

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Agency: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Incident Investigation Team

Title: Interview of Brian Grimes
(Closed)

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


ADDENDUM

| <u>Page</u> | <u>Line</u> | <u>Correction and Reason for Correction</u> |
|-------------|-------------|--|
| 5 | 11. | change "role" to "rule" |
| 5 | 12 | " " " " |
| 5 | 20 | " " " " |
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| 7 | 9 | " " " " "of" |
| 8 | 24 | " "planned" to "plant" |
| 22 | 1 | " the second "and" to "in" |
| 22 | 5 | delete "that's" to "that" |
| 22 | 11 | delete "you" - clarity |
| 24 | 4 | delete "," and add "in" |
| 25 | 4 | add "for" after "statistics" |
| 25 | 19 | add "the" before "SSFI" |
| 25 | 25 | change "in" to "and" - transcription error |
| 26 | 5 | change "swing" to "safety" |
| 29 | 21 | delete "N" |
| 29 | 22 | change "stronger" "some" to "something" we treat it as an " - clarity |
| 30 | 2 | change "to compile" to "compiled in" |
| 30 | 3 | change "categorize" to "categorized" |
| 31 | 3 | change "Johnson" to "Johnston" - transcription error |
| 36 | 13 | add "it would include" before "things" - clarity |
| 37 | 11 | change "is" to "could use" - clarity |
| 40 | 2 | add "such as" after "common" |
| 40 | 13 | change second "problem" to "question" |
| 40 | 14 | change "Doesn't" to "Does it" - transcription error |
| 40 | 24 | add "go" after first "to" - clarity |
| 43 | 15 | change "system" to "assistance" - transcription error |

Date 9/24/91 Signature Bruce Loman

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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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4 INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM
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7 INTERVIEW OF: :

8 BRIAN GRIMES :

9 [CLOSED] :

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12
13 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
14 Conference Room 100
15 The Woodmont Building
16 8120 Woodmont Avenue
17 Bethesda, Maryland
18

19 Monday, September 9, 1991
20

21 The above-entitled interview commenced in closed
22 session at 1:00 O'clock p.m.
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11-21



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BRIAN GRIMES, Interviewee

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LYNN ESTEP, Court Reporter

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P R O C E E D I N G S

INTERVIEW OF BRIAN GRIMES

[1:00 o'clock p.m.]

MR. CONTE: Good afternoon. It's almost 1:00 o'clock on the 9th of September. We're in Bethesda Maryland at the Woodmont Building.

We're conducting interviews associated with an event that occurred at Nine Mile Unit 2, August 13th, 1991, where there was a loss of power to annunciators and subsequent declaration of site emergency. We're here with Brian Grimes and we'll introduce each other.

My name is Richard Conte, I'm from Region I.

MR. IBARRA: Jose Ibarra, I'm a member of the IIT/NRR.

MR. ASHE: Frank Ashe, I'm member of the IIT/NRR.

MR. CONTE: Brian, will you give your name and your current position?

MR. GRIMES: Yes, Brian K. Grimes, and I'm Director, Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards in NRR.

MR. CONTE: Okay. Let me just ask you what your involvement -- you or your staff's involvement in the site area emergency, August 13th, 1991 at Nine Mile 2?

MR. GRIMES: Essentially none. As I mentioned before we went on the record, I was on vacation at the time




1 and was back briefly last week, and this was my third day in
2 the office. So, I have just a very sketchy knowledge of the
3 incident, itself.

4 MR. CONTE: Okay. How about past involvement with
5 the generic letter 83-28 on the Salem ATWS actions dealing
6 primarily with the broader scope issue of important to
7 safety and the handling of vendor-related information, as it
8 applies to the safety-related and nonsafety-related?

9 MR. GRIMES: I was involved in discussions,
10 particularly after 83-28 was first published, and we got the
11 industry responses then as to the adequacy of industry
12 responses. We also did some vendor inspections at that time
13 which looked at vendor interface at -- vendor inspections at
14 plant sites, which looked at vendor interface and brought
15 that perspective back to the -- to the technical groups. I
16 was also involved in discussions leading up to the
17 supplement to 83-28, where we -- we redefined our
18 expectations on what -- what should be done, in terms of
19 vendor interface information, and to what degree utilities
20 should have established relationships between the various
21 vendors themselves.

22 MR. ASHE: Could you define the scope of that for
23 us, please? Are you covering just safety-related equipment,
24 or were you covering safety-related and nonsafety-related,
25 in terms of vendor information?



1 MR. GRIMES: Principally, the safety-related.
2 Although, from time to time, we'd get into things which are
3 required by the NRC that are not strictly safety-related,
4 the ATWS and things that are not defined as safety-related,
5 but nevertheless, have requirements on them. Occasionally
6 we look at that sort of thing.

7 In terms of the vendor branch and vendor fraud
8 areas, we go beyond strictly safety-related at some times
9 when there's misrepresentation. But, in general, we stick
10 to safety-related.

11 MR. CONTE: Okay. How about the maintenance role?

12 MR. GRIMES: Little involvement in the maintenance
13 role, some indirect involvement. I have -- one of my
14 branches is the Special Inspection Branch, and we did a
15 couple of maintenance team inspection out of headquarters,
16 one at North Anna and one I believe at Salem in the last few
17 years. So, I have some insight on the development of the
18 maintenance team inspection and conduct of those, but I was
19 not involved in the current negotiations on the maintenance
20 role.

21 MR. CONTE: Okay. One last question on
22 establishing the scope of your knowledge here. In
23 particular, the IE -- I'm sorry, the NRC Information Notice
24 85-05, which dealt with the loss of annunciators to -- at
25 three plants, that was attributed to a common power -- a



1 common vendor-made equipment. Any involvement in that
2 information?

3 MR. GRIMES: You'll have to remind me what the --
4 what the vendor was and the equipment was, because I don't
5 remember the information notice by the number.

6 MR. CONTE: There were fires in the control
7 cabinets. I'll have to look it up for you.

8 MR. ASHE: Okay. There were fires in the control
9 cabinets, I believe, that ultimately resulted in loss of
10 annunciators and some instrumentation, that was the issue
11 that was addressed.

12 MR. GRIMES: I don't recall right off the top.

13 MR. ASHE: In terms of your maintenance team
14 inspections, can you expound on that a little bit, in terms
15 of the kinds of equipment that you were primarily focusing
16 on? Is it Class 1E stuff that's viewed as safety-related,
17 as opposed to non-Class 1E?

