

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Agency: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
 Incident Investigation Team

Title: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant
 Interview of: TODD KELLY

Docket No.

LOCATION: Scriba, New York

DATE: Tuesday, August 20, 1991

PAGES: 1 - 16

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93-05-060343




Exhibit 3-1 (continued)


-3-

ADDENDUM TO INTERVIEW OF Todd Kelly / Aux Operator B
(Name/Position)

Page Line Correction and Reason for Correction

No corrections made.

Page ___ of ___ Signature _____ Date ___/___/___



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM

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Interview of :
TODD KELLY :
(Closed) :

Conference Room B
Administration Building
Nine Mile Point Nuclear
Power Plant, Unit Two
Lake Road
Scriba, New York 13093
Tuesday, August 20, 1991

The interview commenced, pursuant to notice,
at 11:40 a.m.

PRESENT FOR THE IIT:
Michael Jordan, NRC
Rich Conte, INPO



P R O C E E D I N G S

[11:40 a.m.]

1
2
3 MR. JORDAN: It's August 20, 1991. We're at the
4 Nine Mile Point Unit Two, the P building. We're conducting
5 interviews concerning an event of a transient that occurred
6 on August 13, 1991. I'm Michael Jordan. I'm with the NRC,
7 out of Region III.

8 MR. CONTE: I'm Rich Conte, section chief, Region
9 I.

10 MR. KELLY: Todd Kelly, nuclear auxiliary operator
11 B, for unit 2.

12 MR. JORDAN: Okay, Todd. Before we get started,
13 or as we get started, why don't you just go ahead and
14 explain to us what your background and where you're coming
15 from.


16 MR. KELLY: Six years Navy nuke. I was an
17 electronics technician, reactor operator technician; served
18 on the Dwight D. Eisenhower. Shortly -- about four
19 months -- after leaving the service, I started here, as an
20 AOB.

21 MR. JORDAN: When did you leave the service?

22 MR. KELLY: I left the service January 8, started
23 here around April 30.

24 MR. JORDAN: Of this year?

25 MR. KELLY: No, of last year.



1 MR. JORDAN: That's 1990?

2 MR. KELLY: Yes.

3 MR. JORDAN: So you started here in April of '90?

4 MR. KELLY: Yes.

5 MR. JORDAN: Okay.

6 Why don't you in your own words tell us what you
7 saw, what you heard, and what you did.

8 MR. KELLY: There was me, three other people
9 riding down the elevator, and the lights in the elevator
10 went off. The elevator seemed to hang on for a second and
11 then opened up on the regular floor, 261. The doors opened
12 up, and it was dark out there, too, so we ran to the here-
13 here to try to get a-hold of the control room to see what
14 was up.

15 MR. CONTE: What elevation?


16 MR. KELLY: 261.

17 MR. JORDAN: What building?

18 MR. KELLY: I guess you call it aux service
19 building.

20 MR. JORDAN: Okay. Go ahead.

21 MR. KELLY: We couldn't get a-hold of the control
22 room on the regular here-here. Then we tried the phone.
23 One of the operators got through, and the CSO told us to
24 come up; he had lost all indications. From there, we headed
25 up the stairs back to the control room.



1 MR. CONTE: Were the stairs dark?

2 MR. KELLY: Yes, they were.

3 MR. JORDAN: Did you have a flashlight?

4 MR. KELLY: I didn't have one on me.

5 MR. JORDAN: Did somebody have a flashlight?

6 MR. KELLY: Yes. I know a couple of them had
7 flashlights. One of them, I know, dropped his.

8 Once we reached the control room, got in the
9 control room, there was only the CSO and the SSS and the
10 ASSS. As soon as you entered, you could tell something was
11 wrong by how quiet it was. I could tell that the full-core
12 display wasn't lit up. I really didn't notice any alarms or
13 anything flashing.


14 Shortly after that, the SSS started giving
15 instructions. He started sending people out on jobs. I
16 was sent down to verify reactor level and pressure on
17 elevation 261 in the reactor building.

