage, an indication was identified in this weld using UT inspection techniques. Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) applied Mechanical Stress Improvement Process (MSIP) to improve the residual stress distribution in the region of the flaw to eliminate the potential for flaw growth. After MSIP application, UT inspections were again performed during the first refueling outage, at a mid-cycle outage during the second fuel cycle, and at the second, third, and fourth refueling outages. No growth in the flaw was identified. NMPC has determined that the stabilization of the flaw is due to the application of MSIP which has maintained the flaw in compression.

By letter dated July 8, 1993, NMPC committed to conduct a UT reinspection of the flaw at each subsequent refueling outage. Nine Mile Point 2 (NMP2) Technical Specification 4.0.5.f states that an inservice inspection program for piping identified in Generic Letter (GL) 88-01 shall be performed in accordance with staff positions. In accordance with GL 88-01, "NRC Position on IGSCC in BWR Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping," weld KC-32 was categorized as an intergranular stress-corrosion cracking (IGSCC) Category "F" weld which requires that all indications be inspected every refueling outage. Welds that have been treated by stress improvement that are classified as IGSCC Category "F" because they do not meet the applicable Staff positions may be upgraded to Category "E" if no adverse change in crack condition is found after four successive examinations. Category "E" welds are examined once every other outage. NMPC has performed four successive examinations which indicate no adverse change in the cracking condition. One exam was performed at a midcycle and three were performed during refueling outages. All four of the exams indicate that MSIP has been effective in mitigating any crack growth and the intent of GL 88-01 has been met.

NRC FILE OENTER

FO1 110

9602150311 960212 PDR ADUCK 05000410 PDR PDR

¢

140141

....

đ

In a conference call hold on February 1, 1996, you addressed the NRC staff's concerns regarding variations in the measured flaw size and the effectiveness of the MSIP in arresting deep cracks. The subject safe end weld had been UT examined five times during the last three fuel cycles after application of MSIP. The reported flaw depth varied from 29% to 41% of wall thickness and its length varied from 8.3% (2.5 inches) to 11.3% (3.4 inches) of the weld circumference. In the conference call, you stated that the variations in the flaw size were caused by uncertainties in the UT examinations and is bounded by the maximum flaw size (41% in depth and 11.3% in length) measured in the December 1990 refueling outage. You also stated that NMPC will perform a weld overlay repair on the subject safe end weld if the flaw depth exceeds 41% of the wall thickness or the flaw length exceeds 11.3% of the weld circumference. Your commitment for weld overlay repair as stated above is similar to that made in your previous submittal dated July 8, 1993. Considering the range of the UT results reported in the last five examinations, the NRC staff finds that the NMPC proposed criteria for weld overlay repair of the subject safe end weld are acceptable. Therefore, the NRC staff grants approval to upgrade the weld (KC-32) joining the nozzle safe end to the safe end extension to Category "E."

Sincerely,

AE Edward

Gordon E. Edison, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate I-1 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-410

9

B. Sylvia

cc: See next page





















B. Ralph Sylvia Niagara Kohask Power Corporation

cc:

Ŷ

hark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire Winston & Strawn 1400 L Street, NW. Washington, DC 20005-3502

Mr. Richard Goldsmith Syracuse University College of Law E. I. White Hall Campus Syracuse, NY 12223

Resident Inspector Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station P.O. Box 126 Lycoming, NY 13093

Gary D. Wilson, Esquire Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 300 Erie Boulevard West Syracuse, NY 13202

Ms. Denise J. Wolniak Manager Licensing Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station P.O. Box 63 Lycoming, NY 13093

Mr. F. William Valentino, President
New York State Energy, Research, and Development Authority
2 Rockefeller Plaza
Albany, NY 12223-1253

Supervisor Town of Scriba Route 8, Box 382 Oswego, NY 13126

Mr. John V. Vinquist, MATS Inc. P.O. Box 63 Lycoming, NY 13093 Nine Wile Point Nuclear Station Unit 2

Regional Administrator, Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406

Charles Donaldson, Esquire Assistant Attorney General New York Department of Law 120 Broadway New York, NY 10271

Mr. Richard M. Kessel Chair and Executive Director State Consumer Protection Board 99 Washington Avenue Albany, NY 12210

Mr. Kim A. Dahlberg Plant Manager, Unit 2 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation P.O. Box 63 Lycoming, NY 13093

Mr. Richard B. Abbott Vice President - Nuclear Generation Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station P.O. Box 63 Lycoming, NY 13093

Mr. Martin J. McCormick, Jr. Vice President Nuclear Safety Assessment and Support Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station P.O. Box 63 Lycoming, NY 13093

• ۶ ۲

.

## B. Sylvia

In a conference call held on February 1, 1996, you addressed the NRC staff's concerns regarding variations in the measured flaw size and the effectiveness of the MSIP in arresting deep cracks. The subject safe end weld had been UT examined five times during the last three fuel cycles after application of MSIP. The reported flaw depth varied from 29% to 41% of wall thickness and its length varied from 8.3% (2.5 inches) to 11.3% (3.4 inches) of the weld circumference. In the conference call, you stated that the variations in the flaw size were caused by uncertainties in the UT examinations and is bounded by the maximum flaw size (41% in depth and 11.3% in length) measured in the December 1990 refueling outage. You also stated that NMPC will perform a weld overlay repair on the subject safe end weld if the flaw depth exceeds 41% of the wall thickness or the flaw length exceeds 11.3% of the weld circumference. Your commitment for weld overlay repair as stated above is similar to that made in your previous submittal dated July 8, 1993. Considering the range of the UT results reported in the last five examinations, the NRC staff finds that the NMPC proposed criteria for weld overlay repair of the subject safe end weld are acceptable. Therefore, the NRC staff grants approval to upgrade the weld (KC-32) joining the nozzle safe end to the safe end extension to Category "E."

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

Gordon E. Edison, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate I-1 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-410

cc: See next page

**DISTRIBUTION:** 

Docket File	L. Marsh	J. Strosnider	
PUBLIC	S. Little	ÓGC	
PDI-1 R/F	G. Edison	ACRS	
S. Varga	K. Cotton	RConte, RI	
J. Zwoľinski	W. Koo	D. Terao	

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\NMP2\NM294350.LTR \*See previous concurrence To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy

OFFICE	LA:PDI-10 E	*PM:PDI-1	PM:PDI-1	*EMCB	D:PDI-1
NAME	SLittle	KCotton/rsl	GEdison	JStrosnider	LMarsh
DATE	02/12/96	01/11/96	02/12/96	02/12/96	Ø1/, /96
		Off	icial Record Copy		02 12

, **.** 

\* . .

•

. .

•

ŕ

. .

r • • •

•

•