ACCELERATED DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

REGULATERY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION STEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION FACIL: 50 AUTH. NA TERRY, C RECIP. 1	0-220 Nine Mile Poi AME AUTHOR A .D. Niagara M NAME RECIPIEN	nt Nuclear AFFILIATION Mohawk Power MT AFFILIATI	ON -	agara Powe	DOCKET # 05000220
	Documer	it Control B	ranch (Document Con	trol Desk)	
SUBJECT			002, "Debris Pluggi		Ι.
	filters or other	temporary s	ation identified no ources of fibrous m nstalled or stored	atl,not	r D
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE11D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR _ ENCL _ SIZE:					
TITLE:	Bulletin Response (50 DKT)			1
NOTES:					•
NOIDD.	RECIPIENT	COPIES	RECIPIENT	COPIES	A
	ID CODE/NAME PD1-1 PD			LTTR ENCL	D
INTERNAL:	AEOD/DOA	1 1	NRR/DE/EMEB	1 1 1 1	D
	NRR/DRPW/OGCB NRR/DSSA NRR/SCSB RES/DSIR/EIB	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	NRR/DRSS/PEPB NRR/PDIII-2 REG FILE 02 RGN1 FILE 01	1 1 1 1 1 1	s
EXTERNAL:	NRC PDR	1 1	NSIC	1 1	

NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM P1-37 (EXT. 504-2065) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

·R

I


D

S

D

D

S





NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION/301 PLAINFIELD ROAD, SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13212/TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511

June 10, 1993 NMP1L 0764

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk

Washington, D.C. 20555

Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 1

Docket No.50-220

DPR-63

Gentlemen:

Subject: NRC Bulletin No. 93-02, Debris Plugging of Emergency Core Cooling

Suction Strainers

On May 11, 1993, the Commission issued NRC Bulletin No. 93-02, Debris Plugging of Emergency Core Cooling Suction Strainers, to notify licensees of a contributor to the potential loss of net positive suction head margin for Emergency Core Cooling Systems. Specifically, Bulletin No. 93-02 discussed the concern that Loss-of-Coolant-Accident generated debris (fibrous material) could enter the suppression pool and block Emergency Core Cooling System suction strainers.

Accordingly, the Commission requested that licensees identify fibrous air filters or other temporary sources of fibrous material, not designed to withstand a Loss-of-Coolant-Accident, which are installed or stored in primary containment. Licensees were requested to take any immediate compensatory measures which may be required to assure the functional capability of the Emergency Core Cooling System. The Commission also requested that licensees submit a written report within 30 days stating actions that have been taken or that will be taken to address the identified concerns.

Niagara Mohawk has investigated the use of fibrous material in the Nine Mile Point Unit 1 drywell. The investigation has identified no fibrous air filters or other temporary sources of fibrous material, not designed to withstand a Loss-of Coolant-Event, currently installed or stored in the drywell. The enclosure to this letter provides the basis for this determination.

Very truly yours

C. D. Terry

Vice President Nuclear Engineering

150099 JMT/mls

xc:

Mr. T. T. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region I


Mr. R. A. Capra, Director, Project Directorate I-1, NRR

Mr. D. S. Brinkman, Senior Project Manager, NRR

Mr. W. L. Schmidt, Senior Resident Inspector


Records Management

9306160393 930610 PDR ADDCK 05000220 Q PDR JE11 1/1



UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

In the Matter of)
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation) Docket No.50-220
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit No. 1	· ·
C. D. Terry, being duly sworn, states that it Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation; that it Corporation to sign and file with the Nuclea attached hereto; and that the document is knowledge, information and belief.	ar Regulatory Commission the document
	11
	C. D. Perry
	Vice President
	Nuclear Engineering
*	
Subscribed and sworn before me, in and for the State of New York and the County of <u>State</u> , this <u>IGAL</u> day of <u>June</u> , 1993	
My Commission expires:	KATHLENA R. CICCARINO Notary Public in the State of New York Qualified in Onondega County No. 4968237 My Commission Expires June 18, 19 94
- N. 18, 18:4 Laster & Gravino	



ENCLOSURE

NRC Bulletin No. 93-02 was issued following an event that occurred at the Perry Nuclear Station, a Boiling Water Reactor 6 with a Mark III Containment. A routine outage practice at Perry was to install temporary filters in the drywell and containment cooling systems for the purpose of maintaining cleanliness. These filters were replaced each outage and left there during normal operation. Fibers from these filters eventually entered the suppression pool resulting in clogged Emergency Core Cooling System suction strainers.

Unlike Perry, the Nine Mile Point Unit 1 drywell cooling system is adequate to support refueling activities. Therefore, enhancements to the existing cooling system are not normally required (fibrous air filters are not routinely brought into the drywell during an outage). If additional ventilation is required, portable High Efficiency Particulate Air Ventilation units are brought into the drywell and removed prior to plant startup. The accountability of these units is maintained through a site radiation protection procedure. The use of temporary fibrous insulation is minimal. If fibrous material (filters, insulation, etc.) were to be used, even on a temporary basis, its use would need to be reviewed in accordance with the temporary modification or other plant change procedure. This would include evaluating the potential impact of fibrous material on plant operation. Currently, no temporary modifications exist on drywell cooling or ventilation systems.

Cleanliness of the pool is a key contributor to the potential for strainer blocking. Because of the Mark III containment design (Perry), maintenance activities can take place over the suppression pool. With a Mark I containment (Ninė Mile Point Unit 1) the pool is enclosed and less susceptible to foreign material intrusion. Therefore, the possibility of intrusion of foreign matter into a Mark III containment pool is greater than for a Mark I pool.

The Nine Mile Point Unit 1 drywell is thoroughly inspected for cleanliness (housekeeping) by plant operators prior to start-up following each refueling outage. In addition, during Nine Mile Point Unit 1's most recent outage, personnel performed a drywell walkdown prior to the performance of the containment integrated leak rate test. This walkdown would have identified any poor housekeeping or abnormal drywell configurations. Non-essential materials are not stored in the drywell. Accordingly, filters or other fibrous material stored in the drywell would have been identified and removed.

In conclusion, the need and therefore use of fibrous material in the Nine Mile Point Unit 1 drywell on a temporary basis is minimal. If fibrous material were to be used (such as the use of filters at Perry) the potential impact of its use would be evaluated in accordance with the temporary modification or other plant change procedure. This evaluation would include determining the effect of the use of fibrous material on plant operations during a Loss-of Coolant-Accident. The walkdown performed prior to start-up from the last refueling outage would have identified the storage of any fibrous material and identified any such material inadvertently left behind following outage work. Based on the above discussion, no fibrous air filters or other temporary sources

97 ----

of fibrous material, not designed to withstand a Loss-of-Coolant-Accident, are installed or stored in the Nine Mile Point Unit 1 drywell. Therefore, no specific actions are required. Also, the Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Mark I containment design is less susceptible than the Mark III containment design to the introduction of fibrous material into the suppression pool. Therefore, design features and controls are in place to preclude an event similar to the one at Perry at Nine Mile Point Unit 1.

