

ORIGINAL

07-160A-91

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Agency: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Incident Investigation Team

Title: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant
Interview of: JOE SABOCA

Docket No.

LOCATION: Scriba, New York

DATE: Monday, August 26, 1991

PAGES: 1 - 13


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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
475 ALLENDALE ROAD
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406

September 27, 1991


MEMORANDUM FOR: Martin J. McCormick, Plant Manager, Nine Mile Point Unit 2
FROM: Wayne L. Schmidt, Senior Resident Inspector, Nine Mile Point
SUBJECT: Review of IIT Interview Transcripts


The IIT has sent the transcripts of interviews conducted with the personnel listed below to the resident inspector's office. If any of the listed individuals wish to review the transcripts they should do so at the resident inspector's office by October 4, 1991. Guidelines for the review of transcripts are provided in the enclosure. If an individual does not review his transcript by that date we will assume that he did not wish to do so and that the statement is correct to the best of his knowledge.

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Thank you for your help. If there are any questions please contact me.

Wayne L. Schmidt
Wayne L. Schmidt
Senior Resident Inspector
Nine Mile Point





UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM


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Interview of :
JOE SABOCA :
(Closed) :

Conference Room B
Administration Building
Nine Mile Point Nuclear
Power Plant, Unit Two
Lake Road
Scriba, New York 13093
Monday, August 26, 1991

The interview commenced, pursuant to notice,
at 1:10 p.m.

PRESENT FOR THE IIT:
John Kauffman, NRC
William Vatter, INPO
Walton Jensen, NRC



P R O C E E D I N G S

[1:10 p.m.]

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2
3 MR. KAUFFMAN: At this time we'll go on the
4 record. My name is John Kauffman. I'm out of NRC
5 headquarters. We're here at the Nine Mile Point, Unit Two,
6 P admin building, conducting interviews concerning a
7 transient and plant response to an event on August 13, 1991.

8 MR. JENSEN: I'm Walton Jensen. I'm from the NRC
9 headquarters, and I'm a systems engineer on the IIT.

10 MR. VATTER: I'm Bill Vatter from INPO.

11 MR. SABOCA: I'm Joe Saboca. I'm Unit Two general
12 supervisor for mechanical maintenance.

13 MR. KAUFFMAN: Joe, at this time I'd like you to
14 tell us a little bit about your previous background and
15 experience you brought to your job and a little bit about
16 what your current job responsibilities are.

17 MR. SABOCA: Prior to being general supervisor, I
18 was maintenance supervisor. We had a reorganization, and
19 the buildings and grounds fell under my responsibility. At
20 that time I became a general supervisor.

21 Prior to that I was a construction supervisor for
22 construction services over at Unit One. Prior to that I was
23 a maintenance support engineer. Prior to that I was a
24 contract supervisor for Chicago Bridge & Iron Company in
25 New Castle, Delaware.



1 My responsibilities are Unit Two: I'm responsible
2 for the mechanical maintenance department, and that includes
3 the buildings and grounds crews, which are laundry and
4 decon, so I have mechanical maintenance and also laundry and
5 decon.

6 MR. KAUFFMAN: Okay. Good.

7 There are a number of equipment responses and some
8 equipment problems in this event. Walt has a list here, so
9 we'll let Walt run down through his list and ask some detail
10 technical questions.

11 MR. JENSEN: All right. I'd like, if it's okay,
12 to go one system at a time and talk about the present
13 maintenance status, and past and future, with regard, I
14 guess, first to the RHR system.

15 We understand that, at the time of the event, the
16 B and C RHR pumps were both take out of service. We're
17 wondering if you could address the cause of that and whether
18 or not it's general practice to take two trains of safety
19 equipment out at the same time.

20 MR. SABOCA: I don't know why the two RHR loops
21 were out of service at the time, so I can't say whether or
22 not that would be a general practice. It would depend on
23 the reason they were taken out.

24 MR. JENSEN: Do you know they were taken out?

25 MR. SABOCA: No, I do not.



1 MR. JENSEN: Later in the event, there were
2 problems with the RHR MOV-142 valve, which drains water from
3 the RHR system into the rad waste system. Are you familiar
4 with the problems that occurred with that valve. We wonder
5 if there have been similar problems in the past and what the
6 future maintenance might be on that valve?