18 MR. CONTE: Elevation 261 in the reactor
19 building?

20 MR. KELLY: Yes.

21 MR. CONTE: Continue.

22 MR. KELLY: Again, not really sure what was going
23 on, figuring it was an electrical problem with the system --
24 and I wasn't sure about the phones, since I tried again and
25 the phone system down there couldn't get through to the



1 control room. I had to run back up to the control room to
2 report the reactor level and pressure. When I got back up
3 there that time, by that time some of the other licenses had
4 started arriving, so there were more people in the control
5 room.

6 Then I was sent out on another job.

7 MR. JORDAN: Do you know what the level and
8 pressure were that you recorded?

9 MR. KELLY: I remember the level specifically, 155
10 and 162. Pressure, I can't say positively what it was.

11 MR. JORDAN: There were two different locations?


12 MR. KELLY: Yes. Both location across and then an
13 instrument rack across from the HCUs.

14 MR. JORDAN: I'm sorry. You went back to the
15 control room, and they sent you out again?

16 MR. KELLY: Yes. To the condensate
17 demineralizers.

18 MR. CONTE: What was your task at the condensate
19 demineralizers?

20 MR. KELLY: Normally, as you're going down in
21 power, you're going to take demineralizers off to maintain
22 the flow between 2,000 to 3,000. Also, you're watching the
23 DP to make sure it doesn't exceed 55. But we had already
24 scrambled, so the flow on all of them was less than 1,000. I
25 started taking them off line. I know, in normal shutdown,



1 usually we're left with two on line, but the flow didn't
2 come back up at all.

3 I went back to the control room again to tell them
4 specifically what I had done, that there was a problem, the
5 flow hadn't come back.

6 MR. JORDAN: So you were taking the condensate
7 demins off line. How many did you take off?

8 MR. KELLY: I left two; I think I took seven.

9 MR. CONTE: You left two, and then you took the
10 rest of them off?

11 MR. KELLY: Right. There was already one still on
12 standby. What you do is, you're just putting them in
13 standby, shutting the outlet valve, according to the
14 procedure.

15 MR. JORDAN: And you say the flow was --

16 MR. KELLY: Even after I took them all, dropped it
17 down to two, the flow was less than 1,000 still.


18 MR. JORDAN: A thousand --?

19 MR. KELLY: Gpm.

20 MR. CONTE: What flow were you trying to achieve?

21 MR. KELLY: Greater than 2,000; 2,000 to 3,000 is
22 normal.

23 Then I returned to the control room, reported what
24 I had done, what I had seen, and that the flow wasn't normal
25 to me. But he had decided that he needed me to go check on



1 the water system.

2 MR. JORDAN: When you went back to the control
3 room, was the power yet up or not?

4 MR. KELLY: The power had lit up just on my way
5 back from the condensate demineralizer; about halfway back
6 it came on.

7 MR. JORDAN: Any stairwell problems, lighting, on
8 the way back -- I mean, before the lighting came back?

9 MR. KELLY: The only problem I noticed was, on the
10 way back out, as I was leaving the turbine building, as soon
11 as the power came on all kinds of alarms came on.

12 MR. JORDAN: That was an indication to you that
13 the power had come back, because of the alarms?


14 MR. KELLY: Yes.

15 MR. JORDAN: Do you know what kinds of alarms
16 these were?

17 MR. KELLY: Let's see. The radiation monitor
18 alarm started flashing. There were fire panel alarms going
19 off. Also, the lighting system really was the main one,
20 because, as you enter the control building on 250, all the
21 lights came on there.

22 MR. JORDAN: I'm sorry. I interrupted your train
23 of thought. You were saying you were on your way back; the
24 lights came back; you reported into the control room.

25 MR. KELLY: Again, as I entered the control room



1 now, the number of licenses was -- it seemed to me there
2 were at least three to four per panel now. Then again the
3 CSO directed me out on another job, after I had informed him
4 that there was a problem with the flows and the condensate
5 demineralizer.

6 MR. CONTE: What was the other job?

7 MR. KELLY: I was sent to the water system. They
8 wanted to get an aux boiler running, and they also wanted to
9 make sure they had water in the demin tanks. Actually, it's
10 processing water filling the demin tanks, so we wanted to
11 make sure -- We were doing that before the scram started,
12 and we wanted to make sure it was still up and running.