18 MR. GRIMES: The two that we did were principally
19 safety-related equipment. The only nonsafety-related
20 emphasis that I've been involved in in the inspection area
21 recently was about '86 or '87 we developed a balance-of-
22 plant inspection module, to assist the regions in looking at
23 nonsafety-related areas. We did, as I recall, perhaps one
24 prototype inspection and I think one or two of the regions
25 since then have done some balance-of-plant inspections. But



1 there is an inspection module on balance-of-plant that I
2 think came after the Commission paper on important to
3 safety.

4 MR. IBARRA: What does that cover?

5 MR. GRIMES: I covers how you would go about
6 taking a sample of balance-of-plant equipment and what sort
7 of regulatory leverage we have or don't have and from what
8 standpoint should the inspector look at it, in terms of the
9 context of the safety of the plant.

10 MR. IBARRA: Okay. But this is an inspection?

11 MR. GRIMES: It's an inspection.

12 MR. IBARRA: So, you actually go out there and
13 then start looking at it?

14 MR. GRIMES: Right, yea. It's something that's
15 put in the -- it has been put in the inspection manual as a
16 tool for people to use if they find an area in the balance-
17 of-plant that they think is worthy of attention.

18 MR. CONTE: Do you happen to remember the number?

19 MR. GRIMES: No. No, not off-hand.

20 MR. CONTE: Okay. It's my understanding that that
21 is an initiative-type inspection. It's not really a core-
22 mandatory --

23 MR. GRIMES: Right. Right.

24 MR. CONTE: -- type inspection?

25 MR. GRIMES: It's as needed. As needed.



1 MR. CONTE: So, it may or may not have been
2 implemented in --

3 MR. GRIMES: Right.

4 MR. CONTE: -- Nine Mile 2, we just don't know at
5 this point?

6 MR. GRIMES: Yes. Right.

7 MR. IBARRA: What is the result of that so far?

8 MR. GRIMES: I am having a hard time remembering
9 which plant we did the -- we did, I think, one pilot,
10 perhaps from headquarters or with the Region -- one or more
11 pilots. Since that time, the only recent one I remember is
12 -- it seems to me Region III did a balance-of-plant
13 inspection someplace, perhaps at Fermi within the last year.
14 That's the last one I remember.

15 MR. ASHE: Could you expand on the leverage an
16 inspector has in that area of BOP in such an inspection?
17 You mentioned that earlier.

18 MR. GRIMES: Yes. It's not very much, but if we
19 find technical problems, those need to be brought to the
20 attention of the utility, and those problems generally have
21 some indirect safety significance that can be pointed out.

22 I think it kind of goes back to the overall
23 context that the NRC does have the ability to regulate in
24 the balance of planned or non safety related area, but we
25 have chosen to focus on a core of what we think is the most



1 important aspects.

2 As we find things that require some additional
3 attention either from requirements or from an inspection
4 standpoint, we have the ability to do that, but we've kind
5 of made the up-front decision to put our resources on this
6 predefined set of things that people have thought about as
7 the most important.

8 MR. ASHE: Do you recall a specific issue in the
9 BOP area that's come out of these maintenance inspections?

10 MR. GRIMES: The maintenance inspections?

11 MR. ASHE: Yes. A specific item or issue in that
12 area. Do you recall one which fits the category of the
13 kinds of things that you were talking about?

14 MR. GRIMES: No, not under the maintenance
15 inspection offhand.

16 MR. ASHE: Okay.

17 MR. CONTE: Let's talk about that general
18 philosophy before we go into the details about the handling
19 of the vendor information and preventive maintenance
20 program. Your name is listed on that. We have a copy of
21 the SECY paper, 1986. Your name is listed as a contact.

22 MR. GRIMES: Right.

23 MR. CONTE: Could you give us the flavor of what's
24 the results of that SECY paper? All we've got is the staff
25 recommendation for the Commission to pursue some options,



1 but we don't have any documentation to tell us what ever
2 happened to it.

3 MR. GRIMES: As far as I know, it's never been
4 acted on, and it was discussed I think at the time, after it
5 went up by the commissioners and the top staff management,
6 the EDO at the time -- probably Mr. Stello, I think -- and
7 it was decided that it was -- one of the options was to
8 leave things as they were, and I think that was the option
9 that was chosen.

10 At the time the paper was written, it was at the
11 Commission's request. It was not a staff initiative; it was
12 a specific request by the Commission to try to address this
13 area in more detail. The staff took a shot at it and when
14 the Commission looked at it, I presume that they decided
15 that maybe the status quo was okay because they've never
16 acted on it.

17 MR. CONTE: Would you know that there's a piece of
18 paper that says that, that we opted to do that?

19 MR. GRIMES: Not that I know of. Not that I know
20 of.

21 MR. CONTE: That's the last document in this trail
22 on the importance to safety issue?

23 MR. GRIMES: As far as I know.

24 MR. IBARRA: The model you listed earlier, the BOP
25 inspection, wouldn't that be sort of a follow-on?



1 MR. GRIMES: The BOP inspections were a follow-on.
2 After that, we decided that -- and I don't recall whether we
3 mentioned that possibility in this paper or whether that was
4 ever --

5 MR. IBARRA: I think you briefly mention it.

6 MR. GRIMES: But we went ahead and followed up and
7 did put a BOP inspection module in place.

8 MR. CONTE: As an inspector in the field, I
9 remember getting the word -- I think it was verbal -- that
10 we were discouraged from using the term "important to
11 safety." Was that ever written or formalized in some shape
12 or form? And I guess it was about the time that this --

13 MR. GRIMES: I think that you're right.

14 MR. CONTE: -- second paper came out.

15 MR. GRIMES: Yes, I think you're right, because
16 people were using it in a variety of different ways, and it
17 was easier to just talk about safety related and things that
18 were not safety related rather than to talk about a class of
19 things which wasn't very well defined.

20 MR. CONTE: Was that guidance ever formalized in
21 writing or was it just word of mouth to the staff?

22 MR. GRIMES: I don't recall any specific document,
23 but I don't recall a decision to not document it either, so,
24 you know, I suppose it could have been written down as,
25 "Stay away from this terminology because it's causing



1 confusion." But I can't recall exactly at the moment.

2 MR. IBARRA: If something was written on it, whose
3 responsibility would it be, what group?

4 MR. GRIMES: Well, it could have come out either
5 of the I&E organization at that time, or with directions to
6 inspectors, or it could have come out as something out of
7 NRR as general policy to the technical staff. But I just
8 can't remember a specific memo. I may have, you know, in
9 normal correspondence reemphasized the point someplace
10 myself; so there may be something around, but I don't recall
11 a specific memo.