7 MR. SABOCA: Again I'm not familiar with the
8 problems with that valve.

9 MR. JENSEN: Has anyone from operations discussed
10 problems with the RHR system during the event with you or
11 worked up maintenance requests?

12 MR. SABOCA: No, they haven't>

13 MR. JENSEN: Okay.

14 Any questions?

15 MR. KAUFFMAN: No.


16 MR. JENSEN: All right.

17 Standby gas treatment: I understand that train B
18 was inop at the time of the event. Are you familiar with
19 any problems with that system?

20 MR. SABOCA: No, again, and I don't know why it
21 was inop at the time, either.

22 MR. JENSEN: Okay.

23 RCIC: They had reported problems with the
24 automatic flow controller, and they had to go to manual. We
25 understand this was a longstanding problem. Are you aware



1 of that problem and of any attempt to stabilize the
2 automatic control system?

3 MR. SABOCA: Again, I'm not familiar with that
4 problem.

5 MR. VATTER: Is that something that would fall
6 under the jurisdiction of mechanical maintenance, because
7 it's a comp, or would it be I&C that would be messing with
8 that controller?

9 MR. SABOCA: That's would be an I&C
10 responsibility.

11 MR. JENSEN: Okay.

12 We understand that there were several water hammer
13 problems occurring during the event, when the reactor
14 cleanup was actuated and when the RHR MOV-142 was opened.
15 Are you aware of any mechanical maintenance that came from
16 those water hammers?

17 MR. SABOCA: No, I'm not aware of any maintenance
18 problems that came from those water hammers. I do know that
19 during the event engineering requested to do a walk-down of
20 those systems, or portions of those systems, to inspect for
21 any damage to snubbers, hangers, spring cans, that type of
22 equipment.

23 MR. VATTER: Did you or your people participate in
24 that water hammer -- excuse me; in that walkdown?

25 MR. SABOCA: A damage control team was sent out to



1 do those inspections with engineering. I don't know for
2 certain, but I imagine there was a mechanic to go with them.

3 MR. JENSEN: All right.

4 Back to the RCIC system. There were problems
5 during the event with ALV-56 and 57, which had intermittent
6 valve position at different times during the event. Are
7 you aware of this problems? Has it been something that has
8 occurred in the past? Are there maintenance requests
9 written on these?

10 MR. SABOCA: I'm more familiar with these. One
11 note of correction: It's ICS ALV-156 and 157.

12 We had maintenance requests on both of those
13 valves this outage. On 156, the original problem was dual
14 indication, I believe. That was corrected by adjusting the
15 limit switches. On 157, I was not aware there was a problem
16 with that valve during the event; however, a problem
17 developed this outage, and we disassembled that valve,
18 inspected it, reassembled it, and reset the limit switches.

19 MR. JENSEN: Is this a recurring problem that has
20 happened before, or is this the first time this particular
21 problem has occurred?

22 MR. SABOCA: These check valves are Anchor-Darling
23 testable check valves, and position indication is a
24 recurring problem with these valves.

25 There is a mod designed for the limit switches for



1 these Anchor-Darling valves, and that mod has been
2 installed on several of our Anchor-Darling testable checks.
3 It has been installed on AOV-156; it has not been installed
4 on 157.

5 MR. JENSEN: Is this a vendor-supplied
6 modification from Anchor-Darling?

7 MR. SABOCA: No, I believe it was an engineering
8 design, in house.


9 MR. KAUFFMAN: What does that mod do or correct?
10 What's the purpose of the mod?

11 MR. SABOCA: The purpose of the mod is, the
12 indicator shaft on the Anchor-Darling testable checks is,
13 especially on 156 and 157, either a quarter inch or five
14 sixteenths diameter, and it tends to bend really easily.
15 This mod adds a bearing on the outboard side and a larger
16 cam. Part of it is to prevent that indicator shaft from
17 bending.

18 MR. JENSEN: Any other questions on RCIC?

19 [No response.]

20 MR. JENSEN: Well, let's look at the feedwater and
21 condensate systems. There were problems with the 84-series
22 valves in the suction of the main feedwater pumps. These
23 valves were closed before -- they were closed, and then the
24 condensate booster pumps were started, and then they
25 couldn't open the valves again. Do you know the nature of



1 that problem and why it occurred, why the valves couldn't be
2 opened?

