

ORIGINAL

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OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Agency: Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Incident Investigation Team

Title: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant  
Interview of: JIM STEVENS

Docket No.

LOCATION: Scriba, New York

DATE: August 17, 1991

PAGES: 1 - 24

ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.

1612 K St. N.W., Suite 300

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 293-3950.

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Exhibit 3-1 (continued)

ADDENDUM TO INTERVIEW OF <sup>-3-</sup> W James Shum NAOC  
(Name/Position)

Page      Line      Correction and Reason for Correction

NO CHANGES REQUESTED

Lined area for corrections and reasons for correction.

Page \_\_\_ of \_\_\_ Signature W James Shum Date 8/22/91

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM

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Interview of :  
JIM STEVENS :  
(Closed) :  
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Conference Room B  
Administration Building  
Nine Mile Point Nuclear  
Power Plant, Unit Two  
Lake Road  
Scriba, New York 13093  
Saturday, August 17, 1991

The interview commenced, pursuant to notice,  
at 4:03 p.m.

PRESENT FOR THE IIT:  
Rich Conte, NRC  
William Vatter, INPO  
PRESENT WITH MR. STEVENS:  
Mike Colomb, Niagara Mohawk



## P R O C E E D I N G S

[4:03 p.m.]

1  
2  
3 MR. CONTE: Let's go around the room and introduce  
4 ourselves. I'm Rich Conte. I'm with the NRC's Region I  
5 office.

6 MR. VATTER: I'm Bill Vatter. I work for INPO.  
7 I'm on loan to the NRC to work with the Incident  
8 Investigation Team.

9 MR. STEVENS: Jim Stevens. I work for Niagara  
10 Mohawk. I'm a C operator.

11 MR. COLOMB: Mike Colomb. I work for Niagara  
12 Mohawk. I'm the operations manager at Unit Two.

13 MR. CONTE: Okay, Jim. I'd like you to kind of  
14 recount, very generally, what you were doing on the shift  
15 before this event, if you can.

16 MR. STEVENS: Well, we were filling out our  
17 turnover sheets, getting prepared to turn over; it was  
18 getting near the end of shift. There were a few of us  
19 riding down the elevator to the lock room, and all of a  
20 sudden the lights went out and the elevator kind of  
21 hesitated.

22 MR. CONTE: So you were in the control building on  
23 the elevator, going down to the locker room, at the time  
24 that the so-called lights went out.

25 MR. STEVENS: Yes, that's true.





1 MR. CONTE: It's our understanding that, earlier  
2 in the shift, there were some evolutions in transferring in-  
3 house loads from the reserve transformer back to the normal  
4 station services transformer. Were you involved in that at  
5 all?

6 MR. STEVENS: No, I wasn't. The control building  
7 was my set of rounds for that night. I had nothing to do  
8 with the switchgear building.

9 MR. VATTER: The elevator you were riding down was  
10 in the control building?

11 MR. STEVENS: We don't really call it control  
12 building. It goes to the service building. It's not the  
13 control room --

14 MR. CONTE: Go ahead, Mike.

15 MR. COLOMB: It's an aux services building, it's  
16 called, and it's not really considered part of the control  
17 building, as far as envelope concerns.

18 MR. CONTE: Is the control room in the aux  
19 services building?

20 MR. COLOMB: No. The control room is in the  
21 control building, and this is like an adjacent building that  
22 houses the elevator and stairwell.

23 MR. CONTE: Okay.

24 You just mentioned that you had the  
25 responsibilities for control building rounds.



1 MR. STEVENS: That's correct.

2 MR. CONTE: Did that include upstairs --

3 MR. STEVENS: Area.

4 MR. CONTE: Were you where the power supplies are?

5 MR. STEVENS: I had three of them in my area, the  
6 1-G and the Div 1 and Div 2 on 261.

7 MR. CONTE: Did your logs call for you to make any  
8 checks of those?

9 MR. STEVENS: Yes, they did.

10 MR. CONTE: And what do you normally do in those  
11 checks?

12 MR. STEVENS: We check on voltage and see if we  
13 have any LEDs and alarms on the panels themselves.

14 MR. CONTE: Okay.

15 When you made your checks earlier in the shift,  
16 with at least the 1-G, were there any abnormalities?

17 MR. STEVENS: No, 1-G looked good. One of the  
18 divisibles -- I can't remember if it was 1 or 2 -- had an  
19 LED fan failure in, but there had been a WR in against it.

20 MR. CONTE: When we were up touring the other  
21 UPS's, we noticed them to be extremely hot. Do you remember  
22 feeling around the 1-G or being locally in the area and  
23 noticing an unusually higher temperature? Would you say  
24 that that's normal for these?

25 MR. STEVENS: I'd say the ambient temperature



1 down there is normal. It's usually warm in the lower  
2 control building.

3 MR. CONTE: Did you ever put your hand on the UPS  
4 power supplies?

5 MR. STEVENS: I have in the past. I didn't that  
6 night.

7 MR. CONTE: Would you say you can keep your  
8 hand -- When you've done this in the past, would you say  
9 you'd be able to keep your hand on it, or it would be too  
10 hot?

11 MR. STEVENS: I don't remember.

12 MR. CONTE: You don't remember. Okay.

13 That takes us to the time of the event.

14 Bill, do you have any questions about before the  
15 event?

16 MR. VATTER: Yes.

17 Did you say the elevator hesitated and the lights  
18 went out in the elevator?

19 MR. STEVENS: Right.

20 MR. VATTER: Did the lights stay out in the  
21 elevator?

22 MR. STEVENS: Yes. The indication lights for  
23 what elevation stayed on, but the lights themselves, that  
24 lighted up the inside of the elevator, stayed out.

25 MR. VATTER: Okay. They didn't come back for



1 quite a while.

2 MR. STEVENS: I don't know when they came back. I  
3 have no idea when they came back, because we stopped using  
4 the elevator from there on.

5 MR. VATTER: But the lights in the elevator went  
6 out -- was it the ones that indicate the floor?

7 MR. STEVENS: No, they stayed on.

8 MR. VATTER: They never went off at all.

9 MR. STEVENS: No.

10 MR. VATTER: The elevator hesitated?

11 MR. STEVENS: Just slightly. It was right in  
12 between elevation 261 and 277 -- or 288; excuse me.

13 MR. VATTER: It just kind of jerked a little.


14 MR. STEVENS: Yes, just a bit.

15 MR. VATTER: It didn't like stop and then start  
16 again later?

17 MR. STEVENS: No.

18 MR. VATTER: The reason why I'm interested in that  
19 is that apparently this electrical transient was seen a  
20 little bit differently by different equipment around the  
21 plant, like the lights went off for about 30 seconds in the  
22 reactor building, and the elevator jerked a little bit.  
23 We're trying to understand that electrical transient.

24 MR. STEVENS: The lights in the control building  
25 were out almost the whole time, and no emergency lighting





1 every came on, because I tried to go up and down the stair  
2 tower a couple times in the control building, and I had my  
3 flashlight, and then I finally lost my flashlight, so I  
4 stopped using those stairs.

