

ORIGINAL

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Agency: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Incident Investigation Team

Title: Telephone Interview of:
Joseph Furia
(Closed)

Docket No.

LOCATION: Bethesda, Maryland

DATE: Monday, September 9, 1991 PAGES: 1 - 12


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
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM

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Telephone Interview of: :

Joseph Furia :


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Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Conference Room 100
The Woodmont Building
8120 Woodmont Avenue
Bethesda, Maryland

Monday, September 9, 1991

The above-entitled telephone interview convened in
closed session at 9:08 o'clock a.m.



1 PARTICIPANTS:

2

3

JOHN KAUFFMAN, IIT Team Member

4

WALTER JENSEN, IIT Team Member

5

BILL VATTER, IIT Team Member

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JOSEPH FURIA, Interviewee

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LYNN ESTEP, Court Reporter

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
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P R O C E E D I N G S

[9:08 a.m.]

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3 MR. KAUFFMAN: It is September 9th, 1991. It's
4 about 9:08 in the morning. We're at the Woodmont Building
5 in Bethesda, Maryland, conducting an interview of Joseph
6 Furia concerning what he saw and his involvement in an event
7 at Nine Mill Point Two on August 13th, 1991.

8 I'm John Kauffman, the NRC headquarters AEOD.

9 MR. JENSEN: I'm Walt Jensen, NRC headquarters
10 Event Assessment Branch.


11 MR. VATTER: I'm Bill Vatter, INPO.

12 MR. KAUFFMAN: Okay. Joe, at this time, would you
13 tell us a little bit about the position you had and a little
14 bit about your background, and then go into what you saw on
15 August 13th.

16 MR. FURIA: No problem. My name is Joe Furia.
17 I'm a senior radiation specialist in Region I, Facilities
18 Radiation Protection Check Section, Facilities Radiation
19 Safeguards Branch, Division of Radiation Safety and
20 Safeguards.

21 I was at Nine Mile Point the week of August 12th
22 through the 16th to conduct a routine health physics
23 inspection as part of the core inspection program.

24 Basically, I arrived at the site on August the
25 13th at about 5:55 in the morning, came through the Unit 1




1 side security and went over to the NRC resident trailer. I
2 have a key to get in there. There was no one in the
3 resident trailer at the time.

4 At about five after six in the morning, I heard an
5 announcement that sounded to me like it came from the Unit 2
6 side of the paging system -- the paging system is not common
7 at Nine Mile -- saying that there was a site area emergency,
8 that there had been a loss of control room annunciators, and
9 that was about what I recall hearing at that time.

10 About five minutes later -- this is about ten
11 after six in the morning -- there was a second announcement
12 -- this time I know for sure it was on the Unit 1 side as
13 well -- saying that there was a site area emergency, that
14 the Unit 2 control room had lost annunciators and power, and
15 that all personnel were to report to their assembly areas.

16 About that time that that announcement was coming
17 over, I had located the home phone number for Rob Temps, who
18 is, or was at the time, one of the resident inspectors on
19 the site. I called him at his house, told him that the
20 announcement had been made that there was a site area
21 emergency. He gave me Rich Laura's home phone number --
22 Rich is the other resident inspector up there -- and told me
23 to stay in the trailer until he got there. I reached Laura
24 at his residence, told him about the site area emergency
25 announcement, told him I'd be staying in the trailer until




1 either he or Rob got there.

2 About 6:30, 6:40, sometime in that time frame, Rob
3 Temps got to the trailer. We talked about what was going on
4 briefly, what announcements I had heard, what we should do,
5 and he decided that we should go over to the Unit 2 control
6 room and that there was a telephone line at one of the desks
7 behind some of the control panels that he felt we could use
8 to make a call down to the Incident Respondent Center at
9 headquarters.

10 We got over to the control room right around 6:40,
11 6:45. Rob talked briefly with one gentleman who I
12 understand was the shift supervisor to get a quick briefing
13 on what was going on. When we got to the control room, the
14 lights were on, the panels on the control panels appeared to
15 be all functioning.