12 MR. CONTE: Let me just make a comment. It's
13 interesting that the paperwork from the region involved with
14 Nine Mile One -- in relation to Nine Mile One start-up as
15 the terminology "important to safety" in it.

16 MR. GRIMES: It relapsed.

17 MR. CONTE: I got the feeling it was not a written
18 guideline.

19 Okay. I think you've given us enough on the
20 important to safety concept, and we were going to ask you
21 what ever happened to the SECY 86-164 proposals, and I think
22 you've answered that. I guess let's talk about the
23 maintenance rule. We're interested in some of your views on
24 specific pieces of equipment in terms of where it fits in
25 the whole scheme of things. But what is your involvement or



1 what was your involvement with the maintenance rule as it
2 relates to your current function?

3 MR. GRIMES: As I indicated, I have had very
4 little involvement with the maintenance rule itself, but we
5 did do a couple of maintenance team inspections which have
6 fed information into that. So we did use the maintenance
7 tree, the tree concept to evaluate maintenance programs and
8 things like that at at least two facilities.

9 MR. CONTE: It's our understanding that those
10 maintenance team inspections, I guess, spoke to utilities
11 and vendors? Is that correct --

12 MR. GRIMES: No.

13 MR. CONTE: -- that they involved the vendors?

14 MR. GRIMES: No.

15 MR. CONTE: They were just --

16 MR. GRIMES: Maintenance team inspections were
17 strictly utilities.

18 MR. CONTE: Just utilities. Okay. I guess the
19 benefit in those maintenance team inspections were reliance
20 by the Commission that they don't need to get into the
21 details of how to maintain things. Is that a fair
22 characterization?

23 MR. GRIMES: Yes. I think it was establishing
24 some confidence that there were industry programs in place
25 to perform the principal important functions in the



1 maintenance area, and that these were generally being
2 implemented in the field. That's what the inspection did.
3 It looked both at the programmatic and the implementation
4 aspects of a variety of different subparts of the
5 maintenance program.

6 MR. CONTE: Do you have any information on the
7 apparent di-pole of the staff and the Commission on the
8 maintenance rule as to why they were -- it seems like the
9 Commission wants the rule and the staff didn't, and yet the
10 Commission obviously overruled. Is there a reason why that
11 difference of opinion?

12 MR. GRIMES: My impression at the time was that
13 there was just a difference of opinion on how sure the NRC
14 needed to be that there was future leverage on utilities in
15 the long-term, that the Staff, I think, felt very
16 comfortable with an ongoing process and ongoing relationship
17 with the industry that they didn't see changing that much,
18 and Chairman Carr, in particular, worried about the future
19 in terms of making sure that what was done now was going to
20 stay in place. And I think that was the main thing.

21 I have no insight as to how the current Commission
22 proposal got developed. That was done kind of at the
23 Commission level.

24 MR. CONTE: Do you think that the maintenance rule
25 will solve the problem of poor maintenance practices dealing



1 with non-safety-related equipment?

2 MR. GRIMES: Non-safety-related equipment, of
3 course, there was some attempt, I know, to expand the
4 definition of what maintenance should cover in the
5 maintenance rule, and I guess I didn't study it well enough
6 to say how it would match against the old definitions we had
7 proposed previously. But it looked to me like there was an
8 attempt to expand beyond safety-related certainly.

9 MR. CONTE: Just for everybody's benefit, I
10 participated in Mr. Ader's transcript, his interview this
11 morning, and he's very heavy into that. And the way he
12 characterizes it is that it's clear the maintenance rule
13 applies to safety-related equipment. The extent that it
14 applies to non-safety-related equipment is based on some
15 analysis of the availability or unavailability of that
16 equipment, a monitoring function, if you will.

17 And he acknowledges, going from memory, that that
18 would not necessarily -- you know, if there's an urgent
19 preventive maintenance recommendation for a piece of non-
20 safety-related equipment, the maintenance rule may or may
21 not pick that up.

22 You've got to wait for it to fail or become
23 unavailable, and then go into some kind of analysis before
24 it gets picked up.

25 MR. GRIMES: Yes. I'm just not familiar with --



1 MR. CONTE: The maintenance rule.

2 MR. GRIMES: -- the maintenance rule itself. I
3 haven't really studied it.

4 MR. CONTE: Well, how about -- you're dealing with
5 vendors; is that correct?

6 MR. GRIMES: Right. And the licensees.

7 MR. CONTE: Can you characterize that interchange
8 in a non-safety area, equipment that's classified non-
9 safety in terms of how those preventive maintenance
10 recommendations or good operating practices or training are
11 transcribed into the plant?

12 MR. GRIMES: It's highly dependent upon the
13 utility. Some utilities, as I recall TMI is one of them,
14 treat most everything like it was safety-related, and so
15 they have a common process for procurement and treating
16 these things in terms of experience.

17 Other plants draw very sharp lines and pay almost
18 no attention to the non-safety-related class of equipment.

19 And there's a third class that's kind of in-
20 between. As things come up that give them problems, they'll
21 feed that into their programs and pay more attention to
22 them.

23 So I'd say there's a pretty wide spectrum of how
24 people handle this.

25 MR. CONTE: I think I'd like to go into some of



1 the specific equipment that we've been looking at with you
2 two guys in the electrical area.

3 But before we do that, let me ask another general
4 question. Does your group have any recent maintenance
5 involvement, aside from the Regional implementation of an
6 MTI, at Nine Mile-2? Do you have any recent information
7 about maintenance practices at Nine Mile-2?

8 MR. GRIMES: The last thing we did at Nine Mile --
9 there's a couple things we did at Nine Mile-2, but they're
10 more than a year old, I think.

11 MR. CONTE: What were they?

12 MR. GRIMES: We did a -- the Special Inspection
13 Branch, we did an inspection. I think it was in the winter
14 of either '89 or '90 when Nine Mile was in the midst of its
15 problems with the Headquarters team inspection. They did
16 one at Calvert Cliffs in a similar timeframe.

17 MR. CONTE: It was a Special Inspection Branch?

18 MR. GRIMES: Yes.

19 MR. CONTE: What was the focus of it?

20 MR. GRIMES: It was on -- it was a mini-diagnostic
21 type of thing to try to determine what some of the root
22 causes of the problems were.