3 MR. SABOCA: No, I don't know the nature of that
4 problem. We had possibly a related problem with CNM MOV-84-
5 A. We tried to use it as an isolation point, and we could
6 not close it the whole way, or ops could not close it the
7 whole way. We didn't get a good isolation; it closed, but
8 it wasn't 100 percent closed, or it appeared not to be 100
9 percent closed.

10 MR. VATTER: Because you had leakage?

11 MR. SABOCA: Because we had leakage by, right. It
12 was determined by operations and maintenance that it was
13 leaking by the 84 valve, not one of the other isolation
14 points.

15 MR. VATTER: Do you know what type of valve that
16 is?

17 MR. SABOCA: It's a Clow tricentric stop valve
18 with a limit-torque actuator.


19 MR. VATTER: I don't understand that terminology.
20 Does that mean it's a globe valve?

21 MR. SABOCA: No. It's a tricentric stop. It's a
22 disc on a --

23 MR. VATTER: So it's a swing-disc type.

24 MR. SABOCA: Right.

25 MR. KAUFFMAN: When did you have this problem with



1 the leakage? Was that in the outage, before the event?

2 MR. SABOCA: No, several weeks before the outage.
3 We were getting set to do maintenance on the min flow check
4 valve. It was a pressure-sealed check valve. The pressure
5 seal was leaking, and we needed to use the 84 as an
6 isolation point.

7 MR. JENSEN: Is there periodic calibration of the
8 limit-torque switches on the valves in the condensate and
9 feedwater systems?

10 MR. SABOCA: The responsibility for setting up and
11 maintaining limit-torques rests with the electrical
12 maintenance department.

13 MR. JENSEN: Okay.

14 MR. VATTER: Do you have a valve diagnostic
15 program using something like MOVATS or VOTES or one of those
16 other diagnostic systems?

17 MR. SABOCA: Yes. We use MOVATS here, and,
18 again, that's the responsibility of electrical maintenance.
19 I'm not familiar with VOTES.

20 MR. JENSEN: Is MOVATS used on the condensate and
21 feedwater systems?

22 MR. SABOCA: I don't know. That's electrical's
23 responsibility; they would be able to tell you.

24 MR. JENSEN: We understand that the reason that
25 the 84-series valves are closed when the condensate booster



1 pumps are started is to prevent damage to the upstream
2 feedwater system. Are you familiar with that damage and
3 where it was and what it entailed?

4 MR. SABOCA: No, I'm not.

5 MR. JENSEN: Could you address in general the
6 preventive maintenance program that is exercised on non-
7 safety equipment? Is there such a program to prevent
8 potential damage in non-safety-equipment, and how is that
9 maintained?

10 MR. SABOCA: We have a preventative maintenance
11 program on non-safety-related equipment. What we did back
12 during construction days was, we evaluated all the equipment
13 we had in the plant and, based on our experience at Unit
14 One, we decided -- it was a combination. Based on our
15 experience at Unit One and vendor recommendations, we
16 decided which equipment we would and would not perform
17 preventative maintenance on. That went across safety-
18 related and non-safety-related equipment.

19 So, yes, we have a non-safety-related PM program.

20 There was another half to your question. What was
21 the other portion of the question?

22 MR. JENSEN: Well, I think you've answered it.
23 Does that include the condensate and feedwater system? Is
24 there a preventive maintenance program on that?

25 MR. SABOCA: We have preventative maintenance on



1 both condensate and feedwater; however, specifically the 84
2 valves, no, to my knowledge, there is no preventative
3 maintenance on those 84 valves.

4 As a note, the 84 valves were replaced at our
5 first refuel outage.

6 MR. VATTER: Why was that?

7 MR. SABOCA: We never got adequate isolation
8 capability with the original design, so they were replaced.

9 MR. VATTER: So this is a different-design valve?

10 MR. SABOCA: It's very similar. The seat design
11 is different. The original valves were Clow tricentric stop
12 valves, also; this is a later model.

13 MR. JENSEN: I have a general question. In your
14 view, is the maintenance backlog of work orders something
15 that has been decreasing with time or increasing, or is it
16 about -- About how many maintenance work orders are
17 outstanding at this time?