16 There was a significant number of staff in front
17 of the various panels. I was later told by Rob that the
18 event occurred right around a shift change, and so they had
19 both the night shift and the day shift operators in the Unit
20 2 control room when we got there.

21 We called down to headquarters about 6:50 in the
22 morning, contacted the Incident Response Center. At that
23 point, I stayed on the phone line to allow Rob to interface
24 with the licensees, and basically I was on that phone line
25 until about 2000 hours that evening. That was about what I



1 did.


2 MR. JENSEN: Okay. What did you observe about the
3 conduct in the control room? Did you notice anyone making
4 any specific control room manipulations of note that you
5 could give a time for, an approximate time?

6 MR. FURIA: No. As I said, I was sitting on the
7 phone, and where the phone was located I did not have a
8 clear view of the center consoles in the control room. I
9 was behind one of the consoles. Anything I can give you
10 would be related back from what Rob Temps told me.

11 Having said that, Rob told me at the time that
12 there was some questioning about the positioning of, I
13 believe it was six of the control rods, and so at the time
14 we arrived and until sometime shortly after seven o'clock,
15 the licensee was in its ATWS procedures.

16 Sometime after seven, they exited those procedures
17 and went into another set of procedures to bring the unit
18 into cold shutdown. The licensee related to Rob and I that,
19 under their emergency criteria, since they had gone through
20 a site area emergency, they could not exit that emergency
21 until they were in cold shutdown. So the licensee spent the
22 bulk of the morning and afternoon cooling down the reactor
23 far enough and depressurizing so the RHR System could be put
24 into service.

25 MR. JENSEN: Well, Joe, you say you are relating



1 information to headquarters.

2 MR. FURIA: Yes, sir.


3 MR. JENSEN: What type of information were you
4 relaying and what was your source of that information?

5 MR. FURIA: Okay. The information that I was
6 relaying -- by about 7:00, 7:05, headquarters had connected
7 the regional Incident Response Center on line and Paul
8 Harris was who I spent most of the morning talking with. He
9 was on the phone here at Region I.

10 At about 9:30, 10:00 in the morning, the Tech
11 Support Center was brought on line, and that was Tom Dexter,
12 who is a security inspector from Region I who was also up at
13 Nine Mile doing a routine inspection that day, and he had
14 accompanied Rich Laura into the TSC.

15 Basically, we would periodically update whoever
16 cared to listen as to the pressure temperature readings that
17 were on the control panel. Periodically, I would stand up,
18 walk around, see what they were. If I didn't do it about
19 every 15 minutes or so, generally Paul Harris in the region
20 would ask me what that data was.

21 Paul and whoever he was communicating with in the
22 region periodically had some questions. Early on, the
23 questions centered around what procedures that the licensee
24 was following, and the information that Rob Temps related
25 back to me was that the licensee was not -- did not have



1 specific procedures per se, but rather was in a plan that
2 allowed them to float through various manipulations.
3 Originally, the plan they were following was the ATWS, and
4 after that, it was just to bring them down into cold
5 shutdown.


6 Around 9:00 or so, there were some questions from
7 headquarters. Tom McKenna, as I recall, was on the link
8 that we had, and there were some questions concerning
9 whether or not the off-site sirens had gone off, and when we
10 determined that they had not, Tom had some questions about
11 why not.

12 Shortly thereafter, someone, and I don't recall
13 who, but it was someone, I believe, at headquarters, made
14 some decisions that those type of questions would wait, and
15 I did not hear any more emergency plan type questions for
16 the rest of the day.

17 By about 10:00 in the morning, the phone line that
18 we had established was pretty well -- maybe once every 20
19 minutes, we would relay temperature and pressure of the
20 core, but other than that, most of the questions had
21 stopped. There really wasn't much going on. The licensee
22 was just kind of powering down everything.

23 MR. JENSEN: Do you remember what instruments you
24 were using to get the temperature and pressure from?

25 MR. FURIA: It was a digital display, an LED type



1 display, that was on the center of the control -- or the
2 main control panel. There were four displays there. One
3 was time; one was reactor temperature; the other was reactor
4 pressure, and I cannot offhand recall what the fourth
5 readout was.