13 MR. CONTE: Any difficulties out there on that
14 job?

15 MR. KELLY: No. The water system was running
16 fine, but I found two pumps were tripped out there.

17 MR. CONTE: Which two pumps? Do you know?

18 MR. KELLY: The circ water seal pump and demin
19 transfer pump.

20 MR. CONTE: Circ water seal pump and demin --


21 MR. KELLY: Transfer pump.

22 MR. CONTE: -- transfer pump.

23 You found them in a tripped condition?

24 MR. KELLY: Yes.

25 MR. CONTE: Did you attempt to restart them?



1 MR. KELLY: All the alarms were pretty much
2 flashing on all the panels out there. I acknowledged the
3 alarms, realized that two of the pumps were tripped, and
4 then I got in touch with the control room again, let them
5 know what pumps were tripped. They told me to restart them.
6 From there, I restarted them.

7 MR. CONTE: I just want to go over these pumps
8 again. One was a circulating water seal pump and a demin
9 transfer pump.

10 MR. KELLY: Yes.

11 MR. CONTE: The circulating water seal pump --
12 circulating meaning --


13 MR. KELLY: Circ pumps.

14 MR. CONTE: Circulating for the tower, cooling
15 tower?

16 MR. KELLY: Yes, well it's the system, circ water
17 system.

18 MR. CONTE: Circ water system, okay. All right.
19 Then what happened when you checked, after you started those
20 pumps?

21 MR. KELLY: They started up and they ran, you
22 know. They didn't trip again, to my knowledge. I am not
23 sure exactly how they are powered all the way through, how
24 the -- you know -- the fault caused them to trip but from
25 there I just made sure, you know, that the other tanks for



1 making the water system was, the levels were going, trying
2 to stay the same, that you weren't losing level in any tank.

3 MR. CONTE: All right. What happened next?

4 MR. KELLY: It was set and from there I told them
5 that the water system was fine. The CSO sent me to see if
6 they needed any help with aux boilers.

7 MR. CONTE: Okay.

8 MR. KELLY: There was a C operator out there with
9 -- actually there's two C operators and I think one more B
10 operator already at the boilers so they didn't need any help
11 there and they wanted me to check on HVH --

12 MR. CONTE: On what? Say that again?

13 MR. KELLY: HVH.

14 MR. CONTE: HVH, which does that stand for?

15 MR. KELLY: It's the hot water heating system.

16 MR. CONTE: All right.

17 MR. KELLY: Once I got in there the alarms --
18 that's when they decided they -- see, we already had been
19 notified that the control buildings -- well, the guy that
20 was with me, I told him that they were all on and then he
21 said the control already knew about the radiation alarms in
22 the turbine building.

23 We started to enter and then we also got word from
24 another operator that now they just said they wanted to
25 evacuate the turbine building. From there we evacuated the



1 turbine building.

2 MR. JORDAN: So that you were directed to the hot
3 water heating system?

4 MR. KELLY: Not really, that's in the turbine
5 building, on 250.

6 MR. JORDAN: Is the aux boiler in the turbine
7 building also?

8 MR. KELLY: No. Screenwell building.

9 MR. JORDAN: Was there alarms going on out there,
10 as far as radiation alarms or anything like that?

11 MR. KELLY: Oh, no.

12 MR. JORDAN: I know the alarm just had the whole
13 panel was lit up it sounds like for --

14 MR. KELLY: Oh, the alarms that I said were going
15 off were by the water system.

16 MR. JORDAN: By the water system. Then you
17 acknowledged those --


18 MR. KELLY: Yes.

19 MR. JORDAN: And then you restarted it but as far
20 as other alarms?

21 MR. KELLY: No.

22 MR. CONTE: All right. Go ahead.

23 MR. KELLY: And about that time is when all the
24 other personnel from the other shifts were coming in from
25 day shift and stuff and they started, you know, taking over



1 for our shift that was on.

2 MR. JORDAN: You're on the Mids --

3 MR. KELLY: Yes. A couple more times I just went
4 out to check on the water system again until it was time for
5 us -- I was relieved.

6 MR. CONTE: I thought you couldn't get into the
7 turbine building? How can you check on the water system?

8 MR. KELLY: You can go around by the -- you know,
9 the cafeterias. There is a door that leads to the outside
10 and they circle around and come in the Screenwell building.
11 The water system is all in the Screenwell building.