18 MR. SABOCA: Our backlog has been decreasing, and
19 we recently had a PSC goal to decrease our backlog. I don't
20 remember the numbers offhand, but we met that goal. The
21 problem we've had with decreasing maintenance backlog has
22 been what operations will allow us to work while the plant
23 is running. That has had more of an impact than the number
24 of work orders.

25 MR. KAUFFMAN: Bill, do you have any questions?



1 MR. VATTER: No.

2 MR. JENSEN: That's about the end of my list.

3 MR. KAUFFMAN: Just a general topic: We've been
4 asking the questions. Is there anything that you learned
5 about this event or know about this event that you think is
6 important or interesting and something that we might like to
7 know?

8 Do you know of any failures, for example, as a
9 result of the event that we didn't bring up?

10 MR. SABOCA: We had a problem with the turbine
11 turning gear when the plant came down.

12 MR. VATTER: What was the cause of that problem?

13 [No response.]

14 MR. VATTER: We heard that the turbine wouldn't go
15 on the turning gear.

16 MR. SABOCA: That's correct.

17 MR. VATTER: But I think we don't know much beyond
18 that -- or I don't personally know much beyond that.

19 MR. SABOCA: I believe what happened was, when the
20 plant came down and the turbine coasted to a stop, it was
21 several hours before operations tried to put it on gear.
22 Our feeling is that it may have warped slightly, and then,
23 when they tried to put it on gear, the turning gear motor
24 didn't have enough torque to take that wobble out.

25 We rolled it by hand; once we did that, we were



1 able to get it on turning gear.

2 MR. VATTER: I infer from your answer that that
3 turning gear does not start automatically when it coasts
4 down.

5 MR. SABOCA: I don't believe it does. I believe
6 there's an ops procedure to put it on gear.

7 MR. JENSEN: Any more questions?

8 [No response.]

9 MR. KAUFFMAN: That concludes the interview.

10 [Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., the taking of the
11 interview was concluded.]

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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

In the Matter of:

NAME OF PROCEEDING: Interview of Joe Saboca


DOCKET NUMBER: (Not applicable)

PLACE OF PROCEEDING: Scriba, New York

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.

Mark Handy

Mark Handy
Official Reporter
Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.



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Interview of: JOE SABOCA

Docket No.

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
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
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
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P R O C E E D I N G S

[1:10 p.m.]

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3 MR. KAUFFMAN: At this time we'll go on the
4 record. My name is John Kauffman. I'm out of NRC
5 headquarters. We're here at the Nine Mile Point, Unit Two,
6 P admin building, conducting interviews concerning a
7 transient and plant response to an event on August 13, 1991.

8 MR. JENSEN: I'm Walton Jensen. I'm from the NRC
9 headquarters, and I'm a systems engineer on the IIT.

10 MR. VATTER: I'm Bill Vatter from INPO.

11 MR. SABOCA: I'm Joe Saboca. I'm Unit Two general
12 supervisor for mechanical maintenance.

13 MR. KAUFFMAN: Joe, at this time I'd like you to
14 tell us a little bit about your previous background and
15 experience you brought to your job and a little bit about
16 what your current job responsibilities are.

17 MR. SABOCA: Prior to being general supervisor, I
18 was maintenance supervisor. We had a reorganization, and
19 the buildings and grounds fell under my responsibility. At
20 that time I became a general supervisor.

21 Prior to that I was a construction supervisor for
22 construction services over at Unit One. Prior to that I was
23 a maintenance support engineer. Prior to that I was a
24 contract supervisor for Chicago Bridge & Iron Company in
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1 My responsibilities are Unit Two: I'm responsible
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7 There are a number of equipment responses and some
8 equipment problems in this event. Walt has a list here, so
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10 technical questions.

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15 We understand that, at the time of the event, the
16 B and C RHR pumps were both take out of service. We're
17 wondering if you could address the cause of that and whether
18 or not it's general practice to take two trains of safety
19 equipment out at the same time.

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21 were out of service at the time, so I can't say whether or
22 not that would be a general practice. It would depend on
23 the reason they were taken out.

24 MR. JENSEN: Do you know they were taken out?

25 MR. SABOCA: No, I do not.



1 MR. JENSEN: Later in the event, there were
2 problems with the RHR MOV-142 valve, which drains water from
3 the RHR system into the rad waste system. Are you familiar
4 with the problems that occurred with that valve. We wonder
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10 problems with the RHR system during the event with you or
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12 MR. SABOCA: No, they haven't>

13 MR. JENSEN: Okay.

14 Any questions?

15 MR. KAUFFMAN: No.


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8 occurred in the past? Are there maintenance requests
9 written on these?