23 MR. CONTE: This is the problem that led to the
24 shutdown of Unit-1? Is that --

25 MR. GRIMES: I think we were there just after.



1 MR. CONTE: It was applied to both units, Unit-1
2 and Unit-2?

3 MR. GRIMES: Yes. We looked at both units.

4 MR. CONTE: Do you remember any --

5 MR. GRIMES: But I don't remember. I'd have to
6 pull out the report to say what we did in maintenance. I
7 don't really recall what we did in maintenance. I know
8 there were substantially different attitudes between the
9 two, the two units, on operations and maintenance matters,
10 but that's about all I can recall.

11 MR. CONTE: We have access to NUDOCs, but not the
12 microfiche themselves at this point. Could I ask you to
13 commit to getting that report out?

14 MR. GRIMES: Sure. Give me a piece of paper.

15 [Pause.]

16 MR. GRIMES: The other thing, the other
17 involvement with Nine Mile has been through the Vendor
18 Branch where there have been a few problems in terms of
19 equipment, and I think it was electrical equipment, and this
20 dealt with General Electric and how well General Electric
21 qualified the equipment, I believe, or dedicated commercial
22 grade equipment for safety-related purposes.

23 So there probably -- probably is an inspection
24 report or two that would relate to that, if you're
25 interested.



1 MR. ASHE: Do you recall the specific pieces of
2 equipment you're talking about installed by GE?

3 MR. GRIMES: No.

4 MR. ASHE: Or any specific piece of equipment?

5 MR. GRIMES: No. Again, it was a couple years
6 ago. But it was electrical, in the electrical area.

7 MR. ASHE: All right. For this mini-diagnostic,
8 who was the Team Leader? Do you recall the guy on the
9 Special Inspection mini-diagnostics, as you characterized
10 it; do you recall the name of the Team Leader on that?

11 [Pause.]

12 MR. ASHE: You don't recall at the moment?

13 MR. GRIMES: No. I know I went up for part of the
14 inspection.

15 MR. CONTE: That will be obviously in the report.


16 MR. GRIMES: It will be in the report.

17 MR. IBARRA: On that paper, can you also give us a
18 copy of the BOP module inspection?

19 MR. GRIMES: Yes. Yes, I'll get you the BOP
20 module.

21 MR. IBARRA: Brian, can you tell us the Branches
22 under you, please?

23 MR. GRIMES: Yes. The Special Inspection Branch,
24 the Vendor Inspection Branch, and the Reactor Safeguards
25 Branch.



1 MR. IBARRA: When we're talking about the vendor
2 inspection, do you all do hardware as much as also
3 procedures?


4 MR. GRIMES: Oh, yes. In fact, much of our
5 activities are reactive, and we go out when something fails.
6 For example, we went to ASCO in August, because in early
7 August there was a report -- I think it involved perhaps
8 Calvert Cliffs -- that the calibration seemed to be or
9 something -- it was off when they used it, used the -- when
10 they did their DC -- checked their DC system or something.

11 Anyway, the Vendor Branch sent one or two people
12 out and determined that the vendor was using -- had the
13 wrong value in the vendor manual. They had used an AC value
14 for DC solenoid valves.

15 So the vendor has committed by the end of
16 September to, you know, determine what the right value is
17 and get to their customers and to report back to us.

18 So a lot of the vendor activity is reactive to
19 specific hardware problems rather than procedural. Now when
20 we're out there, we also look at their Part 21 reporting
21 evaluations and try to make sure that that threshold is
22 right and they're doing -- notifying their customers of
23 problems.

24 But often it's triggered not by the fact that we
25 haven't been there for awhile, but rather by the fact that



1 there's some specific events that we can use as examples to
2 dig into with the vendor.

3 MR. IBARRA: When the NSSS vendors did their EOP
4 revisions or their initial EOPs right after TMI, was your
5 group ever involved into looking into the integration aspect
6 of it?

7 In other words, when they were doing the EOPs do
8 we know if they had specialists in I&C, electrical, human
9 factors and so forth in the development of those EOPs?

10 MR. GRIMES: I guess we didn't look at that
11 particular aspect and we did get involved after the EOPs
12 were put in place. We did about 13 inspections of the Mark
13 I facilities, not including Nine Mile.

14 I think that was done by Region I but we did a
15 number of field inspections of how these things were
16 implemented in the field and whether the plant matched the
17 procedures and whether the procedures were doable, whether
18 the operators were trained, and observed simulator exercises
19 but we didn't go into the actual base recommendation of the
20 EOPs.

21 MR. ASHE: You mentioned something about vendor
22 inspections.

23 Are most of these at the vendor's facility?

24 MR. GRIMES: Most of them are but a few a year are
25 at power plants and there we look both at commercial grade



1 dedication and using commercial grade items and safety-
2 related things, things that were not produced under an
3 Appendix B manufacturing process but rather by commercial
4 grade and then special tests done.

5 That's part is vendor interface, 83-28 for
6 example, aspects. In the last year or so our focus has been
7 almost exclusively on the commercial grade. When we first
8 started in the '86 time frame it was more on the -- '85-'86
9 time frame, I guess it was more on the vendor interface
10 aspects but we -- for the most part people now have systems
11 that you evaluate at least for safety-related aspects with
12 the vendor information when it comes in the door and have it
13 processed and distributed to the right technical folks.

14 This eventually gets into the manuals they use for
15 maintenance on the equipment.

16 MR. ASHE: You mentioned that the vendor
17 inspection branch is reactive, suggesting that you wait
18 until something happens and then you go out and do
19 something.

20 Is there any activities that are proactive?

21 MR. GRIMES: Yes, there are a few and that are
22 related more to the utility inspections, particularly for
23 example commercial grade dedication, that consciously went
24 to a few plants and inspected them and then that resulted in
25 enough pressure that NUMARC started an initiative in that



1 area. We backed off for a year and we've been doing some
2 assessments. Now we're ready to go back to inspections, so
3 that's been a conscious area where we planned to look at a
4 particular area.

5 Other than that, I guess there's one, there's two
6 other areas that -- two other places we've been, GE and
7 Westinghouse, where we have gone in with the idea
8 specifically of looking at their threshold for reporting.
9 That was partly because of past experience but partly
10 because we made a conscious decision that we should, they
11 were pretty important players and that we should look at
12 that area.

13 MR. IBARRA: Was your branch involved in any of
14 the EQ inspections?

15 MR. GRIMES: Yes. When I was in I&E we did all
16 the, essentially all the EQ inspections on a fairly rapid
17 schedule.

18 MR. IBARRA: When we were looking at those
19 inspections did we make sure -- was there ever any
20 connection with the EOPs whatsoever?