5 MR. CONTE: When you came out of the elevator,  
6 you went into the control building.

7 MR. STEVENS: No. We got on the elevation 261.  
8 When the door opened, I started heading towards our locker  
9 room. I went to use the Gaitronics there to call the  
10 control room to see what had happened, and the Gaitronics  
11 was dead.

12 MR. CONTE: This locker room and the Gaitronics  
13 are in the service building?

14 MR. STEVENS: It's in the cardox room, part of the  
15 service building.

16 MR. CONTE: Okay.

17 MR. VATTER: But the lights were on there?

18 MR. STEVENS: It was dark in there, too, but the  
19 roadway door was open, and the sun was coming up, so you  
20 could see there, at least.

21 MR. VATTER: And in the control building it was  
22 dark.

23 MR. STEVENS: In the stair towers it was dark,  
24 yes.

25 MR. VATTER: Earlier we talked with Dave -- oh,



1 shoot.

2 MR. STEVENS: Hanczyk.


3 MR. VATTER: Yes, Dave Hanczyk.

4 He said that, as he came from the reactor building  
5 to the control room -- and I guess he was running at a  
6 pretty good clip there -- after he got out of the reactor  
7 building, he didn't notice any lighting discrepancy in the  
8 control building. He said it was light; he could see; he  
9 didn't know whether maybe half the lights might have been  
10 out or if emergency lights were also gone. Is there a  
11 different stairway that he would have probably taken coming  
12 from the reactor building?

13 MR. STEVENS: Oh, yes. He would have come out  
14 through the trailers. He would have come up the south  
15 stairwell of the reactor building. He came out that way.  
16 It doesn't even hook onto the control building; it's a  
17 different building.

18 MR. VATTER: Okay. The most direct route from the  
19 reactor building, after you get out of the trailers, would  
20 have had him coming up the south reactor building stairs.

21 MR. STEVENS: He would have come out of the  
22 reactor building, the south stairs, gone outside and come  
23 back in, probably -- I don't know which way he came in, but  
24 I would have to assume the cardox room, where I tried to use  
25 the Gaitronics -- and then he went up the stairs by the



1 elevator that almost stopped on us.

2 MR. VATTER: And those stairs were not dark.

3 MR. STEVENS: They were dark, but there were still  
4 -- you had a few lights still working, and they weren't jet  
5 black like some of the other of the ones that are enclosed.  
6 These stairs are kind of open; they're not enclosed like the  
7 ones in the control building.

8 MR. VATTER: So maybe there were some lights off  
9 there.

10 MR. STEVENS: Yes. The normal -- I mean, we  
11 didn't have all of our lights on that staircase, either.

12 MR. VATTER: But it wasn't dark.

13 MR. STEVENS: It wasn't pitch black.

14 MR. VATTER: You wouldn't have wanted to take out  
15 a flashlight so you could find your way.

16 MR. STEVENS: No. We could see -- the four guys  
17 that were in the elevator with me, we all went up those  
18 stairs together, and we didn't need flashlights.


19 It wasn't four -- that's four including me, I  
20 should say.

21 MR. CONTE: Do the control building stair towers  
22 have emergency lights?

23 MR. STEVENS: Yes, they do.

24 MR. CONTE: And they were not on.

25 MR. STEVENS: They were not on.



1 MR. CONTE: Do you have any reason -- would you  
2 know why, from your knowledge of the plant?

3 MR. STEVENS: No.

4 MR. CONTE: All right. So you went to the  
5 Gaitronics, to the locker room; it was dead. Then what did  
6 you do?

7 MR. STEVENS: I went into the locker room because  
8 I knew there was a regular telephone in there, so I called  
9 the control room from in there.

10 MR. CONTE: Did the telephone work?

11 MR. STEVENS: Yes.

12 MR. CONTE: Did someone answer?

13 MR. STEVENS: Yes. The CSO answered.


14 MR. CONTE: What did he say?

15 MR. STEVENS: Well, I asked him what had happened,  
16 and he said, he's not sure; he's lost all of his indication.  
17 I said, We'll be right up, and I turned around and told the  
18 guys, We've got to get back to the control room, and we all  
19 took off running for the stairs.

20 MR. VATTER: Did he sound pretty upset? Did he  
21 sound excited?

22 MR. STEVENS: Well, he sounded nervous; there's no  
23 doubt about that.

24 MR. CONTE: You went up to the control room. Did  
25 you card into the control room to get into the control room





1 proper, or did you go to the Beehive?

2 MR. STEVENS: No, everyone went to the control  
3 room. As I went up to 288, I remembered I had the diesels.  
4 I buzzed down the hall to hear if I could hear any diesels  
5 running, but, when I heard the diesels weren't running, I  
6 ran up the south stairs the rest of the way to 306, and then  
7 I went right into the control room.

8 MR. CONTE: These are the emergency diesels?

9 MR. STEVENS: Yes.

10 MR. CONTE: Okay.

11 You walked into the control room. How crowded was  
12 it with the response personnel?


13 MR. STEVENS: It was just our shift guys; they  
14 were the only ones in there. I can't remember exactly how  
15 many people were in there, but I know they had already sent  
16 one guy out to check the UPS's, and that's when the CSO  
17 asked me to go help them. He said, I sent Eron to check  
18 the switch gear and the UPS's; go help him. I said okay.  
19 That's when I took off.

20 MR. CONTE: Okay. With Eron you went to the UPS  
21 area.

22 Do you remember an approximate time you got to the  
23 control room?

24 MR. STEVENS: No, I don't.

25 MR. CONTE: You didn't happen to notice whether or



1 not the digital clock was working or not?

2 MR. STEVENS: The one by the full-core display?

3 MR. CONTE: Yes.

4 MR. STEVENS: No, that was out.

5 MR. CONTE: That was out.

6 MR. STEVENS: Definitely.

7 MR. CONTE: The full-core display was out.

8 MR. STEVENS: That was out.

9 MR. CONTE: Okay. All right.

10 You don't remember much of a time. Can you  
11 estimate in terms of minutes to do that evolution? You  
12 started out from the elevator. Can you approximate? It had  
13 to be less than ten minutes? Five minutes?

14 MR. STEVENS: Oh, definitely less -- I'd say less  
15 than five minutes.

16 MR. CONTE: Less than five.

17 Then you went out to the UPS.

18 MR. STEVENS: Well, first I went to switch gear,  
19 hollered for Eron, didn't heard him; then I ran down to 237,  
20 where the UPS's are, and that's where I met up with Eron.

21 MR. CONTE: Okay. You weren't sure where Eron  
22 was.

23 MR. STEVENS: No. He had already gone. The  
24 switch gear is on 261, and the UPS's are underneath that.

25 MR. CONTE: You didn't make any verifications in



1 the switch gear.