12 MR. JORDAN: Just the hot water system?

13 MR. KELLY: The hot water system, that's in the
14 turbine.

15 MR. CONTE: All right. Go ahead.

16 MR. JORDAN: What time did you leave?


17 MR. KELLY: I'd say around 10:00.

18 MR. CONTE: I had a just a couple of questions.

19 Let's go back to retracing your path from the
20 control room to the 261 to the reactor building to do the
21 level checks.

22 If you can kind of take us through corridors and
23 stairwells, what did you see from a lighting point of view.

24 How did you get from the control room to the
25 reactor building, 261?



1 MR. KELLY: The same where the elevator is in the
2 aux service building there, there's a set of stairs right
3 there, the stairs we came up.

4 MR. CONTE: That was still black.

5 MR. KELLY: Right. I went down those stairs--

6 MR. CONTE: With your flashlight now?

7 MR. KELLY: No.

8 MR. JORDAN: You didn't need a flashlight to get
9 down the stairs?

10 MR. KELLY: The lighting was out but it wasn't
11 pitch dark. You could, you know, you could -- there was
12 still some light that you could see.

13 MR. CONTE: From daylight coming through the
14 doors?

15 MR. KELLY: No. There's no windows.

16 MR. CONTE: There's no windows? Where does the
17 lighting come from?

18 MR. KELLY: There was --


19 MR. CONTE: Emergency lights?

20 MR. KELLY: I don't think the emergency lights
21 were on. Some lighting was on, so I'm not that familiar.

22 MR. JORDAN: But you didn't need a flashlight?

23 MR. KELLY: No.

24 MR. JORDAN: You didn't have one, okay. Go ahead,
25 Todd. I didn't mean to interrupt you.



1 MR. KELLY: I went down the stairs there and you
2 come out on 261 by the elevator and if you turn left you
3 head out towards where the Cardox is, but I turned right and
4 into the entrance into the reactor building.

5 MR. JORDAN: Was the lighting in the reactor
6 building better lit than the --

7 MR. KELLY: Right. I didn't notice any difference
8 in the reactor building lighting. The lighting was fine in
9 there.

10 MR. JORDAN: Okay, in the 261 it was dark?

11 MR. KELLY: Just only, really only in the
12 stairwell.

13 MR. JORDAN: Okay. Just the stairwell was dark.
14 You came out on the -- let's see. You went down the stairs
15 and went to an elevation. Do you know the actual building's
16 at, what the elevation it's at?


17 MR. KELLY: 261.

18 MR. JORDAN: That's 261, okay, and you entered the
19 reactor building and the light in the reactor building
20 was --

21 MR. KELLY: Seemed normal to me.

22 MR. JORDAN: Seemed normal.

23 MR. CONTE: At that instrument panel that you
24 verified reactor pressure and level -- I'm sorry, just
25 level? Or both?



1 MR. KELLY: He sent me down for a level but I
2 glanced at pressure too and I reported both of them to him.
3 That was the Triple S, Mike Conway.

4 MR. CONTE: Was there any other parameter
5 indications with the nuclear plant there? Just pressure and
6 level?

7 MR. KELLY: Yes.

8 MR. JORDAN: Could you tell if the gauges were
9 steady on or were they moving? Did it look like they were
10 operating or did they look like they weren't operating?

11 MR. KELLY: The level was changing.

12 MR. JORDAN: So you knew it was operating.


13 MR. CONTE: Down in condensate demin area you were
14 trying to get 2000 gallons per minute flow.

15 Do you have any reason why you couldn't do that?

16 MR. KELLY: I found out later on that the
17 condensate demineralizer bypass valve, all the condensate
18 demineralizers were -- somehow that valve had come open some
19 and they'd all become bypassed because I specifically asked
20 later on to find out why the flow didn't return to normal.

21 MR. CONTE: Did you think the operators opened
22 them, the control room, or they came on automatically?

23 MR. KELLY: I can't say for sure. From what I
24 understand, the thing had drifted open. I don't know. I
25 can't say for sure.



1 MR. CONTE: You're not sure? Okay. That's a fair
2 answer. That's it.

3 MR. JORDAN: Okay. Let's go off the record.

4 [Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the taking of the
5 interview was concluded.]