21 Was there any tie-up?

22 MR. GRIMES: I don't recall a direct tie-up. The
23 EQ scope is a little bit broader or can be a little bit
24 broader than strictly safety-related but I think we relied
25 on the NRR SER to define the scope and then we just went out




1 and looked at the implementation of the things that had been
2 agreed that fell within the scope, so I don't think we were
3 looking at what should be or should not be inside because
4 they were relied on, the EOPs.

5 MR. IBARRA: Under your programs under the Special
6 Inspection Branch have a term called vertical slice, right,
7 or team inspections, which is a very good mechanism for
8 integration but do all your team inspections include an
9 electrical and an I&C engineer?

10 MR. GRIMES: No. The recent inspections by the
11 Regions we have a current area of emphasis, which is the
12 electrical area, so all of the current major -- a lot of the
13 current major team inspections are in the electrical area so
14 every plant, and we have been to about 30 I think so we are
15 about half-way through but every plant will have an
16 electrical/vertical slice by early '93, early calendar '93,
17 and we found a number of problems.

18 In fact we just had a counterpart meeting last
19 week and one day it was devoted to the electrical team
20 inspections, and should we -- one of the questions was
21 should we call a halt now and draw some general relations or
22 should we go on?

23 The consensus was we should go on and do every
24 plant because they are mostly implementation questions. They
25 aren't questions of telling somebody to do something. They



1 are how somebody implemented what they were supposed to do
2 and the errors they made.

3 For example, 7 out of 21 I think was the
4 statistics under voltage problems but that wasn't --
5 everybody had agreed to take care of under voltage grid
6 problems but the way they did it in detail, engineering
7 detail, based on their specific systems turned out to not be
8 adequate.


9 Those don't have an I&C component, for example.

10 Some of our vertical slices cover several
11 different areas, the SSFIs, the electrical and mechanical
12 systems and often they will have an I&C component also --
13 not always but quite frequently.

14 MR. IBARRA: For Instrumentation and Control
15 itself, are there any plans for a functional inspection just
16 dealing with instrumentation?

17 MR. GRIMES: Yes. Region V, as a result of a
18 vertical slice we did at San Onofre, one of the pilots for
19 the electrical inspection was a vertical slice. SSFI at San
20 Onofre had an I&C component. And out of that inspection, we
21 found enough problems that about a year later, Region V
22 went and looked strictly at I&C and found some, you know,
23 interesting things.

24 My understanding of where that stands is we've had
25 discussions with the Electrical Branch in Region V, and I



1 guess the I&C Branch has gotten involved, also. And I think
2 the thought is to do one or two more pilots with that, with
3 the I&C thing, but the consensus was it wasn't a big enough
4 safety payoff. While there were a lot of small findings, it
5 wasn't clear there would be a big enough saving payoff to do
6 it as a major, major thing. But we are planning to do one
7 or two more pilots with I&C as the focus.


8 MR. IBARRA: Team inspections, do they include a
9 human factors engineer?

10 MR. GRIMES: Not always. When we did the EOP
11 inspections, we did take along human factors folks, for
12 example. I think perhaps on the Nine-Mile diagnostic there
13 may have been a human factors person. It just depends on
14 the scope of the inspection. But not as a normal, as a
15 normal thing.

16 We get some, I was going to say we get input on
17 PRA from the PRA folks when we go out, as to where they
18 would suggest we focus in terms of importance for that
19 particular plant. But we don't usually get human factors
20 input unless it's a human factors-type problem.

21 MR. CONTE: Let me see if I can give you some
22 feedback here.

23 You're saying that the current electrical
24 functional inspections that you're doing right now are
25 mostly focused on power to the equipment rather than power



1 on the instruments? Is that what I'm hearing?

2 MR. GRIMES: Well, I would say yes.

3 MR. CONTE: And you're kind of piloting this I&C
4 component?

5 MR. GRIMES: We also, of course, worry about
6 whether the operators have the information to take the
7 actions. But the I&C look was more, in a little more detail
8 as to when the sequence of valve openings, it was
9 mechanical-electrical things. For example, switching from
10 injection to re-circ. mode. You have to look at all the
11 delay times, and you have to determine whether the setpoints
12 take into account all the uncertainties and all the
13 different possible conditions.

14 MR. CONTE: So this is looking at the instrument
15 loops themselves, not so much the power supplies to the
16 instrument loops?

17 MR. GRIMES: Right. The I&C really focuses on
18 that. The electrical inspection, certainly from the
19 standpoint of whether or not the operator has information,
20 they would look at it that far, but they would not go into
21 the actual instrument loop, they would take a load path.
22 They would come from the switchyard and under both offsite
23 available and offsite power not available, or testing during
24 a diesel test configuration. What if something happens at
25 that point; how does the system react?



1 Then they go through all the, take at least a load
2 path through all the different voltage levels and then look
3 at the actual calculations that support the adequacy of
4 that, and they draw some conclusions, and if they find
5 problems they ask the licensee to expand and check other
6 similar things.

7 MR. ASHE: When you say that you find problems
8 during these inspections, what kind of problems are you
9 talking about? Are you talking hardware problems, are you
10 talking software problems? And if so, could you give us a
11 percentage on each in raw figures?

12 MR. GRIMES: In terms of software, you mean
13 computer software?

14 MR. ASHE: No. I mean paper problems as opposed
15 to hardware problems which require hardware to be fixed.
16 That is to say you change a line, the cable is too small,
17 bus is not adequate, has to be replaced; as opposed to doing
18 other calculations, analysis, this, that, or the other.

19 MR. GRIMES: I'd say the first attempt, when we
20 identify a problem, is to sharpen the pencil and see if they
21 can make it go away.

22 I would say on these under-voltage problems, most
23 of those are resulting in actual changes to procedures, as
24 temporary fixes, and eventual hardware changes.

25 For example, Susquehanna, which had a setpoint to



1 switch over, which was, I can't remember the numbers, 85
2 percent, and they needed 92 percent, to run the, all the
3 equipment.


4 It was in their tech. spec's that 85 percent was
5 okay. They clearly could not run the equipment if the grid
6 had degraded there, so they put in temporary administrative
7 controls to switch over to the diesels, if the grid fell
8 that low, and they've got a longer-term hardware fix.

9 There are a number of other undervoltage problems
10 where similar things are being done. Hatch had to put in an
11 administrative fix. Dresden had to, I think, also.