2 MR. STEVENS: No.

3 MR. CONTE: Okay.

4 Then you went to the UPS area, the series A  
5 through D?

6 MR. STEVENS: I believe it's A through D.

7 MR. CONTE: And you found Eron.

8 MR. STEVENS: Yes.


9 MR. CONTE: Then what did you do?

10 MR. STEVENS: Well, we both looked at the LEDs  
11 that were in there and looked them over to see what had  
12 happened. Then we said, We've got to get hold of the  
13 control room; then we realized we couldn't get hold of the  
14 control room, because the Gaitronics was dead.

15 MR. CONTE: Did Eron make an attempt to use the  
16 Gaitronics?

17 MR. STEVENS: I did. I went over and grabbed it,  
18 and I said, Well, let's check first. I picked it up, and I  
19 said, No, it's dead. Eron says, Well, I'll head up. So  
20 Eron headed up, and I don't know if he went to a telephone  
21 or what. I don't know where he went. He came back and he  
22 said, Come on back up. That's when we went back up there,  
23 to tell them what had happened.

24 MR. CONTE: And you're in the control building  
25 this whole time now.



1 MR. STEVENS: No, the switchgear building.

2 MR. CONTE: The switchgear building. We're very  
3 unfamiliar with your site.

4 What is the status of the switchgear building in  
5 terms of lighting now? Any dark areas?

6 MR. STEVENS: The switchgear building didn't seem  
7 to be too dark.

8 MR. CONTE: Was it somewhat dark?

9 MR. STEVENS: I don't really remember. I think it  
10 had all of its normal lighting on, but I'm not really sure.

11 MR. CONTE: You didn't happen to notice any  
12 emergency lighting on?

13 MR. STEVENS: The stair tower was black.

14 MR. CONTE: In the switchgear building?

15 MR. STEVENS: In the switchgear building. A  
16 fireman came down in between Eron heading up to call  
17 somebody, and he said he had opened up the doors to try and  
18 get some light in the stair tower.

19 MR. CONTE: Are you aware that there's emergency  
20 lighting in that stair tower also, and it wasn't on?

21 MR. STEVENS: I'm not sure if there is any in  
22 there. I would believe there would be, but I'm not sure.

23 MR. CONTE: Okay. From the switch gear back to  
24 the control building, and then into the control room.

25 MR. STEVENS: Yes.





1 MR. CONTE: Approximate time you think you got  
2 back to that control room?

3 MR. STEVENS: It would only be a guess; I really  
4 don't know. I lost concept of time during this whole thing.

5 MR. CONTE: Then what? What happened next?

6 MR. STEVENS: I was asked to go check the  
7 divisional UPS's, Div 1 and Div 2, and report back to them,  
8 so I went down and checked both of those, and the only thing  
9 I saw, other than the fan failure that was in earlier in the  
10 night, was a sink loss on both the Div 1 and Div 2 UPS's.

11 MR. VATTER: What does that sink loss mean?

12 MR. STEVENS: I've got to believe it was from  
13 their switching over, but I'm not sure. I'm no expert on  
14 UPS's.

15 MR. VATTER: Had they switched? Could you tell?

16 MR. STEVENS: I couldn't tell, no. I mean, I  
17 called him over the alarms; he said, Okay, come on back.  
18 Then he said, Wait a minute; we're sending Eron down to  
19 reset the UPS's; why don't you meet him there. Then I took  
20 off for the switchgear building again.

21 MR. CONTE: In the Div 1, Div 2, did you verify  
22 input and output voltages when you did this?

23 MR. STEVENS: No. I just looked for the alarms.

24 MR. CONTE: Back to the control room then, with  
25 this information?



1 MR. STEVENS: No. I called the control room,  
2 because I knew where I could use the telephone, and I think  
3 I went into the remote shutdown room; I'm not sure, but I  
4 think that's where I went in to use the phone.

5 MR. CONTE: Okay.

6 MR. STEVENS: I called them to tell them what I  
7 had found, and they said they wanted to try and reset the 1-  
8 series UPS's down on switchgear 237, so I left the control  
9 building, and then I ran into Dave Hanczyk coming around the  
10 corner. I went down with him to the UPS's, and Eron and  
11 Phil MacEwen were already down there.

12 MR. CONTE: Okay. Then what?

13 MR. STEVENS: Then we got the procedure out, and  
14 we were trying to figure out how we could start the UPS back  
15 up.


16 MR. CONTE: How did you come upon the procedure?

17 MR. STEVENS: The procedure was right in the unit.  
18 They have little plastic drawers they can slide the  
19 procedure right into. They do it in quite a few of the  
20 systems throughout the plant; they try and keep a procedure  
21 right by the panels.

22 MR. CONTE: There's only one procedure, an OP?

23 MR. STEVENS: Yes. I think there was one down  
24 there for all the UPS's.

25 MR. CONTE: You don't happen to know the name of



1 this procedure, or the number?

2 MR. STEVENS: I don't remember what the number is,  
3 no.

4 MR. CONTE: Okay.

5 Who started to implement the step-by-step of the  
6 procedure?

7 MR. STEVENS: I think Dave Hanczyk started reading  
8 the procedure, and I think Eron was trying to line up the  
9 breakers. We didn't get too far into it, and we realized we  
10 weren't going to be able to use the procedure, because it  
11 assumed the 4 breaker was already closed, and it wasn't. So  
12 we kind of stopped there and tried to figure out what we  
13 were going to do next. By then we had some more guys that  
14 showed up down there, and we were all kind of looking them  
15 over.

16 Then we decided we were going to close the 4  
17 breaker in and get it back on a maintenance supply.

18 MR. CONTE: Who proposed closing the 4 breaker?

19 MR. STEVENS: I believe Dave Hanczyk did.

20 MR. CONTE: He showed you how to do it? Or did he  
21 tell you how to do it? Who did it, though?

22 MR. STEVENS: He was trying -- I think Bob  
23 Spooner and Mike Garbus were trying to get the cabinet on  
24 one of the other UPS's for the 4 breaker open, and Dave was  
25 trying to get the other one open. He finally got it open,



1 and he was having trouble closing it, so I told him, Move;  
2 I'll close it. He stepped aside, and I closed the breaker,  
3 and right then I heard the Gaitronics go off, so I knew we  
4 had gotten some of it back.

5 Then, one by one, I kept closing the four breakers  
6 on the other ones.

7 MR. CONTE: How much force -- I mean, were you  
8 straining to get this breaker up?

9 MR. STEVENS: It took quite a bit. It's in kind  
10 of an awkward spot: It's probably only eight inches off the  
11 floor. I don't think he could have closed it. I don't know  
12 if he was just getting nervous, but I closed it without any  
13 problem, and we got all the other ones closed, too.

14 MR. VATTER: Is operating that breaker something  
15 you knew how to do previously, or did Dave have to tell you  
16 about it?