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
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
in the matter of:

NAME OF PROCEEDING: Int. of TODD KELLY


DOCKET NUMBER:

PLACE OF PROCEEDING: Scriba, N.Y.

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.



JON HUNDLEY
Official Reporter
Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.



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67-91A-91

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
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM

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Interview of :
TODD KELLY :
(Closed) :

Conference Room B
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Power Plant, Unit Two
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Tuesday, August 20, 1991

The interview commenced, pursuant to notice,
at 11:40 a.m.

PRESENT FOR THE IIT:
Michael Jordan, NRC
Rich Conte, INPO



P R O C E E D I N G S

[11:40 a.m.]

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3 MR. JORDAN: It's August 20, 1991. We're at the
4 Nine Mile Point Unit Two, the P building. We're conducting
5 interviews concerning an event of a transient that occurred
6 on August 13, 1991. I'm Michael Jordan. I'm with the NRC,
7 out of Region III.

8 MR. CONTE: I'm Rich Conte, section chief, Region
9 I.

10 MR. KELLY: Todd Kelly, nuclear auxiliary operator
11 B, for unit 2.

12 MR. JORDAN: Okay, Todd. Before we get started,
13 or as we get started, why don't you just go ahead and
14 explain to us what your background and where you're coming
15 from.


16 MR. KELLY: Six years Navy nuke. I was an
17 electronics technician, reactor operator technician; served
18 on the Dwight D. Eisenhower. Shortly -- about four
19 months -- after leaving the service, I started here, as an
20 AOB.

21 MR. JORDAN: When did you leave the service?

22 MR. KELLY: I left the service January 8, started
23 here around April 30.

24 MR. JORDAN: Of this year?

25 MR. KELLY: No, of last year.



1 MR. JORDAN: That's 1990?

2 MR. KELLY: Yes.

3 MR. JORDAN: So you started here in April of '90?

4 MR. KELLY: Yes.

5 MR. JORDAN: Okay.

6 Why don't you in your own words tell us what you
7 saw, what you heard, and what you did.

8 MR. KELLY: There was me, three other people
9 riding down the elevator, and the lights in the elevator
10 went off. The elevator seemed to hang on for a second and
11 then opened up on the regular floor, 261. The doors opened
12 up, and it was dark out there, too, so we ran to the here-
13 here to try to get a-hold of the control room to see what
14 was up.

15 MR. CONTE: What elevation?

16 MR. KELLY: 261.

17 MR. JORDAN: What building?

18 MR. KELLY: I guess you call it aux service
19 building.

20 MR. JORDAN: Okay. Go ahead.

21 MR. KELLY: We couldn't get a-hold of the control
22 room on the regular here-here. Then we tried the phone.
23 One of the operators got through, and the CSO told us to
24 come up; he had lost all indications. From there, we headed
25 up the stairs back to the control room.

11



1 MR. CONTE: Were the stairs dark?

2 MR. KELLY: Yes, they were.

3 MR. JORDAN: Did you have a flashlight?

4 MR. KELLY: I didn't have one on me.

5 MR. JORDAN: Did somebody have a flashlight?

6 MR. KELLY: Yes. I know a couple of them had
7 flashlights. One of them, I know, dropped his.

8 Once we reached the control room, got in the
9 control room, there was only the CSO and the SSS and the
10 ASSS. As soon as you entered, you could tell something was
11 wrong by how quiet it was. I could tell that the full-core
12 display wasn't lit up. I really didn't notice any alarms or
13 anything flashing.


14 Shortly after that, the SSS started giving
15 instructions. He started sending people out on jobs. I
16 was sent down to verify reactor level and pressure on
17 elevation 261 in the reactor building.

18 MR. CONTE: Elevation 261 in the reactor
19 building?

20 MR. KELLY: Yes.

21 MR. CONTE: Continue.

22 MR. KELLY: Again, not really sure what was going
23 on, figuring it was an electrical problem with the system --
24 and I wasn't sure about the phones, since I tried again and
25 the phone system down there couldn't get through to the



1 control room. I had to run back up to the control room to
2 report the reactor level and pressure. When I got back up
3 there that time, by that time some of the other licenses had
4 started arriving, so there were more people in the control
5 room.