12 MR. ASHE: In terms of percentages, did you take
13 the total number of problems identified in electrical, and
14 just give a broad over-figure, would you say 80 percent are
15 paper problems as opposed to 20 percent being hardware
16 problems? Paper problem being defined as the guy can't
17 demonstrate to you how he did the analysis to come up with
18 the hardware he has or something like that.

19 MR. GRIMES: I guess we don't really call it a
20 finding until we get down to the bottom of that trail.

21 InN other words, if he just has a problem showing
22 us some unresolved item until he shows us one way or
23 another, then when he shows us it's okay, then that goes
24 away. If he can't show it's okay, then he's got to do
25 something about it.



1 Probably if you're interested, the easiest thing
2 to do is we've got the inspection results today to compile a
3 computer listing and categorize a couple of different ways,
4 and we're still working on the program, but we do have a
5 printout of the electrical.

6 MR. ASHE: Do you recall the primary consultants
7 you are using to do these inspections with?

8 MR. GRIMES: Well, we use AECL, Atomic Energy of
9 Canada, Limited, as the prime contractor, and we've gone
10 through a number of people, some who we use again, some of
11 whom we don't. They also sub to several people that we've
12 used in the past. So we've got some pretty good consultants
13 identified by this time to assist us in the details. And
14 the regions, I was impressed at this counterpart meeting,
15 each of the regions got up and gave a presentation on a
16 particular technical area that was of interest to them, or
17 had given them problems, and each region demonstrated a
18 really in-depth, better than I thought they would, knowledge
19 of electrical theory and the safety significance.

20 MR. ASHE: What's the driving point behind that?
21 Obviously you feel that something is driving that, because
22 otherwise, it wouldn't be so widespread, the EDSFIs. Is
23 that simply based on the nature and number of problems that
24 you've found in your pilot inspection programs, or is it
25 based on something else?



31



1 MR. GRIMES: It came out of the SSFIs, partly, the
2 problems identified there, over the last few years. It also
3 came out of a study that Bill Johnson from Region I did, and
4 I think he came down to Headquarters and compiled the
5 experience information, and that was part of the input. And
6 I think that study is referenced in the temporary
7 instruction that's out to the Regions, if you want to
8 consult that. It was based on experience, essentially.


9 MR. CONTE: Who can we contact about the computer
10 listing you just mentioned?

11 MR. GRIMES: Let's see. I was trying to think who
12 is -- Gene Imbro is the branch chief, and Anil Gautam I
13 think is the best guy to talk to.

14 MR. CONTE: Okay. What's being found on
15 uninterruptible power supplies? Has that topic come up
16 recently in any of these electrical distribution SSFIs?
17 Just your nature of your work in dealing with the vendors.

18 MR. GRIMES: Well, the power supplies, whether
19 they're called uninterruptible or not doesn't matter too
20 much to us, and so I guess I don't have an impression on
21 that particular item.

22 I know we've had a lot of problems on bus
23 transfers from one power supply to another, so that that is
24 a problem. Transferring among the power supplies is
25 something that comes up.



1 MR. CONTE: How about with the -- to focus that
2 down a little better, where the ACs and DCs are being
3 provided as back-ups to one another, and the inverter
4 battery charger --

5 MR. GRIMES: I think you're going beyond my
6 electrical engineering expertise. I'm a chemical engineer.

7 MR. CONTE: So in your division, you haven't
8 really heard of an issue at this point with inverters, power
9 supplies --

10 MR. GRIMES: Oh, yes. I hear all of those things
11 as problems at various times, but I can't say there's an
12 overwhelming pattern like there is on under-voltage
13 problems. I think when you look at the computer list,
14 you'll be able to pick off, you know, a few of each of
15 those.


16 MR. ASHE: Are you planning to do any inspection
17 of Exide as a result of the Nine Mile Point occurrence?

18 MR. GRIMES: I haven't really looked into the
19 thing.

20 MR. ASHE: Are any of your people -- have they
21 touched base with Exide about uninterruptible power
22 supplies, as far as you know?

23 MR. GRIMES: Not as far as I know.

24 MR. CONTE: Would you characterize Exide as a
25 problem vendor?



1 MR. GRIMES: I don't think we've dealt with them.
2 I guess the one thing that surprised me in the trade press
3 was that Nine Mile was having trouble getting information
4 from Exide, but that to me is telling me we really ought to
5 have a relationship with a vendor that is willing to give us
6 the full design information on its product.

7 MR. CONTE: I went out and got this Information
8 Notice 88-05. It's Electro Devices, Incorporated of St.
9 Louis, Missouri. Apparently, the three plants affected had
10 fires. The fires, at least from the information notice,
11 it's not clear what caused the fires, but the commonality
12 there is all the power supplies were manufactured by Electro
13 Devices, Incorporated. Any knowledge on them?

14 MR. GRIMES: No, I don't recall that specific one.
15 We might have done an inspection, then in which case there
16 would be an inspection report, but the guys listed here were
17 not in the vendor branch, they were in the branch that
18 evaluated operating information. But we could take a look
19 and see if we've got any inspection reports on them.


20 MR. CONTE: Would you do that for us, please?

21 MR. GRIMES: Yes. And what was the number on
22 that?

23 MR. CONTE: Information 88-05.

24 MR. GRIMES: 88-05.

25 MR. CONTE: And the company is Electro --



1 MR. GRIMES: Electro.

2 MR. CONTE: -- Devices, Incorporated, of St.
3 Louis, Missouri.

4 MR. GRIMES: Yes. That's easy enough.

5 MR. CONTE: By the way, whatever you provide us,
6 please provide in duplicate. That's the standard rule.

7 MR. GRIMES: Okay.


8 MR. CONTE: Okay. Anymore specific questions?

9 MR. ASHE: Yes. On this Item 4, we have a
10 standard list. I don't know -- it may -- certainly, if you
11 don't have a response, perhaps you'd like to say that. I'm
12 just going to read it really right off here.

13 For each of the following equipment, should that
14 equipment be considered safety related, non safety related,
15 or important to safety, and why or why not? The first item
16 on the list is rod position, sensing elements, indicators
17 and their power supplies. In your mind, should that be
18 safety related, non safety related, important to safety, and
19 why or why not?

20 MR. GRIMES: I don't have enough information on
21 that. I guess you can read the rest of them, but I suspect
22 that I'm not going to have any strong opinions.

23 MR. ASHE: Okay. All right. All instrumentation
24 used to verify the reactor shutdown, to verify the reactor
25 shutdown? The same response?