17 MR. STEVENS: Dave had to tell me about it. We  
18 were having trouble even getting into the cabinets. When we  
19 saw the two screws on there, we thought we were going to  
20 have to take the screws out. Then Dave said, Wait a minute;  
21 I think there's a handle underneath it. He reached  
22 underneath there and popped it up. Then we ran and opened  
23 up all the other ones on the other UPS's and started closing  
24 them one by one.

25 MR. CONTE: Have you happened to have any past





1 experience with, say, a bus outage on one UPS, and you were  
2 assigned the task of isolating, opening breakers, and things  
3 like that?

4 MR. STEVENS: I haven't myself, no.

5 MR. CONTE: No experience with that?

6 MR. STEVENS: No, just some training on how they  
7 work. That's about it.

8 MR. CONTE: How would you characterize the nature  
9 of the training? Classroom training? Hands-on?

10 MR. STEVENS: Just classroom.

11 MR. CONTE: Classroom.

12 MR. VATTER: What kinds of things are covered in  
13 that?

14 MR. STEVENS: Well, your different supplies, the  
15 different breakers.

16 MR. VATTER: Just general stuff?

17 MR. STEVENS: Just general stuff, yes.

18 MR. CONTE: Did that cover the safety UPS also?  
19 Was the nature of the training mostly on the safety UPS?

20 MR. STEVENS: No, I think it was mainly on the 1-  
21 series. I don't remember too much training on the safety  
22 UPS.

23 MR. CONTE: Okay.

24 The nature of the things that were lost, were they  
25 a surprise to you? The Gaitronics -- you said that, as soon



1 as you hit that one breaker on the one UPS, the Gaitronics  
2 came on -- the loss of lighting. Was that a surprise to  
3 you, that these UPS's provide those services?

4 MR. STEVENS: No. I knew they supplies that  
5 stuff. I mean, I couldn't tell you which loads are off  
6 which UPS, but I knew --

7 MR. CONTE: But would you say that you got a  
8 general idea from the training that you received?

9 MR. STEVENS: Yes.


10 MR. CONTE: Okay.

11 So you completed shutting the breakers, and then  
12 what happened?

13 MR. STEVENS: We headed back up the control room.  
14 At that time, I think, Dave headed over to the control  
15 building to get UPS-G down there, to reset that one. I  
16 headed back to the control room, and then I was sent out to  
17 start up the aux boiler, to start getting the steam to the  
18 reboiler for the seals.

19 MR. CONTE: How long did that take?

20 MR. STEVENS: It didn't take too long at all. I  
21 had the boiler in no time. We had a delay on trying to get  
22 the valve open. They were having trouble with the air ski,  
23 and then they had to evacuate the turbine building for a  
24 while. They didn't want anyone going in there, because this  
25 valve we have to pin open to get it to stay open. They



1 wouldn't let a guy go out there until they were sure it was  
2 safe. But the boiler was up quick and went up very easily.  
3 They had done a lot of major work on it in the last couple  
4 months.

5 MR. CONTE: Explain to me a little bit about that  
6 problem with the air booster skids and the pinning of the  
7 valve. Are they related?

8 MR. STEVENS: I don't know if the air skid's  
9 fault. It seems like it has enough pressure to open the  
10 valve, but it doesn't seem like it can maintain the valve to  
11 keep it open. That's why we have to pin them open.

12 MR. CONTE: Oh, I see.

13 The air booster skids are basically used for the  
14 actual operation, not to keep the valve open, then; is that  
15 correct?

16 MR. STEVENS: Well, I think we have to keep them  
17 in position, too.

18 MR. CONTE: Did the evacuation of the turbine  
19 building hamper you in any way?

20 MR. STEVENS: Just that I was waiting with the  
21 boiler, all ready to go, with no place to put the steam. It  
22 handled it well; it never tripped or anything, under high  
23 pressure.

24 MR. CONTE: And you were in the turbine building  
25 when you were doing this.



1 MR. STEVENS: Aux boiler building.

2 MR. CONTE: Aux boiler building. Different  
3 building.

4 MR. STEVENS: Yes. It's off from the screen wall.

5 MR. CONTE: Okay.

6 Then what? They just kept you down there?

7 MR. STEVENS: Yes. They kept me down there until  
8 just about time to go home. They sent some guys down to  
9 start getting the other boiler going, in case they needed  
10 that one. Then I just went up to the control room.

11 MR. CONTE: What time was going home?

12 MR. STEVENS: We were given permission to leave  
13 about 10:30, and we got held up in security until after  
14 11:00, until the right person made the phone call to let us  
15 out.

16 MR. CONTE: Okay. That kind of completes that  
17 morning.

18 Is there anything in the sequence here that you  
19 can think of?

20 MR. VATTER: No, I don't think so. We still have  
21 got questions about those procedures and what they apply to.

22 What I understood you to say was that you tried to  
23 use the one procedure that's in that slot area on the front  
24 of the UPS.

25 MR. STEVENS: Yes.





1 MR. VATTER: And you really didn't meet the  
2 initial conditions.

3 MR. STEVENS: The procedure assume the 4 breaker  
4 was already going to be shut, and in this case they weren't;  
5 they were all tripped open.

6 MR. VATTER: If the 4 breaker had been shut, then  
7 you would have been able to go through that auto-startup  
8 procedure.

9 MR. STEVENS: Yes.

10 MR. VATTER: Did you try to do that with the 4  
11 breaker?

12 MR. STEVENS: No. Once we closed the 4 breaker  
13 and we realized we were on maintenance power, we said,  
14 That's good for now; let's get back and get other things  
15 taken care of.

16 MR. VATTER: You didn't try to do the auto-startup  
17 with the 4 breaker open?

18 MR. STEVENS: No.

19 MR. CONTE: Is there any insight you'd like to  
20 share about your training and preparedness for this type of  
21 event, positive or negative?

22 MR. STEVENS: Well, they've been really stressing  
23 teamwork. We had a big session with INPO on teamwork  
24 training and stuff like that. I'm proud of the shift. I  
25 think we do well together as a team, and this isn't the



1 first time we've had something like this.

2 MR. CONTE: Okay. So you thought the training was  
3 effective on the shift working together.

4 MR. STEVENS: Yes. And I think our shift  
5 communicates well, too.

6 MR. CONTE: I'm trying to think. Is there  
7 anything else you'd like to offer or share about this event,  
8 any impressions that would help us in our investigation?

9 MR. STEVENS: No, I've told you just about  
10 everything I can remember of that day. I mean, I've been  
11 trying to keep it fresh in my mind because I knew this was  
12 going to happen. Things happened fast that morning.

13 MR. CONTE: Okay.

14 Well, it sounded like you offered us a lot of  
15 information, and we appreciate your willingness to  
16 cooperate. I really don't have anything else. Let's go off  
17 the record.

18 [Whereupon, at 4:31 p.m., the taking of the  
19 investigative interview was concluded.]

20

21

22

23

24

25



REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission


in the matter of:

NAME OF PROCEEDING: Int. of JIM STEVENS

DOCKET NUMBER:

PLACE OF PROCEEDING: Scriba, SN.Y.