6 MR. JENSEN: What estimate were you using to get
7 the time from? What clock were you using?

8 MR. FURIA: There were four of these red-lettered
9 LED readouts, and one was the time, clock time.

10 MR. JENSEN: This was on the main control board?

11 MR. FURIA: That's as I recall; yes, sir.

12 MR. JENSEN: Okay. Did you see anybody resetting
13 those clocks, because they might have gone out with the loss
14 of power?

15 MR. FURIA: I did not observe anybody resetting
16 them. The clock time that was on there, I looked at it when
17 I first came in the control room, and the time on that clock
18 and the time on my watch was off by about a minute. I don't
19 recall which one was running faster than the other. But
20 that one-minute difference was consistent throughout the
21 day. So I don't believe anybody would have been resetting
22 that clock after I entered the control room at about 6:45
23 that morning.

24 MR. JENSEN: Let's see, I guess you really weren't
25 watching the control operations too closely.



1 MR. FURIA: I could not see them from where I was
2 sitting.

3 MR. JENSEN: Okay. Can you make any comment about
4 the control of the shift supervisor over the operations in
5 the control room? Did it seem to be well-ordered, and were
6 the procedures being --


7 MR. FURIA: Given my limited knowledge -- I'm not
8 a reactor engineer, and I don't normally go in the control
9 rooms very often -- it appeared to me that this was a well-
10 organized effort going on and that the licensee appeared to
11 be working well together with the large staff that was in
12 the room and seemed to be -- maybe the word is "calm". They
13 felt they had things under control.

14 But again, that's more of a layman's observation
15 than somebody who is experienced in control rooms.

16 MR. JENSEN: And the orders to perform operations,
17 did they seem to be coming from a single source?

18 MR. FURIA: I could not tell from where I was
19 sitting who necessarily was giving out the orders for what
20 was going on. Mr. Temps will be better able to answer that,
21 I'm sure.

22 MR. KAUFFMAN: There were some problems later in
23 the event with some waterhammers and shutdown cooling and
24 reactor water cleanup. Do you recall hearing or observing
25 anything about that?



1 MR. FURIA: I briefly heard a few things about
2 waterhammers and shutdown cooling, and I do recall that
3 there was some discussion about which systems were available
4 for shutdown cooling, and there was some discussion because
5 some of the systems were apparently tagged out for
6 maintenance. But the exact specifics, I was really not
7 privy to.

8 MR. JENSEN: Let's see, when you first went to the
9 control room, do you recall if the licensee or could you
10 tell if the licensee was on the telephone with the NRC at
11 that time?

12 MR. FURIA: They had two people sitting in front
13 of a bank of telephones. Which particular lines were on or
14 not on, I wasn't sure at the time.

15 [Pause.]

16 MR. KAUFFMAN: I think that about takes care of
17 our questions, Joe.


18 MR. FURIA: Okay.

19 MR. KAUFFMAN: Is there anything else that you saw
20 or heard that you might think is important?


21 THE WITNESS: No, I don't believe so.

22 MR. KAUFFMAN: Okay, we'll go off the record,
23 then.

24 I'd like to thank you for taking time out and
25 talking to us this morning.



1 [Whereupon; at 9:24 o'clock, a.m., the interview
2 was concluded.]
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

in the matter of:

NAME OF PROCEEDING: Joseph Furia


DOCKET NUMBER:

PLACE OF PROCEEDING: Bethesda, Maryland

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.

Marilynn Estep

Official Reporter
Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.



OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

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Incident Investigation Team

Title: Telephone Interview of:
Joseph Furia
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
DATE: Monday, September 9, 1991 **PAGES:** 1 - 12

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



ADDENDUM

<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Correction and Reason for Correction</u>
3	18	Should be "Radiation Protection Section" delete word "Check"
3	19	should be "Safety and Safeguards Branch" add "Safety and"

Date 10/15/91

Signature





UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM

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Telephone Interview of: :

Joseph Furia :

[Closed] :

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Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Conference Room 100


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
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P R O C E E D I N G S

[9:08 a.m.]