10 MR. SABOCA: I'm more familiar with these. One
11 note of correction: It's ICS ALV-156 and 157.

12 We had maintenance requests on both of those
13 valves this outage. On 156, the original problem was dual
14 indication, I believe. That was corrected by adjusting the
15 limit switches. On 157, I was not aware there was a problem
16 with that valve during the event; however, a problem
17 developed this outage, and we disassembled that valve,
18 inspected it, reassembled it, and reset the limit switches.

19 MR. JENSEN: Is this a recurring problem that has
20 happened before, or is this the first time this particular
21 problem has occurred?

22 MR. SABOCA: These check valves are Anchor-Darling
23 testable check valves, and position indication is a
24 recurring problem with these valves.

25 There is a mod designed for the limit switches for



1 these Anchor-Darling valves, and that mod has been
2 installed on several of our Anchor-Darling testable checks.
3 It has been installed on AOV-156; it has not been installed
4 on 157.

5 MR. JENSEN: Is this a vendor-supplied
6 modification from Anchor-Darling?

7 MR. SABOCA: No, I believe it was an engineering
8 design, in house.

9 MR. KAUFFMAN: What does that mod do or correct?
10 What's the purpose of the mod?

11 MR. SABOCA: The purpose of the mod is, the
12 indicator shaft on the Anchor-Darling testable checks is,
13 especially on 156 and 157, either a quarter inch or five
14 sixteenths diameter, and it tends to bend really easily.
15 This mod adds a bearing on the outboard side and a larger
16 cam. Part of it is to prevent that indicator shaft from
17 bending.

18 MR. JENSEN: Any other questions on RCIC?

19 [No response.]

20 MR. JENSEN: Well, let's look at the feedwater and
21 condensate systems. There were problems with the 84-series
22 valves in the suction of the main feedwater pumps. These
23 valves were closed before -- they were closed, and then the
24 condensate booster pumps were started, and then they
25 couldn't open the valves again. Do you know the nature of



1 that problem and why it occurred, why the valves couldn't be
2 opened?

3 MR. SABOCA: No, I don't know the nature of that
4 problem. We had possibly a related problem with CNM MOV-84-
5 A. We tried to use it as an isolation point, and we could
6 not close it the whole way, or ops could not close it the
7 whole way. We didn't get a good isolation; it closed, but
8 it wasn't 100 percent closed, or it appeared not to be 100
9 percent closed.

10 MR. VATTER: Because you had leakage?

11 MR. SABOCA: Because we had leakage by, right. It
12 was determined by operations and maintenance that it was
13 leaking by the 84 valve, not one of the other isolation
14 points.

15 MR. VATTER: Do you know what type of valve that
16 is?

17 MR. SABOCA: It's a Clow tricentric stop valve
18 with a limit-torque actuator.


19 MR. VATTER: I don't understand that terminology.
20 Does that mean it's a globe valve?

21 MR. SABOCA: No. It's a tricentric stop. It's a
22 disc on a --

23 MR. VATTER: So it's a swing-disc type.

24 MR. SABOCA: Right.

25 MR. KAUFFMAN: When did you have this problem with



1 the leakage? Was that in the outage, before the event?

2 MR. SABOCA: No, several weeks before the outage.
3 We were getting set to do maintenance on the min flow check
4 valve. It was a pressure-sealed check valve. The pressure
5 seal was leaking, and we needed to use the 84 as an
6 isolation point.

7 MR. JENSEN: Is there periodic calibration of the
8 limit-torque switches on the valves in the condensate and
9 feedwater systems?

10 MR. SABOCA: The responsibility for setting up and
11 maintaining limit-torques rests with the electrical
12 maintenance department.

13 MR. JENSEN: Okay.


14 MR. VATTER: Do you have a valve diagnostic
15 program using something like MOVATS or VOTES or one of those
16 other diagnostic systems?

17 MR. SABOCA: Yes. We use MOVATS here, and,
18 again, that's the responsibility of electrical maintenance.
19 I'm not familiar with VOTES.