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.



JON HUNDLEY

Official Reporter  
Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.



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## OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Agency: Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Incident Investigation Team

Title: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant  
Interview of: JIM STEVENS

Docket No.

LOCATION: Scriba, New York

DATE: August 17, 1991

PAGES: 1 - 24

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




Exhibit 3-1 (continued)


ADDENDUM TO INTERVIEW OF <sup>-3</sup> W James Steen NAOC  
(Name/Position)

Page      Line      Correction and Reason for Correction

NO CHANGES REQUESTED

Multiple horizontal lines for corrections.

Page \_\_\_ of \_\_\_ Signature W James Steen Date 8/22/91



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM


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Interview of :  
JIM STEVENS :  
(Closed) :  
-----

Conference Room B  
Administration Building  
Nine Mile Point Nuclear  
Power Plant, Unit Two  
Lake Road  
Scriba, New York 13093  
Saturday, August 17, 1991

The interview commenced, pursuant to notice,  
at 4:03 p.m.

PRESENT FOR THE IIT:  
Rich Conte, NRC  
William Vatter, INPO  
PRESENT WITH MR. STEVENS:  
Mike Colomb, Niagara Mohawk



## P R O C E E D I N G S

[4:03 p.m.]

1  
2  
3 MR. CONTE: Let's go around the room and introduce  
4 ourselves. I'm Rich Conte. I'm with the NRC's Region I  
5 office.

6 MR. VATTER: I'm Bill Vatter. I work for INPO.  
7 I'm on loan to the NRC to work with the Incident  
8 Investigation Team.

9 MR. STEVENS: Jim Stevens. I work for Niagara  
10 Mohawk. I'm a C operator.

11 MR. COLOMB: Mike Colomb. I work for Niagara  
12 Mohawk. I'm the operations manager at Unit Two.

13 MR. CONTE: Okay, Jim. I'd like you to kind of  
14 recount, very generally, what you were doing on the shift  
15 before this event, if you can.

16 MR. STEVENS: Well, we were filling out our  
17 turnover sheets, getting prepared to turn over; it was  
18 getting near the end of shift. There were a few of us  
19 riding down the elevator to the lock room, and all of a  
20 sudden the lights went out and the elevator kind of  
21 hesitated.

22 MR. CONTE: So you were in the control building on  
23 the elevator, going down to the locker room, at the time  
24 that the so-called lights went out.

25 MR. STEVENS: Yes, that's true.



1 MR. CONTE: It's our understanding that, earlier  
2 in the shift, there were some evolutions in transferring in-  
3 house loads from the reserve transformer back to the normal  
4 station services transformer. Were you involved in that at  
5 all?

6 MR. STEVENS: No, I wasn't. The control building  
7 was my set of rounds for that night. I had nothing to do  
8 with the switchgear building.

9 MR. VATTER: The elevator you were riding down was  
10 in the control building?

11 MR. STEVENS: We don't really call it control  
12 building. It goes to the service building. It's not the  
13 control room --

14 MR. CONTE: Go ahead, Mike.

15 MR. COLOMB: It's an aux services building, it's  
16 called, and it's not really considered part of the control  
17 building, as far as envelope concerns.

18 MR. CONTE: Is the control room in the aux  
19 services building?

20 MR. COLOMB: No. The control room is in the  
21 control building, and this is like an adjacent building that  
22 houses the elevator and stairwell.

23 MR. CONTE: Okay.

24 You just mentioned that you had the  
25 responsibilities for control building rounds.





1 MR. STEVENS: That's correct.

2 MR. CONTE: Did that include upstairs --

3 MR. STEVENS: Area.

4 MR. CONTE: Were you where the power supplies are?

5 MR. STEVENS: I had three of them in my area, the  
6 1-G and the Div 1 and Div 2 on 261.

7 MR. CONTE: Did your logs call for you to make any  
8 checks of those?

9 MR. STEVENS: Yes, they did.

10 MR. CONTE: And what do you normally do in those  
11 checks?

12 MR. STEVENS: We check on voltage and see if we  
13 have any LEDs and alarms on the panels themselves.

14 MR. CONTE: Okay.

15 When you made your checks earlier in the shift,  
16 with at least the 1-G, were there any abnormalities?

17 MR. STEVENS: No, 1-G looked good. One of the  
18 divisibles -- I can't remember if it was 1 or 2 -- had an  
19 LED fan failure in, but there had been a WR in against it.

20 MR. CONTE: When we were up touring the other  
21 UPS's, we noticed them to be extremely hot. Do you remember  
22 feeling around the 1-G or being locally in the area and  
23 noticing an unusually higher temperature? Would you say  
24 that that's normal for these?

25 MR. STEVENS: I'd say the ambient temperature



1 down there is normal. It's usually warm in the lower  
2 control building.

3 MR. CONTE: Did you ever put your hand on the UPS  
4 power supplies?

5 MR. STEVENS: I have in the past. I didn't that  
6 night.

7 MR. CONTE: Would you say you can keep your  
8 hand -- When you've done this in the past, would you say  
9 you'd be able to keep your hand on it, or it would be too  
10 hot?

11 MR. STEVENS: I don't remember.

12 MR. CONTE: You don't remember. Okay.

13 That takes us to the time of the event.

14 Bill, do you have any questions about before the  
15 event?

16 MR. VATTER: Yes.


17 Did you say the elevator hesitated and the lights  
18 went out in the elevator?

19 MR. STEVENS: Right.

20 MR. VATTER: Did the lights stay out in the  
21 elevator?

22 MR. STEVENS: Yes. The indication lights for  
23 what elevation stayed on, but the lights themselves, that  
24 lighted up the inside of the elevator, stayed out.

25 MR. VATTER: Okay. They didn't come back for



1 quite a while.

2 MR. STEVENS: I don't know when they came back. I  
3 have no idea when they came back, because we stopped using  
4 the elevator from there on.

5 MR. VATTER: But the lights in the elevator went  
6 out -- was it the ones that indicate the floor?

7 MR. STEVENS: No, they stayed on.

8 MR. VATTER: They never went off at all.

9 MR. STEVENS: No.

10 MR. VATTER: The elevator hesitated?

11 MR. STEVENS: Just slightly. It was right in  
12 between elevation 261 and 277 -- or 288; excuse me.

13 MR. VATTER: It just kind of jerked a little.


14 MR. STEVENS: Yes, just a bit.

15 MR. VATTER: It didn't like stop and then start  
16 again later?

17 MR. STEVENS: No.

18 MR. VATTER: The reason why I'm interested in that  
19 is that apparently this electrical transient was seen a  
20 little bit differently by different equipment around the  
21 plant, like the lights went off for about 30 seconds in the  
22 reactor building, and the elevator jerked a little bit.  
23 We're trying to understand that electrical transient.

24 MR. STEVENS: The lights in the control building  
25 were out almost the whole time, and no emergency lighting



1 every came on, because I tried to go up and down the stair  
2 tower a couple times in the control building, and I had my  
3 flashlight, and then I finally lost my flashlight, so I  
4 stopped using those stairs.

