

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Agency: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Incident Investigation Team

Title: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant
Interview of: BRIAN HILLIKER

Docket No.

LOCATION: Scriba, New York

DATE: Monday, August 19, 1991

PAGES: 1 - 11

ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.

1612 K St. N.W., Suite 300

Washington, D.C. 20006

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~~930-5060-296~~




Exhibit 3-1 (continued)


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ADDENDUM TO INTERVIEW OF BRIAN A. HILLIKER .ROP.
(Name/Position)

Page Line Correction and Reason for Correction

NO CHANGES REQUESTED .

Page 1 of 1 Signature Brian A Hilliker Date 8/12/91



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM


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Interview of :
BRIAN HILLIKER :
(Closed) :

Conference Room B
Administration Building
Nine Mile Point Nuclear
Power Plant, Unit Two
Lake Road
Scriba, New York 13093
Monday, August 19, 1991

The interview commenced, pursuant to notice,
at 11:45 a.m.

PRESENT FOR THE IIT:
John Kauffman, NRC
William Vatter, INPO



P R O C E E D I N G S

[11:45]

1
2
3 MR. KAUFFMAN: We're at the Nine Mile Point Unit
4 Two Admin. Building. The date is August 19, 1991. The time
5 is 11:45 a.m.

6 We are here to conduct an interview concerning the
7 August 13th event at Nine Mile Point.

8 My name is John Kauffman, NRC.

9 MR. VATTER: Bill Vatter, INPO.

10 MR. HILLIKER: Brian Hilliker, Niagara Mohawk.

11 MR. KAUFFMAN: Brian, to start the interview we
12 would like you to tell us a little bit about your background
13 and prior experience and education.

14 MR. HILLIKER: Okay. I got out of high school in
15 1974 from Pulaski High School. Went to college for a year
16 and a half, took Environmental Sciences and went in the Army
17 in 1976 to 1979 when I got out.

18 Worked on small generators in the Army. I started
19 with Niagara Mohawk in 1981, in February. Worked in the
20 Security Department for two years. Started in Operations
21 Department in June, 1983. I licensed -- I got my license I
22 believe it was in February of 1988 and went to license class
23 for all of 1987.

24 I've worked as a reactor operator since then.

25 MR. KAUFFMAN: And that was all in Unit Two?



1 MR. HILLIKER: Yes.

2 MR. KAUFFMAN: I would like you to tell us, I
3 guess starting a few minutes before you arrived in the
4 control room, about what you observed and what you did --

5 MR. HILLIKER: Before I arrived in the control
6 room that morning?

7 MR. KAUFFMAN: Right, say when you went through
8 security.


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18 than the scram so I ran up the stairs and got to the control
19 room. I think it was about five after 6:00.

20 When I got in there, it was like more or less
21 complete silence except for the sound of people talking, no
22 annunciators and very very quiet.

23 MR. KAUFFMAN: When you say lights were out --

24 MR. HILLIKER: The lighting in, the hallway
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
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24 But RCIC was already running and he told me to
25 maintain water level and I can't remember the range but I



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11 MR. HILLIKER: They both do.

12 MR. VATTER: They both go shut.

13 MR. HILLIKER: Yes.

14 MR. KAUFFMAN: So at that point you stood by the
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16 MR. HILLIKER: Monitoring water level and
17 pressure, right.

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19 recall about what the reactor pressure was at that time?

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5 more and more people showing up for work between, you know,
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7 coming in and asking what they could do to help or trying to
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
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22 We didn't want it to cool down too fast.

23 MR. VATTER: Did you ever restart RCIC?

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25 MR. VATTER: When they started feeding the vessel



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3 MR. HILLIKER: No, that's on Panel 851, probably
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7 MR. HILLIKER: Yes. I could tell they had gotten
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11 MR. KAUFFMAN: I assume you got relieved off the
12 panel at some point? You said you were there about an hour?

13 MR. HILLIKER: Yes, I think about an hour.

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
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13 there was --

14 MR. HILLIKER: Well, I think the SRO in charge,
15 Mike Conway, did a good job being calm, cool and collected
16 at the EOPs when I saw because I think nobody appeared to
17 know for sure what exactly had happened for a few minutes
18 and how to correct it.

19 MR. KAUFFMAN: Had you personally ever seen any
20 events like this in the simulator?

21 MR. HILLIKER: Not a complete loss of all UPS's.
22 We have regular training where we have, you know, power
23 failures and things like that but never a loss of all UPS's.