6 Then I was sent out on another job.

7 MR. JORDAN: Do you know what the level and
8 pressure were that you recorded?

9 MR. KELLY: I remember the level specifically, 155
10 and 162. Pressure, I can't say positively what it was.

11 MR. JORDAN: There were two different locations?


12 MR. KELLY: Yes. Both location across and then an
13 instrument rack across from the HCUs.

14 MR. JORDAN: I'm sorry. You went back to the
15 control room, and they sent you out again?

16 MR. KELLY: Yes. To the condensate
17 demineralizers.

18 MR. CONTE: What was your task at the condensate
19 demineralizers?

20 MR. KELLY: Normally, as you're going down in
21 power, you're going to take demineralizers off to maintain
22 the flow between 2,000 to 3,000. Also, you're watching the
23 DP to make sure it doesn't exceed 55. But we had already
24 scrambled, so the flow on all of them was less than 1,000. I
25 started taking them off line. I know, in normal shutdown,



1 usually we're left with two on line, but the flow didn't
2 come back up at all.

3 I went back to the control room again to tell them
4 specifically what I had done, that there was a problem, the
5 flow hadn't come back.

6 MR. JORDAN: So you were taking the condensate
7 demins off line. How many did you take off?

8 MR. KELLY: I left two; I think I took seven.

9 MR. CONTE: You left two, and then you took the
10 rest of them off?

11 MR. KELLY: Right. There was already one still on
12 standby. What you do is, you're just putting them in
13 standby, shutting the outlet valve, according to the
14 procedure.

15 MR. JORDAN: And you say the flow was --

16 MR. KELLY: Even after I took them all, dropped it
17 down to two, the flow was less than 1,000 still.


18 MR. JORDAN: A thousand --?

19 MR. KELLY: Gpm.

20 MR. CONTE: What flow were you trying to achieve?

21 MR. KELLY: Greater than 2,000; 2,000 to 3,000 is
22 normal.

23 Then I returned to the control room, reported what
24 I had done, what I had seen, and that the flow wasn't normal
25 to me. But he had decided that he needed me to go check on



1 the water system.

2 MR. JORDAN: When you went back to the control
3 room, was the power yet up or not?

4 MR. KELLY: The power had lit up just on my way
5 back from the condensate demineralizer; about halfway back
6 it came on.

7 MR. JORDAN: Any stairwell problems, lighting, on
8 the way back -- I mean, before the lighting came back?

9 MR. KELLY: The only problem I noticed was, on the
10 way back out, as I was leaving the turbine building, as soon
11 as the power came on all kinds of alarms came on.

12 MR. JORDAN: That was an indication to you that
13 the power had come back, because of the alarms?


14 MR. KELLY: Yes.

15 MR. JORDAN: Do you know what kinds of alarms
16 these were?

17 MR. KELLY: Let's see. The radiation monitor
18 alarm started flashing. There were fire panel alarms going
19 off. Also, the lighting system really was the main one,
20 because, as you enter the control building on 250, all the
21 lights came on there.

22 MR. JORDAN: I'm sorry. I interrupted your train
23 of thought. You were saying you were on your way back; the
24 lights came back; you reported into the control room.

25 MR. KELLY: Again, as I entered the control room



1 now, the number of licenses was -- it seemed to me there
2 were at least three to four per panel now. Then again the
3 CSO directed me out on another job, after I had informed him
4 that there was a problem with the flows and the condensate
5 demineralizer.

6 MR. CONTE: What was the other job?

7 MR. KELLY: I was sent to the water system. They
8 wanted to get an aux boiler running, and they also wanted to
9 make sure they had water in the demin tanks. Actually, it's
10 processing water filling the demin tanks, so we wanted to
11 make sure -- We were doing that before the scram started,
12 and we wanted to make sure it was still up and running.

13 MR. CONTE: Any difficulties out there on that
14 job?

15 MR. KELLY: No. The water system was running
16 fine, but I found two pumps were tripped out there.

17 MR. CONTE: Which two pumps? Do you know?

18 MR. KELLY: The circ water seal pump and demin
19 transfer pump.

20 MR. CONTE: Circ water seal pump and demin --

21 MR. KELLY: Transfer pump.

22 MR. CONTE: -- transfer pump.

23 You found them in a tripped condition?

24 MR. KELLY: Yes.

25 MR. CONTE: Did you attempt to restart them?

13



1 MR. KELLY: All the alarms were pretty much
2 flashing on all the panels out there. I acknowledged the
3 alarms, realized that two of the pumps were tripped, and
4 then I got in touch with the control room again, let them
5 know what pumps were tripped. They told me to restart them.
6 From there, I restarted them.