5 MR. CONTE: When you came out of the elevator,  
6 you went into the control building.

7 MR. STEVENS: No. We got on the elevation 261.  
8 When the door opened, I started heading towards our locker  
9 room. I went to use the Gaitronics there to call the  
10 control room to see what had happened, and the Gaitronics  
11 was dead.

12 MR. CONTE: This locker room and the Gaitronics  
13 are in the service building?

14 MR. STEVENS: It's in the cardox room, part of the  
15 service building.

16 MR. CONTE: Okay.


17 MR. VATTER: But the lights were on there?

18 MR. STEVENS: It was dark in there, too, but the  
19 roadway door was open, and the sun was coming up, so you  
20 could see there, at least.

21 MR. VATTER: And in the control building it was  
22 dark.

23 MR. STEVENS: In the stair towers it was dark,  
24 yes.

25 MR. VATTER: Earlier we talked with Dave -- oh,





1 shoot.

2 MR. STEVENS: Hanczyk.


3 MR. VATTER: Yes, Dave Hanczyk.

4 He said that, as he came from the reactor building  
5 to the control room -- and I guess he was running at a  
6 pretty good clip there -- after he got out of the reactor  
7 building, he didn't notice any lighting discrepancy in the  
8 control building. He said it was light; he could see; he  
9 didn't know whether maybe half the lights might have been  
10 out or if emergency lights were also gone. Is there a  
11 different stairway that he would have probably taken coming  
12 from the reactor building?

13 MR. STEVENS: Oh, yes. He would have come out  
14 through the trailers. He would have come up the south  
15 stairwell of the reactor building. He came out that way.  
16 It doesn't even hook onto the control building; it's a  
17 different building.

18 MR. VATTER: Okay. The most direct route from the  
19 reactor building, after you get out of the trailers, would  
20 have had him coming up the south reactor building stairs.

21 MR. STEVENS: He would have come out of the  
22 reactor building, the south stairs, gone outside and come  
23 back in, probably -- I don't know which way he came in, but  
24 I would have to assume the cardox room, where I tried to use  
25 the Gaitronics -- and then he went up the stairs by the



1 elevator that almost stopped on us.

2 MR. VATTER: And those stairs were not dark.

3 MR. STEVENS: They were dark, but there were still  
4 -- you had a few lights still working, and they weren't jet  
5 black like some of the other of the ones that are enclosed.  
6 These stairs are kind of open; they're not enclosed like the  
7 ones in the control building.

8 MR. VATTER: So maybe there were some lights off  
9 there.

10 MR. STEVENS: Yes. The normal -- I mean, we  
11 didn't have all of our lights on that staircase, either.

12 MR. VATTER: But it wasn't dark.

13 MR. STEVENS: It wasn't pitch black.

14 MR. VATTER: You wouldn't have wanted to take out  
15 a flashlight so you could find your way.

16 MR. STEVENS: No. We could see -- the four guys  
17 that were in the elevator with me, we all went up those  
18 stairs together, and we didn't need flashlights.


19 It wasn't four -- that's four including me, I  
20 should say.

21 MR. CONTE: Do the control building stair towers  
22 have emergency lights?

23 MR. STEVENS: Yes, they do.

24 MR. CONTE: And they were not on.

25 MR. STEVENS: They were not on.



1 MR. CONTE: Do you have any reason -- would you  
2 know why, from your knowledge of the plant?

3 MR. STEVENS: No.

4 MR. CONTE: All right. So you went to the  
5 Gaitronics, to the locker room; it was dead. Then what did  
6 you do?

7 MR. STEVENS: I went into the locker room because  
8 I knew there was a regular telephone in there, so I called  
9 the control room from in there.

10 MR. CONTE: Did the telephone work?

11 MR. STEVENS: Yes.

12 MR. CONTE: Did someone answer?

13 MR. STEVENS: Yes. The CSO answered.


14 MR. CONTE: What did he say?

15 MR. STEVENS: Well, I asked him what had happened,  
16 and he said, he's not sure; he's lost all of his indication.  
17 I said, We'll be right up, and I turned around and told the  
18 guys, We've got to get back to the control room, and we all  
19 took off running for the stairs.

20 MR. VATTER: Did he sound pretty upset? Did he  
21 sound excited?

22 MR. STEVENS: Well, he sounded nervous; there's no  
23 doubt about that.

24 MR. CONTE: You went up to the control room. Did  
25 you card into the control room to get into the control room



1 proper, or did you go to the Beehive?

2 MR. STEVENS: No, everyone went to the control  
3 room. As I went up to 288, I remembered I had the diesels.  
4 I buzzed down the hall to hear if I could hear any diesels  
5 running, but, when I heard the diesels weren't running, I  
6 ran up the south stairs the rest of the way to 306, and then  
7 I went right into the control room.

8 MR. CONTE: These are the emergency diesels?

9 MR. STEVENS: Yes.

10 MR. CONTE: Okay.

11 You walked into the control room. How crowded was  
12 it with the response personnel?


13 MR. STEVENS: It was just our shift guys; they  
14 were the only ones in there. I can't remember exactly how  
15 many people were in there, but I know they had already sent  
16 one guy out to check the UPS's, and that's when the CSO  
17 asked me to go help them. He said, I sent Eron to check  
18 the switch gear and the UPS's; go help him. I said okay.  
19 That's when I took off.

20 MR. CONTE: Okay. With Eron you went to the UPS  
21 area.

22 Do you remember an approximate time you got to the  
23 control room?

24 MR. STEVENS: No, I don't.

25 MR. CONTE: You didn't happen to notice whether or





1 not the digital clock was working or not?

2 MR. STEVENS: The one by the full-core display?

3 MR. CONTE: Yes.

4 MR. STEVENS: No, that was out.

5 MR. CONTE: That was out.

6 MR. STEVENS: Definitely.

7 MR. CONTE: The full-core display was out.

8 MR. STEVENS: That was out.

9 MR. CONTE: Okay. All right.

10 You don't remember much of a time. Can you  
11 estimate in terms of minutes to do that evolution? You  
12 started out from the elevator. Can you approximate? It had  
13 to be less than ten minutes? Five minutes?

14 MR. STEVENS: Oh, definitely less -- I'd say less  
15 than five minutes.

16 MR. CONTE: Less than five.


17 Then you went out to the UPS.

18 MR. STEVENS: Well, first I went to switch gear,  
19 hollered for Eron, didn't heard him; then I ran down to 237,  
20 where the UPS's are, and that's where I met up with Eron.

21 MR. CONTE: Okay. You weren't sure where Eron  
22 was.

23 MR. STEVENS: No. He had already gone. The  
24 switch gear is on 261, and the UPS's are underneath that.

25 MR. CONTE: You didn't make any verifications in



1 the switch gear.