24 MR. KAUFFMAN: Did you notice anything that didn't
25 work real well or could have been better? We know, for



1 example, that there were problems with the RCIC controller
2 that had to be in manual or are there any other equipment or
3 procedure things you noticed that had to be worked around or
4 didn't apply to the situation?

5 MR. HILLIKER: It's hard to tell exactly what was
6 caused -- what malfunctions were caused by the loss of
7 UPS's or if something wasn't working the way it was supposed
8 to.

9 We had trouble determining if all our control rods
10 were full in. We knew our power was downscale and
11 indication where we couldn't tell for a few minutes if all
12 of the control rods were full and I don't know if that had
13 to do with the UPS failure or what.

14 MR. VATTER: Do you know what they did to get the
15 control rod indication back?

16 MR. HILLIKER: No. I saw people working on that
17 but I am not sure exactly what they did.

18 MR. KAUFFMAN: Okay. I don't have any more
19 questions. I will throw the mike open to you though if you
20 have any questions or comments you would like to raise for
21 the record, anything that you want to talk about that we
22 didn't bring up or raise.

23 MR. HILLIKER: I can't think of anything I'd like
24 to add, I guess, no.

25 MR. KAUFFMAN: Okay. That concludes the



1 interview.

2 [Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the taking of the
3 interview was concluded.]

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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission


in the matter of:

NAME OF PROCEEDING: Int. of BRIAN HILLIKER

DOCKET NUMBER:

PLACE OF PROCEEDING: Scriba, N.Y.

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.



JON HUNDLEY
Official Reporter
Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.



ORIGINAL

07-87A-91

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Incident Investigation Team

Title: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant
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Exhibit 3-1 (continued)


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ADDENDUM TO INTERVIEW OF BRIAN A. HILLIKER ROP
(Name/Position)

Page Line Correction and Reason for Correction

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Page 6 of 1 Signature Brian A Hilliker Date 8/22/91



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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
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Interview of :
BRIAN HILLIKER :
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Administration Building
Nine Mile Point Nuclear
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8 My name is John Kauffman, NRC.

9 MR. VATTER: Bill Vatter, INPO.

10 MR. HILLIKER: Brian Hilliker, Niagara Mohawk.

11 MR. KAUFFMAN: Brian, to start the interview we
12 would like you to tell us a little bit about your background
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14 MR. HILLIKER: Okay. I got out of high school in
15 1974 from Pulaski High School. Went to college for a year
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24 I've worked as a reactor operator since then.

25 MR. KAUFFMAN: And that was all in Unit Two?

22



1 MR. HILLIKER: Yes.

2 MR. KAUFFMAN: I would like you to tell us, I
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6 room that morning?

7 MR. KAUFFMAN: Right, say when you went through
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9 MR. HILLIKER: Okay. I went through Security. I
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24 But RCIC was already running and he told me to
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2 MR. VATTER: Do you recall the injection rate at
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22



1 example, that there were problems with the RCIC controller
2 that had to be in manual or are there any other equipment or
3 procedure things you noticed that had to be worked around or
4 didn't apply to the situation?

5 MR. HILLIKER: It's hard to tell exactly what was
6 caused -- what malfunctions were caused by the loss of
7 UPS's or if something wasn't working the way it was supposed
8 to.

9 We had trouble determining if all our control rods
10 were full in. We knew our power was downscale and
11 indication where we couldn't tell for a few minutes if all
12 of the control rods were full and I don't know if that had
13 to do with the UPS failure or what.

14 MR. VATTER: Do you know what they did to get the
15 control rod indication back?

16 MR. HILLIKER: No. I saw people working on that
17 but I am not sure exactly what they did.

18 MR. KAUFFMAN: Okay. I don't have any more
19 questions. I will throw the mike open to you though if you
20 have any questions or comments you would like to raise for
21 the record, anything that you want to talk about that we
22 didn't bring up or raise.

23 MR. HILLIKER: I can't think of anything I'd like
24 to add, I guess, no.

25 MR. KAUFFMAN: Okay. That concludes the

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1 interview.

2 [Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the taking of the
3 interview was concluded.]

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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission


in the matter of:

NAME OF PROCEEDING: Int. of BRIAN HILLIKER

DOCKET NUMBER:

PLACE OF PROCEEDING: Scriba, N.Y.

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.



JON HUNDLEY

Official Reporter
Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.

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PHYSICS DEPARTMENT

PHYSICS 435