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3 MR. KAUFFMAN: It is September 9th, 1991. It's
4 about 9:08 in the morning. We're at the Woodmont Building
5 in Bethesda, Maryland, conducting an interview of Joseph
6 Furia concerning what he saw and his involvement in an event
7 at Nine Mill Point Two on August 13th, 1991.

8 I'm John Kauffman, the NRC headquarters AEOD.

9 MR. JENSEN: I'm Walt Jensen, NRC headquarters
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
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12 MR. KAUFFMAN: Okay. Joe, at this time, would you
13 tell us a little bit about the position you had and a little
14 bit about your background, and then go into what you saw on
15 August 13th.

16 MR. FURIA: No problem. My name is Joe Furia.
17 I'm a senior radiation specialist in Region I, Facilities
18 Radiation Protection Check Section, Facilities Radiation
19 Safeguards Branch, Division of Radiation Safety and
20 Safeguards.

21 I was at Nine Mile Point the week of August 12th
22 through the 16th to conduct a routine health physics
23 inspection as part of the core inspection program.

24 Basically, I arrived at the site on August the
25 13th at about 5:55 in the morning, came through the Unit 1




1 side security and went over to the NRC resident trailer. I
2 have a key to get in there. There was no one in the
3 resident trailer at the time.

4 At about five after six in the morning, I heard an
5 announcement that sounded to me like it came from the Unit 2
6 side of the paging system -- the paging system is not common
7 at Nine Mile -- saying that there was a site area emergency,
8 that there had been a loss of control room annunciators, and
9 that was about what I recall hearing at that time.

10 About five minutes later -- this is about ten
11 after six in the morning -- there was a second announcement
12 -- this time I know for sure it was on the Unit 1 side as
13 well -- saying that there was a site area emergency, that
14 the Unit 2 control room had lost annunciators and power, and
15 that all personnel were to report to their assembly areas.

16 About that time that that announcement was coming
17 over, I had located the home phone number for Rob Temps, who
18 is, or was at the time, one of the resident inspectors on
19 the site. I called him at his house, told him that the
20 announcement had been made that there was a site area
21 emergency. He gave me Rich Laura's home phone number --
22 Rich is the other resident inspector up there -- and told me
23 to stay in the trailer until he got there. I reached Laura
24 at his residence, told him about the site area emergency
25 announcement, told him I'd be staying in the trailer until



1 either he or Rob got there.

2 About 6:30, 6:40, sometime in that time frame, Rob
3 Temps got to the trailer. We talked about what was going on
4 briefly, what announcements I had heard, what we should do,
5 and he decided that we should go over to the Unit 2 control
6 room and that there was a telephone line at one of the desks
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10 We got over to the control room right around 6:40,
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22 morning, contacted the Incident Response Center. At that
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
2 MR. JENSEN: Okay. What did you observe about the
3 conduct in the control room? Did you notice anyone making
4 any specific control room manipulations of note that you
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6 MR. FURIA: No. As I said, I was sitting on the
7 phone, and where the phone was located I did not have a
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22 bulk of the morning and afternoon cooling down the reactor
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3 MR. JENSEN: What type of information were you
4 relaying and what was your source of that information?

5 MR. FURIA: Okay. The information that I was
6 relaying -- by about 7:00, 7:05, headquarters had connected
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8 Harris was who I spent most of the morning talking with. He
9 was on the phone here at Region I.

10 At about 9:30, 10:00 in the morning, the Tech
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12 who is a security inspector from Region I who was also up at
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1 specific procedures per se, but rather was in a plan that
2 allowed them to float through various manipulations.
3 Originally, the plan they were following was the ATWS, and
4 after that, it was just to bring them down into cold
5 shutdown.


6 Around 9:00 or so, there were some questions from
7 headquarters. Tom McKenna, as I recall, was on the link
8 that we had, and there were some questions concerning
9 whether or not the off-site sirens had gone off, and when we
10 determined that they had not, Tom had some questions about
11 why not.

12 Shortly thereafter, someone, and I don't recall
13 who, but it was someone, I believe, at headquarters, made
14 some decisions that those type of questions would wait, and
15 I did not hear any more emergency plan type questions for
16 the rest of the day.

