



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. 50-410

NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 56  
License No. NPF-69

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensee) dated July 1, 1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter 1;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-69 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, as revised through Amendment No. 56 are hereby incorporated into this license. Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance to be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Michael J. Case, Acting Director  
Project Directorate I-1  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: August 30, 1994



10-15-54

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 56 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-69

DOCKET NO. 50-410


Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages

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
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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.6.5.1 (Continued)

c. At least once per 18 months:

1. Verifying that each standby gas treatment subsystem will draw down the secondary containment to greater than or equal to 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge in less than or equal to 66.7 seconds by adjusting test conditions to drawdown analysis conditions when starting at a pressure no less than zero psig, and
2. Operating one standby gas treatment subsystem for 1 hour and maintaining greater than or equal to 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge in the secondary containment at an adjusted flow rate not exceeding 2670 cfm.



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## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT


Secondary containment is designed to minimize any ground level release of radioactive material which may result from an accident. The reactor building and associated structures provide secondary containment during normal operation when the drywell is sealed and in service. At other times, the drywell may be open and, when required, secondary containment integrity is specified.

Establishing and maintaining a subatmospheric condition in the reactor building with the standby gas treatment system once per 18 months, along with the surveillance of the doors, hatches, dampers, and valves, is adequate to ensure that there are no violations of the integrity of the secondary containment.

To prevent exfiltration, secondary containment leakage is limited to less than 100 percent of the containment free air volume per day. Since the exhaust air flow rate is measured after it passes through the SGTS, the surveillance test result must be adjusted for the volumetric changes that occur as the exhaust air flows through the SGTS to reflect the volume of air exhausted from the building. In addition, the surveillance test result must be adjusted to account for the negative pressure present in the secondary containment during the surveillance test, which is normally more negative than the required -0.25 inch water gauge. Secondary containment leakage varies with secondary containment air and outside air temperatures, with the highest leakage occurring at the highest anticipated secondary containment temperature and at the lowest anticipated outside air temperature. The test data is adjusted to the limiting conditions of -20°F outside air and 105°F secondary containment air temperature to assure that the actual leakage is within the design limit of secondary containment leakage. These adjustments are discussed in USAR Section 6.2.3.4.

The drawdown time limit has been established considering the same fan performance as in the post-LOCA response analysis. The post-LOCA heat load is not considered in the surveillance drawdown time limit because the test is conducted when the plant is shutdown. In addition, the initial building vacuum is assumed to be zero to reflect the test condition. To assure that the SGTS is capable of meeting its function, the drawdown time limit is calculated as a function of actual leakage that occurs during the surveillance test. Meeting this drawdown time verifies that the SGTS performance is consistent with the assumptions of the LOCA analysis. The methodology to determine the drawdown time is discussed in USAR Section 6.2.3.4.

The OPERABILITY of the standby gas treatment systems ensures that sufficient iodine removal capability will be available in the event of a LOCA. The reduction in containment iodine inventory reduces the resulting site boundary radiation doses associated with containment leakage. The operation of this system and resultant iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions used in the LOCA analyses. Continuous operation of the system with the heaters operating for 10 hours during each 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters.



## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.6.6 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL

The OPERABILITY of the systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that these systems will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within the primary containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. The drywell and suppression chamber hydrogen recombiner system is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen and oxygen generation associated with (1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water, and (3) corrosion of metals within containment. The hydrogen control system is consistent with the recommendations of RG 1.7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA," March 1971.



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