1 MR. GRIMES: Same response except "all" is a very
2 big word. Generally, you can get away with less.

3 MR. ASHE: Most EOP used parameters and indicators
4 and equipment.


5 MR. GRIMES: In general, my experience is they are
6 not. There is a reliance in EOPs on both safety related and
7 non safety related equipment, with the realization that they
8 fall back to the safety related in a pinch. But they
9 generally use everything they've got.

10 MR. ASHE: And do you think that's adequate?

11 MR. GRIMES: Well, I think it's a good practice to
12 have your EOPs consider everything that's available.
13 Whether we've made the right delineation as between safety
14 related and non safety related, I think that's going to take
15 some more thinking.

16 MR. ASHE: Okay. And the last item on the list is
17 the power supplies to control annunciators and balance of
18 plant instrumentation. Should it be safety related, non
19 safety related, important to safety, and if so, why or why
20 not?

21 MR. GRIMES: I guess annunciators are not safety
22 related, and I think it's appropriate to have special
23 procedures if you lose them to be able to know when you have
24 trouble with them. But you can make a reasonable case that
25 they don't have to be safety related, but again you could



1 take some detailed failure analysis and decisions on how
2 often you run into that kind of thing before you make a
3 final decision, I think.

4 MR. CONTE: Do you have any general guidance for
5 us in this list of all these instrumentations? Some of
6 them, the instrument strings perform safety related
7 functions directly. They cause actuations, they cause
8 trips. In other cases, they're used by the operators to
9 verify, to monitor. Any guidance in your mind for us what
10 should be safety related?


11 MR. GRIMES: Well, current definitions, safety
12 related would not necessarily include things that provide
13 information, things that can cause problems or whose failure
14 could cause problems, or -- which is directly relied on in
15 an accident. So if you broaden the definition, you're
16 sweeping in a lot of other equipment, and the question is
17 does that dilute our attention? You can pour a lot of
18 attention on a small island, whereas we might not be able to
19 put that much attention on everything. On the other hand,
20 it's good to treat everything like it was significant.

21 MR. CONTE: As you can gather, we're dealing with
22 non safety related equipment.

23 MR. GRIMES: I know.

24 MR. CONTE: That is why all these questions.

25 MR. IBARRA: Let me ask you an additional




1 question. You mentioned EDSFI has come out of the SSFI
2 area. And you also mentioned that Scott Newberry has said
3 that there wasn't very much to be gained from a safety point
4 of view. We looked at Instrumentation and Control. But are
5 we really going that extra mile? Because I think electrical
6 stops at the bus. And yet we're dealing in incidents like
7 this at the instrument level, where they failed.

8 Are we missing the link here?

9 MR. GRIMES: I don't know. I guess I'd want to
10 look at the TI and see how far down we actually have people
11 taking this. Maybe the TI is something else. But I think
12 we are looking at a lot of different failure modes. And
13 when the electrical inspectors look at this they postulate
14 all kinds of different initiating events and what-if events
15 to test the adequacy of the setup.

16 But generally, the problems don't come from how
17 you bought the equipment, but from how you engineered the
18 equipment, and not even whether it's redundant or not, but
19 whether the engineer hooked it up right or not.

20 So often there's better payoff looking at the
21 details and the implementation of the details and the
22 calculations that support the coordination of breakers or
23 whatever it is, or getting the voltage there, than there is
24 defining something in a particular safety class. That
25 assures redundancy and maybe some quality and higher



1 reliability, but it doesn't assure that the engineer hooks
2 it up right.


3 In this case, it may be a case of somebody not
4 paying enough attention to batteries or whatever it was in
5 terms of making sure the configuration stayed okay. And
6 maybe you buy something by making sure your maintenance
7 program covers a broad area.

8 MR. IBARRA: Previous to getting on Nine-Mile
9 Point, I was involved in a study, and I've been talking to
10 Gene Imbro and Anil. But it was looking at instrumentation
11 and the type of problems that are being encountered. We are
12 seeing a lot of design-type issues that I think might have a
13 direct bearing with Nine-Mile Point.

14 So we are concerned with non-safety-related
15 equipment that is being used by the operators, and them not
16 realizing what they had.

17 MR. GRIMES: I think if you get some insights out
18 of this IIT, the way I'd like to approach this kind of
19 problem is not blanket regulation, but targeting focus of
20 inspection or review. So if you get some insights as to how
21 we might focus a couple of inspections, we would be happy to
22 look at those and work with the technical branches, maybe
23 shape an inspection to look at some areas and see what we
24 find when we dig into a different plant in that area.

25 MR. ASHE: to your knowledge, is there anybody in



1 the NRC looking at upgrading the power supplies for selected
2 equipment?

3 MR. GRIMES: It doesn't ring a bell.

4 MR. IBARRA: Like I mentioned before, your Special
5 Inspections Branch do a very good job on integration because
6 of the vertical slice technique, but from your understanding
7 of the staff itself, the NRC, is there the same, is there a
8 like mechanism that is taking care not only on a spot basis,
9 but overall? Is anybody looking at the whole integration
10 aspect?

11 MR. GRIMES: PRA is supposed to do part of that,
12 supposed to give you relative importance of various systems
13 and various failure modes and things. So from one
14 standpoint, from a kind of an overview, a single-line
15 diagram standpoint, PRA kind of does that. And there are
16 some interfaces on particular problems between the technical
17 branches and things. I don't think there's any, there's no
18 vertical slice branch setups there. But that is a powerful
19 technique, as you said, to look at the integration of
20 various disciplines in a team-type fashion.

21 MR. ASHE: Do you give any special attention to
22 common cause problems that you identified in your various
23 inspections?

24 MR. GRIMES: That's something we worry about if we
25 can find, if we find something that we think is a common



1 mode between things, and sometimes design errors are common
2 under voltage.

3 MR. ASHE: But no special treatment?

4 MR. GRIMES: Give me an example of a common cause
5 and I can maybe better --

6 MR. ASHE: Okay. Five pieces of equipment go down
7 because you wired them wrong.

8 MR. GRIMES: That's what I mean by design, if you
9 got sloppy design or whatever. If we find poor design
10 implementation in one area, we'd probably ask the utility to
11 check other similar areas to see if the same problem was
12 there. So from that standpoint, vertical slice finds a
13 particular problem, then asks the horizontal problem.
14 Doesn't apply to other areas.


15 MR. IBARRA: Do you perform those design
16 inspections?

17 MR. GRIMES: Yes.

18 MR. IBARRA: Under your branch?

19 MR. GRIMES: Yes. Yes. And the Regions do, also.
20 The module is there for the regions to use, or for us to
21 use.

22 Now, we also do NTOL design inspections,
23 integrated design inspections, or overview of IDVPs, by the
24 utilities. We probably are going to down to Unit 2 at
25 Comanche Peak this Fall to take a look at construction and



1 design.