7 MR. CONTE: I just want to go over these pumps
8 again. One was a circulating water seal pump and a demin
9 transfer pump.

10 MR. KELLY: Yes.

11 MR. CONTE: The circulating water seal pump --
12 circulating meaning --


13 MR. KELLY: Circ pumps.

14 MR. CONTE: Circulating for the tower, cooling
15 tower?

16 MR. KELLY: Yes, well it's the system, circ water
17 system.

18 MR. CONTE: Circ water system, okay. All right.
19 Then what happened when you checked, after you started those
20 pumps?

21 MR. KELLY: They started up and they ran, you
22 know. They didn't trip again, to my knowledge. I am not
23 sure exactly how they are powered all the way through, how
24 the -- you know -- the fault caused them to trip but from
25 there I just made sure, you know, that the other tanks for



1 making the water system was, the levels were going, trying
2 to stay the same, that you weren't losing level in any tank.

3 MR. CONTE: All right. What happened next?

4 MR. KELLY: It was set and from there I told them
5 that the water system was fine. The CSO sent me to see if
6 they needed any help with aux boilers.

7 MR. CONTE: Okay.

8 MR. KELLY: There was a C operator out there with
9 -- actually there's two C operators and I think one more B
10 operator already at the boilers so they didn't need any help
11 there and they wanted me to check on HVH --

12 MR. CONTE: On what? Say that again?

13 MR. KELLY: HVH.


14 MR. CONTE: HVH, which does that stand for?

15 MR. KELLY: It's the hot water heating system.

16 MR. CONTE: All right.

17 MR. KELLY: Once I got in there the alarms --
18 that's when they decided they -- see, we already had been
19 notified that the control buildings -- well, the guy that
20 was with me, I told him that they were all on and then he
21 said the control already knew about the radiation alarms in
22 the turbine building.

23 We started to enter and then we also got word from
24 another operator that now they just said they wanted to
25 evacuate the turbine building. From there we evacuated the



1 turbine building.

2 MR. JORDAN: So that you were directed to the hot
3 water heating system?

4 MR. KELLY: Not really, that's in the turbine
5 building, on 250.

6 MR. JORDAN: Is the aux boiler in the turbine
7 building also?

8 MR. KELLY: No. Screenwell building.

9 MR. JORDAN: Was there alarms going on out there,
10 as far as radiation alarms or anything like that?

11 MR. KELLY: Oh, no.

12 MR. JORDAN: I know the alarm just had the whole
13 panel was lit up it sounds like for --

14 MR. KELLY: Oh, the alarms that I said were going
15 off were by the water system.

16 MR. JORDAN: By the water system. Then you
17 acknowledged those --

18 MR. KELLY: Yes.

19 MR. JORDAN: And then you restarted it but as far
20 as other alarms?

21 MR. KELLY: No.

22 MR. CONTE: All right. Go ahead.

23 MR. KELLY: And about that time is when all the
24 other personnel from the other shifts were coming in from
25 day shift and stuff and they started, you know, taking over

10



1 for our shift that was on.

2 MR. JORDAN: You're on the Mids --

3 MR. KELLY: Yes. A couple more times I just went
4 out to check on the water system again until it was time for
5 us -- I was relieved.

6 MR. CONTE: I thought you couldn't get into the
7 turbine building? How can you check on the water system?

8 MR. KELLY: You can go around by the -- you know,
9 the cafeterias. There is a door that leads to the outside
10 and they circle around and come in the Screenwell building.
11 The water system is all in the Screenwell building.

12 MR. JORDAN: Just the hot water system?

13 MR. KELLY: The hot water system, that's in the
14 turbine.

15 MR. CONTE: All right. Go ahead.

16 MR. JORDAN: What time did you leave?

17 MR. KELLY: I'd say around 10:00.

18 MR. CONTE: I had a just a couple of questions.

19 Let's go back to retracing your path from the
20 control room to the 261 to the reactor building to do the
21 level checks.