2 MR. STEVENS: No.

3 MR. CONTE: Okay.

4 Then you went to the UPS area, the series A  
5 through D?

6 MR. STEVENS: I believe it's A through D.

7 MR. CONTE: And you found Eron.

8 MR. STEVENS: Yes.


9 MR. CONTE: Then what did you do?

10 MR. STEVENS: Well, we both looked at the LEDs  
11 that were in there and looked them over to see what had  
12 happened. Then we said, We've got to get hold of the  
13 control room; then we realized we couldn't get hold of the  
14 control room, because the Gaitronics was dead.

15 MR. CONTE: Did Eron make an attempt to use the  
16 Gaitronics?

17 MR. STEVENS: I did. I went over and grabbed it,  
18 and I said, Well, let's check first. I picked it up, and I  
19 said, No, it's dead. Eron says, Well, I'll head up. So  
20 Eron headed up, and I don't know if he went to a telephone  
21 or what. I don't know where he went. He came back and he  
22 said, Come on back up. That's when we went back up there,  
23 to tell them what had happened.

24 MR. CONTE: And you're in the control building  
25 this whole time now.



1 MR. STEVENS: No, the switchgear building.

2 MR. CONTE: The switchgear building. We're very  
3 unfamiliar with your site.

4 What is the status of the switchgear building in  
5 terms of lighting now? Any dark areas?

6 MR. STEVENS: The switchgear building didn't seem  
7 to be too dark.

8 MR. CONTE: Was it somewhat dark?

9 MR. STEVENS: I don't really remember. I think it  
10 had all of its normal lighting on, but I'm not really sure.

11 MR. CONTE: You didn't happen to notice any  
12 emergency lighting on?

13 MR. STEVENS: The stair tower was black.

14 MR. CONTE: In the switchgear building?

15 MR. STEVENS: In the switchgear building. A  
16 fireman came down in between Eron heading up to call  
17 somebody, and he said he had opened up the doors to try and  
18 get some light in the stair tower.

19 MR. CONTE: Are you aware that there's emergency  
20 lighting in that stair tower also, and it wasn't on?

21 MR. STEVENS: I'm not sure if there is any in  
22 there. I would believe there would be, but I'm not sure.

23 MR. CONTE: Okay. From the switch gear back to  
24 the control building, and then into the control room.

25 MR. STEVENS: Yes.



1 MR. CONTE: Approximate time you think you got  
2 back to that control room?

3 MR. STEVENS: It would only be a guess; I really  
4 don't know. I lost concept of time during this whole thing.

5 MR. CONTE: Then what? What happened next?

6 MR. STEVENS: I was asked to go check the  
7 divisional UPS's, Div 1 and Div 2, and report back to them,  
8 so I went down and checked both of those, and the only thing  
9 I saw, other than the fan failure that was in earlier in the  
10 night, was a sink loss on both the Div 1 and Div 2 UPS's.

11 MR. VATTER: What does that sink loss mean?

12 MR. STEVENS: I've got to believe it was from  
13 their switching over, but I'm not sure. I'm no expert on  
14 UPS's.


15 MR. VATTER: Had they switched? Could you tell?

16 MR. STEVENS: I couldn't tell, no. I mean, I  
17 called him over the alarms; he said, Okay, come on back.  
18 Then he said, Wait a minute; we're sending Eron down to  
19 reset the UPS's; why don't you meet him there. Then I took  
20 off for the switchgear building again.

21 MR. CONTE: In the Div 1, Div 2, did you verify  
22 input and output voltages when you did this?

23 MR. STEVENS: No. I just looked for the alarms.

24 MR. CONTE: Back to the control room then, with  
25 this information?





1 MR. STEVENS: No. I called the control room,  
2 because I knew where I could use the telephone, and I think  
3 I went into the remote shutdown room; I'm not sure, but I  
4 think that's where I went in to use the phone.

5 MR. CONTE: Okay.

6 MR. STEVENS: I called them to tell them what I  
7 had found, and they said they wanted to try and reset the 1-  
8 series UPS's down on switchgear 237, so I left the control  
9 building, and then I ran into Dave Hanczyk coming around the  
10 corner. I went down with him to the UPS's, and Eron and  
11 Phil MacEwen were already down there.

12 MR. CONTE: Okay. Then what?

13 MR. STEVENS: Then we got the procedure out, and  
14 we were trying to figure out how we could start the UPS back  
15 up.

16 MR. CONTE: How did you come upon the procedure?

17 MR. STEVENS: The procedure was right in the unit.  
18 They have little plastic drawers they can slide the  
19 procedure right into. They do it in quite a few of the  
20 systems throughout the plant; they try and keep a procedure  
21 right by the panels.

22 MR. CONTE: There's only one procedure, an OP?

23 MR. STEVENS: Yes. I think there was one down  
24 there for all the UPS's.

25 MR. CONTE: You don't happen to know the name of



1 this procedure, or the number?

2 MR. STEVENS: I don't remember what the number is,  
3 no.

4 MR. CONTE: Okay.

5 Who started to implement the step-by-step of the  
6 procedure?

7 MR. STEVENS: I think Dave Hanczyk started reading  
8 the procedure, and I think Eron was trying to line up the  
9 breakers. We didn't get too far into it, and we realized we  
10 weren't going to be able to use the procedure, because it  
11 assumed the 4 breaker was already closed, and it wasn't. So  
12 we kind of stopped there and tried to figure out what we  
13 were going to do next. By then we had some more guys that  
14 showed up down there, and we were all kind of looking them  
15 over.

16 Then we decided we were going to close the 4  
17 breaker in and get it back on a maintenance supply.

18 MR. CONTE: Who proposed closing the 4 breaker?

19 MR. STEVENS: I believe Dave Hanczyk did.

20 MR. CONTE: He showed you how to do it? Or did he  
21 tell you how to do it? Who did it, though?

22 MR. STEVENS: He was trying -- I think Bob  
23 Spooner and Mike Garbus were trying to get the cabinet on  
24 one of the other UPS's for the 4 breaker open, and Dave was  
25 trying to get the other one open. He finally got it open,



1 and he was having trouble closing it, so I told him, Move;  
2 I'll close it. He stepped aside, and I closed the breaker,  
3 and right then I heard the Gaitronics go off, so I knew we  
4 had gotten some of it back.

5 Then, one by one, I kept closing the four breakers  
6 on the other ones.


7 MR. CONTE: How much force -- I mean, were you  
8 straining to get this breaker up?

9 MR. STEVENS: It took quite a bit. It's in kind  
10 of an awkward spot: It's probably only eight inches off the  
11 floor. I don't think he could have closed it. I don't know  
12 if he was just getting nervous, but I closed it without any  
13 problem, and we got all the other ones closed, too.

14 MR. VATTER: Is operating that breaker something  
15 you knew how to do previously, or did Dave have to tell you  
16 about it?