17 By about 10:00 in the morning, the phone line that
18 we had established was pretty well -- maybe once every 20
19 minutes, we would relay temperature and pressure of the
20 core, but other than that, most of the questions had
21 stopped. There really wasn't much going on. The licensee
22 was just kind of powering down everything.

23 MR. JENSEN: Do you remember what instruments you
24 were using to get the temperature and pressure from?

25 MR. FURIA: It was a digital display, an LED type



1 display, that was on the center of the control -- or the
2 main control panel. There were four displays there. One
3 was time; one was reactor temperature; the other was reactor
4 pressure, and I cannot offhand recall what the fourth
5 readout was.

6 MR. JENSEN: What estimate were you using to get
7 the time from? What clock were you using?

8 MR. FURIA: There were four of these red-lettered
9 LED readouts, and one was the time, clock time.


10 MR. JENSEN: This was on the main control board?

11 MR. FURIA: That's as I recall; yes, sir.

12 MR. JENSEN: Okay. Did you see anybody resetting
13 those clocks, because they might have gone out with the loss
14 of power?

15 MR. FURIA: I did not observe anybody resetting
16 them. The clock time that was on there, I looked at it when
17 I first came in the control room, and the time on that clock
18 and the time on my watch was off by about a minute. I don't
19 recall which one was running faster than the other. But
20 that one-minute difference was consistent throughout the
21 day. So I don't believe anybody would have been resetting
22 that clock after I entered the control room at about 6:45
23 that morning.

24 MR. JENSEN: Let's see, I guess you really weren't
25 watching the control operations too closely.



1 MR. FURIA: I could not see them from where I was
2 sitting.

3 MR. JENSEN: Okay. Can you make any comment about
4 the control of the shift supervisor over the operations in
5 the control room? Did it seem to be well-ordered, and were
6 the procedures being --


7 MR. FURIA: Given my limited knowledge -- I'm not
8 a reactor engineer, and I don't normally go in the control
9 rooms very often -- it appeared to me that this was a well-
10 organized effort going on and that the licensee appeared to
11 be working well together with the large staff that was in
12 the room and seemed to be -- maybe the word is "calm". They
13 felt they had things under control.

14 But again, that's more of a layman's observation
15 than somebody who is experienced in control rooms.

16 MR. JENSEN: And the orders to perform operations,
17 did they seem to be coming from a single source?

18 MR. FURIA: I could not tell from where I was
19 sitting who necessarily was giving out the orders for what
20 was going on. Mr. Temps will be better able to answer that,
21 I'm sure.

22 MR. KAUFFMAN: There were some problems later in
23 the event with some waterhammers and shutdown cooling and
24 reactor water cleanup. Do you recall hearing or observing
25 anything about that?



1 MR. FURIA: I briefly heard a few things about
2 waterhammers and shutdown cooling, and I do recall that
3 there was some discussion about which systems were available
4 for shutdown cooling, and there was some discussion because
5 some of the systems were apparently tagged out for
6 maintenance. But the exact specifics, I was really not
7 privy to.

8 MR. JENSEN: Let's see, when you first went to the
9 control room, do you recall if the licensee or could you
10 tell if the licensee was on the telephone with the NRC at
11 that time?

12 MR. FURIA: They had two people sitting in front
13 of a bank of telephones. Which particular lines were on or
14 not on, I wasn't sure at the time.

15 [Pause.]

16 MR. KAUFFMAN: I think that about takes care of
17 our questions, Joe.


18 MR. FURIA: Okay.

19 MR. KAUFFMAN: Is there anything else that you saw
20 or heard that you might think is important?


21 THE WITNESS: No, I don't believe so.

22 MR. KAUFFMAN: Okay, we'll go off the record,
23 then.

24 I'd like to thank you for taking time out and
25 talking to us this morning.



1 [Whereupon, at 9:24 o'clock, a.m., the interview
2 was concluded.]
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

in the matter of:

NAME OF PROCEEDING: Joseph Furia

DOCKET NUMBER:

PLACE OF PROCEEDING: Bethesda, Maryland

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.

Marilyn Estep

Official Reporter
Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.