20 MR. JENSEN: Is MOVATS used on the condensate and
21 feedwater systems?

22 MR. SABOCA: I don't know. That's electrical's
23 responsibility; they would be able to tell you.

24 MR. JENSEN: We understand that the reason that
25 the 84-series valves are closed when the condensate booster



1 pumps are started is to prevent damage to the upstream
2 feedwater system. Are you familiar with that damage and
3 where it was and what it entailed?

4 MR. SABOCA: No, I'm not.

5 MR. JENSEN: Could you address in general the
6 preventive maintenance program that is exercised on non-
7 safety equipment? Is there such a program to prevent
8 potential damage in non-safety-equipment, and how is that
9 maintained?

10 MR. SABOCA: We have a preventative maintenance
11 program on non-safety-related equipment. What we did back
12 during construction days was, we evaluated all the equipment
13 we had in the plant and, based on our experience at Unit
14 One, we decided -- it was a combination. Based on our
15 experience at Unit One and vendor recommendations, we
16 decided which equipment we would and would not perform
17 preventative maintenance on. That went across safety-
18 related and non-safety-related equipment.

19 So, yes, we have a non-safety-related PM program.

20 There was another half to your question. What was
21 the other portion of the question?

22 MR. JENSEN: Well, I think you've answered it.
23 Does that include the condensate and feedwater system? Is
24 there a preventive maintenance program on that?

25 MR. SABOCA: We have preventative maintenance on



1 both condensate and feedwater; however, specifically the 84
2 valves, no, to my knowledge, there is no preventative
3 maintenance on those 84 valves.

4 As a note, the 84 valves were replaced at our
5 first refuel outage.

6 MR. VATTER: Why was that?

7 MR. SABOCA: We never got adequate isolation
8 capability with the original design, so they were replaced.


9 MR. VATTER: So this is a different-design valve?

10 MR. SABOCA: It's very similar. The seat design
11 is different. The original valves were Clow tricentric stop
12 valves, also; this is a later model.

13 MR. JENSEN: I have a general question. In your
14 view, is the maintenance backlog of work orders something
15 that has been decreasing with time or increasing, or is it
16 about -- About how many maintenance work orders are
17 outstanding at this time?

18 MR. SABOCA: Our backlog has been decreasing, and
19 we recently had a PSC goal to decrease our backlog. I don't
20 remember the numbers offhand, but we met that goal. The
21 problem we've had with decreasing maintenance backlog has
22 been what operations will allow us to work while the plant
23 is running. That has had more of an impact than the number
24 of work orders.

25 MR. KAUFFMAN: Bill, do you have any questions?



1 MR. VATTER: No.

2 MR. JENSEN: That's about the end of my list.

3 MR. KAUFFMAN: Just a general topic: We've been
4 asking the questions. Is there anything that you learned
5 about this event or know about this event that you think is
6 important or interesting and something that we might like to
7 know?

8 Do you know of any failures, for example, as a
9 result of the event that we didn't bring up?

10 MR. SABOCA: We had a problem with the turbine
11 turning gear when the plant came down.

12 MR. VATTER: What was the cause of that problem?

13 [No response.]

14 MR. VATTER: We heard that the turbine wouldn't go
15 on the turning gear.

16 MR. SABOCA: That's correct.

17 MR. VATTER: But I think we don't know much beyond
18 that -- or I don't personally know much beyond that.

19 MR. SABOCA: I believe what happened was, when the
20 plant came down and the turbine coasted to a stop, it was
21 several hours before operations tried to put it on gear.
22 Our feeling is that it may have warped slightly, and then,
23 when they tried to put it on gear, the turning gear motor
24 didn't have enough torque to take that wobble out.

25 We rolled it by hand; once we did that, we were



1 able to get it on turning gear.

2 MR. VATTER: I infer from your answer that that
3 turning gear does not start automatically when it coasts
4 down.

5 MR. SABOCA: I don't believe it does. I believe
6 there's an ops procedure to put it on gear.

7 MR. JENSEN: Any more questions?

8 [No response.]

9 MR. KAUFFMAN: That concludes the interview.

10 [Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., the taking of the
11 interview was concluded.]

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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

In the Matter of:

NAME OF PROCEEDING: Interview of Joe Saboca

DOCKET NUMBER: (Not applicable)

PLACE OF PROCEEDING: Scriba, New York

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.

Mark Handy

Mark Handy
Official Reporter
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