17 MR. STEVENS: Dave had to tell me about it. We  
18 were having trouble even getting into the cabinets. When we  
19 saw the two screws on there, we thought we were going to  
20 have to take the screws out. Then Dave said, Wait a minute;  
21 I think there's a handle underneath it. He reached  
22 underneath there and popped it up. Then we ran and opened  
23 up all the other ones on the other UPS's and started closing  
24 them one by one.

25 MR. CONTE: Have you happened to have any past



1 experience with, say, a bus outage on one UPS, and you were  
2 assigned the task of isolating, opening breakers, and things  
3 like that?

4 MR. STEVENS: I haven't myself, no.

5 MR. CONTE: No experience with that?

6 MR. STEVENS: No, just some training on how they  
7 work. That's about it.

8 MR. CONTE: How would you characterize the nature  
9 of the training? Classroom training? Hands-on?

10 MR. STEVENS: Just classroom.

11 MR. CONTE: Classroom.

12 MR. VATTER: What kinds of things are covered in  
13 that?

14 MR. STEVENS: Well, your different supplies, the  
15 different breakers.

16 MR. VATTER: Just general stuff?

17 MR. STEVENS: Just general stuff, yes.

18 MR. CONTE: Did that cover the safety UPS also?  
19 Was the nature of the training mostly on the safety UPS?

20 MR. STEVENS: No, I think it was mainly on the 1-  
21 series. I don't remember too much training on the safety  
22 UPS.

23 MR. CONTE: Okay.

24 The nature of the things that were lost, were they  
25 a surprise to you? The Gaitronics -- you said that, as soon





1 as you hit that one breaker on the one UPS, the Gaitronics  
2 came on -- the loss of lighting. Was that a surprise to  
3 you, that these UPS's provide those services?

4 MR. STEVENS: No. I knew they supplies that  
5 stuff. I mean, I couldn't tell you which loads are off  
6 which UPS, but I knew --

7 MR. CONTE: But would you say that you got a  
8 general idea from the training that you received?

9 MR. STEVENS: Yes.

10 MR. CONTE: Okay.

11 So you completed shutting the breakers, and then  
12 what happened?

13 MR. STEVENS: We headed back up the control room.  
14 At that time, I think, Dave headed over to the control  
15 building to get UPS-G down there, to reset that one. I  
16 headed back to the control room, and then I was sent out to  
17 start up the aux boiler, to start getting the steam to the  
18 reboiler for the seals.

19 MR. CONTE: How long did that take?

20 MR. STEVENS: It didn't take too long at all. I  
21 had the boiler in no time. We had a delay on trying to get  
22 the valve open. They were having trouble with the air ski,  
23 and then they had to evacuate the turbine building for a  
24 while. They didn't want anyone going in there, because this  
25 valve we have to pin open to get it to stay open. They



1 wouldn't let a guy go out there until they were sure it was  
2 safe. But the boiler was up quick and went up very easily.  
3 They had done a lot of major work on it in the last couple  
4 months.

5 MR. CONTE: Explain to me a little bit about that  
6 problem with the air booster skids and the pinning of the  
7 valve. Are they related?

8 MR. STEVENS: I don't know if the air skid's  
9 fault. It seems like it has enough pressure to open the  
10 valve, but it doesn't seem like it can maintain the valve to  
11 keep it open. That's why we have to pin them open.

12 MR. CONTE: Oh, I see.

13 The air booster skids are basically used for the  
14 actual operation, not to keep the valve open, then; is that  
15 correct?

16 MR. STEVENS: Well, I think we have to keep them  
17 in position, too.

18 MR. CONTE: Did the evacuation of the turbine  
19 building hamper you in any way?

20 MR. STEVENS: Just that I was waiting with the  
21 boiler, all ready to go, with no place to put the steam. It  
22 handled it well; it never tripped or anything, under high  
23 pressure.

24 MR. CONTE: And you were in the turbine building  
25 when you were doing this.



1 MR. STEVENS: Aux boiler building.

2 MR. CONTE: Aux boiler building. Different  
3 building.

4 MR. STEVENS: Yes. It's off from the screen wall.

5 MR. CONTE: Okay.

6 Then what? They just kept you down there?

7 MR. STEVENS: Yes. They kept me down there until  
8 just about time to go home. They sent some guys down to  
9 start getting the other boiler going, in case they needed  
10 that one. Then I just went up to the control room.

11 MR. CONTE: What time was going home?

12 MR. STEVENS: We were given permission to leave  
13 about 10:30, and we got held up in security until after  
14 11:00, until the right person made the phone call to let us  
15 out.

16 MR. CONTE: Okay. That kind of completes that  
17 morning.

18 Is there anything in the sequence here that you  
19 can think of?

20 MR. VATTER: No, I don't think so. We still have  
21 got questions about those procedures and what they apply to.

22 What I understood you to say was that you tried to  
23 use the one procedure that's in that slot area on the front  
24 of the UPS.

25 MR. STEVENS: Yes.



1 MR. VATTER: And you really didn't meet the  
2 initial conditions.

3 MR. STEVENS: The procedure assume the 4 breaker  
4 was already going to be shut, and in this case they weren't;  
5 they were all tripped open.

6 MR. VATTER: If the 4 breaker had been shut, then  
7 you would have been able to go through that auto-startup  
8 procedure.

9 MR. STEVENS: Yes.

10 MR. VATTER: Did you try to do that with the 4  
11 breaker?

12 MR. STEVENS: No. Once we closed the 4 breaker  
13 and we realized we were on maintenance power, we said,  
14 That's good for now; let's get back and get other things  
15 taken care of.

16 MR. VATTER: You didn't try to do the auto-startup  
17 with the 4 breaker open?

18 MR. STEVENS: No.

19 MR. CONTE: Is there any insight you'd like to  
20 share about your training and preparedness for this type of  
21 event, positive or negative?

22 MR. STEVENS: Well, they've been really stressing  
23 teamwork. We had a big session with INPO on teamwork  
24 training and stuff like that. I'm proud of the shift. I  
25 think we do well together as a team, and this isn't the





1 first time we've had something like this.

2 MR. CONTE: Okay. So you thought the training was  
3 effective on the shift working together.

4 MR. STEVENS: Yes. And I think our shift  
5 communicates well, too.

6 MR. CONTE: I'm trying to think. Is there  
7 anything else you'd like to offer or share about this event,  
8 any impressions that would help us in our investigation?

9 MR. STEVENS: No, I've told you just about  
10 everything I can remember of that day. I mean, I've been  
11 trying to keep it fresh in my mind because I knew this was  
12 going to happen. Things happened fast that morning.

13 MR. CONTE: Okay.

14 Well, it sounded like you offered us a lot of  
15 information, and we appreciate your willingness to  
16 cooperate. I really don't have anything else. Let's go off  
17 the record.

18 [Whereupon, at 4:31 p.m., the taking of the  
19 investigative interview was concluded.]

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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission


in the matter of:

NAME OF PROCEEDING: Int. of JIM STEVENS

DOCKET NUMBER:

PLACE OF PROCEEDING: Scriba, N.Y.

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.



JON HUNDLEY

Official Reporter  
Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.