2 MR. CONTE: What is the NRC's position or policy
3 on vendor-related recommendations, the tech. manual
4 requirements on preventive maintenance, or what have you, as
5 it applies to safety, non-safety, and what's our source,
6 what's our regulatory basis for that? Do you understand
7 what I'm driving at? Do we expect utilities to implement
8 everything that's in a vendor manual from a preventive
9 maintenance program? Do we have a position on that? Do we
10 ask utilities to evaluate that, apply as appropriate, what
11 is our position?

12 MR. GRIMES: With respect to safety-related
13 equipment, the position clearly is they must take the
14 information they have from the vendor, evaluate it, and
15 determine to what extent it applies to them and do it. We
16 do not expect them to implement everything the vendor says,
17 but to consciously decide whether indeed it applies, on an
18 engineering basis, does it apply to their situation.

19 MR. CONTE: Is that policy in the recent generic
20 letter that modified the scope of the Salem ATWS; it's a 90-
21 03 something?

22 MR. GRIMES: I don't know. That's more to do with
23 how often you check with your vendor to find out whether
24 he's got new information for you.

25 MR. CONTE: Where's the written document on this



1 policy?

2 MR. GRIMES: 83-28 I thought covered it to some
3 extent with respect to having an engineering process to
4 consider this.

5 MR. CONTE: How about non-safety?

6 MR. GRIMES: None-safety, I don't know if there's
7 a written policy.

8 MR. CONTE: Well, we do know that 83-28 loosely
9 tried to broaden the actions to the important-to-safety. It
10 uses those words. Any licensee response was, basically from
11 what we can get, it was accepted. Yes, we have that or we
12 don't need it.

13 I think I've got that straight. Thank you. What
14 else?

15 MR. ASHE: Is there a more detailed interface
16 between your groups and the various other NRR technical
17 review groups, other than what you've already said. From
18 time to time, you said you talked to Newberry and a few more
19 others.

20 MR. GRIMES: Yes. In particular, when we
21 developed, for example, electrical module, there was a great
22 deal of sharing of the draft inspection procedure and
23 working with the electrical branch. We also encourage
24 people to come up on our inspections. We don't get a lot of
25 that, but we get some.



1 MR. ASHE: Is there a formal mechanism of sharing
2 your inspection findings with the various NRR groups that
3 may be interested in some findings that you would have?


4 MR. GRIMES: Just the availability of the
5 inspection reports, mainly.

6 MR. ASHE: So, there's no formal mechanism?

7 MR. GRIMES: We -- we -- the other mechanism is
8 periodically, we write information notices. For example,
9 this last winter we wrote an information notice on initial
10 results of the electrical inspections. That gets
11 distributed to everybody. Other than that, the formal
12 mechanism is -- there are a couple of mechanisms, one is the
13 technical systems request from the regions. When we run
14 into a problem where there's no clear guidance, the regions
15 will write in, if they're doing an inspection, or we'll
16 write it if we're doing the inspection, to the technical
17 branch and say we need some interface on this particular
18 subject.

19 As we see general areas come up, we occasionally
20 write. In fact we just got a response on testing of
21 breakers or something, what should be expected. When that
22 area isn't clear, we'll try to flush that out of the
23 technical branches.

24 But, the availability of the inspection reports is
25 the principal thing and the NRR weekly highlights, of



1 course, carries the results of headquarters inspections to
2 the other branches.

3 MR. ASHE: Do you have anything else to offer?
4 I'll just take any positive or negative that you feel that
5 we haven't covered or we didn't cover it adequately, or
6 questions that we should have asked and that we did not ask.

7 MR. GRIMES: I don't know enough about the Nine
8 Mile event to really make a judgment in that area. I guess
9 I would re-emphasize, just based on 20-some years of
10 experience in this place that the biggest safety pay-off
11 comes when you find problems and focus in on them, as
12 opposed to trying to find a new definition that will fit
13 everything in the world. I find we get a lot more safety
14 payoff if power supplies are the problems or whatever, that
15 we then devote some resources to them and the details of
16 that particular thing, rather than trying to redefine the
17 world.

18 MR. CONTE: Yes. I think what you're saying is --
19 let me summarize for you -- to focus on the treatment of the
20 equipment rather than the classification of it. That's good
21 advice. Thank you. Frank?

22 MR. ASHE: I don't have anything.

23 MR. CONTE: Jose?

24 MR. IBARRA: I don't have anything else.

25 MR. CONTE: I don't have anything else. We -- I



1 do want to summarize here. We have to be somewhat formal in
2 our request for documents, so we're going to follow-up our
3 request here with a listing. And you'll see something faxed
4 to you.

5 MR. GRIMES: Okay.

6 MR. CONTE: But I wanted to make sure we got the
7 list of documents straight.

8 MR. GRIMES: Here's my list.

9 MR. CONTE: I was taking notes here. Correct me
10 if I'm wrong guys. You're going to provide the BOP module.
11 We asked for that. The special inspection that was done, in
12 the winter of '89 or '90 at Nine Mile. Nine Mile Point
13 vendor inspection reports.

14 MR. GRIMES: If we have any vendor inspection
15 reports that relate to Nine Mile. At GE we talked about
16 that.

17 MR. CONTE: Thanks. And the TI on the EDSFI, and
18 any information on Electro Devices -- any inspection report
19 which is related to the information notice 88-05. I heard
20 somebody say something about a computer listing of problems
21 or something?

22 MR. GRIMES: Yes. Findings -- computer list of
23 EDSFI findings.

24 MR. ASHE: I think he wanted to make it a little
25 broader than that because he was interested in I&C also.



1 MR. GRIMES: That's the only computer list I've
2 got.

3 MR. CONTE: Just to make sure we've got the right
4 words, I'm going to xerox a copy of this paper when we go
5 out, and I'll give this back to you and you'll see the
6 follow-up.

7 MR. GRIMES: Okay.

8 MR. CONTE: Okay. With that, let's go off the
9 record.

10 [Whereupon, at 2:03 o'clock p.m. the above-
11 entitled interview was concluded.]

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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

in the matter of:

NAME OF PROCEEDING: Brian Grimes

DOCKET NUMBER:

PLACE OF PROCEEDING: Bethesda, Maryland

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.

Marilyn Estep

Official Reporter
Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.