22 If you can kind of take us through corridors and
23 stairwells, what did you see from a lighting point of view.

24 How did you get from the control room to the
25 reactor building, 261?

11



1 MR. KELLY: The same where the elevator is in the
2 aux service building there, there's a set of stairs right
3 there, the stairs we came up.

4 MR. CONTE: That was still black.

5 MR. KELLY: Right. I went down those stairs--

6 MR. CONTE: With your flashlight now?

7 MR. KELLY: No.

8 MR. JORDAN: You didn't need a flashlight to get
9 down the stairs?

10 MR. KELLY: The lighting was out but it wasn't
11 pitch dark. You could, you know, you could -- there was
12 still some light that you could see.

13 MR. CONTE: From daylight coming through the
14 doors?

15 MR. KELLY: No. There's no windows.

16 MR. CONTE: There's no windows? Where does the
17 lighting come from?

18 MR. KELLY: There was --


19 MR. CONTE: Emergency lights?

20 MR. KELLY: I don't think the emergency lights
21 were on. Some lighting was on, so I'm not that familiar.

22 MR. JORDAN: But you didn't need a flashlight?

23 MR. KELLY: No.

24 MR. JORDAN: You didn't have one, okay. Go ahead,
25 Todd. I didn't mean to interrupt you.



1 MR. KELLY: I went down the stairs there and you
2 come out on 261 by the elevator and if you turn left you
3 head out towards where the Cardox is, but I turned right and
4 into the entrance into the reactor building.

5 MR. JORDAN: Was the lighting in the reactor
6 building better lit than the --

7 MR. KELLY: Right. I didn't notice any difference
8 in the reactor building lighting. The lighting was fine in
9 there.

10 MR. JORDAN: Okay, in the 261 it was dark?

11 MR. KELLY: Just only, really only in the
12 stairwell.

13 MR. JORDAN: Okay. Just the stairwell was dark.
14 You came out on the -- let's see. You went down the stairs
15 and went to an elevation. Do you know the actual building's
16 at, what the elevation it's at?

17 MR. KELLY: 261.

18 MR. JORDAN: That's 261, okay, and you entered the
19 reactor building and the light in the reactor building
20 was --

21 MR. KELLY: Seemed normal to me.

22 MR. JORDAN: Seemed normal.

23 MR. CONTE: At that instrument panel that you
24 verified reactor pressure and level -- I'm sorry, just
25 level? Or both?

11



1 MR. KELLY: He sent me down for a level but I
2 glanced at pressure too and I reported both of them to him.
3 That was the Triple S, Mike Conway.

4 MR. CONTE: Was there any other parameter
5 indications with the nuclear plant there? Just pressure and
6 level?

7 MR. KELLY: Yes.

8 MR. JORDAN: Could you tell if the gauges were
9 steady on or were they moving? Did it look like they were
10 operating or did they look like they weren't operating?

11 MR. KELLY: The level was changing.

12 MR. JORDAN: So you knew it was operating.


13 MR. CONTE: Down in condensate demin area you were
14 trying to get 2000 gallons per minute flow.

15 Do you have any reason why you couldn't do that?

16 MR. KELLY: I found out later on that the
17 condensate demineralizer bypass valve, all the condensate
18 demineralizers were -- somehow that valve had come open some
19 and they'd all become bypassed because I specifically asked
20 later on to find out why the flow didn't return to normal.

21 MR. CONTE: Did you think the operators opened
22 them, the control room, or they came on automatically?

23 MR. KELLY: I can't say for sure. From what I
24 understand, the thing had drifted open. I don't know. I
25 can't say for sure.



1 MR. CONTE: You're not sure? Okay. That's a fair
2 answer. That's it.

3 MR. JORDAN: Okay. Let's go off the record.

4 [Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the taking of the
5 interview was concluded.]

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
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission


in the matter of:

NAME OF PROCEEDING: Int. of TODD KELLY

DOCKET NUMBER:

PLACE OF PROCEEDING: Scriba, N.Y.

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.



JON HUNDLEY
Official Reporter
Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.

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PHYSICS DEPARTMENT



PHYSICS 309

